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Historians have traditionally paid little attention to the influence of institutional Catholicism in 
shaping the international state system in the twentieth century. This dissertation argues that the 
Vatican played a crucial role in facilitating the rise of anti-liberal and anti-socialist political 
movements after World War I, and in laying the foundations for the emergence of the Cold War 
Atlantic Order after 1945.  
 
Following its loss of the Papal States in 1870, the Vatican fought to regain influence on the 
European continent by pioneering a new form of treaty diplomacy and by launching a 
transnational anticommunist campaign with broad appeal. These actions enabled the Vatican to 
seize a prominent place in European affairs, and integrate elements of its vision of state-society 
relations within the legal, economic and social framework of nearly a dozen European states. 
The Vatican's interwar gains led it to partner during World War II with the United States and 
Christian Democratic leaders, forging an alliance that would contribute decisively to Europe's 
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As evening fell on December 24, 1944, hundreds of thousands of men and women, old and 
young, crowded into the central square of Europe's smallest state. Adults crawled up on 
newsstands and light-posts; small children were eagerly hoisted on shoulders. Natives brushed 
shoulders with foreign soldiers, gear-laden sentinels of the international press, and scores of 
prominent European politicians. As midnight approached, the crowd swelled. Those who had 
made it inside St. Peter's Cathedral scaled confessional booths and perched on statues to get a 
better view of the coming spectacle. At last the long-awaited moment arrived, as Eugenio Pacelli, 
known since 1939 as Pope Pius XII, rose to the altar to make his annual Christmas speech. His 
stern-looking face, flowing robes and carefully choreographed movements (recently 
immortalized in the popular 1942 film, Pastor Angelicus) imbued the scene with gravitas. Only 
a careful observer would have noticed the array of modern contraptions surrounding the 
sixteenth-century altar, including a special lighting set-up and several microphones poised at 
various heights. The trappings helped Pius XII's momentous speech reach millions, as it was 
broadcast live over the radio and reprinted on the pages of international newspapers.  
 On this night in 1944, Pope Pius XII did more than use his words to give hope in a time 
of crisis. He articulated a vision that the Vatican had begun to translate into reality in the 
interwar years and which the Pope and his speechwriters hoped would live on at war's end. The 
European continent would enjoy peace and prosperity, Pius XII intimated, only if the Vatican 
and state leaders could continue to work in close partnership to build Christian polities, which 
avoided the excesses of both liberalistic and communist political systems by instantiating social, 
economic and legal policies in keeping with Church teachings. In a first in Church history, 
Cardinal Pacelli affirmed that the ideal Christian polity could in theory be realized within a 
democracy, though he cautioned that democracies would receive the Pope's full sanction only if 




state. In practice, the Pope's speech constituted a promise and a warning. As long as emergent 
powers in Europe heeded the Pope's teachings, they would receive his blessing. But if these 
powers sought to break with the Vatican, they would lose the backing of both Pope and the wider 
Catholic world. 
 Largely ignoring the conditional and theocentric nature of Pius XII's statement, the 
United States government and leaders of the Christian Democratic movement welcomed the 
1944 message. Both sides had been pressuring the Pope for years to make a clear statement in 
their favor and they saw in this message the promise of support. As the war drew to an end, the 
Pope issued several additional endorsements of the U.S. and Christian Democratic parties. He 
readily lent the Vatican's network of hospitals, schools, and churches to the distribution of 
American aid and propaganda materials, praised the generosity of the American occupiers, and 
provided the Americans with crucial intelligence information. The Pope also emerged as a 
crucial partner of Christian Democratic movements, as Vatican funds gave Christian Democratic 
movements an indispensable starting budget, and parishes and monasteries acted as early 
meeting halls. Vatican-directed Catholic lay organizations helped bring hesitant voters to the 
polls, through classic door-to-door campaigning and an array of modern means of persuasion, 
including striking posters and short films screened in the remotest of villages. Once the 
Christian Democrats had seized power, they would engage in near-daily backdoor negotiations 
with papal officials to ensure that the victories of interwar Vatican diplomacy be re-enshrined in 
postwar laws and constitutions. The Vatican became a partner of utmost importance and utility 
as the Cold War took root on European soil by disseminating the notion that Christianity was a 
bulwark against communism -- a message that the Americans and Christian Democratic parties 
took to heart by protecting the Vatican's privileged place in European politics and society. 
 There was, of course, nothing predetermined about the centrality the Vatican came to 
occupy in postwar Europe. Indeed, some saw it as quite a surprise that an institution ruled by an 




non-pluralist, absolute, truth emerged as a leading partner of democratic powers in the years 
following 1944. How did this strange turn of events come to pass? In what ways did the 
intellectual and diplomatic history of the Vatican in the interwar years prepare the ground for 
the events such as the 1944 sermon and the postwar partnership with the United States and 
Christian Democratic powers? How might this story give us new perspectives on the history of 
modern European and transatlantic relations? These are the questions my dissertation explores.  
 
1. Outline of the Argument 
 
Between World War I and the early 1950s, the Vatican shifted from the margins to the center of 
European political and social affairs. My dissertation argues that this transformation came 
about as a result of the Vatican's response to the recasting of the Western state system after 
World War I, and specifically its decision to make peace with the nation-state -- a political form 
it had long abhorred. The Vatican signaled the shift via the conclusion of binding treaties with 
European state leaders, effectively tying the fate of global Catholicism to its protection and 
promotion by individual nation-states. These treaties helped the Vatican expand its influence 
within and across European states, in domains as varied as civil society, law, public and private 
education, and the drafting of foreign policy. By the eve of World War II, the Vatican had 
successfully brought into being a new form of religious politics and begun taking advantage of 
its newfound position so as to gain concessions from the emerging global hegemon of the United 
States.  
 The story of the Vatican's re-emergence after World War I is as much one of high-power 
politics as it is one of ideas, for the Vatican's diplomatic shifts were accompanied by large-scale 
ideological transformations within the Vatican and the larger Catholic world. The decision to 
make peace with the nation-state as a political form was accompanied by the Vatican's 




Christianization of European society. From the early 1930s, this view grew more detailed and 
became a Vatican-sanctioned theological school defending the notion that corporatist economics 
was the solution to the nineteenth-century social question and to the scourge of Marxist 
socialism and liberal capitalism. This school of thought justified state invention in this-worldly 
affairs, calling on the state to recognize and protect purportedly pre-existing social units like the 
family, worker's associations, and the Church. By the latter half of the 1930s, this school of 
thought registered an important shift, in response to tensions with Nazi Germany and the 
emergence of a trans-Atlantic Catholicism characterized by increased dialogue between Vatican 
officials, theologians, and lay Catholic exiles on both sides of the Atlantic.  From this moment 
on, theologians with direct institutional ties to the Vatican began to refer to a key phrase -- the 
"rights of the human person" -- in their attempts to delineate the proper degree of state 
intervention in human affairs. As the new position affirmed, the Church's role was to protect the 
"rights of the human person," defined as the right of Catholic citizens to fulfill Catholic religious 
duties, such as attending mass or sending their children to religious schools. In the name of 
these rights, the Church must protect individuals against the potential incursion of overly 
powerful, "totalitarian," states. The position was rigidly integralist, in the sense that it was based 
on Catholic norms, values and epistemic standards and was committed to the idea that these 
norms, values and standards had priority over all other considerations and belief systems.1 
Though initially elaborated in response to Nazism, the juxtaposition of individual Catholic rights 
to "totalitarian" states was soon mobilized by the papacy in the fight against the Soviet Union 
and used to justify the violence of Catholics in armed conflicts in Mexico and Spain. This, 
combined with the launching of the Second World War and the further diversification of the 
Vatican's interlocutors -- who now also included Christian democrats and American Protestants 
-- caused the teachings of the Vatican to shift subtly once again. For the first time in Church 
                                                            
1 This definition of "integralism" is borrowed from Nancy L. Rosenblum, "Pluralism, Integralism and 
Political Theories of Religious Accommodation," in Obligations of Citizenship and Demands of Faith: 
Religious Accommodation in Pluralist Democracies, ed. Nancy L. Rosenblum (Princeton: Princeton 




history, Vatican theologians affirmed that democracy might be able to protect the rights of 
individuals and "natural" social units like the family against totalitarian states, on the condition 
that democracy be redefined in theocentric terms and commit to socio-economic solutions that 
averted the excesses of liberal capitalism and communist collectivism.  
 My dissertation argues that the Vatican turn towards a new mode of interaction with the 
nation-states emerged in the aftermath of World War I, in reaction to the failure of a preceding 
diplomatic goal: the restoration of the Papal States, which had been seized in the course of 
Italy's wars of unification (1859-1870). Between 1870 and 1917, the Vatican sought to regain its 
former statehood by centralizing its government structure and growing a modern, efficient, 
bureaucracy. Though these reforms failed to restore the Papal States, they did lead to the 
emergence of a cadre of Vatican functionaries trained in civil and canon law that developed a 
new mode of diplomacy eschewing the previous focus on reconstituting the Papal States. It 
depended on the conclusion of international treaties, known as concordats, which sought to 
prevent the liberal separation of Church and state and the instantiation of religious freedom by 
establishing regimes of joint sovereignty, in which power was shared between religious and lay 
leaders. From 1917 on, the Vatican successfully concluded nearly a dozen concordats with 
European state leaders. In exchange for the concessions it was granted, the Vatican promised to 
help European politicians defeat rival political factions and militate against the Wilsonian 
Versailles order and the rise of left-wing radicalism. It also began to develop its corporatist third 
way solution to the twin excesses of liberalism and communism. 
 By the mid 1930s, the challenge of an increasingly mobilized civil society, coupled with 
the perceived effects of the Great Depression and the rise of the Soviet Union, led the Vatican to 
draft official statements of doctrine that emphasized the imperative to protect the rights of the 
human person against the potential incursions of an all-encompassing state. This 
counterrevolutionary ideology was primarily directed against international communism, and 




partnerships and casting communism as Catholicism's antithesis. Over the course of the 1930s, 
the Vatican's anticommunist campaign was institutionalized and became more radical, 
particularly by virtue of its increased imbrication with right-wing political movements.  Having 
stamped out a range of alternative Catholic political ideologies that aimed to describe and shape 
contemporary affairs, the Vatican's counterrevolutionary anticommunist campaign grew in 
strength and tenacity and began to justify recourse to violence in the resurgent Mexican 
Cristeros conflict and in the Spanish Civil War. By the eve of World War II, the campaign had 
provided the Vatican with international visibility and proof that its words had concrete 
consequences, as Catholics in both Europe and the Americas were increasingly perceived as a 
mobilized political force that must be taken seriously in the drafting of domestic and foreign 
policy.  
 The Second World War confirmed and consolidated the Vatican's interwar gains, as 
emergent powers keen on expanding their influence at home and abroad increasingly turned to 
the Vatican for support. The most important country to do so was the United States, which 
promised to protect Church prerogatives in Europe in exchange for being supplied with wartime 
intelligence and being invited to help shape European affairs at war's end. In the course of 
building its alliance with the United States, the Vatican expanded upon its interwar theological 
innovations, developing an improvised language that allowed it to preserve the core of its 
interwar agenda. Now, in place of pitting Wilsonian liberalism against Church-state 
partnerships, and Soviet-style communism against Vatican-led Catholicism, the Vatican began 
to present the ontological antithesis as that between a materialistic Nazi-Soviet totalitarianism 
and Christian democracy. In other words, the theological critique of Nazism had finally been 
made public, though it was now "democracy" which was presented as totalitarianism's 
antithesis. The keywords "totalitarianism" and "Christian democracy" in fact summarized the 
Vatican's demand that the U.S. prolong World War II so as to ensure the double defeat of Nazi 




democratic forms of rule in Europe and Christian Democratic political movements, on the 
condition that they preserve concordats and the Vatican's new organs in civil society. In this way 
the Vatican's interwar theology made peace with democracy, all the while preserving its anti-
liberal and anti-secular core. 
 In the early years following World War II, the Vatican was quite successful in 
maintaining its prominence in European affairs. The Vatican benefitted from the United States' 
increased willingness to join hands in the battle against the Soviet Union through the support of 
organized religion. Throughout the 1940s, the Vatican was also able to press pliant Christian 
Democratic parties to keep international communism at bay and maintain recently accorded 
Church protections through new state constitutions and civil laws. By the 1950s, however, the 
Vatican's prominence in European affairs began to fade, as Catholicism's weakening social 
appeal, the Pope's increasingly heavy-handed attempts to control domestic and foreign policy, 
and the reactionary policing of Catholic thought, estranged American and Christian Democratic 
allies. At this point, the Vatican began to shift its attention to non-democratic countries in 
Europe, like Spain and Portugal, and to certain parts of Latin America. 
 
2. Review of the Literature 
 
Recent and landmark overviews of contemporary European and international history make only 
passing mention of the Vatican, as do more detailed studies. 2  With only a few exceptions, 
scholarly interest in the Vatican has been limited to the question of the Vatican's relations with 
                                                            
2 See, e.g., Charles Maier, Recasting Bourgeois Europe: Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in 
the Decade after World War I (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Zara Steiner, The Lights 
that Failed: European International History, 1919-1933 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Id., 
The Triumph of the Dark: European International History, 1933-1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011); Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (New York: Knopf, 1998); Id., 
Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin Press, 2012); Tony Judt, Postwar: A 
History of Europe since 1945 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); and Akira Iriye, Cultural 





Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and whether Vatican policies and ideologies facilitated the 
slaughter of European Jewry during the Second World War. Though the so-called Pius wars 
have generated some useful studies, they have also produced an abundance of polemical tracts, 
based on thin archival research. 3 Most importantly, overemphasis on the ideological and 
political "totalitarian kinship" (or lack thereof) between the Vatican and Nazi-Fascism has 
occluded the important story of the Vatican's restoration to prominence in Europe as a whole, 
and the role of the United States and small states in Eastern Europe therein.4 It has also led to 
comparatively little work on the Vatican's contribution to the democratization of Europe after 
1945. Thus rather than trying to fit the Vatican into what Charles Maier has usefully called the 
dominant "moral narrative" of the twentieth century (the narrative of mass atrocity, which 
concerns the causes, content, and consequences of the Holocaust), I here try to take stock of the 
Vatican's broader contributions to contemporary Western politics and society.5 In this sense, I 
                                                            
3 The Pius wars have generated a vast literature, and prosecutors and apologists abound. Stimulating 
contributions to the debate include Richard Steigmann-Gall, The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of 
Christianity, 1919-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Susan Zuccotti, Under His Very 
Windows: The Vatican and the Holocaust in Italy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Suzanne 
Brown-Fleming, The Holocaust and Catholic Conscience: Cardinal Aloisius Muench and the Guilt 
Question in Germany (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006); and John Connelly, 
From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the Jews, 1933-1965 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). For a useful review of the literature, see William Patch, "The 
Catholic Church, the Third Reich, and the Origins of the Cold War: On the Utility and Limitations of 
Historical Evidence," Journal of Modern History 82 (June 2010): 396-433, as well as Mark Ruff, The 
Battle for the Catholic Past in Germany, 1945-1975 (forthcoming).  
 
4 Prominent defenses of the "totalitarian kinship" thesis include Arturo Carlo Jemolo, Chiesa e stato in 
Italia negli ultimi cento anni (Turin: Einaudi, 1963); Fabrice Bouthillon, La Naissance de la mardité: une 
théologie politique à l'âge totalitaire (Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2001); and 
Vincenzo Ferrone, ed., La chiesa cattolica e il totalitarismo (Florence: Olschki, 2004). For important 
rebuttals that show how the Vatican and Catholic clergy either partially or fully resisted Nazi-Fascist 
totalitarianism, see Hubert Wolf, Pope and Devil: The Vatican's Archives and the Third Reich 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010); Kevin Spicer, Resisting the Third Reich: The Catholic 
Clergy in Hitler's Berlin (DeKalb, Ill: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004); Emma Fattorini, Pio XI, 
Hitler e Mussolini: La solitudine di un papa (Turin: Einaudi, 2007); and Lucia Ceci, Il papa non deve 
parlare: Chiesa, fascismo e guerra d'Etiopia (Rome: Laterza, 2010). 
 
5 See Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern 
Era," The American Historical Review 105, 3 (June 2000): 807-831, here 826. On the Vatican's 
historiographical ghetto, see David Blackbourn, "The Catholic Church in Europe since the French 
Revolution," Comparative Studies in Society and History 33, 4 (1991): 778-790; and Vincent Viaene, 
"International History, Religious History, Catholic History: Perspectives for Cross-Fertilization (1830-




see my work as being broadly in line with a new religious history that is beginning to examine 
the central role played by religious groups and ideologies well into the twentieth century.6  
 My dissertation attempts to restore the Vatican to modern European and international 
history by offering new perspectives on the following three historiographical questions: (1) How 
did the Vatican help undermine liberal and communist visions of the international state system 
in the interwar years, and what impact did its actions have?; (2) Why did the Vatican turn to 
democracy in 1944, and how might the Vatican have contributed to Western Europe's 
democratization after World War II?; and (3) How did the Vatican's theology and diplomacy 
legitimize the Cold War Atlantic order, by welcoming the United States' presence in postwar 
Europe and helping determine the success of Christian Democracy -- one of the most long-
standing political experiments in modern European history?  
 I argue that the Vatican's concordat diplomacy helped undermine liberal and communist 
visions of the international state system in the interwar years in two ways: first, by empowering 
anti-liberal and anti-communist state leaders against rival factions; and second, by creating a 
legal framework for the socialization and mobilization of national Catholics in a distinctly anti-
liberal and anti-communist sense. Concordat diplomacy was explicitly conceived as a response 
to the Versailles settlement and the rise of communist revolution, and advertised as such to 
European state leaders. Though scholars have tended to argue that the secular, sovereign, and 
self-determining nation-state came to represent the leading political form in the international 
state system after World War I, concordat diplomacy actually instantiated complex forms of 
joint sovereignty, wherein the Vatican was allowed dominion over certain domains, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
 
6 For an overview of the recent "religious turn" in history and international relations, see Andrew Preston, 
"Bridging the Gap between Church and State in the History of American Foreign Relations," Diplomatic 
History 30 (November 2006): 783-812; "The Persistence of Religion in Modern Europe," special issue, 
The Journal of Modern History 82, 2 (June 2010): 255-517; Timothy Samuel Shah, Alfred C. Stepan, 
Monica Duffy Toft, eds. Rethinking Religion and World Affairs (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2012); Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, The Politics of Secularism in International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2008); and the proceedings of the American Historical Association's 2011 





state over others. 7 These joint sovereignty models allowed the Vatican to work in concert with a 
large number of state leaders to actively militate against liberal and communist 
internationalism, in both national settings and before international courts of opinion like the 
League of Nations. 
 My research on the Vatican's interwar concordat diplomacy as instrument in the fight 
against liberalism and communism thus connects to recent scholarly work that seeks to 
complicate an older emphasis on the ideal of ethnic or national homogeneity under the state by 
paying attention to the role of religion in structuring statehood in the interwar years. 8 As 
scholars are beginning to show, ideals of religious homogeneity under the state and hostility to 
the notion of religious liberty was pervasive in the interwar years, and advocated by a range of 
lesser-studied historical actors, including East Central European nationalists, Pan-Islamic 
lobbyists, and League of Nations lawyers, despite (or alongside) their commitment to minority 
rights. The notion that greater religious homogeneity and peace went hand in hand helped 
determine population movements and forced deportations, such as the landmark Greco-Turkish 
population exchange of 1923, which separated Christian and Muslim populations on 
purportedly humanitarian grounds.9 League of Nations lawyers also argued that accelerating 
                                                            
7 Versions of this consensus position have been strongly defended in several recent path-breaking works, 
including Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the 
Modern Era," The American Historical Review 105,3 (June 2000): 807-831; Eric D. Weitz, "From the 
Vienna to the Paris System: International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced 
Deportations, and Civilizing Missions," The American History Review 113,5 (December 2008): 1313-
1343; and Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of 
Anticolonial Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  
 
8 On the ideal of national and ethnic homogeneity, see, e.g., Gary B. Cohen, The Politics of Ethnic 
Survival: Germans in Prague, 1861-1914 (West Lafayette, Ind., 2006); Pieter Judson, Guardians of the 
Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2006); and Matthew Frank, “Fantasies of Ethnic Unmixing: Population ‘Transfer’ and the End of 
Empire in Europe,” in Refugees and the End of Empire: Imperial Collapse and Forced Migration in the 
Twentieth Century, eds. Panikos Panayi and Pippa Virdee (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 81–101. 
For a complicating case, see Dominique Reill, Nationalists Who Feared the Nation: Adriatic Multi-
Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste and Venice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
 
9 See Alexis Alexandris, "Religion or Ethnicity: The Identity Issue of the Minorities in Greece and Turkey," 
in Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and 




religious homogenization processes could be a useful way to control revolution and curb 
disruptive nationalism in the colonies, League Mandates, and protectorates.10 So too, Muslim 
activists of the interwar years appealed to the notion that religious homogeneity was a 
stabilizing force as they petitioned the League for the re-establishment of the Caliphate, the 
religious-cum-political institution which had received strong European support during Ottoman 
times, only to be abolished by Mustafa Kemal's nationalist government in the early 1920s.11 
Finally, several East Central European nationalists sought to appeal to the power of Christianity 
as a source of national identification, as a means of opposing liberalistic and communist 
worldviews.12 As will be argued, it was no accident that the Vatican's concordat diplomacy began 
in East Central Europe, where many new state leaders partnered with the Vatican to resist the 
Versailles settlement and its attempt to protect ethnic and religious minority groups.  
 Given the role of religious claims in structuring political discourse and praxis, my 
research suggests that it is insufficient to paint the interwar years as a caricatured contest 
between "Fascism" and "communism," or as the Cold-War academy suggested, between 
"totalitarianism" and "democracy." Doing so leaves out an important third-way religious politics 
that developed with Vatican support from c.1917. 13 During the Great War, the Vatican began to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Population 'Transfers,' and the Question of Human Rights and Genocide in the 1930s and 1940s" 
(unpublished paper, 2012). 
 
10 See Nathaniel Berman, "'The Sacred Conspiracy': Religion, Nationalism and the Crisis of 
Internationalism," Leiden Journal of International Law 25 (2012): 9-54.  
 
11 See Hussein Alkhazragi, "The Globalization of World Politics and Religion: Islam at the League of 
Nations" (unpublished paper, 2012); Joshua Teitelbaum, "'Taking Back' the Caliphate: Shar!f Husayn Ibn 
'Al!, Mustafa Kemal and the Ottoman Caliphate," Die Welt des Islams 40, 3 (2000): 412-424; and Saad 
Omar Khan, "The 'Caliphate Question': British Views and Policy toward Pan-Islamic Politics and the End 
of the Ottoman Caliphate," The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 24, 2 (2007):1-25.  
 
12 See Holly Case, Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World 
War II (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); and Paul Hanebrink, In Defense of Christian 
Hungary: Religion, Nationalism and Antisemitism, 1890-1944 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2006). 
 
13 Scholars who have made this point, highlighting in particular the limited appeal of liberal democracy in 
interwar Europe, include Mazower, Dark Continent; Case, op. cit.; Martin Conway, "Democracy in 




advance a distinctive political ideology that responded directly to the worldviews put forward by 
liberal and communist thinkers and sought to engage with some of their core insights. By the 
1930s, its ideology had come to advocate the joint creation of neo-corporatist structures and the 
expansion of Catholic civil society, as a means of avoiding the twin extremes of ungrounded 
liberalistic individualism and mechanized communitarianism. The Vatican's theological 
program was further developed in the course of the anticommunist campaign, and won broad 
appeal during and after World War II -- not least because of its presumed compatibility with a 
new vision of democracy as a political system emerging from Christian principles, and grounded 
in Christian teachings. 
 My dissertation also engages with recent work on Europe's democratization after World 
War II. The existing literature has tended to adopt one of four broad positions on the question of 
European democratization. The first holds that Europe "truly" democratized only in the latter 
part of the 1960s, as a result of student uprisings and contestations against previous hierarchical 
forms of rule. On this view, the rigidities of the Cold War froze Europe's transition to a truly 
democratic continent for the better part of twenty years, and it was only the children of the 
"1945ers" who were able to see through the divide and demand a more participatory, 
democratic, system.14 The second historiographical position presents Europe's democratization 
as primarily the result of the rising influence of the United States as a political and economic 
power. Through covert and overt strategies -- from its distribution of aid and consumer goods to 
its status as a model for war-torn Europe -- the United States, on this reading, helped determine 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
59-84; Tom Buchanan, "Anti-Fascism and Democracy in the 1930s," European History Quarterly, 32 
(2002): 39-57; Nadia Urbinati, "Surviving but Not Governing: Intellectuals in Italy's Second Republic" 
(unpublished paper, 2012); and Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-
Century Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011). 
 
14 This was the dominant position in an older strand of the left-wing historiography. More recently, it has 
been picked up anew in, e.g., Jeremi Suri,  Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), esp. 164-213; and Quinn Slobodian, Foreign Front: 





the continent's turn to democracy.15 Finally, the third and most recent strand in the literature 
presents democratization as the doing of European actors. This work emphasizes the vibrancy of 
postwar social democratic thought, the collaboration of "left Catholics" and socialists during the 
Resistance, or the dialogue between individuals who stood ranged at opposite ends of the 
political spectrum, but were able to reach an agreement on the viability and advisability of 
democracy through deliberative consensus formation. 16   In some cases, the discursive 
consensus-formation model -- which holds that divergent camps (e.g., the social democrats and 
the Christian conservatives) crafted a working relationship based on a shared commitment to 
democracy via dialogue over certain core ideas -- also incorporates elements of the second 
strand in the historiography, for instance by suggesting that American actors and European 
émigrés based in the United States contributed decisively to fomenting democracy-talk on the 
continent.  
 Much of the existing literature on Europe's democratization continues to treat 1945 as a 
year zero and pays little heed to how interwar political, intellectual and diplomatic shifts 
prepared the ground for postwar developments. Furthermore, little attention is paid to the 
independent role of institutional Catholicism and the Vatican in the story of Europe's 
democratization. My dissertation attempts to fill this gap in the scholarship by showing how the 
support of democracy emerged as a potentiality within trans-Atlantic Catholicism in the 
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16 For the former view, see, e.g., Gerd-Rainer Horn and Emmanuel Gerard, eds., Left Catholicism 1943-
1955: Catholics and Society in Western Europe at the Point of Liberation (Leuven: Leuven University 
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interwar years. This implies that the model that posits the centrality of the Resistance and 
postwar reconstruction to enabling the dialogue between social democrats, socialists, 
communists, and Catholics, dates the Catholic shift to considerably later than when it actually 
took place. As my dissertation will try to show, it was processes internal to Catholicism that 
initially brought about the shift, and though dialogue is important to explaining it, the relevant 
dialogue was not across socialist-Catholic divides, but rather across Catholic-Catholic, and at 
best Catholic-Protestant, lines. The Vatican's willingness to engage in dialogue with lay Catholics 
and Protestant thinkers about state-society relations was what in fact what helped determine the 
subtle discursive shift which paved the way for the Christian Democratic moment.  So too did a 
series of Vatican diplomatic choices.  
 In addition to shedding light on the origin and appeal of some Christian Democratic 
ideas, the dissertation also illuminates the sociological bases of Christian Democratic support. 
Following decades of neglect, Christian Democracy has happily become the object of recent 
scholarly attention, in an effort to complicate the previous vision of a postwar Europe 
dominated by the contest between "Marx and Coca-Cola" (as Jean-Luc Godard playfully put it), 
or communism and American consumer culture. But by not giving due attention to the Vatican, 
scholars continue to have trouble explaining why Christian Democratic parties emerged as 
hegemonic in so many Western European countries, and why they were able to put in place 
highly constrained, neo-corporatist, democracies, with such relative speed. Some have provided 
"arguments from absence," by suggesting that Europeans turned to Christian Democracy 
because of the exhaustion of alternatives, while others have appealed to myths of sudden 
awakening, according to which a highly minoritarian strand of Christian Democracy -- one that 
was liberal democratic, pluralistic, and anti-Fascist -- suddenly became mainstream.17  Others 
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still have focused in a more limited way on the activism of Catholic lay organizations with close 
ties to the Pope, without however paying due attention to the interwar years or filling in the 
picture to provide a fuller account of Vatican-Christian Democratic relations. 18 My dissertation 
instead suggests that postwar Christian Democracy owed its existence in part to the Vatican's 
interwar civil society structures, in which many of Christian Democracy's leaders were born and 
bred, and in which many core intellectuals innovations took shape.19 If these findings are 
correct, they cast further doubt on the idea of 1945 as the beginning of an entirely new era, and 
suggest interwar and postwar continuities worthy of future study.20  
 Finally, attention to the Vatican can help us answer the question of what local forces 
encouraged American hegemony in Western Europe after the Second World War. Restoring the 
Vatican to this history shows us that it was not just European consumers who -- to use Geir 
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18 See, e.g., Mark Ruff, The Wayward Flock: Catholic Youth in Postwar West Germany, 1945-1965 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005), Carolyn M. Warner, Confessions of an Interest 
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classe dirigente cattolica (1929-1937) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979). 
 
20 The postwar survival of Europe's interwar institutions and institution-builders is analyzed in Stanley 
Hoffmann's classic 1963 essay, "Paradoxes of the French Political Community," in In Search of France: 
The Economy, Society and the Political System in the Twentieth Century, ed. Hoffmann et al. 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), 1–117. More recent accounts defending continuity in 
institutional and intellectual terms include Jan T. Gross, "Themes for a Social History of War Experience 
and Collaboration," in The Politics of Retribution in Europe: World War II and Its Aftermath, eds. István 
Deák, Jan T. Gross and Tony Judt (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 15-37; Susan Pedersen, 
Family, Dependence and the Origins of the Welfare State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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Vacances in France, 1880-1960 (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002); Phillip Nord, France's 
New Deal: From the Thirties to the Postwar Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); and Udi 
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Lundestad's terms -- "invited" Americans into the continent.21 Through complex overt and 
covert channels, Vatican officials strongly encouraged the United States to stay in Europe and 
expand its influence there. I argue that they did so because they sought a powerful ally to carry 
on the Vatican's anticommunist campaign, and because the United States had promised the 
Vatican extensive powers to shape European affairs. In exchange, the Vatican encouraged the 
United States not only to stay and distribute aid and political assistance to noncommunist and 
religious groups, but also to rearm countries in the event of a Soviet attack. Though scholars 
have commented in passing on the U.S.-Vatican partnership after World War II, few have 
provided a systematic account of its history. Most have tended to focus on the U.S. side of the 
story, looking less at how the alliance between the two powers was forged around the 
construction of joint hegemony in Europe and on European soil.22  
 My dissertation suggests that in the early Cold War, the U.S. and the Vatican converged 
on the centrality of Christianity in the self-projection of the Western or "Atlantic" international 
order. To date, this phenomenon has been most studied by scholars of U.S. diplomatic history 
post-1945, who have shown how Christianity as a social force and rhetorical construct was 
mobilized to differentiate the Cold War West from its "Godless" Eastern enemy.23 Seen from the 
                                                            
21 Geir Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952," Journal of 
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way of life to European citizens has been beautifully analyzed by Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: 
America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
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22 See, e.g., Peter D'Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento 
to Fascism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Charles Gallagher, S.J., Vatican 
Secret Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurley and Pope Pius XII (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); 
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Christianity, 1945-8," Journal of Contemporary History 35 (2000): 385-412; Patrick McNamara, A 
Catholic Cold War: Edmund A. Walsh, S.J. and the Politics of American Anticommunism (New York: 
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important include Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race and 
U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950-1957 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); Dianne Kirby, 
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perspective of the interwar years, it is reasonable to conclude that Christianity played this role 
not only because American and European state leaders used religion in a calculating, 
instrumental, way, to advance their power within individual countries and on an international 
scale -- the only function an older generation of diplomatic historians seemed willing to accord 
religion.24 Instead, perhaps Christianity assumed the justificatory status it did because of the 
survival of a certain idea of international affairs that had taken shape in the interwar years; an 
idea that had been fortified by the Vatican's concordat diplomacy and its launching of a 
transnational anticommunist campaign. This idea was that Christianity could and should dictate 
transnational blocs of allegiance and draw the line between friends and foes. On this view, the 
postwar battle against the Soviet Union leaned so heavily on Christian rhetoric and on Christian 
organizations because the ideational map had already been partly redrawn in this sense by a 
group of European and American actors in the interwar years.25 
 
3. Source Base 
 
This dissertation is based on recently released sources culled from various archives associated 
with the Vatican, and the Jesuit and Dominican orders, and housed in Italy, France and Canada. 
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It also makes extensive use of the private and public papers of American, French and Italian 
state officials, consulted in university, political party, presidential and state archives on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Finally, the dissertation draws on an array of printed primary sources, such 
as pamphlets, newspapers, journals, photographs, novels, memoirs, and political and religious 
tracts. The kinds of sources analyzed might be usefully classified as follows: 1/ Sources relating 
to internal Vatican communication; 2/ Sources relating to the Vatican's communications with 
the outside world; 3/ The private or administrative musings of non-Vatican officials regarding 
the Vatican; 4/ Bureaucratic byproducts of daily Vatican operations.26  
 Sources relating to internal Vatican communication include internal meeting notes, 
private letters between Vatican officials, and telegrams and files to and from Vatican officials. 
These sources are useful in shedding light on how Vatican officials viewed their institution and 
the world and what they saw as the leading priorities for the Vatican moving forward. I 
consulted many files in this category at the Secret Vatican Archives, in the Holy Office Archives, 
and in the archives of the Jesuit order in Rome, Paris, and Montréal. The papers consulted in 
the files of the Secretariat of State, which may be viewed as the rough equivalent to an Interior 
Ministry, provide a neat summary of the Vatican's institutional priorities. Housed at the Secret 
Vatican Archives, the papers of this Secretariat deal with all matters internal to Church 
discipline and order, and concern the Secretariat's coordination of all other branches of the 
Roman Curia. This Secretariat is led by a single cleric, the Secretary of State, who is directly 
appointed by the Pope and typically considered his second-in-command. The Congregation for 
Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, also presided over by the Secretary of State, is the rough 
equivalent to the Vatican's Foreign Ministry. The third branch of the Roman Curia whose papers 
shed light on internal Vatican communication is the Congregation of the Holy Office, charged 
with policing matters of doctrine and defending the faith through the proscription of error. The 
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Pope, who appoints a Secretary of the Holy Office as the institution’s de facto head, nominally 
leads the Holy Office, which issues a regular Index of prohibited books (known as the Index 
Librorum Prohibitorum), drafts Syllabi of Errors cataloguing heretical doctrines, and produces 
less-binding (but often greatly damaging) reprimands against individuals, journals, 
organizations and states perceived in violation of Church teachings. Letters and notes of 
conversations between the Pope, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Holy Office, and the 
clerics of the Holy Office, provide important sources of information about the kinds of 
theological/political problems deemed most important, and the strategies drafted for handling 
them. 
Material relating to the Vatican's relations with the outside world constitutes the second 
category of sources analyzed in the dissertation. Sources which fall into this category include 
letters to and from local churches, communications of various sorts between heads of state and 
lay Catholic leaders and politicians, and newspapers, posters, radio and film. They include 
means of communication with the outside world which are distinctive to the Vatican, such as the 
aforementioned Syllabi of Errors, which catalogue the heresies of the age, as well as papal 
sermons and Encyclicals, which are circular letters to the faithful communicating the Pope's 
teachings on pressing social, political and religious issues. The Secret Vatican Archives, state 
and foreign office archives, and the archives of Catholic Action and Christian Democratic 
parties, supply most of the sources relating to the Vatican's communications with the outside 
world.  
Thirdly, my dissertation makes use of private or administrative communications about 
the Vatican written by diplomats and observers. Particularly rich sources here include the secret 
police files of agents tracking certain Vatican officials, as well as memoirs written by diplomats 
and state officials in residence at the Vatican. Documents wherein diplomats in regular 
communication with the Vatican report home to their superiors are also extraordinarily 




bias and self-interest can make interpretation difficult. Many of the sources in this category are 
private papers or state archive material, some of which have already been partially studied by 
scholars eager to grasp, for instance, the workings of the Fascist secret police. 
Finally, my dissertation makes use of the bureaucratic byproducts involved in the 
Vatican's day-to-day operations. These sources include multiple drafts and translations of 
documents directed at the outside world (letters to heads of state, Encyclicals, Syllabi of Errors, 
etc.). They also include records of Vatican accounts, which detail monthly and yearly moneys 
spent and earned in various Vatican operations, calendars of particularly influential Vatican and 
Jesuit officials, and log-visit books. The Secretariat's daily notes on his meetings with the Pope 
are particularly valuable byproducts, insofar as they provide crucial information not only about 
the Vatican's internal chain of command but also about which countries and issues were 
considered most pressing in any given moment in time. Most of these internal bureaucratic 
byproducts were consulted at the Secret Vatican archives, at the Holy Office archives, or at the 
Jesuit and Dominican archives, and are being used (to my knowledge) for the first time. 
 
4. A Note on Language 
 
The most important oft-recurring term in this dissertation is, of course, the "Vatican." I use the 
term "Vatican" to refer to the state of Vatican City since 1929 and the last absolute monarchy on 
earth. The word derives from the Latin word Vaticanus, which literally means "mound" or "hill," 
and was the name given since Roman times to a hill west of the Tiber River. It was on this hill 
that Popes resided since the fourteenth century, building an impressive complex of palaces, 
galleries, and museums, bounded by protective walls. Following the loss of the Papal States 
during the Italian wars of unification, it was to this hill that Popes retreated. The word "Vatican" 
became quite popular as a way not just to refer to the hill, but to the central government of the 




(who reigned from 1846 to 1878), who had declared himself a "prisoner of the Vatican" following 
the breach of Porta Pia. By so doing, Pius IX was highlighting the fact that the Italian state had 
taken papal lands and titles without his consent and that it had left him free only to inhabit the 
small walled enclave atop Vatican hill. Pius IX's claim was largely performative, for the Pope was 
not actually being held captive or prisoner by the new Italian state. But the phrase gained 
traction. So much so that the papacy and its supporters insistently used it until 1929, when the 
"prison" of Vatican hill was officially recognized as a miniature sovereign state -- the state of 
Vatican City. Again, the word "Vatican" had received privileged status; from simple hill, it had 
become a city-state, and one that survives to this day. Scholars instead use the term "Holy See" 
to refer to the Petrine ministry and the bishopric of Rome. In Catholic teachings, the Holy See 
has the nature of a moral person, and is endowed as such by divine law.  
 In this dissertation, I consider the Vatican's quest for concordat partners and its 
anticommunist campaign as instances of "diplomacy." I use the term "diplomacy" to signal a 
pre-determined political program for interaction with state and non-state actors, which had 
certain precise aims and was pursued primarily by specially trained officials. Vatican diplomacy 
was as much about the art of restraining power as it was about creating power -- that is, about 
creating opportunities for the Vatican to influence political, economic and social domains. As 
will be emphasized, however, the Vatican's diplomacy often evolved in counter-intuitive ways, 
and it did not spring, Athena-like, from the head of any single Vatican diplomat -- or much less, 
from the head of the Pope. Going against the grain of standard Vatican histories, my account 
considerably downplays the relative importance of the figure of the Pope in determining Vatican 
diplomacy, emphasizing instead how diplomatic practice emerged as a result of complex intra-




social networks in shaping individual agency, in that they present individuals with a discursive 
context and a set of really existing limitations and opportunities.27  
 In the dissertation, I use the term "ideology" to refer to a relatively cohesive group of 
ideas that exist under particular conditions, include normative claims, and aim to have an effect 
on social practices. I argue that in the interwar years the Pope advanced an ideology that sought 
to both describe and proscribe the characteristics of the international state system, through the 
realization of a Christian polity.28 In using the term "ideology," I am not making any claims 
about whether the Vatican's beliefs were true or false, nor do I conceive of the project of 
describing the Vatican's ideology as a critique in search of internal contradictions and 
inconsistencies.29 I am however suggesting that the Vatican's ideology was grounded in language 
and in certain social forces, from which it drew both its strength and a measure of instability. 
Indeed, the Vatican's ideology developed in a hybrid space, which had formal independence 
from European states, but which at the same time depended on European (and increasingly, 
American) states for financial and political support. It was for this reason that throughout the 
period under analysis, the Vatican's ideology did not typically resist the guiding ideologies of the 
Vatican's partner states, but neither was it exclusively identified with what Louis Althusser has 
                                                            
27 More recently, versions of this long-standing Marxist position have been reworked and developed in 
new directions by, e.g., Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network 
Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, trans. 
Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). Older theorizations that have shaped my views 
in this dissertation include Georg Simmel, On Individuality and Social Forms (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1971), and Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere (Turin: Einaudi, 1975). 
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called the "ideological state apparatus" -- a phrase he used to refer to that intermediary space 
between the state and the individual which transmits the values of the state.30 Rather -- to use 
Antonio Gramsci's terms -- the Vatican's ideology simultaneously embodied both hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic tendencies, as it sought to differentiate itself from partner states by 
attempting to mold them in its image.31 
 
5. Chapter Outline 
 
The dissertation is organized chronologically, and divided into three parts: I. Towards the New 
Papal Diplomacy (Chapters One through Three); II. Launching the Anti-Communist Campaign 
(Chapters Four through Six); and III. Reconstructing Christian Europe (Chapters Seven through 
Nine). 
  Part I of the dissertation, "Towards the New Papal Diplomacy," traces the origins of how 
the Vatican began to work closely with European states after World War I. Chapter One, "The 
Failed Pursuit of Statehood," explores the Vatican's unsuccessful attempt to regain the Papal 
States by engaging in several important state-building processes. These included the 
centralization of power in the person of the Pope, and the training of a new professional 
functionary class, which was well versed in both canon and civil law. Chapter Two, "Making 
Peace with the Nation-State," shows how the existence of this new functionary class -- coupled 
with the unique conditions presented by World War I -- led the Vatican take a new diplomatic 
course, which focused on establishing regimes of power sharing between Church and state, 
enshrined via treaty diplomacy. In the process, the Vatican partnered with many of the war's 
losers and presented itself as a useful ally in the fight against the "liberalistic" Versailles order 
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and the rise of destabilizing forms of left-wing radicalism.  Chapter Three, "Civil Society Comes 
into View," explores how in parallel to treaty diplomacy, the Vatican signaled its willingness to 
partner with the state via the centralization and mobilization of Catholic associational life. Doing 
so demonstrated the Vatican's inclination to disown Christian Democratic political movements 
and partner with political forces deemed more malleable. The reinvention of Catholic 
associational life also provided the Vatican with a mobilized base that it used to pressure partner 
states, if and when it felt under threat. Finally, it exposed Vatican officials to a greater degree of 
exchange and dialogue with the Catholic laity (and with Catholic lay intellectuals in particular) 
than had been the case prior. 
 Part II of the dissertation, "Launching the Anticommunist Campaign," investigates how 
anticommunism became the centerpiece of the Vatican new diplomacy in the interwar years. 
Chapter Four, "The Origins of the Vatican Anticommunist Campaign," shows how the creation 
of Church-state partnerships made the Vatican more wealthy, powerful, and aware of global 
goings-on -- but also more paranoid and worried about losing its newfound position of 
influence. This, coupled with the perceived effects of the Great Depression and with Stalin's 
antireligious policies, led the Vatican to develop an increasingly hardline stance on the Soviet 
Union and international communism. As Chapter Five shows, the Vatican's hardline stance 
gradually morphed into a sophisticated, institutionalized, campaign that sought to marginalize 
the Soviet Union, and assist partner states in their battle against left-wing forces. Soon, the 
Vatican campaign began to cast the battle against the Soviet Union as an existential one, which 
must be waged, if necessary, through violence. This began to determine the actions of its 
participants in profound ways; hence, the chapter title, "An Iron Cage." Chapter Six -- "The 
Theoretical Underpinnings of Vatican Anticommunism" -- explores how the existence of the 
institutionalized anticommunist campaign not only constrained action: it also limited the 




critique of Nazi-Fascism being developed within its walls, and then creatively repurpose this 
critique as a theoretical justification for its campaign against the Soviet Union. 
 Part III of the dissertation, "Reconstructing Christian Europe," covers the years between 
1939 and 1958. Chapter Seven, "The Pursuit of Old Diplomacy and New Allies," discusses how 
the Vatican laid the foundations for an alliance with the United States during World War II, as it 
belatedly began a secret disavowal of its previous allegiance with authoritarian leaders, once it 
had come to the conclusion that these leaders would either lose the war or fail to maintain 
Church-state partnerships intact. Chapter Eight, "Redefining Democracy," demonstrates how 
the Vatican definitively cast its lot with the United States and with Christian Democratic powers 
in 1944, as its interwar theology began to incorporate the language of democracy. Finally, 
Chapter Nine shows how the Vatican successfully recreated its Church-state partnerships in 
several countries in Western Europe in the years immediately following the war, all the while 
reinvigorating its Manichean campaign against the Soviet Union and accepting the loss of 
Eastern Europe. Thus, the chapter traces "How the Vatican Helped Forge the Cold War West" -- 
and how it came to accept a new notion of the "West" in the process. However, as the 
dissertation's conclusion explores, the new situation was unsustainable. By the 1950s, the 
partnership of Church and state in Western Europe was unable to withstand internal and 
external shocks, and began to come undone. So did the Vatican-U.S. alliance. But as the Vatican 
retreated from the European continent and turned its attention elsewhere, many of its interwar 





























































Sovereignty is contagious: once any community becomes a state, neighboring communities 
respond in kind. 
--Nicholas J. Onuf1 
 
 
Once none had the state, then some had it, and finally all had it. 





In the course of Italy's wars of unification between 1859 and 1870, the papacy lost control of the 
near entirety of the Papal States -- a vast swath of territory in central Italy it had controlled for 
centuries. Following this event, the papacy's leading diplomatic goal became to regain its lost 
state. Between c.1860 and 1905, the papacy pursued this goal by rhetorically affirming the 
inerrancy of its ruler (the Pope), the divinely inspired and "perfect" nature of the papal state, 
and the utter indivisibility of sovereignty. Faced with the failure of this strategy, from c.1905, the 
Vatican began to pursue the goal of regaining the Papal States in a new way: through the tools of 
law, as employed by a new class of functionaries trained in both canon and civil law, and in 
active dialogue with the wider world. Initially, legal instruments were used to further buttress 
the notion that the Pope was the infallible ruler of the universal Catholic Church and as such 
entitled to territories of his own. By World War I, the new functionaries pushed the Vatican to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Nicholas J. Onuf, "Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History," Alternatives 16, 4 (1991): 425-46, here 
430. As cited in David Armitage, "The Contagion of Sovereignty: Declarations of Independence since 
1776," South African Historical Journal 52, 1 (2005): 1-18, here 3. 
 





abandon its old dream of restoring the Papal States and instead begin pursuing a new form of 
diplomacy, which depended on the cultivation of strategic alliances with European state leaders.  
 The Vatican was by no means the only state reinventing its theoretical bases and 
practical modus operandi in the years between c.1860 and 1914. This arc of time was in fact 
characterized by the decline of confederal empires amidst prolonged civil wars, and the birth of 
a new kind of strongly centralized and territorially cohesive nation-state.3 Insofar as these new 
nation-states depended on the control of well-defined land and populations, they were 
characterized by great concern with the drawing of boundaries, both between states, and within 
them. As one scholar has astutely noted, it is unsurprising that this historical era was 
accordingly characterized by so many "questions" regarding matters both geographical and 
socio-political: consider the Transylvanian Question, the Polish Question, the Eastern Question, 
the Macedonian Question, the Social Question and the Woman Question.4 All of these questions 
interrogated really existing and metaphorical boundaries, and offered rival answers concerning 
the definition of sovereign statehood and citizenship. 
 It was within this crowded field of questions and divergent answers that the papacy 
provided its own response to the so-called Roman Question. This question broadly asked what 
role religion should play within newly constituted nation-states, and more narrowly interrogated 
whether the Pope had a right to control a state and wield political influence. It became central 
throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, as the pan-European Kulturkampf pitted !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Many scholars have suggested that Eric Hobsbawm's notion of a "long nineteenth century," stretching 
from 1789 to 1914, does not pay sufficient attention to the important transformations underway between 
1860 and 1914. See, inter alia, Charles Maier, "Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative 
Narratives for the Modern Era," The American Historical Review 105,3 (June 2000): 807-831, and 
Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, "World History in a Global Age," American Historical Review 100 
(October 1995): 1034-60. Eric Hobsbawm defended the notion of a long nineteenth century (1789-1914) 
and a short twentieth century (1914-1991), in The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848 (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962); The Age of Capital: 1848-1875 (New York: Scribner, 1975); The Age of 
Empire: 1875-1914 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987); and The Age of Extremes: The Short 
Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994). 
 
4 Holly Case, Between States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during World War II 





Catholic groups against anti-clerical factions eager to reverse Church privileges dating from the 
Restoration years. In Germany, France, Italy and elsewhere, lands belonging to the Catholic 
Church and its religious congregations were seized, and Catholicism's place in public education 
was sharply limited.5 But rather than by extreme acts of violence and non-interaction between 
opposed groups, the culture wars were characterized by a constant exchange, which was at times 
antagonistic, and at times mutually accommodating.6 Indeed, it was in the papacy's attempt to 
dialogue about the Roman Question -- on the pages of newspapers and pamphlets, and on the 
floors of parliaments and piazzas -- that its position regarding the right to reclaim the Papal 
States, and defend Catholicism's centrality in European affairs, gradually emerged.  
 Following definitions of state building provided by historical sociologists, this chapter 
will argue that the papacy's initial attempt to answer the Roman Question by regaining 
continuous territory and increasing its independent authority can be usefully understood as an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 For a useful overview of the culture wars, see the introductory chapters in Christopher Clark and 
Wolfram Kaiser, eds., Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). On the history of the term Kulturkampf, see Jörg Fisch, 
"Zivilisation, Kultur," in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur Politisch-Sozialen 
Sprache in Deutschland, eds. Otto Bruner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 
1992), VII, 679-774. On France's exile of religious congregations and on the Laws of Association (1901) 
and the Act of Separation (December 9, 1905), see, inter alia, Patrick Cabanel and Jean-Dominique 
Durand, eds., Le Grand exil des congrégations religieuses françaises, 1901-1914 (Paris: Cerf, 2005), and  
Joseph F. Byrnes, Catholic and French Forever: Religious and National Identity in Modern France 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), esp. chapters four and five. On the 
Italian state's legislation against the Catholic Church, see, inter alia, Carlo M. Fiorentino, Chiesa e stato a 
Roma negli anni della destra storica, 1870-1876: Il trasferimento della capitale e la soppressione delle 
corporazioni religiose (Rome: Istituto per la storia del Risorgimento italiano, 1996); Manuel Borutta, 
Antikatholizismus: Deutschland und Italien im Zeitalter der europäischen Kulturkämpfe (Göttingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2010); and Luciano Pazzaglia, ed., Chiesa e prospettive educative in Italia tra 
Restaurazione e Unificazione (Brescia: La Scuola, 1994). 
 
6 For recent attempts to recast the culture wars as sites of dialogue, see Oliver Zimmer, "Beneath the 
'Culture War': Corpus Christi Processions and Mutual Accommodation in the Second German Empire," 
The Journal of Modern History 82 (June 2010): 288-334; Michael B. Gross, The War Against 
Catholicism: Liberalism and the Anti-Catholic Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Ann 
Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2004); Rebecca Ayako Bennette, Fighting for the Soul of 
Germany: The Catholic Struggle for Inclusion after Unification (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
2012); David Blackbourn, Marpingen: Apparitions of the Virgin Mary in a Nineteenth-Century German 
Village (New York: Random House, 1995); Sarah Ann Curtis, Educating the Faithful: Religion, Schooling, 
and Society in Nineteenth-Century France (De Kalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000); Ruth 
Harris, Lourdes: Body and Spirit in the Secular Age (New York: Viking, 1999); and Raymond Jonas, 
France and the Cult of the Sacred Heart: An Epic Tale for Modern Times (Berkeley: University of 





exercise in state building.7 Though scholars have written a great deal on the state-building 
practices pursued in the years between c.1860 and 1914 by countries such as Italy, France, 
Spain, Germany, Hungary, Romania, the United States, Japan, and others, none, to my 
knowledge, have applied a similar analytic framework to the Vatican.8 Instead, scholars of 
European and American history, with only a few recent exceptions, have cast the Vatican as a 
relic of a bygone age, which gradually receded more and more from view during this vibrant 
period in history. 9  Church historians, on the other hand, have remained trapped in a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 For sociological definitions of state building highlighting territorial control, the centralization of power, 
the creation of bureaucratic autonomy, and the integration of citizenry, see Charles Tilly, "Reflections on 
the History of European State-Making," The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1975), 3-84; J.P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," World Politics 
20 (1968): 559-592; Cyril Black, The Dynamics of Modernization: A Study in Comparative History (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1966); and Joseph Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970; 2005). Newer attempts to rethink state building, which 
highlight similar trends, include Michael Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, c.1550-
1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, ed., 
Statebuilding and State-Formation: The Political Sociology of Intervention (London: Routledge, 2012). 
 
8 Recent and classic works on a wide range of forces in state making in late nineteenth-century Europe 
include, inter alia, Eagle Glassheim, Noble Nationalists: The Transformation of the Bohemian 
Aristocracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); Case, op.cit.; Margaret Lavinia Anderson, 
Practicing Democracy: Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000); Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in 
Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005); Lucy Riall, Garibaldi: Invention of a 
Hero (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007); Mary Vincent, Spain, 1833-2002: People and State 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Paul Hanebrink, In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, 
Nationalism and Antisemitism, 1890-1944 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); István Deák, 
Assimilation and Nationalism in East Central Europe during the Last Century of Habsburg Rule 
(Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburgh, 1983); Cyril Black and L. Carl Brown, eds., Modernization in the 
Middle East: The Ottoman Empire and its Afro-Asian Successors (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1992); and 
Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1976). For a failed nineteenth-century movement to unite the lands 
surrounding the Adriatic sea, see Dominique Kirchner Reill, Nationalists Who Feared the Nation: 
Adriatic Multi-Nationalism in Habsburg Dalmatia, Trieste and Venice (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2012). For the birth of a late nineteenth-century movement to found a state for the Jewish people, 
see Gideon Shimoni, The Zionist Ideology (Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1995). For an overview of 
how the state took shape in the United States after the American Civil War, see Megan Kate Nelson, Ruin 
Nation: Destruction and the American Civil War (Atlanta: University of Georgia Press, 2012). On the 
state-building reforms of the Meiji Restoration, see Marius B. Jansen, The Making of Modern Japan 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).  
 
9 A few recent works that attempt to connect nineteenth-century Vatican history to key historiographical 
questions like the rise of global capitalism, and the creation of transnational "imagined communities," 
include Vincent Viaene, Belgium and the Holy See from Gregory XVI to Pius IX (1831-1859): Catholic 
Revival, Society and Politics in 19th-Century Europe (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2001); Peter 
D'Agostino, Rome in America: Transnational Catholic Ideology from the Risorgimento to Fascism 




historiographical ghetto, focusing their attention rather narrowly on the presumed progressive 
or regressive nature of individual Popes, rather than investigating the structural changes and 
constant dialogue with the wider world that characterized the late nineteenth-century Vatican.10 
As will be argued below, the turn to state building was a constant feature following the seizure of 
the Papal States, until c.1914. It was a rejoinder to the rise of new nation-states across Europe, 
and the question of what role -- if any -- religion should play therein. Paradoxically, the 
Vatican's state building emerged precisely in reaction to the papacy's loss of statehood. 
 
1. Restoring a Deposed Leader: The Centralization of Power  
 
The Vatican's first response to the loss of the Papal States was to defend the absolute inerrancy 
of its ruler, and centralize power in the person of the Pope to a degree unheard of prior. 
Analogous contemporary processes were underway in Italy and Germany, as both newborn 
countries sought to bring about the shift from a system of strong regional loyalties to a unitary 
system, characterized by a central governing structure. 11  In the nineteenth century, the 
rhetorical and practical augmentation of the Pope's powers was accomplished through an official !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Modern Papacy: Financing the Vatican, 1850-1950 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and 
John McGreevy, "American Politics, Global Catholicism" (unpublished paper, 2012). 
 
10 See, e.g., Owen Chadwick, A History of the Popes, 1830-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); 
Frank J. Coppa, The Modern Papacy, 1798-1995 (London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998); Derek J. 
Holmes, The Triumph of the Holy See: A Short History of the Papacy in the Nineteenth Century 
(London: Burns & Oates, 1978); and David Kertzer, Prisoner of the Vatican: The Pope's Secret Plot to 
Capture Rome from the New Italian State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004). 
 
11 See Daniel Ziblatt, Structuring the State: The Formation of Italy and Germany and the Puzzle of 
Federalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), especially chapters five through seven; and 
Mario Isnenghi and Eva Cecchinato, eds., l'Italia: unità e disunità nel Risorgimento (Turin: UTET, 
2008). Foundational neo-Marxist and institutionalist works also emphasize that the formation of national 
states in early modern Europe (1517-1789) came about through a process of political and administration 
centralization. See Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Vergo, 1979); Immanuel 
Wallerstein, The Modern World-System, 3 vols. (New York: Academic Press, 1976-87); Ernst Barker, The 
Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660-1930 (Hamden, Conn: Anchon, 1966); Charles 
Tilly, The Formation of National States in Europe; Id., Coercion, Capital and European States 
(Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990); and Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State 





declaration of papal infallibility, and through a wide-scale media campaign, which empowered a 
certain part of the Catholic world keen on celebrating the Pope as the leader of the Catholic 
world. This "Ultramontanist" faction had arisen in France in the early nineteenth century, and 
held that the leader of the Church lay ultra montes, or beyond the Alps, rather than within any 
given national territory. Ultramontanists strongly opposed movements such as Gallicanism in 
France, Febronianism in Germany, or Josephinism in Austria, all of which sought to subsume 
religious authority under national authority and oppose or temper the primacy of the Roman 
Pontiff. In one of the founding texts of the movement, the French diplomat and theorist Joseph 
De Maistre had argued that the Pope must be venerated for he was a divine ruler and the only 
true safeguard of social stability.12 Picking up on this idea, other Ultramontanists had argued 
that the Pope was the best defense against the secular, anti-clerical, tendencies pervading 
nineteenth-century society. Their extreme exaltation of the Roman Pontiff led them to elaborate 
extensively upon the monarchical character of the Pope and his rights as King.13 The defense of 
the Pope as King was not an accidental move in an age of constitutional revolution, and was in 
certain ways analogous to the attempt of defenders of the Bourbon dynasty in France to resist 
constitutionalism up until the revolution of 1830.14 This would gradually develop into a fully-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 See Joseph de Maistre, Du Pape (Lyon: Rusand, 1819). 
 
13 On Ultramontanist ecclesiology in the nineteenth century, see Maurice Nédoncelle, ed., L'ecclésiologie 
au XIXe siècle (Paris: Cerf, 1960); Richard F. Costigan, Rohrbacher and the Ecclesiology of 
Ultramontanism (Rome: Universitá Gregoriana, 1980); and L'Ecclesiologia dal Vaticano I al Vaticano II 
(Brescia: La scuola, 1973). On the activism of the Ultramontanist faction, see, inter alia, Stephen 
Schloesser, “Vivo ergo cogito. Modernism as Temporalization and Its Discontents,” in The Reception of 
Pragmatism in France, 21-59; Darrin M. MacMahon, Enemies of the Enlightenment: The French 
Counter-Enlightenment and the Making of Modernity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); 
Chadwick, A History of the Popes, 1-94; T. J. Jackson Lears, No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the 
Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981); and Anton Van de 
Sande, La Curie romaine au début de la Restauration. Le problème  de la continuité dans la politique de 
restauration du Saint-Siège en Italie, 1814-1817 (Rome: Stüdien van hette Nederlands Instituut te Rome, 
1979), 30ff. For an attempt to show how the Ultramontanist label could accommodate a variety of 
diverging viewpoints, see the analyses of six leading nineteenth-century Ultramontane bishops, in Jeffrey 
von Arx, S.J., ed., Varieties of Ultramontanism (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
1998).  
 
14 On the French case, see Pamela Pilbeam, "The Growth of Liberalism and the Crisis of the Bourbon 




fledged theory defending the notion that the Pope was a king endowed with extensive temporal 
powers, and as such best positioned to lead all Catholic and non-Catholic nations.  
 Pope Pius IX, who ruled from 1846 to 1878, was the first pontiff to officially enshrine 
Ultramontanist views as Church doctrine. Taking advantage of increased donations from the 
faithful and inventions like the telegraph, the steam ship and mass printing technologies, Pius 
IX actively supported the expansion of a Catholic journalism toeing a strong Ultramontanist 
line.15 The Pope first helped the Jesuit journal Civiltà Cattolica expand its scope, and then, 
shortly after the proclamation of the Kingdom of Italy, helped give rise to the Vatican's daily 
newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano. These and other media perpetuated the image of a 
sovereign pontiff, who despite his loss of land maintained all of the trappings of an independent, 
absolute, monarch.16 The Pope also encouraged this image to be kept alive through religious 
services, where chants invoking the glory of “the Pope-King” were frequent. 17  
 The first key site empowering the Ultramontanist view of the papacy was the First 
Vatican Council, convened in 1864. The first of its kind since the Council of Trent, the First 
Vatican Council brought together over seven hundred prelates from across Europe, North 
America and Latin America, tasked with issuing a set of binding statements on the nature of the 
Catholic Church and its internal leadership structure. Around Christmas of 1869 (just a few 
months prior to the seizure of Rome), the Ultramontanist faction present at the council set the 
tone of the event. Thanks to its well-organized tactics, it added the doctrine of papal infallibility 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
15 Technology was being put to similar uses in countries like Italy and Germany. See, e.g., James M. 
Brophy, Capitalism, Politics and Railroads in Prussia, 1830-1870 (Columbus: Ohio State University 
Press, 1998); and Albert Schram, Railways and the Formation of the Italian State in the Nineteenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
 
16  Riall, Garibaldi, 378-9; Clark, “The New Catholicism and the European Culture Wars,” in Culture 
Wars, 11-19; and Pollard, Money and Rise of the Modern Papacy, 46, and passim. 
 
17 Gail Hamilton, “The Pope and Italy,” The North American Review 150, 399 (February 1890): 177-188, 




to the agenda. Soon, the doctrine of papal infallibility won the majority of council votes, and was 
promptly enshrined as Church dogma.18  
 As outlined in the First Vatican Council, the dogma of papal infallibility defended the 
absolute certainty of all statements the Pope made ex cathedra, on matters of doctrine. The 
dogma further declared the "primacy of the Roman pontiff, on which the unity, strength and 
stability of the entire Church rests." Clergy and faithful "of every rite and rank" were henceforth 
called upon to heed the Pope on all matters of jurisdiction. The text further specified that the 
Pope and the Pope alone was allowed to have "direct and free relations with the clergy and laity 
of the entire Church," and that "no one is permitted to interfere" in these relations.19 In other 
words, the doctrine of papal infallibility enshrined the Pope as the undisputed head of the 
Catholic Church, and announced that the Pope ruled, in last instance, alone, and by definition 
justly. The entire Catholic world must stand or fall with him.  
 Pius IX proclaimed the dogma of papal infallibility on July 18, 1870, exactly one day 
before the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War. Planning for war had caused France to 
withdraw its troops from Rome, thus enabling the breach of Porta Pia by Italian troops 
(September 20, 1870), and abruptly bringing to a halt the First Vatican Council. The preliminary 
finding of "papal infallibility" thus took on an even greater meaning, and was used to send a 
clear message to the Pope's rival state-makers in Europe. In an age characterized by liberal 
nationalist attempts to whittle away clerical influence, the Roman Pontiff in person had 
responded with a loud and spectacular claim to extensive, and non-derogable, power. Militating 
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18 On Ultramontanist pressure tactics at the First Vatican Council, see Richard F. Costigan, The Consensus 
of the Church and Papal Infallibility: A Study in the Background of Vatican I (Washington, DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 2005); August Bernhard Hasler, How the Pope Became Infallible: Pius IX 
and the Politics of Persuasion (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1981); and Emiliana P. Noether, “Vatican 
Council I: Its Political and Religious Setting,” The Journal of Modern History 40, 2 (June 1968): 218-233. 
 
19 The full text of the First Vatican Council is reprinted in Norman P. Tanner, ed., Decrees of the 






against parliamentarianism, the First Vatican Council erected an unimpeachable, absolute 
monarch as the symbol of Catholic loyalty. In an age when states were demanding the exclusive 
loyalty of their subjects, the Pope rebutted by suggesting the omnipotence of his own central 
government and his control over millions of Catholics worldwide. 
 In addition to broadcasting the Pope's desiderata regarding how he should be treated by 
the outside world, the First Vatican Council also enabled the Pope to tidy up his own house. It 
forced nearly all minority bishops who had opposed the doctrine of papal infallibility to accept 
it, under penalty of excommunication.20 In the process, the Pope cast aspersion on those clerics 
who sought to reconcile Catholicism with most forms of Enlightenment, liberal, neo-Kantian, 
and historicist thought.21 Thus, the First Vatican Council enabled the Pope to tighten the ranks, 
and begin consolidating a single shared epistemology that aggrandized him. The Pope's 
profession of infallibility and single-handed rule was thus an invented tradition, which 
attempted to strengthen the bonds of a community cutting across national borders, and owing 
its loyalty to a single, infallible, leader.22  
 
2. The Papal States are Dead; Long Live the Papal States!  
 
As of September 1870, the Pope no longer ruled a state, since the Papal States had been seized 
by Italian troops. In the years between 1860 and 1890, the papacy responded to the disruptive !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 For a discussion of the majority of bishops who accepted the dogma, and the minority of bishops who 
were excommunicated, see Robert McClory, Power and the Papacy: The People and Politics Behind the 
Doctrine of Infallibility (Liguori, Mo.: Triumph, 1997). 
 
21 On the Catholic engagement with Kant and neo-Kantianism, see Joseph Fitzer, ed., Romance and the 
Rock: Nineteenth-Century Catholics on Faith and Reason (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989); and 
Gerald A. McCool, From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1992), 87-111. On the Catholic engagement with historicist hermeneutics and pragmatist 
philosophy, see The Reception of Pragmatism in France. On the rise of liberalistic Catholicism, over and 
against papal censure, see Libéralisme chrétien et catholicisme libéral en Espagne, France et Italie (Aix-
en-Provence: University of Provence, 1989). 
 
22 The references here are of course to Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger, eds., The Invention of 
Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Benedict Anderson, Imagined 




state making of its rivals by not only declaring the Pope King, but also by providing its own, self-
legitimating, definition of the contested legal-political term, "sovereignty." In the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, investigating the problem of sovereignty had become a central 
preoccupation for the emerging field of international law. The questions up for debate included: 
Who (or what) was the locus of sovereignty? What was sovereignty's origin, and what was its 
purpose? Was sovereignty a spiritual or a temporal attribute? Was it possible to divide 
sovereignty, or was it advisable to limit it?23 If the word "sovereignty" had originally referred to 
the condition, typically possessed by a monarch, of supreme dominion, authority or rule, by the 
late nineteenth century, the term signaled both the right of territorially bounded states to be 
independent within their own boundaries and free from incursion, as well as the right of "the 
people," rather than the king, to possess supreme ruling power. 24   
 Starting from the 1860s, the papacy and its defenders picked up the word "sovereignty" 
to defend the supposed continued permanence of the Papal States. The redeployment of the 
term began in Pius IX's sweeping Syllabus of Errors of 1864, and was developed by Pope Leo 
XIII in a series of encyclicals of the 1880s. Soon, "sovereignty" also became a keyword in press 
organs defending the restoration of the Papal States. In the English, French and Italian versions 
of these discussions, the word sovereignty, souveraineté or sovranità was employed repeatedly. 
Papal documents addressing the problem of sovereignty typically rendered the term in Latin as 
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23 For a taste of how eighteenth and nineteenth-century state-makers debated the problem of sovereignty, 
see David Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 1-145; and Case, op.cit., 7-11, and passim. 
 
24 For an overview of the history of the term, see James Crawford, "Sovereignty as a Legal Value," in The 
Cambridge Companion to International Law, eds. Crawford and Koskenniemi (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 117-134; and, "Sovereignty, n." Oxford English Dictionary (1989; online version 
March 2012). <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/185343>; accessed 31 May 2012. For a taste of the 
ongoing debate regarding whether the Peace of Westphalia (1648) inaugurated the definition of 
sovereignty as power over a certain territory, see, e.g., Osiender, op.cit.; and Stéphane Beaulac, "The 
Westphalian Model in International Law: Challenging the Myth," Australian Journal of Legal History 7 
(2004): 181-213. For a discussion of how the term was used by American and French revolutionaries, see 





potestas, imperium or principatus.25 The key features of the emergent Vatican doctrine of 
sovereignty included the notion that the Vatican was a sovereign state power because 
sovereignty was, first, indivisible and limitless; second, construed in both territorial and political 
terms; and, third, a legal-political concept that found its origin and purpose in God.26   
 The abstract claim that sovereignty was indivisible was used in practice by defenders of 
the Vatican to argue that the Pope maintained exclusive sovereignty over the city of Rome, and, 
on some counts, vast swaths of the Italian peninsula. This was for instance articulated in 1901-2, 
when Pope Leo XIII (Pius IX's successor), "reaffirmed the impossibility of two sovereigns living 
in Rome and expressed his belief that God would eventually bring to an end the unholy revolt 
against his kingdom."27 The Italian state and the Pope could not share Rome; Rome was and 
remained the Pope's alone. Furthermore, the claim that the Vatican had undivided territorial 
sovereignty was used to defend the notion that the Pope was still the sovereign ruler of the 
(former) Papal States. Reasons of historic right were marshaled, including appeal to Scriptures, 
or emphasis on the fact that the Pope had been the leader of roughly the same territories for 
centuries and therefore could not be deprived of them on a whim.28 Other defenders of this 
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25 For the Latin rendering of "sovereignty" as potestas, imperium and principatus, see, e.g., paragraphs 29 
and 34 of Immortale Dei, as reprinted in Latin in Documenta Pontificia (Rome: Typis Polyglottis 
Vaticanis, 1935), 12, 14. Late nineteenth century English-Latin and French-Latin dictionaries also 
converged on defining these three Latin words as synonyms of sovereignty and souveraineté. See, e.g., 
"Sovereignty," in Charlton Thomas Lewis, ed., An Elementary Latin Dictionary (New York: Harper & 
Brothers, 1899); and "Souveraineté," in Emile Chatelain, ed., Lexique Latin-Française (Paris: Hachette et 
Cie, 1882). 
 
26 These threefold definition of sovereignty is laid out in Leo XIII, Immortale Dei (November 1, 1885), §3; 
§12; §17; §18; §31; §35; §45. 
 
27 Kertzer, Prisoner of the Vatican, 272-85, 291. 
 
28 Consider the following articulation of the latter argument for historic right: “The habitual dimensions of 
the Papal territory have varied comparatively little since the eighth century; so that it would seem their 
measure was pretty nearly determined by the same special Providence to which the sovereignty itself is 
attributed.” Edmund J. O’Reilly, “The Relations of the Church to Society,” The Irish Monthly 5 (1877): 
107-113, here, 113. The scriptural passages cited to justify the territorial sovereignty of the Pope included 
Matthew 16:17-19 ("Thou art Peter, and upon this rock...", "the keys of the kingdom of heaven"); Matthew 
28:18 ("all power in heaven and on earth..."); John 2:13ff; Luke 22:3; John 20:23; and Matthew 18:14. For 
defenses of this sort, see, inter alia, Charles Augustus Briggs, “The Real and Ideal in the Papacy,” The 




position held that the Pope still had undivided territorial sovereignty because Italian troops had 
not invaded the papal palace, the ultimate symbol of papal power.29  
 Defenders of the Pope appealed to the supposed indivisibility of sovereignty to argue 
strongly against the separation of Church and state -- particularly as found in countries such as 
the United States. In truth, they asserted, the state has the duty to promote the one true religion, 
Catholicism.30 In a specular fashion, Catholic heads of state, they argued, had the duty to 
promote the Pope's rights -- and thus boycott all relations with the Italian state. Indeed, as Leo 
XIII, influentially argued, God, "the sovereign Ruler of all," endowed the "Church with civil 
sovereignty, as the surest safeguard of her independence." Sovereignty was created by God, and 
embodied by the Catholic Church; it was an absurd error to posit that it resided in "the people, 
without any reference to God." 31 
 Popes and Catholic theorists also defended the notion of the Vatican as a sovereign state 
power by reviving a sixteenth-century theory of the Church as a perfect society. According to this 
theory first proposed by Robert Bellarmine, the Church was a "perfect society," or societas 
perfecta, insofar as it is a body sufficient within itself to deliver the ends for which it was 
created. As such, the Church has superior ends: the salvation of souls. In the hands of late 
nineteenth-century theorists, the notion of the Church as a societas perfecta was extended to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
29 See, e.g., Georges Flaischlen, "La situation juridique du Pape," Revue de Droit international 6 (2nd 
series), 85. 
 
30 When Popes famously condemned "Americanism," they were, among other things, taking a position 
against those clerics in the United States who had accepted the separation of Church and state and 
promoted various forms of ecumenism. The clearest articulation of this condemnation can be found in 
Leo XIII's encyclical, Testem Benevolentiae Nostrae (1899). Both Father Salvatore Maria Brandi (who 
became an editor and writer for the Jesuit Civiltà Cattolica) and the Ultramontane Cardinal Camillo 
Mazzella contributed extensively to drafting this condemnation, after having lived in the United States for 
several years. See, e.g., Cardinal Mazzella, De religione et ecclesia: praelectiones scholastico-dogmaticae 
(Prati: Giachetti, filii et soc., 1905). For a discussion of Father Brandi and Cardinal Mazzella's reflections 
on their time in the United States, see Albert Thomas Howard, God in the Atlantic: America, Europe and 
the Religious Divide (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2011), 67-85, and Gerald McKevitt, Brokers of 
Culture: Italian Jesuits in the American West, 1848-1919 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 
80-90, 100-5, 203-5, 266-7, 315-7. 
 





argue that the Vatican was an ideal sovereign state due to its “most perfect” internal system of 
government and code of laws. Furthermore, the societas perfecta of the Vatican was superior to 
all other political entities and for this reason its sovereignty was absolute. Civil governments 
should try their best to emulate the Church’s “perfect” internal governance and “perfect” moral 
foundations -- indeed, they had much to learn from the institution, precisely in matters of state. 
As it was re-appropriated in the second half of the nineteenth century, this ecclesiology taught 
that thanks to his ability to understand Christ's teachings, the Pope possessed the indirect power 
to dictate over a range of inter and intra-state matters, in virtue of his "superiority."32 
 But by the end of the nineteenth century, despite its retrenched defense of the Church as 
a "perfect state" endowed with an infallible ruler and entitled to state sovereignty, the Vatican 
had failed to attain its leading goal: the restoration of the Papal States. It had also been excluded 
in humiliating ways from the new European order, as it was barred from several high-profile 
international congresses and as its well-meaning overtures on matters like slavery and worker's 
rights were all but ignored by state leaders. Far seemed the days of the Congress of Vienna, 
when following Napoleon's rampage through Europe the Great Powers had handed the Pope a 
crucial role in legitimizing the restoration of monarchies keen on curbing the spread of French 
revolutionary ideas.33 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32  One of the most influential texts reviving perfect society ecclesiology in this sense was Cardinal Felice 
Cavagnis, Institutiones iuris publici ecclesiastici (Rome: Societatis catholicae instructivae, 1882-3). Also 
see Leo XIII, Immortale Dei. On the revival of perfect-society ecclesiology in the late nineteenth century, 
see Daniele Menozzi, “La chiesa e la storia: una dimensione della cristianità da Leone XIII al Vaticano II,” 
Cristianesimo nella storia 5 (January 1984): 69-106; Giovanni Miccoli, “Chiesa e società in Italia tra 
Ottocento e Novecento: il mito della ‘cristianità’,” Chiese nelle società: verso un superamento della 
cristianità (Turin: Marietti, 1980), 155-221; Eugene Cardinale, The Holy See and the International Order 
(Gerrards Cross: Smythe, 1976); and Joseph Robert Giandurco, The Holy See as a Juridical Subject ‘sui 
iuris’ in International Law (Rome: Pontificiam Universitatem S. Thomae in Urbe, 1994). 
 
33 On the Vatican's failure to gain an ear in the international state system, see Jean-Marc Ticchi, Aux 
frontières de la paix. Bons offices, médiations, arbitrages du Saint-Siège (1878-1922) (Rome: École 
française de Rome, 2002); Vincent Viaene, "Introduction: Reality and Image in the Pontificate of Leo 
XII"; Philippe Delisle, "La campagne antiesclavagiste de Lavigerie et Léon XIII devant 'l'opinion 
missionaire' française"; and Hans de Valk, "A Diplomatic Disaster: The Exclusion of the Holy See from the 
1899 Hague Peace Conference," all in The Papacy and the New World Order: Vatican Diplomacy, 
Catholic Opinion and International Politics at the Time of Leo XIII, 1878-1903, ed. Vincent Viaene 




 It was only in 1903, with the election of Pope Pius X to the Throne of St. Peter, that the 
Vatican's prospects for restoring some measure of influence began improving. This Pope is best 
known for launching a far-reaching campaign to enforce neo-Scholastic teachings and fight 
socialism, liberalism, and religious pluralism, through manifold encyclicals and the creation of a 
secret surveillance organization, known as La Sapinière.34 He is also sung by friends and vilified 
by enemies for lifting the ban imposed by Pius IX on Catholic political action, and 
simultaneously throwing his weight behind conservative Ultramontanist civil society 
movements that had arisen on the Italian peninsula and elsewhere to defend the Pope's 
prerogatives. Continuing the legacy of Vatican I, Pius X also increased the Vatican's control of 
local churches by mandating what amounted to a series of geopolitical reforms, implemented on 
a global scale.35 But perhaps Pius X's most lasting legacy was one that scholars have by and large 
overlooked. In the years between 1903 and 1914, Pius X encouraged the development of a new 
class of functionaries within the Vatican. These men were responsible for having the Vatican 
abandon its insistent attempt to regain the Papal States. Instead, they would eventually 
encourage the Vatican to use the tools of law to craft a new mode of papal diplomacy. 
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how the papacy's exclusion from late-nineteenth century international congresses complicated its quest 
for statehood include Franz Despagnet, Cours de Droit international public, 4th ed (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 
1910), §153; and A. Pearce Higgins, “The Papacy and International Law,” Journal of the Society of 
Comparative Legislation 9.2 (1908): 252-264, here, 260. 
 
34 Pius X's signature encyclical in the battle against these ideologies was Pascendi dominici gregis (1907). 
On Pius X's campaign, see, inter alia, Giovanni Vian, Il modernismo: la Chiesa cattolica in conflitto con 
la modernità (Rome: Carocci, 2012); Hubert Wolf and Juth Schepers, eds., 'In wilder zügelloser Jagd 
nach Neuem': 100 Jahre Modernismus und Antimodernismus in der katholischen Kirche (Paderborn: 
Schöningh, 2009); Émile Poulat, Intégrisme et catholicisme intégral: un réseau secret international 
antimoderniste: La Sapinière, 1909-1921 (Paris: Casterman, 1969); and Giovanni Sale, 'La civiltà 
cattolica' nella crisi modernista (1900-1907): fra transigentismo politico e integralismo dottrinale 
(Milan: Jaca Book, 2001). 
 
35 On Pius X's centralizing reforms, see Giovanni Vian, La riforma della Chiesa per la restaurazione 
cristiana della società. Le visite apostoliche delle diocesi e dei seminari d'Italia promosse durante il 
pontificato di Pio X (1903-1914) (Rome: Herder, 1998); and the contemporary, Charles Daniel, Paul-
Marie Baumgarten, and Antoine De Waal, Le chef suprême, l’organisation et l’Administration de l’Eglise. 





3. The New Code of Canon Law  
 
The new class of workers began emerging after 1904, once Pius X announced his intention to 
reform the Code of Canon Law. Part and parcel of the broader project to Romanize, centralize, 
and systematize the governing structure of the Vatican, the reform aimed to fit all of the laws of 
the Church into a single volume.36 It was a daunting task, insofar as the codification of a formal 
legal structure guiding the Church and its faithful had begun in the thirteenth century and had 
been poorly organized since. Materials were collected in dozens of volumes arranged 
chronologically, rather than by subject. And in place of an abstract articulation of a set of rules, 
the laws in these volumes were explained via long and detailed cases and situations.  
 Like Europe's nineteenth-century codes of law, the reform of the Code of Canon Law 
spoke to the Vatican's ambition to use law as a tool in state building. And like the papacy's other 
state-building projects, it was both proactive and reactive. As Pius X announced in 1904, the 
new Code of Canon Law should take European nineteenth-century civil codes as its model. It 
should be written ex novo, and its laws, referred to as "codes," should be stated in analytical and 
abstract terms, rather than fleshed out through case studies. Finally, like its European models, 
the Code should be arranged by subject rather than chronologically, and it should borrow its 
over-arching organizational categories ("persons," "things," and "actions" or "procedures") from 
Justinian's sixth-century codification of Roman law, the Corpus Juris Civilis.  
 In addition to fulfilling broader state-building aims, the reform of the Code of Canon 
Law also constituted a direct response to contingent European developments. In 1903-4, France 
announced its intention to mandate the separation of Church and state, and send most religious 
orders into exile. The Pope was so incensed by what he called the evento nefasto that he asked 
many members of the Code of Canon Law commission to draw up a legal response, which 
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effectively attempted to show the illegality, and hence, illegitimacy, of the French attack on the 
Church. By doing so, Pius X imbued work on the Code with new, urgent, meaning.37 He also 
delayed it somewhat -- indeed, all told, the Code took a total of thirteen years of hard work. On 
May 27, 1917, the Code was complete, and presented to the public; it entered into force 
approximately one year later, on May 19, 1918. As will be investigated in the following chapter, 
the new Code of Canon Law would play a crucial role in positioning the Vatican as a prominent 
voice for peace in the years after World War I. 
 The new Code of Canon Law provided a neat summary of the Vatican's nineteenth-
century state-building strategies. It enshrined perfect-society ecclesiology, and emphasized the 
papacy's right and duty to possess sovereignty. Though its 2,414 laws filled five volumes in place 
of the single volume Pius X had originally mandated, the new Code represented an impressive 
synthesis of centuries of ecclesiastical law in the service of a new political-theological project. As 
a contemporary American jurist noted, the Code was "certainly one of the greatest literary 
juridical achievements of the twentieth century," by virtue of its concision and modernity.38   
 Each of the five volumes of the Code drove home the point that the Vatican, led by the 
Pope, stood at the head of the Catholic world in both temporal and spiritual matters. The first 
volume, Book I (cc. 1-86), enshrined general norms, explaining for instance that where religious 
law conflicts with secular law, the former should be heeded. Book II, "On Persons" (cc.87-725), 
posited the ability of the papacy to regulate the conduct of clerics, religious and lay persons. 
Book III, "On Things," explained what it meant to be a practicing Catholic before the law, by 
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37 The booklet, titled La séparation de l'Église et de l'État en France, was authored by Pietro Gasparri and 
Eugenio Pacelli, among others, and circulated internally in late 1905. See Carlo Fantappiè and Romeo 
Astorri, "Pietro Gasparri," Dizionario biografico degli italiani, vol.52 (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia 
Italiana, 1999): 500-3. 
 
38 Charles P. Sherman, "A Brief History of Imperial Roman Canon Law," California Law Review 7, 2 
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focusing on the administration of Sacraments (cc.731-1153), and the duty to worship God in a 
particular, centrally mandated, way, for instance via the veneration of what the Roman Church 
declared to be sacred times and places (cc.1154-1321). Book III of the Code also defended the 
primacy of the ecclesiastical magisterium within the Catholic world -- that is, the historical-legal 
right of the Pope and the Roman Curia to legislate on behalf of Catholics at large. It urged 
Catholics to recognize the central Church, led by the Supreme Pontiff, as an institution created 
by Christ and entitled to both territorial and political sovereignty  (cc.1322-1551). Book IV, "On 
Processes," concerned the judicial system internal to the Church, to which lay Catholics must 
also answer, for instance in matters pertaining to family law. This book also laid out rules 
preventing local churches from superseding the central Church, discussing at length matters like 
the beatification and canonization of saints (cc.1552-2141). Finally, Book V, "On Crimes and 
Penalties," promised internal accountability, by outlining the penal law of the central Church 
itself (cc.2195-2414).39 
 As only a handful of scholars have noted, the monopoly of jurisdiction the Code created 
was a first in Church history. It had the effect of universalizing Vatican law, and of reinforcing 
disciplinary and administrative uniformity. It powerfully linked Catholic laypeople and clergy 
members more closely to the institution of the Vatican, and helped the Vatican extend its 
influence across national boundaries. 40 As such, the new Code of Canon Law was part of the 
Vatican's response to the burgeoning of nation-states eager to confine religion to private affairs, 
and at best to civil law. 
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of Canon Law (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2001).  
 
40 To my knowledge, the only scholar to pay due attention to the content of the Code is Carlo Fantappiè. 
His various works on the subject include Chiesa romana e modernità giuridica (Milan: Giuffrè, 2008); 
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 In addition to being in line with the older project of increasing ties to the Vatican on all 
levels, the reform of the Code spoke to the new importance that Popes assigned to law as an 
instrument of state building. Since approximately 1860, the study of non-canon law had attained 
a more central place in the curriculum of the Pope's most famous universities, and it was from 
this new breed of students that Pius X drew when putting together the commission of experts to 
reform the Code. All of these men were jurists rather than theologians, and they were familiar 
with the emergent discipline of international law.  
 To be sure, the Vatican was both leading and following other nation-states in its late 
nineteenth-century turn to law. Many newly formed or newly reconstituted states were turning 
to law as never before to centralize authority and increase their legitimacy, both within national 
borders, between them, and beyond, to justify imperial practices, including slaughter and the 
seizure of land. And many individuals, like the Vatican's new class of workers, placed great 
hopes in law's possibility to unite the world, and "gently civilize" it through a shared set of 
principles.41 
 
4. The Rise of New Functionaries 
 
The jurists who drew up the new Code of Canon Law were part of a new group of Vatican 
employees that emerged in the late nineteenth century, which I will be referring to as "new 
functionaries." The distinctive feature of the new functionaries was not their shared social class, 
though it is true that many of them hailed from aristocratic sectors of society that had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 For the reinvention of laws of war, citizenship and statehood in the process of late nineteenth-century 
state building, see, inter alia, Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of 
International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Anthony Anghie, 
Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History of an Illusion 
(Bridgeport, Conn.: Law Review Association of the Quinnipiac College School of Law, 1997); Nathaniel 
Berman, Passion and Ambivalence: Colonialism, Nationalism and International Law (Leiden: Martinus 
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International Law," in Victorian Visions of Global Order: Empire and Relations in Nineteenth-Century 




historically been closely bound to the Pope. Rather, what bound the new functionaries together 
was generational: all had come of age soon after the Italian wars of unification and the 
dissolution of the Papal States, and that had been trained in the Pope's most prestigious 
institutions of higher learning during a crucial period of curricular reform. By virtue of their 
quite similar education and early career training, the new functionaries had acquired what 
might be called a shared cultural praxis, which sought to use law as a transformative instrument 
in global affairs, and -- most immediately -- a way to restore the papacy to primacy. New 
functionaries matter, it will be argued, because they helped bring about the Vatican's rise to 
prominence in European affairs after 1917-8.  
 Most of the new functionaries were trained at the prestigious Pontifical Academy of 
Ecclesiastical Nobles, which increasingly became known as the breeding ground for this new 
class of employees.42 The Academy stood at the forefront of a series of reforms that enabled the 
emergence of new functionaries, insofar as it increasingly stressed diplomacy and law above 
theology, and knowledge of the secular world, as opposed to principled ignorance of it. During 
the 1870s, the Academy carried out a far-reaching curricular reform, which brought the 
Academy to gradually shift its curricular emphasis away from the art of defensive apologia, and 
towards fields like canon law, civil law, international law, and the legal and diplomatic history of 
Church-state relations. 43 So as to guarantee that promising diplomats-to-be gain employment in 
the Vatican, from the 1870s the Academy also included a mandatory internship in a relevant !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42 See Claude Prudhomme, "L'Académie pontificale ecclésiastique et le service du Saint-Siège, XIX-XXe 
siècle," Mélanges de l'Ecole Française de Rome 116 (2004): 61-89. To my knowledge, no monograph on 
this important educational institution exists. For a broad contextualization, see Maria Pia Donato, 
"Accademie e accademismi in una capitale particolare. Il caso di Roma, secoli XVIII-XIX," Mélanges de 
l'École française de Rome. Italie et Méditerranée 111, 1 (1999): 415-30. For contemporary accounts, see 
Ferdinando Procaccini di Montescaglioso, La Pontificia accademia dei nobili ecclesiastici: memoria 
storica (Rome: A. Befani, 1889); and Adolfo Giobbio, Lezioni di diplomazia ecclesiastica dettate nella 
Pontificia Accademia dei nobili ecclesiastici (Rome: Tipografia vaticana, 1899-1904). On the recruit of 
these men, see David Alvarez, "The Professionalization of the Papal Diplomatic Service, 1909-1967," The 
Catholic Historical Review 75, 2 (April 1989): 233-248, here 240. 
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Vatican office as part of its four-year course of study.44 Typically, the brightest students at the 
Academy would be recruited directly by the Vatican, working their way up from less prestigious 
jobs within the organization's diplomatic branches, and gradually earning a higher salary, 
thanks to their seniority and the prestige of the post.45 Many of them entered the organization as 
"Minutanti" -- a rather menial job, consisting of the writing up the minutes of meetings.46 As one 
new minutante noted, "If Christ was a carpenter, I suppose I can be an 'office boy.'"47 If they 
performed their jobs with distinction, and displayed character traits like loyalty, obedience, and 
assiduity, these men were then given the possibility to rise in the ranks; many of them, in fact 
(including the "office boy") came to occupy prominent positions in the Vatican hierarchy. 
  Perhaps the most influential among the new functionaries was Cardinal Pietro Gasparri 
(1852-1934), whom Pius X had placed at the head of the commission of experts charged with 
revising the Code of Canon Law in 1904. Providing a quick sketch of Pietro Gasparri's education 
and career gives a sense of some of the leading characteristics of this class. On September 18, 
1870, the young Gasparri left his native province of Macerata and traveled to Rome -- a mere 
two days before the breach of Porta Pia. The event would profoundly shape him and influence 
his decision to make the besieged capital of the Catholic Church his home. Through his studies 
at prestigious clerical universities in Rome, the young Gasparri -- described by contemporaries 
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46 Prudhomme, 241-2. 
 
47 Antonio Fappani, ed., Giovanni Battista Montini Giovane, 1897-1944: Documenti inediti e 
testimonianze (Turin: Marietti, 1979), 193. As cited in Richard J. Wolff, "Giovanni Battista Montini and 
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1985): 228-247. 
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as keenly intelligent and sharp-tongued -- acquired degrees in philosophy (1872), theology 
(1876) and civil and canon law (1879).48  
 Gasparri was particularly devoted to his legal studies, graduating with highest honors 
from the prestigious Pontifical Academy of Ecclesiastical Nobles, also known as the Apollinaire. 
At the time of Gasparri's attendance, the Academy was emerging as the most highly respected 
site of higher learning for men who had just completed their theological training as secular 
priests, and sought a career in the Holy See's diplomatic corps. As mentioned above, during the 
time of Gasparri's training, the Academy was carrying out an important reform, which many of 
Gasparri's professors personally supported. As Gasparri's professors explained, the reform 
broadly sought to make more apparent the relevance of the Academy's teachings to 
contemporary socio-political transformations.49 
 During his early employment, Gasparri developed his own understanding of the 
Academy's emphasis on the real-world importance of law. As substitute professor of Church 
history, and as professor of canon law at the Institut catholique in Paris, Gasparri taught courses 
on the nature of the Church as societas iuridice perfecta and on Church-state relations. He also 
began developing an extensive analysis of an old tool of Vatican diplomacy, the concordat, and 
fleshed out many of his ideas in a series of influential legal tracts.50 The need to maintain the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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50 Gasparri's most important works of these years include Tractatus canonicus de matrimonio (Paris: 
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Church's dialogue with the modern world was driven home by Gasparri's time in Paris between 
1880 and 1897, when he witnessed the centralization of power of the French Third Republic, 
and the aftershocks of the Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs, in which French Catholics were 
directly involved.51 Gasparri also became increasingly well versed in how the tools of law could 
help heal aspects of the Church-state conflict. He put this into practice between 1898 and 1901, 
as he was invited by Leo XIII and Pius X to travel widely to help quell a series of legal-diplomatic 
controversies that risked endangering the Church's status in Great Britain, the United States, 
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Syria and Palestine.52 These travels gave Gasparri a sense of the scope of 
global Catholicism and of the challenges the Vatican would face in attempting to assert its 
influence far and wide. 
 Gasparri was called back to Rome in 1904 and appointed Secretary of Extraordinary 
Ecclesiastical Affairs. The Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs was a 
branch of the Curia that had been constituted in 1793 to respond to the problems generated for 
the Church by the French Revolution, and the Secretary of the Congregation had functions 
roughly equivalent to those of a Foreign Affairs Minister.53 Per Pius X's request, Gasparri 
promptly began work on his crowning accomplishment, the new Code of Canon Law. The cleric !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Ecuador, ed. Enrique Dussel (Salamanca: Cehila, Ediciones Sígueme, 1987), 343-9. On Gasparri's time in 
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(Paris: Beauchesne, 1979), 286ff. For Gasparri's diplomacy with Great Britain and the United States, see 
Fantappiè and Astorri, op. cit. 
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and jurist was the most important figure responsible for the document's form and content.54 To 
assist him in his task, Gasparri chose a limited number of close collaborators, who were new 
functionaries as he. They included two men who would soon help the Vatican redefine its role in 
international affairs. Their names were Giacomo Della Chiesa (1854-1922) and Eugenio Pacelli 
(1876-1958), and like Gasparri, both men had a keen interest in law as a tool of diplomacy. Also 
like him, they were both attuned to the modern world, yet unflaggingly loyal to the Pope.  
 Giacomo Della Chiesa and Eugenio Pacelli had attained their worldly sensibilities 
thanks, in part, to their early upbringing. Both men hailed from urban, aristocratic, families -- 
the former, in Genoa, the latter, in Rome. Both had pursued their early studies at public 
institutions, precisely in the post-1870 years of rampant anti-clericalism. Della Chiesa had 
obtained a doctorate in law at Genoa's Royal University, which had banned theology and other 
religious subjects precisely during the years of his studies (1872-5). Pacelli's early education was 
also in a public institution (the Ennio Quirino Visconti high school), where he had faced a great 
deal of anti-papal, anti-Catholic, vitriol.55 Following these early studies, both Della Chiesa and 
Pacelli earned degrees at the Pontifical Academy of Ecclesiastical Nobles, where they, like 
Gasparri, had dedicated themselves to the study of law. Recently ordained and with a doctorate 
in theology in hand, Della Chiesa obtained his doctorate in law from the Academy in 1880; 
Pacelli's summa cum laude doctorate in canon and civil law was awarded in 1901.  
 Both men, like Gasparri, considered the Academy their true Alma Mater.56 Pacelli, some 
twenty years younger than both Della Chiesa and Gasparri, benefitted from a second important 
reform of the institution, carried out between 1898 and 1903, which had the twofold aim of 
further professionalizing the papal bureaucracy, and expanding its knowledge base so as to keep !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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(Firenze: F. Le Monnier, 1972). 
55 Frank J. Coppa, The Policies and Politics of Pope Pius XII: Between Diplomacy and Morality (New 
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it more in tune with the modern world. The reform called for making Church-state relations 
central to nearly every course of study, by mandating detailed studies of Church diplomacy, and 
the sophisticated study of international law. New courses focused on matters like the problem of 
sovereignty, the definition of statehood, political economy, the history of socialism, the rise of 
industrialization, and the characteristics of the global financial market. To facilitate Vatican 
communication with the outside world, the reform also increased the language training required 
of future papal diplomats. In addition to fluency in French, students now also had to 
demonstrate proficiency in German and English.57   
 The reform made legal training an even more central feature of the Academy. Following 
the fusion of the Academy's faculty of law (founded in 1853), with Rome's newborn Academy of 
Historical-Juridical Conferences, or Accademia di conferenze storico-giurdiche (est.1878), the 
Academy began offering a joint degree in canon and civil law, in utroque iure (literally, "in one 
and the other law"). "The Church absolutely needs men fully trained in the two laws for the 
defense of its rights," an 1898 document produced by the Vatican's Sacred Congregation for 
Education announced. According to the Congregation, by perfecting their knowledge of canon 
and civil law, the Academy's new functionaries would better face the Church's "enemies" and 
bring an end to "the incessant conflicts" pitting the Vatican against secular states.58  
 In the words of one of the Academy's leading professors, henceforth the Academy would 
teach that "the Church is a sui generis State," endowed with "an international legal personality," 
and as such, entitled by law to a range of rights which other states would do well to enforce.59 
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59 "Conchiudendo, teniamo a confermare che la Chiesa sia uno Stato sui generis [...] Alla Chiesa compete 





The notion of the Vatican as a sui generis state would be carried forth in the words and deeds of 
both Della Chiesa and Pacelli, who both excelled at the Pontifical Academy, and were promptly 
funneled into first menial, and then quite prestigious, Vatican positions. Some within the 
Vatican resented this; as a 1903 article written by a bitter Vatican insider noted, the Apollinaire 
was birthing "a close camarilla of ambitious spirits, bent on controlling the Vatican," and 
remaking it in their own image. 60  
 Within one year of completing his doctoral studies, Della Chiesa was appointed Professor 
of Diplomatic Style at the Apollinaire and clerk at the Congregation of Extraordinary 
Ecclesiastical affairs, the rough equivalent of the Vatican foreign ministry. In 1901, the same 
year he completed his doctorate, Pacelli was admitted as a clerk and copyist to the same 
Congregation. From these starting positions, Della Chiesa, and, even more spectacularly, Pacelli, 
rose in the ranks. Della Chiesa became the assistant to the nuncio in Madrid (1883), arranged 
the visit of the German Emperor William II to the Vatican (in 1887), and traveled to Vienna on 
diplomatic mission (in 1888 and 1889). In 1901, Della Chiesa was appointed papal Under-
Secretary of State. 61  Along with the Secretary for the Congregation for Extraordinary 
Ecclesiastical Affairs, Pietro Gasparri, the Under-Secretary was the most important person in 
the Vatican after the Secretary of State himself, who conducted the routine affairs of papal 
diplomacy.62  
 Like Gasparri, Eugenio Pacelli pursued a double career as legal scholar and diplomat. In 
1901, he began teaching canon, civil and common law at the Pontifical Academy; within two !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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his death in 1927. 
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years, he had become professor of ecclesiastical diplomacy and attaché at the Congregation of 
Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs. While here, per the Pope's request, Pacelli drafted several 
influential legal treatises, including one declaring the illegitimacy of the French abrogation of 
the 1801 concordat and another outlawing the long-standing power of Catholic monarchs to veto 
the election of a candidate for the papacy. He also took several trips abroad, at one point turning 
turned down, with regret, an offer to teach Roman Law at the National Pontifical Catholic 
University of America, in Washington, D.C. 63  
 Interestingly, in addition to their similar education and career paths, Della Chiesa and 
Pacelli also shared certain important personality features. Both were obedient and loyal to 
ruling doctrines, as Della Chiesa announced his reverent implementation of the anti-modernist 
campaign under Pius X, and as a youthful Pacelli cast himself as a "faithful admirer and 
convinced disciple of the doctrine of saint Thomas Aquinas."64 Both had a practical, and 
penetrating, intelligence. Both were extraordinarily hard workers. And both were prudent and 
scrupulous in their painstaking observation of protocol. As a Vatican employee who knew Della 
Chiesa well wrote of him in his private memoirs (published posthumously), 
 Frankly, I must say that he impressed me as a meticulous, accomplished  bureaucrat 
 (...) He possessed a vast store of carefully sorted information upon  which to draw; he was 
 accurate and very precise, acquainted with all the rules and traditions of his chancellery 
 and not ignorant of those of other governments. In matters of protocol -- etiquette, 
 precedence, etc. -- he was as infallible as a man could possibly be. Of brilliancy or 
 originality, I never perceived a trace, but since an exhibition of such traits was not 
 required during his years of subordinate service, it was proof of the greatest wisdom and 
 tact on his part to dissemble any such he may have possessed.65  
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"Meticulous," "careful," "accurate," and "precise" -- strikingly, many of these adjectives were 
used by contemporary observers in reference to Pacelli as well.66 And as this rather caustic 
description of Della Chiesa demonstrates, they cannot be dismissed as banal, laudatory, 
remarks, for in truth, such observations cut both ways. Intelligent yet unoriginal, careful with 
punctilious; Della Chiesa was an "accomplished bureaucrat" -- perhaps nothing more, and 
certainly nothing less.  
 Pacelli, Della Chiesa and Gasparri were new functionaries who together stood at the head 
of the reform of the Code of Canon Law, and together possessed several important shared 
characteristics. All had come of age at a time when it was all but impossible to ignore the risk 
run by the Catholic Church of falling into oblivion. All had received extensive training in law at 
Rome's most prestigious and cutting-edge university. In their early employment at the Vatican, 
all used their training in law to help solve pressing diplomatic problems. Finally, the three men 
relied on skills and hard work to rise in the ranks. And rise they would: in 1914, Della Chiesa, at 
the age of fifty, became Pope; and was very nearly followed by Gasparri in 1922, who instead 
preserved his title as Secretary of State. In 1939, following Gasparri's death, Pacelli would 
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Trained by a self-consciously professionalizing Vatican in the early 1900s, Gasparri, Della 
Chiesa and Pacelli shared much with the networks of experts who helped consolidate states in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, in North and South America, on the European 
continent, and in various countries in the Middle East and East Asia.67 Like them, the Vatican's 
new functionaries increasingly ascended the diplomatic ladder because of their merits; they 
were selected on the basis of traits like efficiency, regularity, and order; and they were similarly 
conversant with a "bureaucratic mode of knowledge production," which depended on teamwork 
and subservience to a higher ordering power.68 Most importantly, as will be shown, the Vatican's 
new functionaries served to strengthen the Vatican through the tools of law.  
 By the eve of the Great War, the Vatican had centralized power in the person of the Pope, 
who was enshrined as the absolute, infallible, monarch, of Catholics worldwide. The religious 
institution had also put forward its own definition of sovereign statehood, presenting itself as a 
perfect state, endowed with divine purpose. But despite these state-building attempts, the 
papacy had not regained the Papal States. During World War I, the Vatican's new functionaries 
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would suggest a change of course and help put it into practice. How they did so is the subject of 












The Vatican is a part of every nation; at the same time, it is above all nations. 
-- Pope Pius XI, 19221 
 
 
The Church itself becomes an integral part of the state when a political group [...]  
joins with the Church to better maintain its monopoly. 





On the eve of the First World War, the Vatican wielded almost no influence in European affairs. 
As a result of the Italian wars of unification and the Kulturkampf, it had lost its dominion over 
the Papal States, its status as a sovereign state actor, and its partnership with many European 
powers. Furthermore, its attempt to regain its lost statehood had borne little fruit. In the 
immediate aftermath of the Great War, however, the Vatican began to regain much of the 
influence it had lost, and by 1933, it had established formal diplomatic relations with over two 
dozen countries, regained political and territorial sovereignty, and emerged as a central player 
on the European continent. How and why did the Vatican fight for influence in Europe during 
and in the immediate aftermath of World War I, and how did it at least partially succeed in 
gaining it? This chapter suggests some answers to the question. 
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 After World War I, the Vatican pioneered a new mode of diplomacy that aimed at the 
creation of joint regimes of rule. I argue that the Vatican partially succeeded in creating these 
joint regimes of rule through a form of diplomacy spearheaded by new functionaries, based on 
the conclusion of binding treaties known as concordats. Concordat diplomacy began in Eastern 
Europe, in countries like Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, and then spread west to Germany, 
Austria, and Italy. Its primary purpose was to legally enshrine a regime of Church-state 
collaboration. In just eleven years, the Vatican concluded eleven concordats, the vast majority of 
which were signed with politicians opposed to the Versailles settlement, and whose countries 
had recently either stifled revolutionary uprisings, or directly waged war with Red Army forces. 
 The concordats concluded in the 1920s and early 1930s increased the identification of 
individual European states with Catholicism and in some cases went so far as to affirm that 
Catholicism was the state religion. Concordats gave the Vatican leadership over national 
Catholic Churches, local clergy, and Catholic movements, thus accelerating a centralization 
process that had begun in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Additionally, concordats 
made Catholic instruction compulsory in public schools, and allowed the Vatican to appoint 
teachers and determine curricula. In some cases, the Vatican was even given these privileges at 
the university level and in disciplines which did not clearly fall within its purview, like history, 
philosophy, pedagogy, sociology and politics. Concordats also gave Vatican-supervised Catholic 
movements freedom to organize and freedom of the press. As the subsequent chapter will 
explore in more detail, these rights were quite important, as in certain countries -- like Italy and 
Germany -- these Catholic movements were the only legal manifestations of civil society, other 
than the organizations created by the state. Finally, concordats greatly increased the Vatican's 
wealth by exempting Church properties from taxation and in some cases promising extensive 
support, in the form of clergy pensions and state donations to maintain old churches, hospitals 




Vatican, concordats typically asserted that the clergy must pledge its loyalty to constituted state 
powers, and purge whoever in its ranks was deemed politically problematic.  
 As this chapter will show, the expansion of concordat diplomacy facilitated the rise of the 
Vatican's influence in European affairs in a number of different domains. Europe's politicians 
increasingly involved the Vatican in legitimacy-seeking rituals, and they, as well as a growing 
number of diplomats, lawyers and opinion-makers, celebrated the Vatican's spectacular rise in 
power. After decades of neglect, the Vatican was also asked to join numerous so-called 
international (European-dominated) organizations, including those closely affiliated with the 
League of Nations. In the process, the Vatican was able to disseminate its theocentric vision of 
international affairs, which depended on the construction of more religiously homogeneous 
states, and helped undermine the League's minority rights provisions.  
 I unfold my argument regarding the resurgence of the Vatican in the immediate 
aftermath of World War I in four stages. In the first, I show how the Pope entered the contest for 
influence at the height of the Great War, by presenting a peace platform that rivaled those put 
forward by his leading competitors, Wilson and Lenin. Then, I show how the Pope's failure to 
gain a seat at the Paris Peace Conference pushed the new functionaries to translate his rhetorical 
recommendations into a precise political program, which sought to create Church-state 
duopolies capable of militating against the Versailles settlement and the minority rights regime. 
In section three, I show that the Vatican's treaty diplomacy was surprisingly successful, and that 
from the early 1920s it was increasingly presented as a way to protect Europe against the Soviet 
Union and the spread of international communism. Section four takes stock of the effects of the 
Vatican's treaty diplomacy, arguing that it greatly increased the Vatican's status in European 
politics and international affairs, all the while foregrounding an influential and increasingly 
broad-based vision of peace. In conclusion, I suggest that the Vatican's rise in influence in 
Europe and its creation of greater union between Church and state was incomplete without the 





1. The Pope's Vision for Europe: The Peace Platform of 1917  
 
The origins of the Vatican's postwar concordat diplomacy lie in the Vatican's failure to regain 
statehood, and in the Pope's decision to enter the contest between Wilson and Lenin, and 
disseminate an attractive vision of peace at the height of war. As Arno Mayer famously showed, 
Wilson had set the wheel in motion in 1916, by urging his advisor, Edward M. House, to travel to 
Europe to work out the first, rather vague, peace proposal of the conflict.3 In a speech of April 
1917 -- issued after the February deposition of the Tsar, but before the Bolshevik revolution of 
October 1917 -- Lenin gave his response to Wilson and to pro-war socialist movements, via a 
speech that affirmed that only the end of capitalism and imperialism (and capitalism qua 
imperialism) would bring world peace.4  
 But Wilson and Lenin were not the only two leaders using peace platforms as a way to 
jockey for leadership of the postwar world: the reigning Pope, Benedict XV, took advantage of 
the opportunity as well. Benedict's peace plan was issued to the public on August 15, 1917, and it 
proposed that the Vatican mediate peace negotiations, and help implement four measures to 
prevent future wars. These measures included: the self-determination of select European states 
(Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Poland); the preservation of the German Empire (including 
its colonies); the legal codification of greater union between Church and state across Europe; 
and the creation of international arbitration courts to regulate future disputes, impose freedom 
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of the seas and oversee a general limitation on armaments. 5  Though the Pope's plan did not use 
the term, it effectively redefined the concept of self-determination, recasting Bolshevik calls for 
the independence of colonial territories as applicable exclusively to a limited number of 
European states. 6  On the Pope's plan, these select states would contain Russia -- a country 
which, it was feared, was well-poised to expand its "hegemony" and gain "absolute control in 
Europe and in the Orient."7 
 The papal peace plan immediately became an important contribution to the ongoing 
debate surrounding the causes of war and the conditions for peace.8 "Just as the Dome of St. 
Peter dominates its surroundings," a Vatican representative boasted, the Pope's message 
"overshadows [other] confused peace efforts."9 By late August of 1917, the plan had been 
endorsed by neutral countries like Spain, and by the Central Powers, including the Emperor Karl 
I of Austria; the Chancellor of the German Empire, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg; the 
German Kaiser, Wilhelm II; the King of Bavaria, Ludwig II; and the German Catholic politician 
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and leader of the Center party, Matthias Erzberger, who introduced Benedict's proposals for 
discussion in the Reichstag.10  
 The fact that Pope Benedict XV had used his peace plan to position himself as a potential 
leader of the postwar order was not lost upon the Wilson administration. Even more worrisome, 
there were only two important respects in which the papal peace plan clearly clashed with 
Wilson's: the Pope's defense of the German Empire, and his strong endorsement of a theocentric 
international order. The Russian ambassador to the United States noted that he was "very much 
disturbed over the Pope's peace overture," and that the fate of the Allied cause could "depend 
upon [the President's] answer."11 Justifiably worried that the Pope had stolen the President's 
fire, Wilson's advisors promptly urged the American president to seize the "opportunity to take 
the peace negotiations out of the hands of the Pope and hold them in [his] own."12   
 On August 23, 1917, Wilson issued what his chief advisor immediately dubbed "the most 
interesting document in the world": the President's reply to Benedict.13 The letter applauded the 
proposals, but advised the Pope to abandon naïve hope in the good will of the Central Powers. 
When in January of 1918, Wilson issued his first concrete set of peace aims in the form of a 
speech delivered before of joint session of Congress, many wondered whether the Pope's peace 
                                                            
10 On the Central Powers' endorsements of the plan, see the telegraphs of the Chancellor of the German 
Empire, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, and of the Emperor of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Karl I, 
to the Pope, dated September 28, 1917. As reprinted in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States. Supplement (henceforth FRUS), The World War, 1917 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1917), 217-220. For Matthias Erzberger's decision to bring the papal peace plan before the 
Reichstag, see chapter three, "Im Vatican," of Erzberger's memoirs, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg (1920; 
Bremen: Dogma, 2012), 41-9; and Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 3 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1926), 150-1. On Spain's endorsement of the plan, and its attempt 
to convince the United States government of its validity, see the letter of Spanish Ambassador Juan Riaño 
to the U.S. Secretary of State, Washington, December 27, 1916. As reprinted in FRUS, Supplement, The 
World War, 1916 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1916), 118. 
 
11 Letter of Colonel House to President Woodrow Wilson, Magnolia, Massachusetts, August 19, 1917. As 
reprinted in Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 3, 157-8. 
 
12 Letter of House to Wilson, Magnolia, Massachusetts, August 17, 1917. As reprinted in The Intimate 
Papers, vol. 3, 156.  
 





statement was one reason Wilson concretized his vision so quickly.14  The Fourteen Points 
followed the Pope in calling for the creation of a supranational organization to regulate disputes, 
and enforce disarmament. They similarly redefined the Bolshevik principle of self-
determination to suit particularistic ends. But in place of endorsing an international order that 
took its cues from the Vatican (or much less from Lenin), Wilson called for the spread of 
democracy, particularly in the former lands of the Russian and German empires.15 Taking stock 
of the import and radical contingency of the Wilson proposal, a flippant contemporary observer 
noted, “Now it’s Wilson who is becoming Pope by drawing moral lessons for the belligerent 
powers […] Long live Pope Wilson!”16 
 The Vatican reaction to Wilson's new peace platform was immediate, and acerbic. A 
prominent Vatican jurist Eugenio Pacelli (future Pope Pius XII) noted that Wilson's plan was 
masquerading as legitimate by imitating key features of Benedict's plan. In a letter to the Pope's 
Secretary of State, Pietro Gasparri, Pacelli further argued that the Fourteen Points had been 
drafted by Freemasons, who opposed Catholicism and "supplied the United States with one of 
the cornerstones of its Government, namely the democratic spirit." If the Allies won the war, 
Wilson would surely "Americanize the whole world, making it Freemason so as to liberate it 
                                                            
14 See Enrico Serra, "La nota del primo agosto 1917 e il governo italiano: qualche osservazione," in 
Benedetto XV e la Pace, 1914-1918, ed. Giorgio Rumi (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1990), 61ff; John Pollard, The 
Unknown Pope: Benedict XV (1914-1922) and the Pursuit of Peace (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1999), 
128; and Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 354ff. 
 
15 For more on Wilson's use of the language of self-determination, see Trygve Throntveit, "The Fable of the 
Fourteen Points: Woodrow Wilson and National Self-Determination," Diplomatic History 35, 3 (June 
2011): 445-81; Michla Pomerance, “The United States and SelfDetermination: Perspectives on the 
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16 “Maintenant c’est Wilson qui devient pape, et qui fait la morale aux belligérants, en nous appuyant de 
son crédit politique, financier, militaire. Vive le pape Wilson!” Letter of Alfred Loisy to Alfred Fawkes, 
circa October 1917, as cited in Alfred Fawkes, “The Papacy and the Modern State,” Harvard Theological 





from its servitude to the Kaiser, the Pope, and the priesthood." 17 Many Vatican officials agreed 
with Pacelli, and promptly deemed Wilson's Fourteen Points a conniving attempt to prevent the 
Vatican from gaining any position of global influence. Vatican worries about an "Americanized" 
Europe increased as Lenin declared neutrality and retreated into purely Russian matters, with 
the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and as Germany and Austria-Hungary signed an 
armistice with the Allies which neatly summarized the Wilsonian platform. For the Vatican in 
1918, the Wilsonian threat loomed large; larger still than the threat emanating from Russia, 
whose recent revolutions were seen as both as an opportunity for the Catholic re-conquest of a 
historically Orthodox nation, and as an abortive, and surely short-lived, imitation of the French 
Revolution.18   
 To avert Wilson's triumph over Europe and increase the Vatican's own bargaining power, 
the Vatican waged a diplomatic campaign to gain a seat at the Paris Peace Conference between 
November of 1918 and January of 1919. Building a case about the Vatican as a legitimate 
political actor, its advocates pointed to the sensibility of the papal peace plan, and to the 
Vatican's new Code of Canon Law, which had been recently revised to bring it in line with the 
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volontà del popolo. Tutti si sono uniti per combattere la Germania, il rappresentante principale della 
Monarchia di diritto divino, antidemocratico; [...] Si ritorna [...] sul dovere di americanizzare tutto il 
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Eugenio Pacelli to Pietro Gasparri, Munich, December 20, 1918. Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City 
(henceforth ASV), Affari Ecclesiastici Straordinari (henceforth AES) Baviera, 3° periodo, 1918-1921, 
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Jesuit whom Pacelli describes as “uno dei migliori conoscitori della Massoneria internazionale” (one of 
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findings with the evident aim of buttressing Pacelli's own case through appeal to accepted experts in the 
field. For a contemporary account of the writings of Father Hermann Gruber, see "Gruber, Pater 
Hermann," in An Encyclopedia of Freemasonry and Its Kindred Sciences, ed. Albert Gallatin Mackey, 
vol. 3 (Chicago: The Masonic History Company, 1921), 1254-5. 
 
18 The vast secondary source literature on the Vatican's views towards the Soviet Union concurs with this 
interpretation. See, inter alia, Antoine Wenger, Rome et Moscou: 1900-1950 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 
1987); Hansjakob Stehle, Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917-1979, trans. Sandra Smith (Athens, Ohio: 
Ohio University Press, 1981); Giorgio Petracchi, "I Gesuiti e il comunismo tra le due guerre," in Chiesa 
cattolica e il totalitarismo, ed. Vincenzo Ferrone (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2004), 123-153; Philippe 
Chenaux, L'Église catholique et le communisme en Europe (1917-1989), De Lénine à Jean-Paul II (Paris: 
Cerf, 2009); Laura Pettinaroli La politique russe du Saint-Siège (1905-1939), (Ph.D. dissertation, 
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codes of laws of modern European states. Vatican diplomats in the United States further 
claimed to support Wilson’s Fourteen Points and the League of Nations, all the while suggesting 
that Benedict’s peace message had been the leading source of inspiration for the American 
President. Finally, in a bid to downplay the Vatican's allegiance to the Central Powers, leading 
Archbishops informed Allied officials that the Vatican had remained neutral during the war, and 
that over the course of its history it had amply demonstrated its credentials as a voice of peace 
and order. 19 
 However, Vatican efforts to gain entry to the Versailles Peace Conference would be for 
naught, as Italy had long since convinced the Allies to exclude the Vatican, fearing that the 
theocracy would attempt to regain the lands it had lost during the Italian wars of unification.20 
The fact that the Vatican had competed with Wilson via its peace platform likely hardened the 
resolve of Great Britain, France, and the United States to comply with what had been Italy's 
condition for joining their side. Of course, the Vatican was not the only aspiring power snubbed 
at the Paris peace conference, where crucial decisions were made by first five, and then three, 
major players: the British and French prime ministers, Lloyd George and Georges Clemenceau, 
and the American president Woodrow Wilson. The resultant Paris peace treaty reflected the 
                                                            
19 For high-ranking Catholics espousing this view, see, e.g., James Cardinal Gibbons, “The War Policy of 
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(November 25, 1919); and Umberto Benigni, “Il Papa e il congresso di pace,” Nuova Antologia (March 1, 
1916). Also see "Papal White Book Soon," The New York Times (February 2, 1918); and "Pope Works on 
White Book," The New York Times (February 10, 1918). Many Catholic scholars of the 1920s and 1930s 
also emphasized Benedict XV's influence on Wilson. See, e.g., Florence A. Wilson, The Origins of the 
League Covenant: Documentary History of its Drafting (London: Leonard and Virginia Woolf, 1928), 
129; and John Eppstein, The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations (London: Catholic Council for 
International Relations/Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932), 311ff. The lobbying efforts of 
American clerics like James Cardinal Gibbons are discussed in Gerald P. Fogarty, S.J., "Roosevelt and the 
American Catholic Hierarchy," in FDR, the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church in America, 1933-
1945, eds. David B. Woolner and Richard G. Kurial (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 11-45, here, 
12-4. 
 
20 Italy's opposition to Vatican participation, which was signed onto by the Allies in a secret clause of the 
1915 Treaty of London, was further exacerbated by a scandal whereby an influential Vatican official 
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authorities. On this episode, see Paloscia Annibale, Benedetto fra le spie: negli anni della grande guerra 





Allied victory, for though it granted a select number of European countries independence and 
created three international arbitration organs (the Permanent Court of International Justice, the 
International Labor Organization and the League of Nations), it also harshly penalized the 
Central Powers, seizing Germany's colonies and demanding $33 billion in reparations. 
Additionally, the League covenant and the subsequent Minority Protection Treaties enshrined 
the principle of the separation of Church and state, as well as that of religious liberty, which 
directly countered the notion of a world of religiously homogeneous nation-states.21 Lenin 
promptly criticized the settlement on the grounds that it reflected imperial, capitalist, interests; 
in response, he helped the Communist International, or Comintern, get off the ground, to rival 
the purported universalism of the League of Nations.22 The Pope's protest was just as quick as 
Lenin's, as was the decision to turn the Versailles failure into an opportunity to win over those 
who had been excluded from the conference.  
 In his objection to the Paris peace treaty, the Pope noted that the settlement was overly 
punitive, for Christian charity "demands that we treat our enemies with kindness."23 The 
Vatican's semi-official Civiltà Cattolica more bluntly proclaimed that Versailles' articles were 
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Comintern, see Kevin McDermott, The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to 
Stalin (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1996). 
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misnamed "articles of peace"; in truth, they would foster future war. 24  Pacelli, similarly, 
predicted that the victory of Wilson would cause a wave of unrest to sweep Europe. "An 
insolvent Germany," would be unable to pay its debts, and European nations ("particularly 
France and Italy") would find themselves "gravely exposed and menaced" by forces of 
revolution.25 In 1920, Benedict echoed these fears and repeated the core theocentric claims of 
the papal peace plan in a sharply worded criticism of the Versailles settlement, couched within a 
circular letter to the faithful. Announcing that the Vatican alone was best positioned to council 
"Heads of State and princes," and "bring concord between civilized nations," the Pope suggested 
that without the Vatican's assistance, Europe would fall back into a state of barbarism, war and 
unrest.26 
 
2. The Vatican Counter-Settlement to Versailles  
 
The highly undemocratic drafting of the Paris Peace Treaties would stand to benefit the Vatican, 
despite initial appearances to the contrary. Indeed, the Versailles settlement pushed the Pope to 
translate his peace platform from a series of rhetorical claims into a practical legal-political 
program. Arguably, this program can be read as the Vatican's counter-settlement to Versailles. 
Like Versailles, the Vatican's counter-settlement depended on the signature of a series of 
Vatican-directed bilateral (peace) treaties with many of Europe's new and newly reconstituted 
states. The Vatican's programmatic treaties inaugurated a new era of Church-state collaboration, 
which began in East Central Europe, and quickly spread west. Known in Church parlance as 
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25 "Non solo la Germania stessa, divenendo insolvibile, non pagherà le indennità di guerra, non solo la 
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significato, i prodromi ed i moniti della seconda rivoluzione in Monaco,” Munich, March 3, 1919. ASV, 
AES, Baviera (3° periodo), 1918-1920, pos.67, fasc.43, ff.7-11. For similar sentiments, see Pacelli to 
Gasparri, telegraph, Munich, April 12, 1919. Ibid., ff.42. 
 




concordats, these treaties militated against the separation of Church and state that the Pope 
worried would be advocated by liberal internationalism, and actualized by the League of 
Nations. Concordats allowed the Pope to pursue his own Catholic international, and build a bloc 
of European states more tightly bound to the Vatican, in both legal and cultural terms.  
 Concordats were old instruments of Vatican diplomacy put to new ends in the immediate 
aftermath of the war. Between 1122 and 1916, concordats had been treaties used primarily to 
settle ongoing disputes between Church and state. 27 Legally speaking, they were valid only 
before ecclesiastical law, which defined them as privileges granted by the Church in virtue of the 
superiority of her aims. But in 1916, Eugenio Pacelli -- fresh from his legal studies -- had 
influentially argued that concordats should be defined not as privileges, but as bilateral treaties, 
to which two sovereign entities, the Vatican and the signatory state, were party.  He further 
contended that in legal terms, concordats were valid not only before canon law, but before civil 
and international law as well. Finally, he recommended that rather than being used to simply 
settle Church-state disputes, concordats had the power to encode a new relationship between 
the Vatican and the European continent as a whole.28  
 In the final years of the Great War -- as part and parcel of the Vatican bid for influence in 
Europe -- Pope Benedict XV boldly accepted Pacelli's redefinition of the concordat, and charged 
two new functionaries (Eugenio Pacelli himself, and Achille Ratti, future Pope Pius XI) with the 
task of spreading this new legal instrument. The turn to concordat diplomacy was intimately 
connected to the Vatican's interest in using the tools of law to assert influence in European 
affairs, a shift that had begun in the early part of the twentieth century (as Vatican universities 
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expanded their training in non-canon law), and continued in the early part of the twentieth 
century, when newly minted lawyer-diplomats, like Eugenio Pacelli, reformed and modernized 
the Vatican's core code of laws.29 Convinced of law's potentially transformative capacities, 
Benedict welcomed the redefinition of the concordat, and asked Pacelli to attempt to sell the 
new legal instrument to Berlin and Munich, while Ratti was sent first to Warsaw, and then from 
there to Riga and Kaunas. Both men were asked to keep an eye on the spread of U.S. and Soviet-
influenced movements, and encouraged to couple a politically motivated humanitarianism with 
concordat diplomacy, to buttress the notion of the Vatican as a legitimate, and wealthy, ally, in 
the struggle against outside influence and internal unrest. 
 The mission of spreading Vatican influence through new instruments was an exciting 
one, as Achille Ratti could not help expressing to a friend soon after his arrival to Poland. "Few 
things," he noted, "would be capable of inspiring in me a more lively and deep interest than the 
resurrection and progressive reconstruction of this great state."30 To underline his quest to 
"resurrect and reconstruct" Poland, Ratti took the suggestive title of Archbishop of Lepanto, to 
signal the purported rebirth of Catholicism following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at 
Lepanto in 1571. Ratti thus began working tirelessly to restore Poland's Catholic identity, and 
guard it against modern-day infidels. The Vatican diplomat pushed Poland's leaders to sign a 
concordat with the Vatican, which would show the world that the new Poland was bound to the 
Pope, rather than to Wilson, or other (non-Vatican) outside powers. He encouraged the 
founding of Catholic organizations and press organs tightly bound to the Pope, and set up a 
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30 Letter of Achille Ratti to William Warner Bishop, Librarian of the University of Michigan, Warsaw, 12 
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Vatican relief organization, which rivaled Herbert Hoover's onsite branch of the American Relief 
Administration.31  
 Additionally, Achille Ratti joined with the Polish Prime Minister, Ignacy Jan Paderewski, 
in opposition to the Minority Rights Treaty being imposed on Poland. The Vatican position was 
that fostering (non-Catholic) minority rights would breed conflict, and Paderewski agreed, 
arguing via a memorandum presented to the League of Nations that "Poland has already 
experienced the nefarious consequences which may result from the protection exercised by 
foreign Powers over ethnical and religious minorities." If the League insisted on applying 
minority rights provisions again, this would "fatally provoke excitement against the minorities 
and would become the cause of incessant unrest."32  
 The fact that the Polish Minority Rights Treat -- also tellingly known as the "Little Treaty 
of Versailles" -- contained provisions protecting the Jewish minority was particularly displeasing 
to Polish and Vatican authorities, who worried that Poland's identity as a Catholic nation would 
thus be diminished.33 The issued was a charged one, not least because in these same years, the 
Vatican was working with Polish diplomats to create a Catholic bloc of states at the League 
(composed of Brazil, France, Italy, Spain and Portugal) to protest Britain's Balfour Declaration, 
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32 "Memorandum of M. Paderewski," in "The Council of Four: minutes of meetings, May 24 to June 28, 
1919." As reprinted in FRUS, The Paris Peace Conference, vol.6 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
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which favored "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people."34 
Leaning a similar logic as that used to protest the Minority Treaties, Benedict's Secretary of 
State argued that the Declaration was to be shunned, because it was an attempt to "subordinate 
the indigenous population for the advantage of other nationalities.” 35  As an article in a 
prominent Catholic newspaper elaborated, fostering religious homogeneity would breed peace, 
while the empowerment of (non-Catholic) minorities could only lead to future conflict. Because 
of "the homogeneity of the whole Moslem body," it would be a grave mistake to declare Palestine 
a Jewish national home, and thereby destroy Palestine's purportedly religiously homogeneous 
character.36  
 Given the collaborations between Vatican and Polish diplomats abroad, it was no 
surprise that the Vatican's activism in favor of the Catholic majority in Poland was widely 
celebrated. The Polish populace (whose popular Catholic piety had received a considerable boost 
during the Great War) hailed Ratti's presence, as did Poland's new Chief of State, Marshal Józef 
Pi!sudski, a recent convert to Catholicism, who had redecorated both his office and his political 
rhetoric with an abundance of Catholic references. The Polish ruler appreciated Ratti's presence 
because it gave him a measure of needed legitimacy, locked as he was in a struggle for power 
with competing political factions, and sorely in need of popular support. To show his will to 
work alongside Ratti, Pi!sudski promptly announced that his country would fight the "French 
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model" of separation of Church and state.37 The Polish leader also invited Ratti to march 
alongside the head of state and Prime Minister Paderewski when the Second Polish Republic 
celebrated the convocation of its first parliament in Warsaw's St. John Cathedral. Finally, 
Pi!sudski encouraged local municipal leaders to welcome Ratti throughout his travels with ranks 
of horses, flag waving, triumphal arches, decorated with the Vatican's colors.38   
 Still, the idea of concluding a concordat with the Vatican was controversial, particularly 
amongst opposition groups who resented Pi!sudski's rule. It was only in May of 1920 when 
exogenous circumstances pushed Poland's politicians to agree with Ratti's request, and, in the 
process, help crucially reorient the Vatican against Lenin. For if the pursuit of concordat 
diplomacy initially took shape in part as a reply to the Versailles order, by 1920 concordat 
diplomacy would be seen as a powerful instrument to contain the Soviet Union, and protect the 
Vatican -- and Europe as a whole -- against the threat of communist revolution.  
 
3. Building a Cordon Sanitaire around the Soviet Union  
 
The fact that the Vatican's bid for influence in Europe became bound up with its re-orientation 
against international communism took place within a highly specific context: that of continued 
war. In February of 1919, Poland's Chief of State had gone to war against Bolshevik Russia, in a 
bid to settle the vaguely defined Polish-Russian frontiers discussed in the Treaty of Versailles. 
The Polish army had attacked Western Ukraine, to which the Red Army responded by pushing 
Polish forces all the way back to the Polish capital of Warsaw. As Poland's recently attained 
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independence seemed once again in danger, and a Soviet take-over imminent, many of 
Warsaw's inhabitants had fled. The Vatican nuncio Achille Ratti, however, stayed onsite, and 
boldly decided to (figuratively) hold the fort during the Soviet onslaught. Finally, in mid-August, 
the Red Army retreated from Warsaw and the city was reclaimed, thanks to a joint attack by 
Polish and French forces. 
 Ratti's stubborn decision to stay in Warsaw during the Soviet attack benefitted both the 
Vatican and the Polish government. It allowed the Polish government to maintain the fiction of 
an independent victory, and proclaim that it had been directly blessed by divine forces. As the 
state-supported myth had it, Warsaw had been saved precisely because of Ratti's "calm and 
trusting presence in the capital," and his invocation of the protection of the Virgin Mary, "Queen 
of Poland." The act would also benefit the Vatican, as it proved that Catholicism and Polish 
nationalism could stand united against what now was presented as the most immediate threat to 
Poland's survival: Bolshevism. As Pietro Gasparri triumphantly reported, Ratti's gesture had 
"encouraged the resistance of the good people" of Poland, while simultaneously showing the 
Vatican's loyalty to the newly independent state.39  
 Matters moved quickly thereafter. In October of 1920, shortly after the armistice, Ratti 
succeeded in making the concordat a central component of Poland's new constitution. Issued in 
March of 1921 (immediately after the Peace of Riga, signed between Poland and Soviet Russia), 
the constitution gave a kind of slap in the face to the League's minorities regime, by dodging the 
principle of freedom of conscience, and affirming instead that "Roman Catholicism took first 
place" among all faiths in Poland. In line with this, the constitution further promised to settle 
Church-state relations through a concordat with the Vatican. Negotiations regarding the articles 
of the concordat began immediately, and despite troubled communications due to the Upper 
Silesian territorial settlement, in February of 1925, Poland's concordat was ratified. A 
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triumphant Ratti declared himself pleased with "every comma" of the landmark legal treaty he 
had worked so hard to conclude.40 
 The Polish concordat was a groundbreaking text, which broadcast a new model for 
Church-state collaboration in domains as varied as education, politics, and organizational life. 
The treaty began by recognizing the Holy See as a sovereign actor, and promised that the Polish 
state would honor the Vatican by mandating obligatory religious education in all public schools, 
at both the primary and the university level, to be taught by individuals directly nominated by 
the Church. The Polish state would also allow Catholic associations of laypeople to operate and 
publish freely -- a promise that effectively led to the exponential growth of a new Catholic 
movement controlled by the Vatican (known as Catholic Action), which would strengthen 
Poland's nascent Christian Democratic movement.41 Finally, the concordat promised to exempt 
Church properties from taxation, protect them from expropriation, and grant the Church full 
freedom in administering its own finances. In exchange, the Vatican promised that Polish clergy 
would swear an oath of loyalty to the Republic, and give the state the ability to veto politically 
problematic bishops-to-be. Further strengthening the Vatican's legitimation of the new Polish 
state, the concordat promised that Polish Catholic Churches would recite a prayer for the Polish 
republic and for its President during mass every Sunday, and on national holidays. Finally, 
ecclesiastical lines were made to coincide with political lines, as diocesan limits were redrawn to 
make them neatly correspond to (and thus reinforce) the new boundaries of the independent 
state, settled at the Peace of Riga.42 Thus, the Polish concordat forcefully declared the Vatican a 
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force in political, economic and social life, and -- implicitly -- against those liberal forces 
advocating the separation of Church and state.  
 As left-wing unrest spread in Europe and the Wilsonian moment faded as the United 
States retreated into isolationism,43 the Pope and many of Europe's leaders became increasingly 
worried about the purportedly contagious nature of the Russian Revolution.44 Soon, many of the 
former imperial states in Eastern Europe that positioned themselves against the Soviet Union, 
and waged territorial battles of their own against it, showed themselves receptive to negotiating 
concordats with the Vatican. 45  Between 1922 and 1927, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and 
Yugoslavia negotiated, and -- in all cases save Yugoslavia -- ratified concordats with the Vatican. 
These states effectively became a kind of "Catholic bloc" which created a cordon sanitaire 
around the Soviet Union. So successful was the Vatican's scramble for European Europe that 
even the Soviet Union briefly entertained the idea of signing a concordat with the Vatican, so as 
to limit its growing power. Though the Vatican initially showed its willingness to dialogue with 
the Bolsheviks, negotiations eventually broke down, largely due to internal opposition from both 
sides.46 Thus despite Soviet attempts, Russia had been effectively cut off from Western Europe 
by a wave of concordat diplomacy. 
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 In form and content, the Vatican's concordats with Latvia, Lithuania and Romania 
mirrored the Polish concordat, and similarly expanded the Vatican's influence in old and new 
domains. The Latvian concordat, for instance, used the same wording to recognize the juridical 
personality and sovereignty of the Holy See. It outlined the Vatican's right to found confessional 
schools and Catholic associations, and receive funding from the state for a Cathedral. In 
exchange, the concordat gave the Latvian state the right to approve the Archbishop of Riga, and 
promised that clergy would swear an oath of loyalty to the Republic.47 The Lithuanian and 
Romanian concordats expanded the Church's influence in domains like education and property 
ownership, and similarly granted the state freedom to control clerics deemed politically out of 
line.48 All of these agreements also militated against the League's imposition of minority rights -
- ironically, even in those territories where Catholicism was itself a minority religion. As a 
perceptive contemporary observer noted, the Catholic Church was in other words acting just like 
the League of Nations, and making "foreign interventions in favor of a minority."49  
 From its development in eastern territories, concordat diplomacy spread west, where it 
too was used to enshrine a new form of Church-state collaboration, and guard against 
communist revolution.  Indeed, the second round of concordat diplomacy was carried out in 
states recently rocked by left-wing uprisings (like Germany, Austria and Italy), and run by anti-
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communist leaders who hoped to diminish the threat of communist revolution by supporting the 
expansion of Vatican influence. Eugenio Pacelli -- who had authored the legal reinvention of the 
concordat in 1916 -- was the father of concordat diplomacy in the west. Like Ratti, Pacelli began 
by presenting concordat diplomacy as an alternative to the Wilsonian peace, and took the 
symbolic name of the Archbishop of Sardi, a reference to one of the seven hundred Christian 
dioceses in modern-day Turkey rebuilt following the Ottoman (read, Allied) invasion of 1306. 
Pacelli, like Ratti, positioned himself against Wilson by working in territories targeted by 
American efforts, and delivering rival aid parcels displaying the coat of arms of the Pontiff and 
the legend, “The Holy Father offers his blessing.”50   
 The short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic, in existence between April 6 and May 3, 1919, 
marked an important shift for Pacelli, who would henceforth present concordat diplomacy as a 
strategy to curb communist internationalism. Using language typical of many of the circles in 
which he moved, Pacelli declared the new Bavarian government the work of doubly foreign 
forces: a "harsh Russian-Judaic-Revolutionary tyranny."51 "The healthy part of the German 
people," he noted, erecting himself as its representative, "is currently desperately fighting to 
liberate its society from the damaging poison of Bolshevism."52  With surprising synchronicity, 
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the Vatican nuncio in Hungary similarly commented that the Hungarian revolution of 1919 was 
a "Judeo-Communist" plot carried out by "a small minority of delinquents."53 
 Like Ratti, Pacelli chose to remain (briefly) onsite, and face the revolutionaries head-on. 
He played up for effect the presence of gunshot marks on the Vatican nunciature, and his refusal 
to hand over his automobile to revolutionaries, as proof of his personal bravery and of the 
Vatican's opposition to revolution writ large.54 In fact, that "bravery" was quite relative: Pacelli 
avoided nearly all of Germany's unrest by retreating to the idyllic shores of Lake Constance, in 
Switzerland, and following the brief attempted car theft, the nuncio took an overnight stay at the 
hospital, to cure a strong attack of nerves and indigestion.55 Still, his purported resistance to 
revolution came in handy by the spring of 1919, as the monarchist Bavarian People's Party was 
swept into power following the bloody defeat of the Republic in May. Concealing the violence, 
Pacelli declared that the end of the Bavarian Soviet Republic was "magnificent," and that none 
could contain their "emotion and applause" as "the red flag was lowered on all public 
buildings."56  Far from hailing the rise of the monarchist party, Wilson's diplomats in Europe, on 
the other hand, worried that the Bavarian People's Party would attempt to stir unrest in German 
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Bohemia and Slovakia, and bring back the "king, as in the 'good old days.'"57 In a striking 
parallel to events in Poland following the Red Army's retreat from Warsaw, the Bavarian 
People's Party showed its distaste for liberal and communist internationalism by immediately 
seeking the Vatican's favor, in its own bid for legitimacy. It loudly protested the terms of the 
Wilsonian peace Germany signed on June 28, 1919. It made a show of resisting anti-clerical 
measures in domains like education, divorce, and abortion, and of cultivating ties with top-
ranking clerics. And by January of 1925, it had concluded a concordat with the Vatican. 58  
 The Bavarian agreement seemed to suggest that Vatican influence would only grow with 
the westward movement of concordat diplomacy. Indeed, the concordat recognized the Holy See 
as a sovereign actor, and allotted considerable funds for churches, clergy pensions, and 
"spiritual services," to be offered in state-run institutions, like prisons and hospitals. It also 
made religious instruction, taught by Church-vetted clerics, mandatory in public schools, and 
expanded clerical influence at the university level, in disciplines like history, philosophy, 
pedagogy, sociology and politics. 59  
 In a sign of the Vatican's growing influence in European affairs, the Prussian government 
began concordat negotiations shortly thereafter, following its brutal crushing of the Spartacist 
uprising in Berlin, and its murder of the German-Polish revolutionary Rosa Luxemburg, who 
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had recently criticized the Catholic Church's support for capitalism and imperialism.60  In 1929, 
the Prussian concordat was signed. In the same year, Eugenio Pacelli's brother, Francesco, 
working in partnership with the Vatican Secretary of State, concluded the sweeping Lateran 
Agreements in Italy.  
 The victories of concordat diplomacy in the East shaped the Vatican's negotiations with 
the Italian state, most notably in the Vatican's decision to pair its long-standing demand for the 
restoration of territorial and political sovereignty with the demand for a far-reaching concordat 
that aimed to greatly increase the status of the Vatican in Italy.61 In addition to extensive 
privileges in realms like education and the organization of civil society, the agreement 
proclaimed Catholicism as Italy's state religion, and granted the Vatican territorial sovereignty 
and a guaranteed income. And like the concordats with East Central European countries, the 
Lateran Agreements rested on an alliance between the Church and the Fascist party, forged in 
opposition to the rise of "Bolshevik" influence in Italy, and Europe as a whole.  
 Achille Ratti, who in 1921 was appointed Archbishop of Milan, sowed the seeds for the 
alliance. When Ratti arrived in Milan, the city was just emerging from two years of worker 
unrest, marked by strikes and factory occupations. Anti-clerical tensions were rife, and the 
socialist mayor of the city refused to attend Ratti's inaugural ceremony at the Duomo.62 The 
contrast with the Vatican diplomat's recent experience in Warsaw was stark: now, rather than 
being called upon to legitimate the new government, Ratti was being ignored to achieve the 
same end. 
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 Ratti chose to respond to the affront by actively campaigning against a series of measures 
under discussion in the socialist-dominated city council.63 In the process, he made contact with 
two groups: the Christian Democratic Popular Party and the Fascists. The former had earned a 
mixed reputation in Vatican headquarters and an even more tepid welcome amidst Milanese 
clergy, who disapproved of its calls to separate Church and state and its pledge to work 
independently from the Vatican hierarchy.64 The violently anti-socialist Fasci di combattimento, 
on the other hand, which had been founded in Milan in March of 1919, appeared more 
promising to Ratti. The party had picked up thirty-five seats in parliament in the May 1921 
elections, with the party's leader, Benito Mussolini deputy from Milan. By the time Ratti arrived 
in the city, the erstwhile socialist had distanced himself from the cavalier atheism of his youth, 
and begun cultivating relations with high-profile Milanese clerics.65 Much to Ratti's liking, 
Mussolini began speaking out against Woodrow Wilson's activism in postwar Europe, and 
campaigning for state funding for religious schools. And in a truly daring gamble, the Fascist 
leader -- well before being handed leadership of the Italian state -- had pretended to be able to 
help solve the Roman Question himself. Thus, Mussolini, as deputy from Milan, pursued talks to 
this end with no less than the Vatican Secretary of State, Pietro Gasparri, who made clear to 
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Mussolini that he was no friend either of the ruling Liberal government, or the Christian 
Democratic Popular Party.66 Soon, the Vatican's official and semi-official publications began 
publishing articles openly sympathetic to the Fascist party.67 
 Ratti doubtless perceived the shift, and it was perhaps because for this reason that 
during his time as Archbishop, he appointed a Fascist supporter as one of his closest 
collaborators, and affirmed in an interview to the press that Mussolini was "a formidable man," 
and that "the future is his."68 Overruling local clergy members who disliked the Fascists' violent 
tactics, Ratti issued two directives: the first permitted Mussolini's followers to attend mass 
throughout Lombardy in their "battle garb," in their eponymous black shirts; the second allowed 
them to bring their banners into Milan's Duomo during the June 1921 commemoration of 
victory in the Great War. 69 As in Poland, Ratti was engaging in highly performative acts that 
aimed to strengthen the partnership between the Vatican and one of several new political forces 
seeking legitimacy from the Church.  
 Ratti's time in Milan was called to an abrupt halt when on January 22, 1922, Benedict XV 
died, and in February, Ratti was elected Pope, taking the name Pius XI. By late October of 1922, 
Mussolini had convinced King Victor Emanuel III to allow him to take the lead of the Kingdom 
of Italy. Once in power, Mussolini continued to seek the Vatican's favor, as Bavarian and Polish 
politicians had done, so as to gain legitimacy and help undermine rival political factions. 
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Asserting that it would be an "absurd error to ignore this two-thousand-year old moral power, 
whose influence is ever growing, and reaches four hundred million people," 70  Mussolini 
immediately fought for a series of laws smiled upon by the Pope. He restored the crucifix in 
schools and public institutions, introduced religious teaching in primary schools, raised clergy 
stipends, and saved the Vatican's Bank of Rome from defaulting on its debts. Additionally, he 
banned Freemasonry, curbed the ability of (American) Protestants to proselytize in Italy, and 
promised to heed Vatican fears regarding Rotary International -- all the while quietly cultivating 
relations with the United States. He also took a strong and decisive stance against communist 
internationalism. 71 Finally, as early as 1922, Mussolini showed his willingness to continue to 
dialogue with Vatican authorities to reach a timely solution to the Roman Question. Ratti was 
just as eager to finalize an agreement with Fascist leaders, for bringing concordat diplomacy to 
Italy was a natural and necessary move for an institution based on Italian soil, and composed of 
largely Italian top-ranking personnel. Indeed, without influence in Italy, concordat diplomacy 
would have appeared a thin, and impartially realized, international strategy.72 
 On February 11, 1929, the Vatican Secretary of State Gasparri and Mussolini signed the 
Lateran Agreements, which were composed of three interlinked agreements, including a 
concordat, which was valid "according to the general rules of international law."73 The first of the 
three texts announced that, "The Holy Catholic Apostolic and Roman Religion is the only State 
religion." The statement was in continuation with that outlined in Poland's religiously infused 
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and anti-minority rights constitution of 1921. By announcing Catholicism as the only state 
religion and refusing to grant pre-existent guarantees to Italy's religious minorities, the treaty 
effectively repudiated the principle of freedom of conscience, and inaugurated a period of 
repression of non-Catholic faiths on Italian territory -- one in which Protestant, and even more 
so, Jewish communities, would suffer immensely. (Though against Vatican wishes, a mild 
Fascist bill protecting religious minorities was passed on June 24, 1929, following protests 
spurred by the signature of the Lateran Agreements, it did little to help these groups.74) From 
prison, Antonio Gramsci lamented that the Agreements had provided "public recognition to a 
caste of citizens of a series of political privileges," including of course that group's claim to 
priority over all other faiths.75  
 In addition to declaring Catholicism the state religion and undoing Italy's minority rights 
provisions, the Lateran Agreements also granted the Pope a small sliver of approximately 108 
acres of land in Rome, henceforth known as Vatican City State. As Francesco Pacelli's diaries 
reveal, the denomination of "state" was one for which the Vatican fought quite hard, so that it 
could claim a greater share of influence in European affairs.76 (Given the centrality of acquiring 
statehood to Vatican foreign policy since 1870, the insistence was hardly surprising.) Though 
Vatican City was declared "neutral territory," Italy promised to provide it with basic resources, 
such as water, railroad, telephone and post services. Further, via a financial convention, the 
Vatican was encouraged to develop its new state extensively, and become an important player in 
emerging European and American finance markets. The convention promised that the Italian 
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state would provide the Vatican with two forms of compensation for the damages it had 
suffered: a cash payment of 750 million lire and investments in Italian government stock worth 
one billion lire. After many years of uncertainty and near-exclusive dependence on the 
fluctuating donations of the faithful, the Vatican had become financially secure; with the hefty 
income of up to 87 million lire per year and the freedom to invest in companies both at home 
and abroad, it "would never be poor again."77 The financial convention also gave Pius XI the 
necessary funds to visually demonstrate the prominence the new city-state of the Vatican, which 
he did by demolishing the area's small rustic houses, and constructing in their place large neo-
classical buildings, and broad, triumphal, avenues.78 
  The third component of the Lateran Agreements was the concordat, which gave the 
Vatican extensive powers in domains like education, family law, and the preservation of Catholic 
youth organizations. Announcing that Christian doctrine was "the foundation and crown of 
public education," the concordat made religious education in primary and secondary schools 
compulsory, and empowered the Church to vet teachers of religious subjects. Expanding the 
Church's influence to family law, the concordat recognized the Church's position of marriage as 
a sacrament, and made canon-law marriage equivalent to civil marriage. Ecclesiastical 
authorities were controversially given full jurisdiction and exclusive competence over marriage, 
which would be regulated by the Vatican's Sacra Rota tribunal. 79 The concordat also gave the 
                                                            
 
77 John Pollard, Money and the Rise of the Modern Papacy: Financing the Vatican, 1850-1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 148. 
 
78 Though many scholars have been drawn to the analysis of Fascist architecture and urban planning, 
none have as of yet written an urban history of Vatican City. For preliminary analyses, see Aristotle Kallis, 
"'Reconciliation' or 'Conquest'? The Opening of the Via della Conciliazione and the Fascist Vision for the 
'Third Rome,'" in Rome: Continuing Encounters between Past and Present, eds. Dorigen Caldwell and 
Lesley Caldwell (Farham: Ashgate Publishing, 2011), 129-53; Id.,  "The 'Third Rome' of Fascism: 
Demolition and the Search for a New Urban Syntax," The Journal of Modern History 84, 1 (March 2012): 
40-79; Piero Ostilo Rossi, Roma: Guida all'architettura moderna, 1909-2000, 2nd ed. (Bari: Laterza, 
2003), 12-5, 39-41, 150-4. For contemporary accounts, see Giulio Tardini, Basilica Vaticana e Borghi 
(Rome: Istituto Grafico Tiberino, 1936), and Leone Castelli, 'Quel tanto di territorio': ricordi di lavori ed 
opere eseguiti nel Vaticano durante il Pontificato di Pio XI (1922-1939) (Rome: Edizione Fuori 





Vatican a great deal of power in civil society, by allowing the largest Catholic lay organization, 
Catholic Action (which would serve as an important site of political socialization for many of 
Christian Democracy's leaders), to operate freely. In keeping with Rome's dual identity as the 
seat of Christendom and of the Fascist regime, the concordat affirmed that the Italian state 
would protect "the sacred character of the Eternal City," and "prevent in Rome anything that 
might clash with that character." Finally, in line with preceding concordats, the Italian state 
gained something in exchange, such as the clergy's "oath of fealty to the Head of State," and the 
right to veto clerics deemed politically suspect.  
 The Lateran Agreements considerably expanded the Vatican's influence both in Italy and 
abroad. On par with the agreements in East Central Europe, they recognized the Vatican's 
sovereignty, empowered the Vatican with control of the Catholicism as a whole, militated 
against the theory and practice of minority rights, and tightly bound the Vatican (and local 
Catholic Churches) to the anti-communist statesmen of the moment, who used it to destroy rival 
political factions -- including, in Italy's case, Catholic ones.80 With concordat diplomacy in 
general and the Lateran Pacts in particular, the Vatican had strengthened its international status 
in Europe, and its claims to independent political power. And with every new agreement, the 
Vatican was becoming staunchly more anti-communist itself, both in response to the rise of 
religious persecution in the Soviet Union, and in a bid to show its utility to concordat partners. 
On the heels of the Lateran Agreements, the Vatican and the Fascist state signed a secret joint 
surveillance pact regarding communist propaganda, and the Pope began to issue his first 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
79 On the concordat's transformation of family law, see David Albornoz Pavisic, I diritti nativi della Chiesa 
nel Codice di diritto canonico e nel diritto concordatario vigente (Rome: LAS, 2008); Arturo Carlo 
Jemolo, Lezioni di diritto ecclesiastico (Milan: Giuffrè, 1962), 457ff; and Alessandro Albisetti, "Il 
matrimonio dei culti acattolici," in Tra diritto ecclesiastico e canonico, ed. Albisetti (Milan: A. Giuffrè, 
2009), 341-354. 
 
80 For a summary of Catholic opposition to the agreement, and the way in which it confirmed the Pope's 
vote of no confidence vis-à-vis Christian Democrats, see, inter alia, Robert Wolff, Between Pope and 
Duce: Catholic Students in Fascist Italy (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 92ff. Alcide De Gasperi, the future 
leader of Italy's Christian Democratic party, bitterly criticized the agreement in a series of letters of 1929-




thunderous condemnations of Soviet affairs from the pulpit of St. Peter's, effectively launching a 
militant Vatican anti-communist propaganda campaign, which would blossom in the 1930s and 
1940s, and employ many of Christian Democracy's future leaders.81 
 Concordat diplomacy continued apace after the conclusion of the Lateran Agreements. 
In 1932, Pacelli signed a concordat with Baden, and in 1933, he helped conclude two additional 
agreements: one with Austria, and the other, controversially, with the Third Reich. As in all 
preceding concordats, these agreements mandated the greater interdependence of Church and 
state, expanding the Vatican's influence in exchange for an imprimatur of legitimacy to the 
ruling political factions. Vatican officials thus did not consider these agreements "pacts with the 
devil," as some scholars have suggested; rather, they were part and parcel of the larger project of 
spreading Vatican influence in Europe.82 
 In sum, by 1933, the Vatican had used concordat diplomacy to greatly expand its 
influence within individual nation-states and in Europe as a whole. Concordats enshrined a 
regime of co-dependence between Church and state, handed the Vatican leadership over 
national Catholic Churches and Catholicism as such, and increased the Vatican's power over 
domains like education, civil society, and family law. Additionally, concordats militated against 
two rival worldviews, in the process of instantiating themselves: the Versailles settlement, which 
included the principle of religious freedom, and the communist settlement, in which religion 
played little role. Further, as they were realized on the ground, concordat states actually formed 
a kind of cordon sanitaire surrounding the Soviet Union. They were states that had recently 
emerged from either war with the Soviet Union, or from a sharp contrast with socialist or 
communist forces. Their politicians were strongly anti-communist themselves, and eager to use 
concordat diplomacy as a means to buttress their own power and diminish that of rival factions.  
                                                            
81 See Chapters Four through Six in this dissertation. 
 
82 The most recent articulation of this view is found in Wolf, Pope and Devil. For a cogent reply, see Larry 
Eugene Jones, "Franz von Papen, Catholic Conservatives, and the Establishment of the Third Reich, 1933-
1934," The Journal of Modern History 83, 2 (June 2011): 272-318. The Austrian and German concordats 




4. The Consolidation of the Church-State Bind 
 
The bid of the Vatican's new functionaries to expand Vatican influence in Europe through legal 
instruments was thus surprisingly successful. Between 1922 and 1933, the Vatican concluded a 
total of eleven concordats, in addition to several less binding agreements, known as modus 
vivendi. All of these agreements had the effect of militating against the separation of Church and 
state, creating regimes in which influence was shared between the two powers. The speed and 
frequency with which concordats were concluded was nothing short of spectacular. In eleven 
years, the Vatican's bureaucrats concluded so many concordats that they represented over 25% 
of the total concluded over nine centuries of Church history. Furthermore, the Vatican's failure 
rate was very low: only in two cases -- the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia -- were concordats 
unsuccessful, either due to insurmountable opposition within the Vatican on the advisability of 
the negotiations, as was the case with the Soviet Union, or due to parliamentary opposition to 
the ratification of the concordat, which blocked progress in Yugoslavia. 
 The Vatican's expansion of influence through legal means -- before and after concordats 
-- was just as impressive. As we have seen, states that hoped to win the Vatican's favor 
independently implemented a large number of laws which were in line with Church priorities, 
including measures outlawing divorce and Freemasonry, and severely curbing the rights of other 
religious groups. Furthermore, concordats themselves did not remain a dead letter, and were 
implemented either partially or completely in all of the countries with which they were signed. 
Indeed, the only states that dared violate limited sections of the concordat -- like Italy and 
Germany -- paid the consequences, in the form of large-scale name and shame campaigns 
pursued in the court of international opinion. On two occasions, Italy bent to the pressure; after 
two attempts to limit concordat gains (in 1931 and 1938), it promptly reverted to the original 




tried to patch up relations with the Vatican during World War II, for instance by giving the Pope 
extensive guarantees regarding the future of Rome and Vatican City. 
 Furthermore, that the Vatican's struggle for influence after World War I was successful is 
also demonstrated by the fact that the theocracy was increasingly invited to participate in 
"international society," and hailed as a prominent European power by observers of various 
political stripes. In the 1920s, the Vatican for instance played a leading role in helping settle a 
territorial dispute between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti, via a Treaty of 
Arbitration.83 The Vatican also joined the International Labor Organization thanks to the 
urgings of the ILO's first director, Albert Thomas, and took part in some of the most important 
conferences of the decade, including those that sought to further disarmament and limit the 
possibility of war.84 Even unsympathetic observers increasingly took stock of the growing 
centrality of the Vatican. As noted above, in 1924 Antonio Gramsci for instance asserted that the 
Vatican had shown itself to be "without doubt the vastest and most powerful private 
organization ever to exist [and] one of the most effective political forces in history."85  
 By virtue of its concordat diplomacy, the Vatican also became of interest to prominent 
legal scholars of the interwar years.  Figures as unrelated as J.T. Delos and Carl Schmitt for 
instance discussed the Vatican as an entity endowed with a new measure of influence in 
European legal and political affairs.86 Bringing the Vatican into debates about ethnic and 
                                                            
83 "Treaty of Arbitration between the Dominican Republic and the Republic of Haiti," FRUS, 1920, vol.1, 
309-10. 
 
84 Liliosa Azara, "The United States, the Vatican and the League of Nations: The Disarmament Conference 
of 1932," in Pius XI and America, ed. Alberto Melloni (forthcoming); and Charles Gallagher, S.J., "The 
Fruits of Perseverance: The Roman Catholic Church, the ILO and the Search for Social Justice," 
unpublished paper presented at Christian Democrat Internationalism in Europe, Rome, September 27, 
2012. 
 
85 " Il Vaticano è senza dubbio la più vasta e potente organizzazione privata che sia mai esistita. Ha, per 
certi aspetti, il carattere di uno Stato ed è riconosciuto come tale da un certo numero di governi [...] [É] 
una delle forze politiche più efficienti della storia moderna." Giovanni Masci [Antonio Gramsci], "Il 
Vaticano," Correspondance Internationale (March 12, 1924). As cited in Antonio Gramsci, La costruzione 





religious homogeneity under the state, the French international lawyer Robert Redslob 
defended the idea that international law could revitalize itself by heeding the example of the "co-
existence of Church and state" in Europe, which showed how the intermingling of religious and 
national identities could strengthen states.87 On the other side of the Atlantic, American lawyers 
similarly noted the "unquestioned significance" of the Vatican's concordat diplomacy, and its re-
establishment of a "proper regard for religious authority" in Europe as a whole.88  
 Finally, the Vatican's growing post-World War I influence is demonstrated by the 
expansion of its diplomatic relations with European and non-European states. If in 1913, there 
were only fourteen nations represented at the Vatican and five papal nuncios abroad, by 1922, 
twenty-five nations were represented there and twenty-five nuncios were abroad.89 And as will 




World War I had created the opportunity for the Vatican to establish its influence in European 
affairs, and in the process transform itself into a new kind of political actor. Pope Benedict XV's 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
86 J. T. Delos, "Le Traité du Latran et la situation juridique nouvelle de la Papauté," in Revue générale de 
droit international public (1929); Carl Schmitt, Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form (1923; 
Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2008). 
 
87 "La loyauté civique, tout en ayant elle aussi une trame idéale, est viable aux côtés d'une allégeance 
ethnique. Ce n'est point là, par ailleurs, le seul exemple d'un parallélisme entre des sentiments de 
convergence dissemblambles. [Par exemple, il y a aussi] la coexistence de l'État et de l'Église. Le 
catholique a deux patries, l'une d'elles est mondiale." Robert Redslob, Le Principe des nationalités (Paris: 
Librairie du Receuil Sirey, 1930), 239-40. On Robert Redslob's attempt to revitalize international law in 
this direction, see Nathaniel Berman, "'But the Alternative is Despair': European Nationalism and the 
Modernist Renewal of International Law," Harvard Law Review 106, 8 (June 1993): 1792-1903, 
especially 1808-1821. 
 
88 Joseph P. Bartilucci, "Six Years of Fascist Legislation," American Bar Association Journal 15, 8 (August 
1929): 473-5, 473. 
 
89 Raymond Buell, “The Vatican and the World,” Current History 16 (New York, 1922), 980. This growth 
was in part due to the spectacular expansion of the Vatican's diplomatic apparatus, and partly due, of 





1917 peace platform marked the point of departure, and concordat diplomacy its actualization. 
Throughout, the Vatican had couched its novel political project -- the construction of Church-
state duopolies -- as an alternative to liberal and communist internationalism. 
 In the years after World War I, the Vatican thus drafted and pursued a rhetorical and 
legal-diplomatic strategy that began to restore it a great degree of influence in European affairs. 
Through concordat diplomacy, the Vatican reconfigured Church-state relations by enshrining a 
regime of collaboration. Additionally, concordat diplomacy allowed the Vatican to erect itself as 
the leader of the Catholic world, and it increased its ability to shape public and private life, in 
domains as varied as education and family law. The Vatican's enterprise matters because it 
contributed to the rise of a religious third-way politics that was conditionally aligned with 
Europe's new right-wing political factions, and opposed to liberalism and communism. 
Additionally, the Vatican's actions furthered ideals of religious homogeneity under the state, 
over and against the League regime of minority rights protections, and communist attempts to 
diminish the power of religion in public and private affairs.  
 Finally, concordat diplomacy matters because it gave the Vatican the freedom to lead 
(and in some cases, create and expand) the organs of Catholic associational life, which were 
open to children and adults, and men and women, from a range of social classes. Indeed, the 
pursuit of concordats and the expansion of Vatican influence through Catholic associational life 
went hand in hand. Both projects showed that the Vatican could work with European states, all 











The problem: [...] the existence of the masses, [and] the creation of the sober, moral, decency 
that we had, and lost in the war. [...] The method: only the "club" in the American sense [...] 
Other means I do not know, as authoritarian means [...] have completely failed -- except in the 
form of the Church.  
-- Max Weber, 19181  
 
 
The teachings and ministry of the Church aim to [...] call back civil society to ways 
conformable to the spirit of Christ, which at one time all followed.  





The Vatican did not signal its decision to make peace with the nation-state through concordat 
diplomacy alone. It also did so through the centralization and mobilization of Catholic 
associational life. Doing so allowed the Vatican to show its willingness to disown Christian 
Democratic political movements in order to partner with emerging forces more willing to accept 
the joint sovereignty model.  The expansion of the Vatican in the realm of associational life 
would also show the Vatican's power in social affairs, and provide it with bargaining power in its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 "Solange so massive technische und ökonomische Probleme den Kopf gefangennehmen, wie das jetzt der 
Fall ist und sein wird -- es handelt sich um die nackte Existenz der Massen --, kommt man zu den 
Kulturproblemen innerlich nicht recht. Auch von diesen steht die Arbeit an der Herstellung jener ganz 
nüchternen moralischen 'Anständigkeit,' die wir -- im grossen gesehen -- hatten, und die wir im Krieg 
verloren haben -- der schwerste Kriegsverlust -- durchaus obenan. Also ganz massive Erziehungsfragen. 
Mittel: nur das amerikanische Klubwesen, einerlei zu welchem Zweck: Ansätze dazu finden sich bei der 
'Freideutschen Jugend.' Andere Mittel kenne ich nicht, da das Autoritäre -- dem ich ganz vorurteilslos 
gegenüberstehe -- jetzt völlig versagt, ausser in Form der Kirche." Letter of Max Weber to Friedrich 
Crusius, Frankfurt, 24 November 1918. As reprinted in Max Weber: Werk und Person, ed. Eduard 
Baumgarten (Tübingen: Paul Siebeck, 1964), 536-7. 
 
2 Pius XI, Rerum Omnium Perturbationem (January 26, 1923), §1. All citations in English are drawn from 
the Holy See's official translation of the encyclical. Encyclicals--Pius XI--The Holy See -The Holy Father, 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_26011923_rerum-




relations with its European allies. Thus, the Vatican's cotemporaneous pursuit of concordat 
diplomacy and associational culture went hand in hand: the first provided the Vatican with the 
sanction of Europe's politicians and the promise of protection against liberal and communist 
internationalism; the second, a way to pressure European citizens -- and European states -- to 
grant the Vatican influence. Without the Vatican's integration of associational culture, its 
expansion of its influence in Europe and its creation of defensive strategies for maintaining that 
influence would have been incomplete.  
 In the years following World War I, the Vatican sought to respond to new forms of civil 
religiosity by centralizing a vast array of European Catholic organizations. During the fin-de-
siècle, the rise in literacy rates and new communication and transportation technologies had 
facilitated the burgeoning of new forms of civil religiosity across Europe and the Americas. 3 
However, as new scholarship has shown, many of these movements had been aligned with 
emergent bourgeois nationalist states against the Vatican. For instance, during the 
Risorgimento many Catholic movements and symbolic repertoires (e.g., the idea of martyrdom) 
played a crucial role in shaping ideas of nationality, as new varieties of civil religion challenged 
the more traditional Catholic forms with which the Vatican was familiar.4 Similar movements 
sprung up during the Great War. For though World War I interrupted the culture wars that had 
pitted anti-clerical factions against the Catholic Church for the better part of forty years, it !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For an overview of the explosion of civil society activism in the late nineteenth century, which however 
ignores the important question of hegemony, see Akira Iriye, Cultural Internationalism and World Order 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), chs.1-2. Also see the classic Benedict Anderson, 
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983). 
 
4 See Simon Levis Sullam, "'Dio e il Popolo': la rivoluzione religiosa di Giuseppe Mazzini," Enrico Francia, 
"'Il nuovo Cesare è la patria': clero e religione nel lungo Quarantotto italiano," and Daniele Menozzi, "I 
gesuiti, Pio IX e la nazione italiana," all in Storia D'Italia: Il Risorgimento, eds. Alberto Mario Banti and 
Paul Ginsborg, vol. 22 of Storia d'Italia: annali (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1007), 401-422; 423-51; 451-181; Lucy 
Riall, "Martyr Cults in Nineteenth-Century Italy," Journal of Modern History 82, 2 (2010): 255-87; 
Roberto Balzani, "Alla ricerca della morte 'utile': il sacrificio patriottico nel Risorgimento," in La morte 
per la patria: la celebrazione dei caduti dal Risorgimento alla Repubblica, eds. Oliver Janz and Lutz 
Klinkhammer (Rome: Donzelli, 2008), 3-22; Giovanni Vian, "Chiesa, cattolici e costruzione dello Stato," 
in Fare l'Italia: unità e disunità nel Risorgimento (Turin: UTET, 2008), 233-45.  For a useful overview, 
see Maurizio Isabella, "Review Article: Rethinking Italy's Nation-Building 150 Afterwards: The New 




simultaneously spawned a new kind of civil religion that risked undermining the Vatican's 
central authority. From the earliest weeks of war, lay Catholics and clergy members signed up to 
defend their nation-states, and normally anti-clerical state leaders welcomed their assistance. 
Soon, the Central Powers invoked God against the Allies, and the Allies did likewise, summoning 
a rhetorical union sacrée, based on a shared foi patriotique. Hybrid nationalist-religious 
frameworks imbued events with meaning, as armies of dead and wounded were beatified as 
martyrs and endowed with Christ's power to save humanity through self-immolation. Poets sang 
of the war as cleansing the continent of sin; mothers, with state support, did the same. Young 
women and men were venerated as saints possessing miraculous powers to end the fighting and 
alleviate pain.5 
 The Vatican's centralization of Catholic associational life after World War I not only 
constituted a reply to the civil religiosity that had sprung up independent of the Pope over the 
previous fifty years; it also sought to provide an alternative to those associations which -- it was 
thought -- directly sought to undermine the Pope's authority. These included a variety of 
socialist organizations, as well as the Communist International, or Comintern (founded in 1919), 
and the network of organizations active after World War I, keen on exporting the so-called 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The notion of a "union sacrée" based on a shared "foi patriotique" was initially proposed by the French 
President Raymond Poincaré in a message of August 1914 to the French national assembly. Recent 
scholarship on the fusion of religiosity and patriotism during the war includes James F. Byrnes, Catholic 
and French Forever: Religious and National Identity in Modern France (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2005), part III; Stephen Schloesser, Jazz Age Catholicism: Mystic Modernism in 
Postwar Paris, 1919-1933 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), esp. ch.2; Annette Becker, War 
and Faith: Religious Imagination in France, 1914-1930 (New York: Berg, 1998); James F. McMillan, 
"French Catholics, Rumeurs Infames and the Union Sacrée, 1914-1918," in Authority, Identity and the 
Social History of the Great War, eds. Frans Coetzee and Marilyn Shevin Coetzee (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 1995), 113-32; Raymond Jonas, The Tragic Tale of Claire Ferchaud and the Great War (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005); Claudia Schlager, Kult und Krieg: Herz Jesu, Sacré Coeur, Christus 
Rex im deutsch-französischen Vergleich, 1914-1925 (Tübingen: Tübingen Vereinigung für Volkskunde, 
2011); Carlo Stiaccini, L'anima religiosa della Grande Guerra: testimonianze popolari tra fede e 
superstizione (Rome: Aracne, 2009); Sergio Luzzatto, Padre Pio: Micracles and Politics in a Secular Age, 
trans. Frederika Randall (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2010); and Suzanne Evans, Mothers of Heroes, 





American way of life, via Protestant missionary activity, Freemasonry, or Rotary International.6 
Worrisome as well were Christian Democratic organizations, which sought to exercise their 
independence from the Pope and which in countries like Italy and Germany risked undermining 
the Vatican's concordat negotiations with rival political factions. 
 For the sake of clarity and to signal in summary form some of my core theses about the 
function of the Vatican's associational culture, I will refer to the Vatican's attempt to seize 
control of Catholic associational life as the struggle for "civil society." I use the term civil society 
to signal a cultural space that is formally independent from the state, and which constitutes a 
way to maintain social order without the use of force. Following Antonio Gramsci, I suggest that 
within civil society, groups exercise hegemony -- i.e., they take part in dynamic process that aim 
to build consent, by representing their narrow interests as universal ones, and attempting to 
exclude threatening visions and discourses. 7 As compared to others groups, the Vatican's 
capture of civil society built on religiosity, rather than what Gramsci and others understood as 
organized professional or class interests. I argue that since the Vatican did not have access after 
1870 to an army with any real power, the capture of civil society became an all the more 
important undertaking, which showed European states the Vatican's potential influence over !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 On the spread of Protestant missionary activity in Europe after the Great War, see R. Laurence Moore, 
"American Religion as Cultural Imperialism," in The American Century in Europe, eds. R. Laurence 
Moore and Maurizio Vadagna (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), 151-71. On Freemasonry, see 
Freemasonry on Both Sides of the Atlantic: Essays Concerning the Craft in the British Isles, Europe, the 
United States, and Mexico, eds. R. William Weisberger, Wallace McLeod and S. Brent Morris (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2002). On Rotary International, see Victoria De Grazia, "The Service Ethic: 
How Bourgeois Men Made Peace with Babbittry," in Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through 
Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 15-74.  
 
7 See Antonio Gramsci, Gli intellettuali e l'organizzazione della cultura (Turin: Einaudi, 1949); and of 
course Quaderni del carcere, ed. Valentino Gerratana, 4 vols. (Turin: Einaudi, 1975). A selection of 
Gramsci's texts on civil society and hegemony have been reprinted in English, in The Gramsci Reader: 
Selected Writings, 1916-1935, ed. David Forgacs (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 189-222; 
and Civil Society Reader, eds. Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley (Hanover: University Press 
of New England for Tufts University, 2003), 190-203. Of course, neither the term hegemony (perhaps 
first used by Thucydides in his History of the Peleponnesian War) nor the phrase "civil society" is 
exclusive to Gramsci. On how the Fascist regime built an (imperfect) "culture of consent" through similar 
instruments in these same years, see Victoria De Grazia, The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of 




public opinion. Further, though Catholic civil society structures could, at times, curb the secular 
state, they more often worked in partnership with it; in this way, they did not represent the 
critical challenge to sovereign power that scholars have recently argued is typical of civil society 
structures.8 
 The period immediately following World War I marked the first concerted Vatican effort 
to capture civil society, and make it impermeable to potentially dangerous influences. Small 
wonder that the first Pope to strongly encourage the move was Achille Ratti, the father of 
concordat diplomacy in Eastern Europe, who in 1922 had left his post as Archbishop of Milan to 
become Pope Pius XI. By this point, concordat diplomacy was well on its ways towards helping 
the Vatican reconfigure Church-state relations in Europe and forge connections with the anti-
communist and anti-liberal leaders of many of these states. But as early objectors to concordat 
diplomacy noted, concordats risked making the Vatican overly dependent on the maintenance in 
power of rulers of the moment, binding them closely to the whims of human politics, and 
potentially compromising the institution's universalist message. Unhappy with the concordat 
turn, a prominent Vatican official noted in a 1921 letter to a fellow cleric that "a prevalence of too 
much politics, worldly diplomacy and intrigue" was "hardly in keeping with the lofty ideals of 
our mission, nor profitable to the best interests of God and his Church." Indeed, "at a time when 
the world has lost its bearings," he concluded, "we should not drift ourselves, or appear to juggle 
with principles."9  
 Even supporters of concordat diplomacy agreed that the Vatican's over-dependence on 
cultivating closed-door agreements with politicians might, in the long run, jeopardize its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The notion of civil society as that which can challenge the state is articulated by Jean Cohen and Andrew 
Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992). For recent attempts to 
apply this model of civil society to the color revolutions, see Valerie Bunch and Sharon Wolchik, Defeating 
Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and 
Andrew Wilson, Virtual Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2005). 
 
9 Merry Del Val to Cardinal O’Connell, Archbishop of Boston, November 1921. As cited in Gerald Fogarty, 




relations with the citizens of those states, and with a powerfully resurgent transnational 
associational culture. As Achille Ratti personally informed the Vatican Secretary of State 
Gasparri in 1921, "In many countries there are marvelous [Catholic] works and associations, 
regarding science, instruction, the social question, charity, press and propaganda." The Vatican 
would do well to attempt to "unite these various organizations," into a global force capable of 
"promoting mutually favorable international actions, wherever the community of Catholic 
interests requires them." It was urgent for the Vatican to act, for "any observer" saw clearly that 
the postwar order was not simply a world of states; it was also characterized by the remarkable 
"growth of the movement across the whole world of a push towards universal union." If the 
Vatican ignored the rise of what I am here calling civil society, it risked being left behind the 
times. Thus, Ratti concluded, cultivating and uniting Catholic civil society constituted "clearly a 
highly worthy and necessary goal."10 The insight was very Wilsonian; after all, in these same 
years the American president was encouraging several organizations in his own country to work 
together, and take advantage of new technologies to travel widely and spread a supposedly 
unique American culture of freedom, prosperity and democratic values.11 Thus, the Vatican 
increasingly realized that turning to civil society -- and cultivating a transnational community of 
its own -- was a necessary move.  
 During the early years of Pius XI's papacy, the awareness of the need to discipline 
Catholic lay organizations took the name "Catholic Action." Prior to Pius XI, the phrase Catholic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 “Chiunque consideri attentamente il movimento che ogni giorno più si va intensificando nel mondo 
intero a favore d’una unione universale, non può dubitare un istante che i cattolici, essi pure, abbiano 
interesse di valersi di questa incomparabile forza. La religione e la morale fanno sì ch’essi si sentanto 
strettamente uniti in seno alla loro Chiesa una e universale; ma tuttavia, quantunque esistano in molti 
paesi opere e associazioni meravigliose nei riguardi della scienza e dell’insegnamento, delle questioni 
sociali propriamente dette, della carità sociale, della stampa e della propaganda, esse sono in massima 
parte, disgiunte e separate. Creare un’unione delle diverse organizzazioni [...] nell’intento di promovere di 
comune accordo un’azione internazionale, ove la comunità degli interessi cattolici lo richieda, appare fine 
sì elevato e d’una evidenza tale che s’impone senz’altro nei tempi che corrono.” Letter of Achille Ratti, 
Archbishop of Milan, to Pietro Gasparri, “Regolamento provvisorio dell’Ufficio centrale,” 1 March 1921. 
ASV, AES Stati Ecclesiastici (quarto periodo), 1922-1934, pos.293 P.O., fasc.19, ff.17. 
 
11 Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe 




action (and "the action of Catholics") had been used rather loosely to refer to Catholic lay 
activism on the Italian peninsula, and from 1904-5, Pius X had begun using the phrase as 
shorthand for four pre-existing lay organizations in Italy, whose strong Ultramontanism stood 
in sharp contrast to the Christian Democratic movements which were taking shape, and viewed 
as suspect by large swaths of Vatican officialdom. Indeed, Pius X had turned to these 
organizations in the same year he was under pressure to lift the non expedit ban, which allowed 
Catholics to participate in electoral politics.12   
 In 1922, Pius XI further extended Pius X's early attempts to exert Vatican control over 
Catholic lay activism, and during the years between 1922 and 1939, the integration of civil 
society into Catholic Action became a privileged strategy. In 1922, Pius XI encouraged Vatican 
officials to draft the statutes of the new "Catholic Action," which would henceforth apply to only 
six organizations (three male, and three female), all of which would have clerics, rather than 
laypeople, in the highest positions of leadership. Its six organizations aimed to follow children, 
youth, and adults  "from the cradle to the grave," by providing them with a range of after-school 
and after-work activities capable of communicating the Vatican's hegemonic project.  
Increasingly, Catholic Action helped the Vatican cultivate a loyal body of subjects, which was 
committed to a project of total Catholic reconquest of society, via the creation of a greater union 
between Church and state.  
 The Vatican's activism in civil society, for all its universalist claims, crucially never 
sought to overturn or eliminate other states.13 Similarly, Catholic Action had a direct stake in 
protecting the status quo. This was because Catholic Action enjoyed early success in the 1920s 
and 1930s precisely thanks to its protection by individual concordats. These concordats enabled 
the organization to maintain sites of association, publish an impressive number of pamphlets !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 For Pope Pius X's first extended discussion of Catholic action, see Il fermo proposito (June 11, 1905), 
§2; §8; §11-2.  
 
13 In this sense, Catholic Action mirrored many American transnational civil society organizations, which 




and newspapers, and hold public, and quite visible, demonstrations. Just as concordats granted 
the Vatican extensive privileges in exchange for support of the constituted political forces, 
Catholic Action was allowed to grow on the condition that it not undermine the ruling political 
class. Thus, though its universalist ambitions sometimes brought it into conflict with ruling 
forces, Catholic Action could only succeed in virtue of concordat diplomacy, and was able to stay 
afloat by fighting to protect concordat gains. This meant that the line between the state's 
imposition of hegemony via civil society and the Vatican's parallel project was in some cases 
difficult to perceive. After all, the state had sought the Vatican's allegiance not least because it 
was aware of its command of a portion of civil society.  As Gramsci had himself noted in the 
1930s, as he tried to work out the transformations in Italian society from prison, it seemed that 
the Fascists had "joined with the Church to better maintain their monopoly [on power], through 
the support of that sector of civil society represented by the Church." 14 But a condition of that 
allegiance had precisely been that the Vatican's civil society structures not undermine the core 
ideological and institutional commitments of the state. 
 In this chapter, I limit myself to providing some essential background on Catholic 
Action. To that end, I will perform a close reading of Pius XI's first text presenting Vatican-led 
lay associations as capable of protecting the world against liberal democracies and international 
communism, all the while strengthening Vatican claims to influence in the European state 
system. Then, I analyze the contents of the Vatican's new statutes regulating Catholic civil 
society, which invented Catholic Action as an intellectual construct and really existing social 
force. Following this, I focus on the Pope's creation of the Feast of Christ the King, and how this 
Feast sought to translate a certain theory of civil society into practice. Finally, I highlight the 
internationalization of Catholic Action in the 1920s and early 1930s, to show how the expansion !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 "...la Chiesa è diventata una parte integrante dello stato, della società politica monopolizzata da un 
determinato gruppo privilegiato che si aggrega alla Chiesa per sostenere meglio il suo monopolio col 
sostegno di quella zona di società civile rappresentata dalla Chiesa)." Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere, 
vol.2, Quaderno 6 (1930-2), §81. Gramsci's passage applies exclusively to Italy, but I think his insight has 




of Catholic civil society both strengthened Vatican relations with European allies and pressured 
them into expanding the Vatican's influence at home and abroad. 
 
1. The Origins of Catholic Action  
  
The birth of Catholic Action in the early 1920s was announced in three important documents 
issued by the Vatican. The first two were encyclicals, or circular letters to the faithful. The third 
was the text of the 1923 statutes of Catholic Action, which outlined the precise form that the new 
organization would take. Together, these three texts presented the notion that the conquest of 
civil society through Catholic Action would be a powerful way to expand Vatican influence, make 
the Vatican attractive to European states, and centralize authority, by casting a Vatican-
mandated Catholic Action as the only valid form of Catholic associational life.   
 Pius XI issued his first defense of Catholic Action in his very first encyclical, published a 
scant two months after Mussolini's seizure of power, in December of 1922. To date, scholars who 
have analyzed Ubi arcano have noted that the text aims to underscore the antithesis between 
secularism and the Catholic Church, and provide a series of practical recommendations for 
bringing Catholicism into daily life.15 Others have emphasized how the text displays Pius XI's 
presumed sympathies with authoritarianism writ large, and with the Fascist state in particular.16 
Though both of these interpretations are plausible, the first is overly vague, and the second 
overly narrow. Both miss the central point of the encyclical, which was to announce to Mussolini !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See, e.g., Carlo Falconi, I Papi del ventesimo secolo (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1967), 219; Idem, Le silence de 
Pie XII, 1939-1945 (Munich: Éditions du Rocher, 1965), 8; Roger Aubert, "L'insegnamento dottrinale di 
Pio XI," in Pio XI nel trentesimo della morte (1939-1969): raccolta di studi e di memorie, ed. Carlo 
Colombo et al. (Milan: Opera diocesana per la preservazione e diffusione della fede, 1969), 224ff. 
 
16 See, e.g., Fabrice Bouthillon, La naissance de la mardité: une théologie politique à l'âge totalitaire 
(Strasbourg: Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 2001), 49ff; Gerd-Rainer Horn, Western European 
Liberation Theology: The First Wave (1924-1959) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 56-8; Oscar 
L. Arnal, Ambivalent Alliance: The Catholic Church and Action Française, 1899-1939 (Pittsburg, Pa.: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985), 118-120; and Alan Paul Fimister, Robert Schuman: Neo-Scholastic 




and other European powers that the Vatican's civil society could be a useful tool in the fight 
against Wilsonian and Leninist settlements. Indeed, Pius XI's encyclical, Ubi arcano Dei 
consiglio, was a weapon of statesmanship explicitly directed to both the city of Rome and the 
world (urbi et orbi). It suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union were the cause of 
continued social and political strife in the aftermath of war. Instead of turning to either of these 
powers, Pius suggested, European states must turn to the Vatican. Further, true peace depended 
on the double restoration of the Vatican in European society via concordat diplomacy and 
through a powerfully centralized Catholic civil society. 
 Imitating similar statements issued by Pope Benedict, the encyclical began by 
denouncing Versailles' failure to bring about "true peace," by pointing to the presumed postwar 
proliferation of obscene and lawless behavior, the high frequency of "famine and epidemics," 
and, worst of all, the rise of a "restless spirit of revolt" (i.e., left-wing revolution) which 
continually kept alive the "threat of war." If the world order was not reoriented, this state of 
affairs, the text warned, would lead society to "lapse back slowly but surely into a state of 
barbarism."17 
 The encyclical then outlined its simple solution to this chaotic state of affairs: the 
recognition of the Vatican as a privileged partner of European states. As the text argued, the 
Vatican was the sole institution up to the task because of its divine constitution, its national and 
supranational identity, and its unique ability to protect civilization writ large. "There exists an 
institution," the encyclical proclaimed, "able to safeguard the sanctity of the law of nations [...] 
Such an institution is the Church of Christ and [it] is divinely commissioned to lead mankind." 
Celebrating the Vatican's new acceptance of a legal regime of shared sovereignty (inaugurated by 
concordat diplomacy), the text further asserted: "This institution is a part of every nation; at the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Pius XI, Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio (23 December 1922), §7; §10-15. All citations in English are drawn 
from the Holy See's official translation of the encyclical. Encyclicals--Pius XI--The Holy See -The Holy 
Father, <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-




same time, it is above all nations."18 Picking up on the language of international relations, the 
Pope thus announced the Vatican to be the only entity capable of protecting the "law of nations" 
-- that is, that psychodiplomatic construct presumably held together by a system of rationally 
derived rules, established by the "civilized nations" of the world.19 
 The Vatican was ideally suited to the task of partnering with European states and 
salvaging "civilization" because it was an absolute monarchy, capable of countering destabilizing 
Wilsonian-inspired democracies. As the encyclical suggested, only "kings" and "kingdoms," 
which the text mentioned on twenty-four occasions, were capable of bringing about peace; 
parliamentary deputies and democracies were not. "Contests between political parties beget 
threats of popular action and, at times, eventuate in open rebellion," the encyclical noted, 
showing how Wilsonian democracy could actually result in left-wing unrest. Thus, "our modern 
democratic states" were the ones "most exposed to the danger of being overthrown by one 
faction or another." 20  Democracy was unstable, dangerous, and divisive, and an important 
reason for the bankruptcy of the Wilsonian Versailles settlement. Only absolute monarchies in 
general -- and the Vatican in particular -- could remedy the damage done.  
 The encyclical went out to specify that the monarchic institution of the Vatican could 
solve the problem of postwar disorder only with support from the wider world. As Pius XI 
announced in 1922, the Vatican must be recognized as a legitimate player in international affairs 
by being encouraged to pursue concordat diplomacy, and -- despite its failure to take part in the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Ibid., §46.  
 
19 This definition of the "law of nations" is drawn from Sir William Blackstone, "Of Offenses against the 
Law of Nations," in Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765-1769), book 4, 
ch. 5. The word "psychodiplomatic" is borrowed from Arno Mayer, Wilson vs. Lenin, 368. On the 
implications of issuing universalistic and self-aggrandizing pronouncements on behalf of "civilized 
nations" (also referred to in interwar documents as "the society of nations" and "all civilized peoples"), see 
Mark Mazower, "The End of Civilization and the Rise of Human Rights: The Mid-Twentieth-Century 
Disjuncture," in Human Rights and the Twentieth Century, ed. Stefan-Ludwig Hoffman (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 29-45; and Gerrit W. Gong, The Standard of 'Civilization' in 
International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
 




Paris Peace Conference -- by being invited to play an active role in the League of Nations.21 
Without the Vatican's assistance, the text proclaimed, "no merely human institution of today can 
be successful in devising a set of international laws which will be in harmony with world 
conditions." In a playful turn of phrase, the text noted that only men of "the Middle Ages were in 
possession of that true League of Nations, Christianity." Second, the encyclical affirmed, the 
Vatican could guarantee "true peace" only if it was granted the freedom to integrate and 
organize civil society. Of late, the text explained, the Vatican had become "intensely interested" 
in "that whole group of movements, organizations, and works [...] which passes under the name 
of 'Catholic Action.'" Making reference to Luigi Sturzo and the claims to independence of 
Christian Democracy, the encyclical asked priests around the world to emphasize the 
importance of the laity's partnership with the ecclesiastical hierarchy, over and against divisive 
Christian democratic movements that had encouraged lay independence from the hierarchy. 
"Tell your faithful children of the laity," the encyclical urged its clerical readers, "that when they 
are united with their pastors and their bishops, [Catholics] participate in the work of the 
apostolate" and as such become "more than ever a 'chosen generation, a Kingly priesthood,' a 
holy nation." The Vatican had the right and duty to control lay Catholics because they were by 
definition "subjects" of the Pope-king, and "those who are subjects," the encyclical explained, 
have the "duty to obey." 22  
 Speaking in one breath to state leaders, clergymen, and lay Catholics the world around, 
Ubi arcano Dei proclaimed that the Pope had a solution to the Versailles settlement and to the 
proliferation of left-wing unrest. This solution was the Vatican itself; an institution which not 
only contained significant legal-practical expertise, but also mobilized large numbers of 
individuals around the world.  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Ibid., §13; §29; §30; §46; §48; §67-7. In fact, the Vatican would be let in through the back door, so to 
speak, as it joined organizations like the ILO. For a broader discussion, see section four of Chapter Two. 




2. Centralizing Catholic Associations and Purging Democratic Forces 
 
In December of 1922, as Ubi arcano Dei was being issued to the public, the Vatican initiated its 
practical reinvention of Catholic lay activism on the Italian peninsula through the rewriting of 
Catholic Action's core statutes. The statutes aimed to put the Vatican at the head of Catholic civil 
society, and counter alternative forms of civil religiosity. But the reform also had a secondary 
aim: to show Mussolini the Pope's willingness to partner with the Fascist movement and 
distance the Vatican from the Italian Christian Democratic (Popular) Party, by diminishing its 
power in civil society.  
 Working with Pietro Gasparri's assistance, Pius XI began by creating a Catholic Action 
national executive body, the Central Committee (Giunta Centrale), to which a series of top-
ranking Vatican officials were promptly appointed. Pius XI gave Monsignor Giuseppe Pizzardo, 
a new functionary who had served in the Vatican Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical 
Affairs and in its Secretariat of State, the leading position, as General Ecclesiastical Assistant.23 
Neither he nor any of the other officials the Pope chose for the Central Committee had sympathy 
for the Italian Popular Party, nor did any of the lay Catholics the Pope appointed as national 
body presidents. Most, like Ratti, nursed a general suspicion not only about the Italian Christian 
Democratic movement, but also about democracy writ large. 24 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 For more on Giuseppe Pizzardo's background and contribution to Catholic Action, see Giuliana 
Chamedes, "Il Cardinal Pizzardo e l'internazionalizzazione dell'Azione Cattolica," in Gouvernement 
pontifical sous Pie XI, ed. Laura Pettinaroli (Rome: École française de Rome, 2013).  
 
24 In addition to Pizzardo, other Central Committee members suspicious of the PPI included the 
Secretary-General under Pizzardo, Monsignor Fernando Roveda, and lay presidents Luigi Civardi, Maria 
Rimoldi, and Armida Barelli. One of the first actions taken by the newly constituted Central Committee 
was to compile an extensive report on how Catholic activism was being undermined by the existence of 
the Popular Party. See Mario Casella, "Per una storia dei rapporti tra Azione Cattolica e fascismo nell'età 
di Pio XI. Indagine nell'Archivio dell'Azione Cattolica Italia," in Chiesa, Azione cattolica e fascismo 
nell'Italia settentrionale durante il pontificato di Pio XI, ed. Paolo Pecorari (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1979), 
1200-26, and Francesco Traniello, Religione cattolica e stato nazionale, dal Risorgimento al secondo 




 On September 1923, Pius XI issued Catholic Action's new statutes -- perhaps, not 
incidentally, soon after Mussolini rescued the Vatican's Bank of Rome from financial difficulties. 
From this point on, "Catholic Action" became the name for the only accepted form of Catholic 
lay activism on the Italian peninsula. This "Catholic Action," the reform announced, should not 
entangle itself with politics, in the sense that it should not serve as the backbone of any specific 
(read, Christian Democratic) political party. It should be bound tightly to the Pope and the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy, and it should be required as mandatory of all lay Catholics, regardless of 
age, sex, or social class.25  
 The 1923 statutes announced that henceforth, "Catholic Action" would refer exclusively 
to six major organizations placed under the direct oversight of a Vatican-appointed cleric.26 The 
first was a youth organization, which would concern itself primarily with socialization to the 
faith. The second was an organization for university students, which would busy itself with 
drafting theoretical alternatives to leading rival worldviews. The third branch of Catholic Action, 
an adult organization, would be concerned with protecting Vatican gains and expanding the 
reach of Catholic worldviews in the workplace, in state legislation, and in family life. Each of the 
three branches would have independent male and female groups.27  
 To ensure that Catholic Action's activities conformed with papal priorities, the reform 
placed a Vatican official at the pinnacle of the structure, as the leader of Central Committee. The 
statute specified in articles 7 through 17 and 37 through 40 that the Central Committee would be 
the "directive and coordinating organ of all action," and be recognized as the "representative of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 See "Statuto dell'Azione Cattolica Italiana del 1923," article 6, as reprinted in Gli Statuti dell'Azione 
Cattolica Italiana, ed. Ernesto Preziosi (Rome: AVE, 2003), 137-51, here 138. 
 
26 The three male organizations were the Federazione Italiana degli Uomini Cattolici, the Società della 
Gioventù Cattolica Italia and the Federazione Universitaria Cattolica Italiana, while the three female 
organizations were the Unione fra le Donne Cattoliche d'Italia, the Gioventù Femminile Cattolica Italiana, 
and the Universitarie Cattoliche Italiane. 
 
27 "[I] problemi che toccano i cattolici appartenenti a più organizzazioni [sono] il decoro del culto, 
manifestazioni religiose pubbliche, difesa della scuola cristiana, propagazione della fede, difesa della 




the collective of organized Italian Catholics." In addition to providing Catholic Action with its 
"rules," and "monitoring the functioning of all institutions," the Central Committee would also 
make sure that local clerics were implementing the organization, by "promoting Catholic Action 
where and when necessary."28 To be an active member of Catholic Action, individuals would 
have to purchase a membership card, at a price to be established by the Central Committee.29 
 In explaining the 1923 statutes, Pius XI innovatively defined Catholic Action as the 
"collaboration of the laity in the apostolate of the hierarchy." The phrase was a nod to an 
increasingly popular ecclesiology, according to which the Church was a community of faithful, in 
which clergy and laypeople had shared roles in the dissemination of the faith.30 However, 
despite the claims of interwar theologians and current-day scholars keen on establishing a 
straight line to Vatican II, Catholic Action did not defend the equality of the laity and the 
hierarchy.31 Rather, the 1923 statutes and the speeches and texts explaining them made clear the 
subordinate nature of the laity to the hierarchy. As Pietro Gasparri explained shortly before the 
statutes were published, the reform would make the laity the "practical executors" of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 "La Giunta Centrale è l'organo direttivo e coordinatore di tutta l'azione: essa ne esamina i problemi 
generali, ne studia le soluzioni e impartisce le norme alle organizazzioni, affinché provvedano alla loro 
attuazione; invigila sul funzionamento di tutte le istituzioni, che operano nell'orbita dell'Azione Cattolica, 
cura il coordinamento della loro operosità per il migliore raggiungimento dei fini comuni; promuove 
l'Azione Cattolica dove e come occorra; rappresenta la collettività dei cattolici italiani organizzati." Ibid., 
138. The Central Committee is discussed in articles 7 through 17, pp.138-143. 
 
29 Ibid., arts. 6 and 16, pp. 138, 143. 
 
30 The German Catholic theologian Karl Adam was central to reviving the ecclesiology emphasizing the 
communitarian nature of the Church. See idem, Das Wesen des Katholizismus (Düsseldorf: L.Schwann, 
1924). In the same vein, see Sidoine Hurtevent, L'unité de l'Eglise du Christ (Paris: Bonne presse, 1930); 
Yves Congar, Chrétiens désunis. Principes d'un 'oecuménisme' catholique (Paris: Cerf, 1937); and J. A. 
Möhler, L'unité dans l'Eglise ou le principe du Catholicisme d'après l'esprit des Pères des trois premiers 
siècles de l'Église (Paris: Cerf, 1938).  
 
31 Theologians claiming that Catholic Action embodied the "communitarian" vision of the Church included 
Paul Dabin, L'Action Catholique. Essai de synthèse (Paris: Imp. La Démocratie, 1930); Idem, L'Apostolat 
laïque (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1931); Josef Will, Die Katholische Aktion. Biblische und dogmatische 
Grundlagen (München: Verlag der Salesianer, 1931); and Rudolf Graber, Die dogmatischen Grundlagen 
der katholischen Aktion (Augsburg: Haas und Grabherr, 1932). Though neither the Pope himself nor 
Vatican theologians explicitly defended this view, which theoretically stood in sharp contrast to perfect-




hierarchy's directives, thus making the laity "entirely dependent on the ecclesiastical 
hierarchy."32 Indeed, the 1923 statutes specified that the Ecclesiastical Assistant was the most 
important member of the Central Committee, insofar as he was the Pope's official liaison, and 
his spokesperson for all matters concerning the organization. As such, he had final say regarding 
the priorities of all Catholic Action organizations across the peninsula. As the organization's first 
Ecclesiastical Assistant personally clarified, "The Ecclesiastical Assistant is and must be the soul 
of the organization, the driving force behind its good initiatives, the source of zealousness and 
the shaper of consciences."33 If lay Catholic members of the organization ever tried to operate 
independently from the hierarchy and from the Ecclesiastical Assistant, Monsignor Pizzardo 
threatened, they would shrivel up, like a plant ripped from its roots.34  
 In addition to binding the laity tightly to the Church hierarchy, and through them to 
Vatican power, the 1923 statutes also tried to discourage Catholics from activism with the Italian 
Popular Party. In July of 1923 --well aware of Mussolini's dislike of the Italian Popular Party, 
and worried that it was effectively diminishing the central hierarchy's power - Pius XI asked 
Luigi Sturzo to step down from his leadership position, and subsequently repeatedly highlighted 
the "non-party" affiliation of Catholic Action. 35 The two actions together effectively spelled the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 "[l'Azione Cattolica sarebbe] esecutrice nell'ordine pratico [delle direttive della gerarchia]... [e] del tutto 
dipendente dall'Autorità ecclesiastica." Letter of Pietro Gasparri to the Bishops of Italy, 2 October 1922. 
As reprinted in Pio XI e l'azione cattolica: documenti relativi a 'l'Azione cattolica', ed. Alfredo Maria 
Cavagna (Rome: Via dei Cestari, 1929), 333ff.  
 
33 “...nell’esercizio della sua normale funzione di Assistente è e dev’essere in realtà l’anima della sua 
associazione, il propulsore delle buone iniziative, la fonte dello zelo, il formatore delle coscienze.” 
Giuseppe Pizzardo, “L’Azione Cattolica e le sue direttive: Discorso di Sua Eccellenza Mons. Pizzardo,” Bu 
(1 October 1930), 680. 
 
34 Mons. Giuseppe Pizzardo, L'Azione Cattolica: Discorso al Congresso dell'Unione Internazionale delle 
Leghe Femminili, Rome, 22 May 1930 (Rome: Giunta Centrale dell'Azione Cattolica Italiana, 1930), 8. 
 
35 The measures were most likely also influenced by the recent rise in tensions between Ultramontanist 
Catholic organizations in Milan privileging "religious, moral and cultural" matters, and those busy with 
"party politics" -- that is, with campaigning for the Italian Popular Party. Milan, where the Pope 
maintained his most active contacts, was the site of some of the most bitter debates between PPI partisans 
and their Ultramontanist opponents. In July of 1922, a Catholic commentator noted that, "Catholic 
organizations have in many places been ignored and devalued because their members have passed to 
political party activity, have become members of a political party [...] have lost interest in their former 
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death of Italy's first Christian Democratic experiment, as Catholics and non-Catholics of the 
time were quick to conclude.36  
 As Secretary of State Pietro Gasparri noted in a speech clarifying the content of the 
reforms, Catholic Action would become "not political, but religious."37 And approximately one 
month after announcing the new statutes, Pius XI further clarified in a speech to Catholic Action 
members that because party politics was divisive and unproductive, the new Catholic Action 
"does not do politics" in the traditional sense of the term. This did not mean, however, that the 
Catholic laity should not be concerned with political matters. To the contrary, Catholic Action 
must do "everything that is necessary to do politics well, that is, it must educate and prepare 
youth." This education should concern both "spiritual and material realities," and be "moral, 
intellectual, cultural, and social." Catholic Action, if properly understood, would effectively 
prepare Catholics to act on their manifold "political rights and duties." Making himself more 
explicit, the Pope asserted: "Yes, we want to resolve all of the problems in life, those of private 
life and those of public life, those of civic life and those of political life." In virtue of their 
"faithful observation of the laws of God," Catholic Action's members would thus be capable of 
not only "solv[ing] political problems," but doing so "in the best possible way."38 To do so, they 
would pledge their allegiance to the Fascist state -- not to Christian Democracy. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
activities, and have placed in second or last place religious, moral, cultural and educational matters." (Le 
organizzazioni cattoliche si sono trovate in parecchi luoghi trascurate, svalutate, perché i loro soci, 
passati al partito politico, si sono disinteressati alle antiche attività....[e] hanno messo in seconda o in 
ultima linea la formazione religiosa, morale e culturale.) Ulisse Pucci, "L'organizzazione cattolica e il 
partito politico in Italia," Vita e Pensiero (July 1922): 419-20. On the contrast between PPI and 
Ultramontanist groups in Milan, see Giorgio Vecchio, I cattolici milanesi e la politica: l'esperienza del 
Partito popolare, 1919-1926 (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1982), 326ff. 
 
36 For more on the Popular Party reaction to these measures, and the institutional Church's response, see 
Agostino Giovagnoli, La cultura democristiana. Tra Chiesa cattolica e identità italiana (Rome-Bari: 
Laterza, 1991), esp.32ff. 
 
37 "[l'Azione Cattolica sarà] non politica, ma religiosa." Letter of Pietro Gasparri to the Bishops of Italy, 
333. 
 
38 "Noi non facciamo della politica. No. Noi vogliamo innanzi tutto fare quello che devesi, far cioè la 
formazione e la preparazione della gioventù, formazione e preparazione religiosa innanzi tutto e poi 
morale, intellettuale, culturale e sociale...Ma non oltre. Se qualcuno dicesse: ma noi non siamo anche 
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 Indeed, though party politics was not permissible, Catholic Action's active, engaged, 
analysis of "all of the problems in life," including political ones, was requisite. The Pope made 
the same point on a later occasion, clarifying that though Catholic Action "does not engage in 
party politics, it wants to prepare citizens to do good politics, great politics." 39 Pius XI explained 
that the apparent paradox fades away if one refers to the original, etymological, sense of the 
term "politics." Referencing Thomas Aquinas (who, following Cicero, had translated Artistotle's 
polis as societas civilis), the Pope suggested that only a "civil society" could guarantee the virtue 
of its citizens, by encouraging them to live in line with Christ's precepts.40 By working in close 
collaboration with the Vatican, Catholic Action would therefore do good politics, for civil society 
etymologically signaled "politics" as such -- something that was not the case for "political 
parties." Indeed, Catholic Action would ensure the virtue of citizens without actively 
campaigning for the Catholic political party that had, from the start, been a source of distress for 
the Vatican.41  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
cittadini, non abbiamo noi anche dei diritti e dei doveri pubblici, politici? Noi risponderemo: 
certissimo...Sì, noi vogliamo risolvere della vita tutti i problemi, quella della vita privata e quelli della vita 
pubblica, quelli della vita civile e quelli della vita politica. Appunto per questo abbiamo bisogno che le 
anime siano preparate e formate nella dottrina cattolica, nella dottrina [della] Chiesa." Pius XI, speech to 
the Gioventù Cattolica, Rome, October 19, 1923. As reprinted in Pio XI e l'Azione Cattolica, 83-5. 
 
39 "L'Azione cattolica, pur non facendo politica di partito, vuol preparare a fare della buona politica, della 
grande politica; essa vuole preparare politicamente le coscienze dei cittadini e formarle, anche in questo 
campo, cristianamente e cattolicamente." Pius XI, speech at the National Congress of the Federation of 
Catholic Men, 30 October 1926. As reprinted in Civiltà Cattolica (20 November 1926): 367-8. 
 
40 “C’è tutto un volume sul destino di certe parole che spesso, vengono a significare il contrario di quanto 
vorrebbero e dovrebbero dire. Politica è una di queste parole. Etimologicamente: polis, la città, la 
repubblica – non la forma di un governo ma la cosa pubblica, l’insieme delle cose pubbliche – la polis 
greca, la civiltà latina, i cives, i cittadini, cioè corpi e anime e tutto; ciò che è essenziale alla loro vita e ai 
loro beni. Politica vuol significare dunque qualche cosa di benefico a tutti; le sollecitudini e le cure del 
bene comune a tutti; ed ecco invece, in pratica, sta a significare correnti parziali, interessi dei partiti: 
precisamente il contrario di ciò che deve essere e voler dire.” Pius XI, as reprinted in La parola del papa 
su l'Azione Cattolica, ed. Alfredo Maria Cavagna (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1937) 138ff. 
 
41 I concur here with Liliana Ferrari's counterfactual claim that Pius XI would likely have distanced 
himself from the Popular Party regardless of Mussolini's pressures. Idem, L'Azione cattolica dalle origini 
al pontificato di Paolo VI (Brescia: Queriniana, 1982); and Una storia dell'Azione Cattolica. Gli 




 Thus, the 1923 statutes distanced Catholic civil society from the Italian Popular Party, 
encouraged them to take part in the "good politics," and laid the bases for a Catholic culture 
bound to the Vatican, which would follow individuals "from the cradle to the grave." The 
theoretical justification for this particular form of Catholic civil society was provided in 1925, 
through an encyclical entitled Quas primas. The encyclical provided the rationale of the new 
Vatican strategy of mass mobilization that had been adumbrated in Ubi arcano and 
implemented in the 1923 Catholic Action statutes. This new strategy sought to actively engage 
the Catholic laity with the Pope through the construction of a community based on shared and 
meaning-laden rituals of belonging. Additionally, Quas primas offered a far-reaching 
indictment of the Locarno Treaties (signed two months before the encyclical was issued), and 
recast the Vatican counter-settlement.  
 Echoing Ubi arcano, Quas primas began by emphasizing that no true peace would be 
possible without the restoration of the Kingdom of Christ, as mediated by the Vatican and its 
concordat diplomacy. Just as Wilson's Versailles settlement had failed, so too the Locarno spirit 
was bound to dissipate into thin air on account of its denial of the social and political role the 
Vatican was entitled to play in society. "As long as individuals and states refuse to submit to the 
rule of Savior," the encyclical noted, "there [will] be no really hopeful prospect of a lasting peace 
among nations." 42  Indeed, "While nations insult the beloved name of our Redeemer by 
suppressing all mention of it in their conferences and parliaments," Catholics, led by the Pope, 
"must all the more loudly proclaim his kingly dignity and power, all the more universally affirm 
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holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_11121925_quas-primas_en.html>. Last 




his rights."43 This was primarily because, "the Church has the right from Christ himself, to teach 
mankind, to make laws, to govern peoples, in all that pertains to their eternal salvation."44  
 The encyclical further clarified that the Vatican as an institution both embodied the 
Kingdom of Christ, and had as its duty to expand this kingdom throughout the world. "In view of 
the common teaching of the sacred books," the encyclical argued, "the Catholic Church is the 
kingdom of Christ on earth, destined to be spread among all men and all nations."45 Indeed, the 
Vatican's "empire" should include "not only Catholic nations" and "not only baptized persons." 
Rather, "the empire of our Redeemer embraces all men," insofar as "the whole of mankind is 
subject to the power of Jesus Christ."46  
 Unlike Ubi arcano, Quas primas did not leave its prescriptions to rest merely on paper. 
Instead, it took measures to ensure that Catholics and secular state leaders not forget the 
important lessons communicated by the encyclical, regarding the imperial mission of the 
Vatican to spread Catholic teachings to Catholic and non-Catholic nations alike. To do so, the 
encyclical invented a mandatory annual festival to remind the laity of the Pope's temporal 
powers. Entitled the Feast of Christ the King, the festival was henceforth held on the last Sunday 
before All Saints' Day, one of the oldest and most important festivals of the Western Church. 
Quas primas carefully specified that the new Feast of Christ the King should always be held on a 
Sunday, so that working people could take part in it as well. 
 The institutionalization of the Feast of Christ the King was part of a new Vatican strategy 
of mass mobilization, which encouraged the Catholic laity to join Catholic Action, and in the 
process, join the Vatican in its mission to grow Catholicism's presence "in private and in public !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Ibid., §25. 
 
44 Ibid., §24. 
 
45 Ibid., §12. 
 
46 Ibid., §18. The encyclical borrows some of its wording on the empire of Christ from Leo XIII's encyclical 




life." As the encyclical noted, festivals were rich pedagogical tools, more poignant even than 
written texts. "People are instructed in the truths of the faith [...] far more effectively by the 
annual celebration of our sacred mysteries," the text asserted, "than by any official 
pronouncement of the teaching of the Church." This was because official Vatican 
pronouncements, including encyclicals, "usually reach only a few and the more learned among 
the faithful; festivals reach them all." Furthermore, "the Church's teaching affects the mind 
primarily; its feasts affect both mind and heart." Finally, unlike official pronouncements, which 
spoke "but once," festivals "speak every year - in fact, forever." Through repetitive, communal, 
and emotionally engaging celebrations, festivals were capable of doing more work than dry, 
official, pronouncements ever could.47 
 In sum, Quas primas argued that the Catholic laity was bound by definition to the Pope; 
a connection to be reinforced annually, through a series of performative and highly visible 
rituals. In this way, Quas primas outlined the integral link between concordat diplomacy and 
the Vatican's integration of civil society, through Catholic Action. It also added a novel definition 
of civil society, which was presented as a pedagogical tool (to teach lay Catholics about Vatican-
approved theology and the papacy's prerogatives), and as a way to speak to people's " hearts," 
rather than just to their "minds." As such, the cultivation of civil society represented a way to 
guarantee the loyalty of individuals "forever," for it bound them through social and emotional 
ties to the Vatican and to one another. 
 Finally, Quas primas provided its endorsement of concordat diplomacy, and of the 
project of establishing regimes in which Church and state ruled jointly. The encyclical forcefully 
made the case that all nations, Catholic or not, were obliged to recognize the Pope's sovereignty 
and allow him to expand the reach of Catholic Action far and wide. As the text noted, "Nations 
will be reminded by the annual celebration of this feast that not only private individuals but also 
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rulers and princes are bound to give public honor and obedience to Christ." By encouraging 
Catholics to gather and show their demographic strength, the Feast of Christ the King would 
create an annual spectacle that state leaders could not ignore. It would call upon all states to 
encourage concordat diplomacy and the activities of the Catholic laity. Any state that did not 
"take account of the commandments of God and of Christian principles" risked losing the loyalty 
of its Catholic citizens, and of Catholics worldwide.48  
 It was no accident that in explaining the bold expansionistic nature of the Vatican 
project, the encyclical made great use of the word "empire," which was repeated on no fewer 
than ten occasions. And "empire" and imperial expansion had of course also been the theme of 
the 1925 Holy Year, which had as one of its most prominent components a Missionary 
Exhibition, modeled on the world's fair.49 To be sure, the Pope's turn to imperial expansion (as a 
rhetorical move and as a real-world project) was likely influenced by his immediate historical 
context. Indeed, his call for a Vatican empire coincided with a moment in which the question of 
empire was very much in the air, both due to the relative decline in influence of certain 
European empires (like the British, which was struggling with anti-imperialist movements in 
India, Egypt, and parts of Africa), and the growth in "empire talk" closer to home. Between 1923 
and 1925, the Fascist regime made abundantly clear that the expansion of Italy's empire would 
be the centerpiece of its foreign policy. As the Duce's navy minister put it, just as the Pope could 
not be expected to remain a prisoner of the Vatican, Italy could not "remain a prisoner of the 
Mediterranean."50 From 1923, Italian military forces began to regain Libya; and by 1924, Italian 
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48 Ibid., §31-2. 
 
49 As Quas primas summarized, the Missionary Exhibition displayed for all to see "the increasing zeal of 
the Church for the spread of the kingdom of her Spouse to the most distant regions of the earth." And in 
addition to showing "how many countries have been won to the Catholic name through the unremitting 
labor and self-sacrifice of missionaries," the Exhibition also displayed "the vastness of the regions which 
have yet to be subjected to the sweet and saving yoke of our King." Quas primas, §3. 
 
50 Atti parlamentari (Rome: Istituto poligrafico e zecca dello Stato, 1848--) (henceforth AP), Senato, 1924, 
vol.1, 915-16 (20 December 1924) and AP, Camera, 1925, 3:3151, 3171 (30 March 1925); Thaon di Revel to 
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troops had occupied the island of Corfu. Journals like L'Impero had begun publication both in 
Italy and overseas, in an effort to generate enthusiasm for the imperial cause. Mussolini had also 
made plain his ambitions to launch new wars of occupation, following his successful seizure of 
the Dodecanese islands in the aftermath of World War I.51 And mere months before Pius XI 
issued Quas primas, Mussolini had cultivated ties with Yugoslavia, concluded a pact enabling 
the pénétration pacifique of Albania, and negotiated an agreement with Great Britain, which 
recognized Italy's right to grow its empire.52 With the creation of the dictatorship in 1925, 
Mussolini (like the Pope) increasingly invoked the need of "Fascistizing" youth, precisely so as to 
"create the great elites that in turn establish empires."53 
 The encyclical Quas primas proclaimed the legitimacy and necessity of a Vatican empire 
in precisely the same years that Mussolini began calling for the expansion of Italian territories. 
And like Mussolini (and, in many senses, anticipating him), the Vatican yoked its expansionist 
ambitions with the attempt to integrate civil society and grow a loyal, missionary, movement. 
But unlike Mussolini and all other secular state rulers, the Pope had a considerable advantage in 
his quest to spread the kingdom of Christ on earth. After all, the Church's peculiar form of 
imperialism did not depend on the exclusive control of territories. As was the case with 
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Mussolini, 28 March 1925. As cited in MacGregor Knox, Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy 
and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 119. 
 
51 Mussolini's 1925 directive on Ethiopia mentioned in the Gàzzera notes, 11 June 1929; Benito Mussolini, 
Opera Omnia, ed. Edoardo and Duilio Susmei (Florence: La Fenice, 1951-1980) (henceforth, OO), vol.39, 
465; I documenti diplomatici italiani (Rome: Libreria dello Stato, 1952--) (henceforth DDI), 7/10/38. As 
cited in Knox, Common Destiny, 128. On Mussolini's seizure of the Dodecanese islands and his plans 
regarding Turkey, see, inter alia, Nicholas Doumanis, "The Italian Empire and brava gente: Oral History 
and the Dodecanese Islands," in Italian Fascism: History, Memory and Representation, eds. R.J.B. 
Bosworth and Patrizia Dogliani (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 161-178. 
 
52 Aristotle A. Kallis, Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-1945, 
esp. 27-138.  
 
53 OO 21:362-63 (22 June 1925). As cited in Knox, op.cit., 67-8. 
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concordat diplomacy, Catholic missionary activity could coexist with the imperialist agendas of 




As will be shown in subsequent chapters, the Feast of Christ the King would soon be used to 
mobilize Catholic organizations around the world to join the Vatican's new European allies and 
the Pope in their joint struggle against the Soviet Union. The Feast of Christ the King became 
strongly identified as the festival of Catholic Action -- one that was tightly organized by its 
members, and one with which Catholic Action was being celebrated. 55 And Catholic Action 
militants increasingly identified themselves as soldiers fighting for the re-establishment of the 
kingdom of God -- and thus of Vatican influence --on earth.56   
 The ambitions outlined in Quas primas to turn Catholic Action in a global arm of the 
Vatican were also realized through the active attempt to internationalize the Italian model of 
Catholic Action created by the 1923 statutes. The General-Secretary of the Italian organization, 
Giuseppe Pizzardo, was put in charge of convincing local clergy and Vatican officials around the 
world to follow the Italian lead, and establish the six organizations under the direction of the 
ecclesiastical hierarchy and bound to the Pope. In addition to pursuing this agenda by holding !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 See, inter alia, J.P. Daughton, An Empire Divided: Religion, Republicanism and the Making of French 
Colonialism, 1880-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Luigi Ganapini, Il nazionalismo 
cattolico. I cattolici e la politica estera in Italia dal 1871 al 1914 (Bari: Laterza, 1970); Claude 
Prudhomme, Missions Chrétiennes et colonisation, XVI-XXe siècle (Paris: Cerf, 2005), esp.67-131; and 
Alice Conklin, A Mission to Civilize: The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1997). The Church's public support for the invasion of Ethiopia and Albania is 
well known. See Lucia Ceci, Il papa non deve parlare; and MacGregor Knox, Mussolini Unleashed, 1939-
1941: Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy's Last War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 
11ff. 
 
55 John Pollard, "'The Participation of the Laity in the Apostolate of the Hierarchy': Pius XI's Attempt to 
Impose the Italian Model of Catholic Action on the World-Wide Church in the 1930s," unpublished talk, 
11 February 2010, Catholic University of Leuven, 4. 
 
56 On this, see Fulvio De Giorgi, "Linguaggi militari e mobilitazione cattolica nell'Italia fascista," 




private meetings and writing copious letters to Vatican nuncios abroad, Pizzardo also began 
teaching courses at Rome's colleges and seminaries regarding the viability and importance of 
exporting the Italian model of Catholic Action. And as more and more Catholic Action 
organizations started getting off the ground, Pizzardo increasingly sought the assistance of loyal 
members of the Catholic laity, to translate key texts and in some cases even produce their own 
material.57  
 Throughout the latter half of the 1920s, Pizzardo and his assistants crisscrossed the 
European continent, checking on the implementation of the Italian model of Catholic Action in 
countries like Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Poland, Ireland, England, the Netherlands 
and Belgium. Throughout, they tried to ensure that Catholic Action stay closely tied to the 
hierarchy, and that it severed all ties with Christian Democratic parties and liberal or 
"Bolshevistik" political movements. In countries like England and Germany, they successfully 
convinced clerics that had been strong supporters of Christian Democracy to shift their energies 
to Catholic Action instead.58 Their actions also spawned counter-movements among the Catholic 
laity, which either flatly refused to submit to the Vatican's oversight, or sought to gently push the 
institution to take on a more active concerns with matters traditionally left to socialist and 
communist parties, such as the mobilization of the working class.59  
 By c.1930, Pizzardo and his assistants had succeeded in expanding Catholic Action to a 
great number of countries. France and Poland had integrated the Italian model of Catholic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Christine de Hemptinne and Henry Aloysius Johnston, The Peace of Christ through the Reign of Christ 
(Melbourne: Australian Catholic Truth Society, 1937); and de Hemptinne, Curso de Acción Católica 
(Lima: CIP, 1935). 
 
58 See, e.g., Kester Aspden, Fortress Church: The English Church, Roman Catholic Bishops and Politics, 
1903-1963 (Leominster: Gracewing, 2002), 154-7, and fns. 63 and 64; and Hans Mommsen, The Rise and 
Fall of Weimar Democracy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 261-2. 
 
59 The push-pull attempt to preserve a more egalitarian, worker-friendly, spirit was most present in the 
youth Catholic Action branches in France and Belgium. On the influence of Joseph Cardijn's controversial 
youth movement in France and Belgium, see Susan Whitney, Mobilizing Youth: Communists and 
Catholics in Interwar France (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), and Emmanuel Gerard and Gerd-
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Action, and Germany, Belgium, Hungary, Croatia, Luxembourg, Britain, Portugal, Austria, 
Australia, Canada, the United States, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina were en route to the same 
goal. 60  Local branches of Catholic Action were also increasingly making transnational 
connections, by taking part in research and study trips to check on partner organizations, and by 
including extensive coverage of Catholic Action's international activism in their newspapers and 
magazines. Starting from the 1930s, Pizzardo's assistants began to make more frequent travels 
to countries like Brazil, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. They also traveled to 
Australia, New Zealand, Ceylon and India, where they pursued active connections with local 
figures bent on implementing the Italian model of Catholic Action. Catholics based in Morocco, 
the Belgian Congo, and China, also began implementing Catholic Action organizations, on the 
Italian model.61  
 In addition to gathering lay Catholics around the image of the Vatican as a powerful 
entity endowed with loyal global subjects, the internationalization of Catholic Action also put 
pressure on local state leaders to expand the Vatican's influence. This was clearly the case in 
Italy, where Mussolini recognized that a mobilized group, composed of intellectuals and 
workers, men and women, children and adults, was more difficult to ignore than the pleas of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Pope and his clerical assistants. Following Fascist reprisals on Catholic organizations after the 
attempt on Mussolini's life (November 1926), 62 the 1927 founding of rival civil society organs for 
Fascist youth (the Opera Nazionale Ballila), and Mussolini's ban on all non-Fascist youth 
organizations (in April of 1928), Pius XI became increasingly worried that the Duce would fail to 
protect Catholic Action in the concordat.63 Perhaps in response to Fascist pressure tactics, Pius 
XI penned three well-publicized letters to Cardinals in Belgium, Germany and Spain, between 
August of 1928 and November of 1929. The letters aimed to both show the Pope's resolution 
with regard to Catholic Action, and the extent to which the organization did not threaten 
Mussolini's power. First, Pius XI announced in clear terms his plan to maintain Catholic Action 
as the centerpiece of his pontificate, and expand its influence internationally. Second, he 
stressed that Catholic Action was "apolitical," in the sense that it nursed no sympathies for 
Catholic political parties.64 So too, a text specially commissioned by the Pope to the French 
Catholic intellectual Jacques Maritain, La primauté du spirituel -- amply disseminated in the 
Italian Catholic press -- emphasized the Vatican scarce support for political movements that 
risked undermining the constituted powers.65  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 "Sembra che una oscura minaccia (minaccia confermata da tutta una nube di sospetti, ingerenze e 
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63 The 1926 repression of Catholic Action organizations and the reaction to it is discussed in Sale, La 
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64 Letter of Pius XI to Cardinal van Roey, archbishop of Malines-Mechelen and primate of Belgium, 
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 When Catholic Action was at last enshrined in article 43 of the concordat with Italy, the 
Vatican won a major victory. The article asserted that Catholic Action would "go about its 
activities regarding the dissemination and actualization of Catholic principles outside of the 
bounds of any political party, and under the immediate dependence of the Church hierarchy."66 
The formulation reflected, in nuce, the central tenets of Ubi arcano dei, Quas primas, and the 
1923 statutory reforms. Catholic Action, it asserted, was dedicated to the "dissemination and 
actualization of Catholic principles" writ large. It must do so, as Pius XI had taken pains to 
highlight, "under the immediate dependence of the Church hierarchy." Furthermore, it would 
avoid forming "any political party" in the process -- something the Pope was quite apprehensive 
about for his own reasons. Broadly speaking, it seemed, Pius XI's decision to integrate civil 
society with Catholic Action had proved a resounding success: it had increased the Vatican's 
power, and in the process provided the Vatican with new channels of communication and new 





as the original French: Jacques Maritain, Primato dello spirituale, ed. Giampietro Dore (Rome: Cardinal 
Ferrari, 1927).   
 
66 Article 43 read: "[L'Azione cattolica svolge la sua] attività al di fuori di ogni partito politico e sotto 
l'immediata dipendenza della gerarchia della Chiesa per la diffusione e l'attuazione dei principii cattolici." 
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The Holy Father implores all nations [...] to unite in a single front against these evil phalanges, 
which are the enemies of God and also of humankind. 
Pius XI, 19321  
 
 
False optimism is not necessary for war; its opposite, false pessimism, can also cause war.  
-- Stephen Van Evera, 19992 
 
 
Je me crois en enfer, donc j'y suis. 





The Vatican's successful bid to reconfigure Church-state relations in the fifteen years following 
World War I, coupled with the fading of the Wilsonian moment and the rise in power of the 
Soviet Union after the Great Depression, inaugurated a new phase in the expansion of Vatican 
influence, which lasted from approximately 1934 through 1958. This phase was characterized by 
the Vatican's attempt to use its interwar gains to influence the foreign policy of its partner states !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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so as to marginalize the Soviet Union from the community of nations. Starting from the 1930s, a 
sector of Vatican opinion began to cast the Soviet Union no longer as one threat among many, 
but rather as the leading threat. As these Vatican diplomats argued, the Soviet Union had to be 
stopped immediately because it was capable of undoing the Vatican's interwar gains and 
destroying Catholicism entirely. 
 During the period between 1934 and 1958, the Vatican tried to have the Soviet Union 
excluded from the international state system through traditional diplomatic channels and the 
launching of a multi-media campaign, which began to disseminate a new and more systematic 
form of Catholic anticommunism. Starting from the 1930s, this Catholic anticommunism can 
properly be called a political ideology, in that it was a coherent system of beliefs that made 
normative claims and had practical consequences. It drew on long-standing motifs from the 
Catholic counterrevolutionary tradition, as had the Vatican's rhetoric against unrest and 
revolution, which had been mobilized against left-wing movements since 1917. But in the 1930s, 
the Vatican's anticommunist rhetoric added several components: it stressed as never before the 
international nature of the communist threat; it highlighted the notion that communism got 
wrong the relationship between the state and its citizens; and it offered a positive alternative, in 
the form of a corporatist Europe characterized by the merging of Church and state, the 
expansion of Catholic civil society, the protection of private property, and the close collaboration 
between employers and employed.   
 As will be argued, the Vatican's political ideology did not simply initiate a war of words. 
Indeed, in several instances the Vatican's anticommunist political rhetoric was mobilized in the 
course of armed conflicts, such as the Spanish Civil War and World War II. This chapter, as well 
as Chapters Five and Six, will argue that it was precisely for this reason that the anticommunist 
campaign consolidated the Vatican's interwar gains and brought the Vatican into an ever-closer 
partnership with countries like Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and Dollfuss' Austria, as well as 
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with right-wing religious-political movements like the Nacionalistas in Spain and the 
Fédération nationale catholique in France.  
 
1. New Functionaries Face the Limits of Concordat Diplomacy  
 
During the same period that new functionaries were positioning themselves against left-wing 
unrest in Poland, Germany and elsewhere, other Vatican officials were working to conclude a 
concordat or modus vivendi with Russia's new leaders. Vatican-Soviet diplomatic talks began in 
earnest in 1921 and continued until 1928. As in Poland and Germany, negotiations were 
accompanied by large-scale relief efforts, which sought to show Vatican goodwill towards the 
Russian people and put on display its wealth and power.4 Soviet leaders, eager to gain de jure 
recognition of the new country through the conclusion of an international agreement with the 
Vatican, initially promised to conclude a generous deal and allow the Vatican to set up schools, 
provide religious instruction, and implement other features of the concordat model.5 Thus, 
against the prevailing opinion in the scholarship, Vatican-Soviet negotiations were part and 
parcel of the broader history of concordat diplomacy.6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 See Giorgio Petracchi, "La missione pontificia di soccorso alla Russia (1921-3)," in Santa Sede e Russia 
da Leone XIII a Pio XI: Atti del Simposio organizzato dal Pontificio Comitato di Scienze Storiche e 
dall'Istituto di Storia Universale dell'Accademia delle Scienze di Mosca (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice 
Vaticana, 2002), 122-73. 
 
5 For the Soviet side of the story, see Jurij E. Karlov, "Il potere sovietico e il Vaticano (1917-1924)," and 
E.S. Tokareva, "Le relazioni tra l'URSS e il Vaticano: dalle trattative alla rottura (1922-9)," in Ibid., 97-121; 
199-261. 
 
6 Along these lines, see Laura Pettinaroli, "Pio XI e Michel d’Herbigny: analisi di una relazione al vertice 
della Chiesa alla luce del materiale delle udienze pontificie (1923-1939)," in Pius XI : Keywords. 
International Conference Milan 2009, eds. Alberto Guasco and Raffaella Perin (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2010), 
279-297; Laurent Koelliker, "La perception de la Russie par le Pape Benoît XV: aspects politiques, 
diplomatiques et religieux," and Piero Doria, "La documentazione vaticana sui rapporti Santa Sede-
Russia," in Santa Sede Russia da Leone XIII a Pio XI: Atti del secondo Simposio organizzato dal 
Pontificio Comitato di Scienze Storiche e dall'Istitute di Storia Universale dell'Accademia Russa delle 




 But diplomatic negotiations dragged on, and following an initial period when they 
seemed to be going well, from 1924, relations began to deteriorate, particularly once they were 
shifted to Berlin and put in the hands of Eugenio Pacelli. Though Pacelli felt it was his duty to 
carry forth concordat diplomacy, he also had just made a name for himself standing against the 
forces of revolution in Germany. This evidently made him -- and Vatican negotiations as a whole 
-- somewhat suspect in Soviet eyes. In September of 1926, the Soviets accused the Vatican's 
most powerful cleric in Russia, Michel D'Herbigny, of being a spy. They prohibited him from 
building a Catholic seminary to train priests onsite and forced him to leave the country. One of 
the young clerics accompanying him, Joseph Henri Ledit, bitterly commented in his diary that, 
"all hope of remaining in Russia has, for now, vanished." The grand plan to conclude an 
agreement with the Soviet Union and restore Catholicism had not been realized, at least for the 
moment. "It's with regret," the young man confessed, "that I leave this vast country, where there 
would be so much work to do to expand God's glory."7  
 Eugenio Pacelli promptly took the expulsion of the Vatican mission from the Soviet 
Union as a sign of the uselessness of talks. He informed Pietro Gasparri that though he was 
trying to follow the Vatican's suggestions to "not break ties with the Soviet Union," he confessed 
that he found meeting his Soviet interlocutors "unpleasant" and "almost repugnant." "It would 
be a vain illusion to hope to reach an agreement with the present government of Moscow," 
Pacelli concluded.8 Upon being asked to comment on Pacelli's report, the Vatican diplomat 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 “Sembra proprio che la mia speranza di restare in Russia sia, per ora, svanita. Lascio con rammarico 
questo immenso Paese dove ci sarebbe tanto da fare alla maggior gloria di Dio.” Joseph Henri Ledit, 
Diario di una spedizione in Russia (1926), Archivio del Pontificio Istituto Orientale. As reprinted in 
Vincenzo Poggi, Per la storia del Pontificio Istituto Orientale: Saggi sull’istituzione, i suoi uomini e 
l’Oriente Cristiano (Rome: Pontifical Oriental Institute, 2000), 286ff. 
 
8 “...mi domandai se valesse più in alcun modo la pena di incontrarmi col Sign.Cicerin, cosa tanto più 
sgradevole e vorrei dire quasi ripugnante [...] Quantunque scarsissima fiducia possa aversi nelle buone 
parole del Signor Cicerin anche perché pur volendo ammettere (cosa più che dubbia) che egli 
personalmente sia in realtà alquanto ben disposto riuscirebbe poi a lui stesso difficile di vincere la 
resistenza dei radicali fanatici dittatori di Mosca; nondimeno in considerazione della di lui ripetuta 
domanda e del desiderio della Santa Sede di 'non rompere questo tenue filo col Governo Russo' (cifrato 
36) ho cercato di preparare un progetto di Nota [...] Sarebbe vana illusione lo sperare di giungere ad un 
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recently expelled from the Soviet Union "concurred with the judgment of the Berlin nuncio," 
and informed the Pope that, "Any relation and appearance of negotiations with [the Soviets] was 
very dangerous, and left little hope of bearing fruit."9  
 In the meanwhile, Stalin, who had emerged as the Soviet Union's leader following a 
prolonged succession crisis, expanded a state-led campaign against Christian religions. He 
implemented legislation that prohibited Christian evangelism and prevented religious groups 
from distributing literature and raising funds. He also encouraged schools and universities to 
introduce anti-religious materials and fire academics known to hold religious beliefs. Local 
authorities took it upon themselves to close churches and organize anti-religious festivals on 
religious holidays. Stalin also enshrined a new Soviet calendar, which forced individuals to work 
on Sundays, effectively shifting the job of enforcing the state-led anti-religious campaign to the 
backs of individual employers.10  
 Heeding pressure from clerics like Pacelli, the Pope promptly responded to Stalin's anti-
religious campaign by calling off Vatican-Soviet negotiations and by protesting Soviet actions 
within its borders. Through a letter published in the Osservatore Romano in early 1930, the 
Pope announced that any hope of concluding a Vatican agreement with the Soviet Union had !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
accordo col presente Governo di Mosca, il quale altro non vuole se non la distruzione di ogni credenza 
religiosa in quell’infelice ed oppresso Paese.” Pacelli to Gasparri, Berlin, 14 June 1927. ASV, AES Pro 
Russia (quarto periodo), 1924-1941, sc.13, fasc.83, ff.11-2. For the expression of similar sentiments by 
Pacelli, see, e.g., D’Herbigny, “Voto del relatore,” 30 November 1927; and Pacelli to Cardinal Luigi 
Sincero, President of the Pro Russia Commission, Rorschach, 11 November 1927. Ibid., ff.34-5. 
 
9 “Condivido totalmente il parere del Nunzio in Germania parere che, se non sbaglio, sarebbe comune a 
tutti che hanno visto da vicino i Sovieti ed osservato le loro intenzioni intorno alla religione [...] Ogni 
relazione ed apparenza di trattative con tali è molto pericolosa e lascia poca speranza di ottenere frutti 
positivi.” Michel D’Herbigny, “Voto del relatore sulla lettera di Sua Ecc. Rev.ma Mons. Eugenio Pacelli,” 
14 June 1927. Ibid., ff.14. 
 
10 On Stalin's policies towards religious groups, see Daniel Peris, Storming the Heavens: The Soviet 
League of the Militant Godless (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); John Anderson, “The Council for 
Religious Affairs and the Shaping of Soviet Religious Policy,” Soviet Studies, 43.4 (1991): 689-710; Philip 
Walters, “Introduction,” in Religious Policy in the Soviet Union, ed. Sabrina Petra Ramet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993); Sheila Fitzpatrick, The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in 
Revolutionary Russia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), 21, 43, 50-4, 112, 128. For the continuation 
of this campaign, see Victoria Smolkin-Rothrock, "'A Sacred Space is Never Empty': Soviet Atheism, 1954-




become impossible, given Stalin's nationwide anti-religious campaign. This campaign, the Pope 
announced, aimed to encourage young people in the Soviet Union to "destroy and defile 
religious buildings and symbols" and "contaminate their souls with all manner of vice."11 Pius 
XI's words focused on how it was because of the Soviet Union's practices within its boundaries 
that the Vatican must suspend its dealings with the country, and meekly asked European state 
leaders to pressure the Soviet Union to allow its citizens to practice their religion.12  
 Only the perceived effects of the Depression, the rise of religious persecution in Catholic 
strongholds like Mexico and Spain, and the coming to power of a cadre of solidly anticommunist 
Vatican functionaries, would transform the Vatican's rather limited protest of Soviet practices 
within its borders into a large-scale campaign protesting communism as a growing, 
transnational, threat to "Christian Europe." The key figure bringing about the shift was Eugenio 
Pacelli, who in early February of 1930 succeeded the elderly Pietro Gasparri as Secretary of 
State.13 As will be analyzed in what follows, the Vatican's global campaign against the Soviet 
Union was adumbrated in a series of documents issued between 1931 and 1932, and put into 
effect between 1933 and 1934. From this point onward, diminishing the power of the Soviet 
Union in the international state system became the centerpiece of the Vatican's diplomacy -- 
something that, to my knowledge, scholars of Vatican-Soviet relations have failed to note.14 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 11  “Gi organizzatori delle campagne d’ateismo e del ‘fronte antireligioso’ vogliono soprattutto pervertire la 
gioventù, abusare della sua ingenuità e della sua ignoranza, ed in luogo di impartirle istruzione, scienza e 
civiltà, [...] l’organizzano nella ‘Lega dei senza-Dio militanti,’ [...] in cui i figli sono istigati a [...] 
distruggere e insozzare gli edifici e gli emblemi religiosi e soprattutto a contaminare le loro anime con 
tutti i vizi [...]” Lettera all’Em. Signor Cardinal Basilio Pompilj, Osservatore romano (9 February 1930). 
For drafts of the letter, see  “Progetto di lettera del Santo Padre all’Emmo Signor Cardinal Vicario." Early 




13 Unfortunately, no archival documents clearly explain why Pius XI substituted the elderly Gasparri with 
Pacelli, and a great deal of speculation surrounds the matter in the historiography. Minimally, it is 
plausible to assert that Pius XI was impressed by Pacelli's successful dissemination of concordat 
diplomacy, his language skills, and his tact in dealing with a wide range of political figures. 
 
14 See Antoine Wenger, Rome et Moscou: 1900-1950 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1987); Hansjakob Stehle, 




Indeed, if several scholars have asserted a change of course in Vatican-Soviet relations from 
c.1930, they have by and large tended to miss the global nature and implications of the Vatican's 
counterattack against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, most scholars have narrowly argued that 
it was as a result of Stalin's anti-religious campaign -- rather than as a result of internal 
personnel changes and global political-economic developments -- that the Vatican turned 
against the Soviet Union.15  
 
2. Shifting the Blame: Pius XI Responds to the Global Economic Crisis  
 
The unprecedented five-year economic crisis known as the Great Depression hit Europe hardest 
between 1930 and 1931. Unemployment in many countries soared above 25%, as standards of 
living dropped and markets froze. Extremist parties of the left and right gained followers by the 
day, and many worried that the so-called "crisis of civilization" inaugurated by the Great War 
was coming to a head.16 Though the Vatican was more insulated from the crisis than most 
European states, it too suffered as a result of the Depression. As a result of the Lateran 
Agreements, the Vatican had become a major investor in European stocks, and in 1930-1, it 
suffered a decrease in its earnings, due to stock depreciation. Additionally, the Vatican felt the 
effects of the economic crisis due to a visible decline in annual contributions to the Church, 
particularly from the two countries that had recently become its biggest donors: Germany and 
the United States.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
15 This argument is made, for instance, by Philippe Chenaux, L'Église catholique et le communisme en 
Europe (1917-1989), De Lénine à Jean-Paul II (Paris: Cerf, 2009), 86ff; as well as by E.S. Tokareva, "Le 
relazioni tra l'URSS e il Vaticano: dalle trattative alla rottura (1922-9)," op.cit., 199-261. To be sure, Stalin 
did increase anti-Vatican propaganda from 1930, in reaction to Pius XI's denouncements of Soviet policy. 
See Tokareva, 260-1. 
 
16 See Renato Moro, La formazione della classe dirigente cattolica, 1929-1937 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979); 




 Global economic matters promptly became the Pope's preferred topic of conversation. 
With no hint of irony, he declared the Great Depression, "the greatest human calamity since the 
Flood."17 Distressed by the Vatican's initial decline in income, registered from late 1930, the 
Pope allowed his leading financial advisor to redirect investments and engage in ethically 
questionable arbitrage schemes, which for instance had as their purpose, as the advisor 
explained, "to profit from the greater depression of the New York market in comparison with the 
London one."18 The Pope also mandated a general reduction in wages for all Vatican employees 
and temporarily halted the rebuilding of Vatican City.  
 However, despite Pius XI's worries, the Vatican ultimately weathered the crisis better 
than many of its neighboring European states, and this gave it a preferred vantage point on the 
causes and consequence of the Depression.19 Soon, the Pope decided that the Vatican should 
make its analysis of the Depression public, and entrusted a handful of experts with preparing an 
encyclical to this end.20 The text provided a much more concrete assessment of international 
affairs than was habitual in encyclicals. From spring of 1931, the Vatican's daily newspaper, the 
Osservatore romano, began foreshadowing its contents, via extended analyses of how the 
depression had been caused by liberal democracies, and had led to the rise of communism and 
communist-inspired "anti-religious organizations" across Western Europe.21  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 As cited in Pollard, Money and the Rise of the Modern Papacy, 150; 157. Also see Domenico Tardini 
(1888-1961): l'azione della Santa Sede nella crisi fra le due guerre, ed. Carlo Casula Tardini (Rome: 
Studium, 1988); and Emma Fattorini, Pio XI, Hitler e Mussolini: la solitudine di un papa (Turin: 
Einaudi, 2007), passim. 
 
18 The citation is drawn from Bernardino Nogara's explanation of his arbitrage operations to the Pope. 
Nogara Archives, Nogara's diary, entry for 15 February 1932. As cited in Pollard, op.cit., 165. For a 
discussion of the Vatican's investment strategy in this period, see ibid., 161-5. 
 
19 Pollard, op. cit. 162. 
 
20 Bernard Passelecq and Bernard Suchecky, L'Encyclique cachée de Pie XI: une occasion manquée de 
l'Eglise face à l'antisémitisme (Paris: Editions La Découverte, 1995), 50. 
 
21 “I ‘besbosniki’ in Germnia,” Osservatore romano (11 April 1931). The article and others like it are 
analyzed at length in ASV, AES Pro Russia (quarto periodo), 1924-1935, Sc. 4, fasc.27, ff.27. In private 
audiences, Pius XI increasingly began making the same point. “È sopratutto il progresso dell’ideologia 
bolscevica in ambienti intelletuali ed universitari che, fra le loro altre propagande, costituisce un grave 
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 In May of 1931, the specially commissioned encyclical providing the Vatican's response 
to the global crisis was released on the fortieth anniversary of Leo XIII's great encyclical on the 
social question, Rerum Novarum. The landmark text, entitled Quadragesimo Anno, and 
tellingly subtitled "the reconstruction of the social order," argued strongly that the multi-year 
economic crisis had been brought about by two states: the United States and the Soviet Union, 
the first responsible for causing the crisis and the second responsible for prolonging and 
exacerbating it. The Soviet Union, the encyclical suggested, was unquestionably the worst of the 
two, for it was actively trying to launch a global revolution, destroy religion, and subsume all 
things under the state. In place of the Soviet Union's transnational and destabilizing project, the 
Vatican had its own answer: the creation of a Europe characterized by ever-stronger 
partnerships between Church and state, which would solve the social question by binding 
employers more tightly to employees via corporative economic structures.  
 Quadragesimo Anno began by suggesting that an unnamed country (the United States) 
had caused the "shipwreck" of the Great Depression. The United States was to blame for 
encouraging a form of monopoly capitalism, based on liberal democratic thinking, which 
instantiated the wrong relationship between the state and its citizens. Its liberal democratic 
"individualism" denied the existence of a shared, public, good, and had turned greed into a 
virtue, allowing for the proliferation of unethical financial speculation, and for the abdication of 
personal moral responsibility. American-style liberalism "had proved that it was utterly unable 
to solve the social problem." Indeed, market-driven, free competition, "clearly cannot direct 
economic life - a truth which the outcome of the application in practice of the tenets of this evil 
individualistic spirit has more than sufficiently demonstrated."22 Pius XI, as had popes before !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
pericolo." D’Herbigny summarizing the Pope's position, preparatory notes, and “Ex audientia Ssmi” notes, 
8 May 1931. Ibid., ff.28. 
 
22 Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (May 15, 1931), §88. All citations are drawn from the official English-
language translation of the encyclical, available online at Encyclicals -- Pius XI -- The Holy See -- The 
Holy Father. <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-anno_en.html>. Last accessed July 16, 2012. 
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him, thus condemned American-style liberalism both as a political doctrine, characterized by a 
preference for republican institutions and democracy, and as an economic doctrine, committed 
to laissez-faire principles.23 
 However, the encyclical specified, the multi-year economic crisis had also tragically led 
to the growth the Soviet Union, which was expounding an even more nefarious ideology than 
American-style liberalism. Communism was dangerous because its penchant for "collectivism" 
subsumed all things in the state, rejected the place of religion in state affairs, and advocated 
"unrelenting class warfare and absolute extermination of private ownership." Just as "the right 
ordering of economic life cannot be left to a free competition of forces," the encyclical noted, so 
also "the unity of human society cannot be founded on an opposition of classes." Indeed the 
Soviet solution was "a remedy far worse than the evil itself," and would "plung[e] human society 
into great dangers."24  
 To demonstrate the growth of Soviet influence, the encyclical tellingly focused on the 
increased prevalence of communist forces in civil society. "Alas," Pius XI lamented, "socialist 
and communist organizations [had recently] surpassed in number" their "Catholic" equivalents. 
Indeed, the Soviet Union was particularly active among youth, seeking to steer away young 
people from groups like Catholic Action, and, "under the guise of affection," attempting "to 
attract children of tender age, and win them to itself." Thus, the "widespread propagation of the 
[communist] doctrine" was growing daily, "not secretly or by hidden methods," but rather, 
"publicly, openly and employing every and all means." But despite this state of affairs, many 
continued to "make light of these impending dangers."25     
 If the United States and the Soviet Union had gotten the proper relationship between the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
23 The point is extrapolated on the basis of indications provided in Michael Novak, Catholic Social 
Thought and Liberal Institutions: Freedom with Justice (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1989), 23-4. 
 
24 Quadragesimo Anno, §10; §46; §88; §112. 




state and its citizens entirely wrong, the Vatican could get it right. In line with the Vatican's 
diplomatic priorities since World War I, the encyclical asserted that the partnership between 
European states and the Vatican would be the best way to solve the crisis. It proposed to 
empower intermediary corporate interests, organized by employment sector, as a way to counter 
the twin evils of liberalism's excessive individualism and communism's overblown and state-
directed communitarianism. Indeed, the Vatican understood that the economy should be 
founded on good moral precepts, like "social justice," "social charity" and "the common good," 
not on individualism and greed. And instead of fomenting class warfare, the Vatican encouraged 
cooperation between employers and workers, in "guilds or associations," which would maintain 
class differences, but instantiate more just relations in the workforce.26  
 To provide a living example of this successful Church-state partnership around 
corporative interests, the encyclical pointed to the Italian state. Happily, the encyclical noted, 
Italy had partially implemented the Vatican's recommendations. As the Italian case 
demonstrated, there were several "obvious advantages" of the corporatist model. These included 
the fact that "various classes work together peacefully," and that socialist and communist 
organizations were "repressed."27 Unsurprisingly, many state corporatists in Italy, Austria and 
Portugal immediately took up Quadragesimo Anno as the flag for their cause. 28 (However, 
careful readers of the text would have noticed that alongside his celebration of Italy, the Pope !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Ibid., §81-3; §88. For an internal argument about Quadragesimo Anno's contribution to Catholic social 
teachings in economic matters (which overlooks its political message), see Michael J. Schuck, That They 
Be One: The Social Teachings of the Papal Encyclicals (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 
1991), 45-117; and Christine Firer Hinze, "Quadragesimo Anno," in Modern Catholic Social Teaching: 
Commentaries and Interpretations (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 151-75. 
 
27 Quadragesimo Anno, §95. 
 
28 For the notion that Quadragesimo Anno marked the Vatican's choice to ally with the Fascist state, see, 
e.g., Paul Misner, "Catholic Labor and Catholic Action: The Italian Context of Quadragesimo Anno," 
Catholic Historical Review 90.4 (October 2004): 650-74; Enzo Collotti, Fascismo e politica di potenza: 
politica estera, 1922-1939 (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 2000), 287ff; and Antonio Occhiuzzo, Intellettuali 
cattolici, fascismo, organizzazione del lavoro e psicotechnica in Italia, 1918-1940 (Soveria Mannelli: 
Calabria letteraria, 1987). Though this argument certainly has merit, it overlooks the full importance of 




had also issued a warning: corporatism should be societal rather than of the state, and Italy 
should not "subordinate to the State all its reciprocally coordinated social elements."29) 
 To summarize: Quadragesimo Anno marked a watershed for the Vatican. With this text, 
the Vatican stressed that Soviet-style communism, masquerading as a remedy, was attempting 
to take advantage of the global instability in order to overturn the constituted order as such. 
Indeed, communism, the encyclical suggested, was the leading global rival of the Vatican, as the 
Soviet Union sought to crowd out Catholic Action's presence in civil society, and as offer its own, 
erroneous, solution to the proper relationship between the state and its citizens. In response to 
this state of affairs, the encyclical sought to orient Vatican partners against the Soviet Union, 
and adumbrated the new ideological precepts undergirding this shift. 
 Quadragesimo Anno also represented a watershed for the Vatican because it marked its 
shift from words to action. Shortly after issuing the encyclical, the Pope encouraged its prompt 
translation into Russian, and began providing secret financial support to organizations of 
Catholic Russian exiles seeking to translate the encyclical's precepts into action. These groups, 
as one of their proponents noted, would be dedicated to "organizing Russian émigré workers, to 
warn them against Bolshevik propaganda, and create unions founded on Christian principles." 
The groups "will become indispensable for the social reconstruction of the Soviet Union," lest 
"the situation in Russia improve."30 One organization founder noted that because Russian exiles 
had seen Soviet power "from close up," they were all the more capable of seeing "in Christianity !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
29 Giuseppe Bottai, "Ancora dello stato corporativo," Critica fascista, June 15, 1928. As defined by Charles 
Maier, societal corporatism "grows stalagmite-like from the basis of civil society," as interests come 
together in "mutually advantageous bargains, sometimes precisely to keep the state at bay." State 
corporatism, on the other hand, is imposed from the top down, "in circumstances where economic groups 
are too diffuse or weak to negotiate their own order." See his Recasting Bourgeois Europe, xii; and In 
Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987), 80. 
 
30 “Le but de tous ces efforts est donc d’organiser les ouvriers russes émigrés pour les prémunir contre la 
propagande bolchéviste e pour constituer sur la base chrétienne les cadres des syndicats qui, dans 
l’éventualité d’une amélioration de la situation en Russie, seraient indispensables à la reconstruction 
sociale de ce pays.” Letter from Father Arnou to Pacelli, on typeface of International Labor Office, League 




the supreme means to counter Satanism [and] the [Soviet Union's] Godless militants."31 Soon, 
Russian émigré organizations inspired by Quadragesimo Anno were active in France, 
Yugoslavia, and Switzerland, where they worked in tandem with the Vatican representative at 
the International Labor Office, to pressure the League of Nations to create a corporatist union 
against communist influence.32   
 
3.  Misreading Contemporary Politics: The "Triangle of Suffering" 
 
If the Great Depression had encouraged the Vatican to begin to take on its global role as never 
before, developments in Spain and Mexico between 1931 and 1932 would further radicalize the 
Vatican against the Soviet Union, and transform its strong rhetorical claims and secret funding 
of small groups into a large-scale, public, foreign policy campaign. Though in fact political 
developments in Spain and Mexico were not directly tied to the Soviet Union, several important 
members of the Vatican hierarchy misinterpreted them in this way, due to pre-existing biases, 
the Vatican's increased connections with starkly anticommunist political forces, and the rather 
primitive nature of the Vatican's information gathering capacities. 
 As Secretary of State and head of the Vatican's foreign policy wing, from 1931 Pacelli 
encouraged the creation of an internal international press bulletin, run by a member of Catholic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 “Ayant vu de près et ressenti sur eux-mêmes la portée de ces forces à la tête desquelles se trouvent les 
militants des Sans-Dieu, les réfugiés russes voient dans le Christianisme le moyen suprême, et le refuge le 
plus sûre contre le satanisme, hostile à toute religion et surtout aggressif vis-à-vis de ceux qui restent 
fidèles à notre Seigneur.” B. Nicolski to d’Herbigny, Geneva, 11 June 1932. Ibid., ff.26-27. 
 
32 The organization of Russian exiles, known as the Bureau des Travailleurs Chrétiens Russes, was 
founded by a Russian Catholic exile B. Nikolski between 1931 and 1932. Nikolski was also responsible for 
translating Quadragesimo Anno into Russian, per the advice of the Vatican representative at the ILO, 
Father André Arnou. In July of 1932, Pius XI decided to help fund the organization, which by July of 1933, 
had begun lobbying the League of Nations to form a union against communism (in tandem with the Pro 
Deo organization), and numbered 3,000 members, living in France, Yugoslavia and Switzerland.  
For a summary of the Bureau's activities and relations with the Vatican, see Lodygensky and Nicolski to 
d’Herbigny, Geneva, 10 July 1933. ASV, AES Pro Russia (quarto periodo) 1924-1935, sc.4, fasc.29, ff.50-2; 
and “Exposé du Dr G. Lodygensky à la XIe Conférence de l’Entente internationale Anticommuniste,” 




Action, and circulated amongst all Vatican personnel and Catholic dailies in Italy. Due to lack of 
funds and the inexistence of a trained body of Catholic journalists abroad, the bulletin drew its 
information regarding international goings-on from reports passed to it directly by the Secretary 
of State. Concealing the extremely limited nature of its sources of information, the bulletin 
feigned the existence of international press correspondents -- news from Germany, for instance, 
was signed "Renano," news from Vienna and Budapest written up by "Danubiano," news from 
Spain delivered by "Cid," and news from Russia and Eastern Europe brought courtesy of "Verax 
and Viator."33 Soon, this international bulletin not only became the basis for international news 
reporting in Catholic newspapers outside of Italy, but it was also drawn on heavily in broadcasts 
of Vatican Radio, which was founded on February 12, 1931, and promptly entrusted to the 
Secretary General of the Jesuit order since 1915, Wladimir Ledóchowski (1866-1942), the son of 
an aristocratic Polish father and a countess of Swiss heritage.34 By the spring of 1931, the 
Vatican's internal press bulletin and Vatican Radio had begun actively reporting. The two 
Catholic countries on which they chose to initially focus their attention -- Mexico and Spain, 
both lamentably outside of the concordat circuit -- would become the Vatican's first "martyrs" in 
its anticommunist crusade. 
 In April of 1931, Spain was preparing to take part in municipal elections, following the 
king's decision to distance himself from the authoritarian Primo De Rivera, who had won !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 The press bulletin was run by the Catholic Action member Federico Alessandrini, per the direct request 
of Vatican officials. Alessandrini described its rather odd modus operandi in his memoirs. See Federico 
Alessandrini, "Memoriale," Studium 81.6 (November-December 1985): 739-56, here 744. For an 
overview, see Francesco Malgeri, “Alessandrini,” in Dizionario storico del movimento cattolico: 
Aggiornamento, 1980-1995, eds. Francesco Traniello and Giorgio Campanini (Turin: Marietti, 1997), 
225-230. 
 
34 Ledóchowski was born in the now Austrian town of Loosdorf, and returned to Poland with his family 
when he was seventeen years old. For more about the Superior General, see Giuliano Cassiani Ingoni, 
Padre Wlodimiro Ledóchowski, XXVI Generale della Compagnia di Gesù, 1866-1942 (Rome: La Civiltà 
Cattolica, 1945), 224. On Vatican Radio, see R.A. Graham, “La radio vaticana tra Londra e Berlino,” 
Civiltà Cattolica 127 (1976): 132-50; Fernando Bea, Ottant'anni della radio del papa (Vatican City: 
Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2011); Marilyn Mateski, Vatican Radio: Propagation by the Airwaves 
(Wesport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995); and Alberto Monticone, Il fascismo al microfono: Radio e politica in 




Catholic sympathies and ruled the country with an iron fist since 1923. The Vatican nuncio in 
Spain -- a new functionary trained at the Pontifical Academy of Ecclesiastical Nobles -- promptly 
informed Pacelli that many high-ranking Spanish clerics were deeply worried about the 
imminent elections. They were convinced, Federico Tedeschini noted, that if Republican parties 
won the day, Spain would return “to the epoch of the persecution of the Church, despite all of 
the Church’s hard-won gains in legal and practical matters.”35 Pacelli, who controlled the 
Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, internalized the view of leading members 
of the Spanish hierarchy almost instantly. Following the victory of anti-monarchical parties at 
the polls and the proclamation of the Spanish Republic on April 15, 1931, Eugenio Pacelli noted 
in an official foreign policy briefing (prepared for the Congregation and the Pope) that now that 
Spain was a Republic, the “Catholic religion will be faced with grave problems and will be hard 
pressed to preserve its privileged position.”36  
 Pacelli's control of the Congregation put him in the important position of controlling the 
Vatican response to events in Spain. As other scholars have shown, if the Congregation for 
Ecclesiastical Affairs had previously existed as a site for debate amongst high-ranking clerics on 
foreign policy matters, after 1930 it became a place where decisions previously taken by Pacelli 
were simply confirmed, if discussed at all.37 Further, only in approximately 6% of cases did Pius 
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35 According to Tedeschini, the clergy were convinced they were about to “retrocedere… all’epoca della 
persecuzione della Chiesa in tutto ció che essa ha potuto faticosamente raggiungere di meglio tanto nei 
principii legali, quanto nella vita pratica.” Letter from Nunzio Tedeschini to Pacelli, Madrid, 27 March 
1931. ASV, AES Spagna (quarto periodo), 1931, pos.781 P.O,, fasc.116, ff.67-68.  
 
36 "Questa Santa Congregazione prevedendo, per notizie avute da diverse parti, che dopo il Governo del 
Generale De Rivera la religione cattolica si sarebbe trovata di fronte a gravi problemi..." Eugenio Pacelli, 
“Sacra Congregazione degli AES: Spagna,” 23 April 1931. ASV, AES Spagna (quarto periodo), 1931-1934, 
pos.784 P.O., fasc.118, ff94. 
 
37 The Cardinals of the congregation were not called upon to weigh in on some of the most controversial 
decisions within the institution, such as the Church’s policy towards the newly appointed Reich chancellor 




XI intervene to modify decisions of the Congregation under Pacelli’s leadership, while when 
Gasparri was head of the Congregation, Pius XI had modified 38% of the decisions.38  
 Soon, Pacelli used his control of the Congregation to make himself the loudspeaker of an 
even more inflammatory view popular among Spanish clergy.39 According to this view, the 
elections and the proclamation of the newborn Spanish Republic were part of a sinister 
Bolshevik plot to conquer Spain and make it communist. Rather than simply lamenting the 
presumed outcome of the April 1931 elections, many members of Spain's clergy and members of 
the Jesuit order had since April 15th argued that the Spanish elections were an illegitimate, 
revolutionary act, brought about by covert Russian intervention in Spanish affairs. Thus, 
Spanish clerics had begun using the phrase "the revolution" as shorthand for the purported 
Russian involvement in the democratically administered and full legitimate April 1931 elections. 
As the Archbishop of Toledo wrote in a personal letter to Pacelli on April 17, 1931, the "present 
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38 Roberto Regoli, “Il ruolo della Sacra Congregazione degli AES durante il pontificato di Pio XI,” 
Convegno internazionale: la sollecitudine ecclesiale di Pio XI alla luce delle nuove fonti archivistiche, 
Vatican City, 27 February 2009.  
 
39 As Frances Lannon also argues, Catholics declared war on the Republic from the moment it was 
proclaimed. See Frances Lannon, “The Church’s Crusade Against the Republic,” in Revolution and War in 
Spain, 1931-9, ed. Paul Preston (London: Routledge, 1984), 35-59. For an argument about how 
Catholicism became the most powerful weapon of Spanish right-wing forces during the Second Republic, 
see Mary Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 
1930-1936 (New York: Clarendon Press, 1996); Julián Casanova, "Order and Religion," in The Spanish 
Republic and Civil War, trans. Martin Douch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For a 
discussion of how many Spanish Catholics mobilized against the Republic, see Federico M. Requena, 
Católicos, devociones, y sociedad durante la dictadura de Primo de Rivera y la Segunda República: La 
Obra del Amor Misericordioso en España (1922-1936) (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2008); Eduardo 
González-Calleja, Contrarrevolucionarios: radicalización violenta de las derechas durante la Segunda 
República, 1931-1936 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 2011); Vicente Cárcel Ortí, ed., La II República y la 
Guerra Civil en el Archivo Secreto Vaticano (Madrid: Biblioteca de los autores cristianos, 2011); Antonio 
Manuel Moral Roncal, La cuestión religiosa en la Segunda República Española : Iglesia y carlismo 
(Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2009); Luis Cano, Reinaré en España: la mentalidad católica a la llegada de 
la Segunda República  (Madrid: Editiones Encuentro, 2009); Julio de la Cueva and Feliciano Montero, 
eds., Laicismo y catolicismo: el conflicto político-religioso en la Segunda República (Alcalá: Universidad 
de Alcalá, 2009); José Ramón Hernández Figueiredo, Destrucción del patrimonio religioso en la 
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Biblioteca de autores cristianos, 2009); Paulino Castañeda Delgado and Josemaría García de Lomas Mier, 
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revolution is a great catastrophe [....] promoted by Russian Bolshevism." 40  "Given the 
orientation and shape of the Revolution,” a powerful Spanish Jesuit noted in a letter hand-
delivered to Pacelli, “the real danger in Spain is the victory of Communism.”41 Similarly, another 
Jesuit writing directly to the Vatican Secretary of State affirmed with certainty that if “the 
current sacrilegious politicians stay in power,” Spain would likely morph into “a Bolshevik 
Russia”— an outcome Spain’s ruling politicians were supposedly “in a rush to bring about.” 42 
Indeed, as the Vatican nuncio Tedeschini informed Pacelli, it was common knowledge (that is, 
common hearsay amongst members of the Spanish hierarchy) that Spain's new republican 
ministers received extensive secret "funding from Russia."43 
Even if any hard and fast evidence regarding Soviet involvement was sorely wanting, 
Eugenio Pacelli quickly grew convinced that the Soviet Union was indeed playing an active role 
in Spanish developments. 44  In a report penned on April 23rd for the Congregation of 
Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, he asserted that there was without question extensive 
"Russian involvement" in Spanish affairs. He also predicted that soon the Spanish Republic !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 “Los que vivimos intesamente esta vida nacional, sabemos que la actual revolución, promovida por [...] 
el Bolchevisquismo ruso y que ha utilizada los elementos sociales y politicos menos estimables de España, 
no responde ni con mucho a la mayoria verdadera de la nación, ni exterioriza la voluntad nacional […] La 
verdadera España en estos momentos está consternada y se considera victima de una gran catástrofe.” 
Letter from Cardinal Segura y Saenza, Archbishop of Toledo, to Pacelli, 17 April 1931. ASV, AES Spagna 
(quarto periodo), 1931-1934, pos.784 P.O,, fasc.119, ff.5, pp.2-3. 
  
41 “El major peligro de España, dada la orientación y la fisonomia de la Revolución, seria el predominio del 
Comunismo.” Otaño, S.J. “La situacion de España,” April-May 1931. Ibid., fasc.122, ff.22-40. Otaño’s 
report was sent to Pacelli by Father Rosa of Civiltà Cattolica. 
 
42 “Nella più grande rovina delle cose religiose, morali e sociali che si sta compiendo, che resterà delle cose 
ecclesiastiche nessuno può prevedere; con poco però che durino nel potere gli attuali sacrilegi detentori, 
non può umanamente sperarsi altro che uno stato più caotico di quello della Russia bolscevica. Hanno 
fretta per portarci a tale stato, e quando si potrà e vorrà lottare sarà troppo tardi.” Letter from Vidal to 
Pacelli, Rome, 19 May 1931. ASV, AES Spagna (quarto periodo), 1931, pos.781 P.O,, fasc.116, ff.5. 
 
43 Spain's new ministers "[sono] particolarmente aiutati [...] dai sussidii di Russia […] Il Signore abbia 
pietà della Nazione ritenuta tradizionalmente cattolica per eccellenza.” Letter from Tedeschini to Pacelli, 
Madrid, 18 April 1931. Ibid., ff.69-78. 
 
44 See Roberto Ceamanos Llorens, El discurso bolchevique: El Parti Communiste Français y la Segunda 
República española (1931-1936) (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2010) and Nicolás Salas, La otra memoria 
histórica: 500 testimonios gráficos y documentales de la represión marxista en España, 1931-1939 




would begin acting more and more like the Soviet Union, and launch an all-out campaign 
against religion.45 Soon, similar interpretations of the Spanish Republic found their way onto the 
pages of the Vatican international press bulletin, and into news reports aired over Vatican 
Radio. 46  The view was also repeated by Pacelli's colleagues at the Congregation for 
Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, who for instance announced that the declaration of the 
Republic in Spain was part of an elaborate plot developed by “the Russo-German Jew calling 
himself Leon Trotsky.” Aiming to “overthrow all Christian Churches in the world,” the report 
noted that Trotsky had supposedly used “his Agents to pull down the [Spanish] King,” and was 
now well on the way towards having the new Spanish Republic “cripple the Church, ruin the 
Aristocracy,” and “corrupt the Army,” thus paving the way for “Red Soviet Dictatorship and 
Atheistical Inquisition, as in Russia.”47  
 When in December of 1931, the Spanish government passed a new constitution calling 
for freedom of religion, the separation of Church and state, and the dissolution of the Jesuit 
order, the Spanish clergy in general -- and, of course, the Jesuit order in particular -- interpreted 
this as proof positive of Soviet involvement. So did Pacelli, who in these months increasingly 
began predicting an imminent communist seizure of power in Spain.48 He urged the Pope to 
issue an official denunciation of the Republic’s Soviet-style efforts to “de-Christianize Spain.” 
The Vatican must take a stand, he recommended, through an encyclical, which would speak out !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 Eugenio Pacelli, “Sacra Congregazione degli AES: Spagna,” 23 April 1931. ASV, AES Spagna (quarto 
periodo), 1931-1934, pos.784 P.O., fasc.119, p.1. 
 
46 See, e.g., “Bollettino n.1: Notiziario Sovietico,” 20 May 1933. ASV, AES Pontificia Commissione Pro 
Russia, 1932-1935, pos.Sc.3a, fasc.21, ff.21-22. 
 
47 “Memo as to the Russo-Jew Plan to overthrow the Catholic Church in Spain” (May 1931). ASV, AES 
Spagna (quarto periodo), 1931-1934, pos.784 P.O,, fasc.122, ff68-73. The heavily underlined report 
prepared by a Vatican correspondent in the UK was sent to Cardinal Frühwirth, one of the most vocal 
members of the AES Congregation, who in turn delivered it to Pacelli. 
 
48 See, e.g., Dr. Fr. Stegmüller, “L’Action sociale en Espagne” (fall 1931). ASV, AES Spagna (quarto 
periodo), 1931-1934, pos.784 P.O., fasc.123, ff.31; Tedeschini to Pacelli, Telegram, 14 October 1931; and 





against the “secret, persistent, revolutionary forces, motivated by their hatred of Jesus Christ 
and his Church,” at work in Spain.49  As he pressured Pius XI to take action on this skewed 
interpretation of Spanish developments, Pacelli also urged the Vatican nuncio in Spain to launch 
"energetic and well-motivated protests" against the government. "Both Spanish public opinion 
and international opinion," Pacelli noted, must get "a good idea of the gravity of the facts 
committed against the rights of the Church."50  
 By late 1931, Eugenio Pacelli had used his position as Secretary of State and head of the 
Vatican's foreign policy branch to disseminate a narrow interpretation of political events in 
Spain. This interpretation pinned rising anti-clerical measures on subversive Bolshevik agents, 
who were supposedly seeking to use Spain as the base of their operations. Faced with the failure 
of concordat diplomacy in the Soviet Union (for which he was in no small measure personally 
responsible), and in regular contact with starkly anti-communist Spanish Jesuits, Pacelli began 
to see the work of Bolsheviks everywhere. Accordingly, he swiftly undertook a secret campaign 
to prevent the Soviet Union from joining the League of Nations by pressuring Italian and 
German diplomats to call for its exclusion.51  
 Pacelli was not the only Vatican official convinced of the need to halt an expansionistic 
and dangerous Soviet Union. From c.1930, clerics in Central America and the United States 
were in the process of building a similar argument regarding political developments in Mexico. 
The leading artifice of this argument was the American Jesuit Edmund A. Walsh. Like Pacelli, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 From as early as October 1931, Pacelli urged Pius XI to issue an Encyclical denouncing the “illegitimate 
actions” of the supposedly illegitimate government. "Si vuole la scristianizzazione della Spagna [...] È 
lecito conchiudere che la lotta mossa alla Chiesa nella Spagna provenga […] dall’opera nascosta, ma 
pertinace, di forze sovvertitrici, mosse dall’odio contro Gesù Cristo e la Sua Chiesa, non diversamente da 
quanto avviene nella Russia.” The words are cited from an early draft of the Encyclical: “Sommario,” 
October 1931. ASV, AES Spagna (quarto periodo), 1931-1933, pos.833 P.O., fasc.208, ff.31. 
 
50 “Santo Padre desidera che Vostra Eccellenza faccia protesta energica e motivata la quale dia anche alla 
pubblica opinione spagnuola e internazionale una giusta idea della gravità dei fatti commessi contro i 
diritti della Chiesa.” Pacelli to Tedeschini, telegram, 20 June 1931. Ibid., 1931-4, pos.784 P.O., fasc.118, 
ff.22. 
 
51 See, e.g., Pacelli, Udienze notes for 21 January 1931. ASV, AES, Stati Ecclesiastici, 1930-1938, pos.430a 




Walsh had a personal, career-related, bone to pick with the Soviets and with Mexico's leftist 
rulers. Indeed, Walsh had been personally responsible for the flop of the Vatican relief mission 
in the Soviet Union, and the failure to conclude a lasting Vatican-Mexican alliance.  An 
enterprising Jesuit from Boston with a keen interest in growing the Vatican's stature in foreign 
policy circles, Walsh had raised considerable funds to establish the School of Foreign Service for 
Georgetown University, in Washington, D.C., in 1919. Following his failed trip to Russia between 
1922 and 1923, he had developed strong ties with American politicians and become the leading 
Catholic voice in the American anticommunist movement. 52  
 Father Walsh had also grown increasingly interested in Mexican affairs. In the early 
1920s, he had taken part in an American Catholic protest of the anti-clerical provisions of the 
1917 Mexican constitution.53 In Mexico, the protest of these provisions led many Catholic 
peasants in the western parts of Mexico to take up arms; from 1926, these peasants called 
themselves "Cristeros," invoking the glory of "Christ the King" in their opposition to the central 
government. Soon, through Walsh's personal enterprise and the successful lobbying undertaken 
by key members of the American Catholic hierarchy, the White House and the State Department 
agreed to join Walsh in informal, secret negotiations with the Mexican government, to settle the 
conflict. This eventually led to the conclusion of the 1929 modus vivendi between the Vatican 
and the Mexican government, which brought the bloody Cristero War to a halt, and committed 
the Mexican government to recognizing the Church and its spiritual rights, restoring churches 
and seminaries, and providing amnesty to the Cristeros. 54 The Vatican appointed Archbishop 
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52 Larry Ceplair, Anticommunism in Twentieth-Century America: A Critical History (New York: Praeger, 
2011), 35. For a recent biography of Edmund A. Walsh, see Patrick McNamara, A Catholic Cold War: 
Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., and the Politics of American Anticommunism (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005). 
 
53 See Marcelo Villegas, Why Reds Rule Mexico: The Red Threat in the Mexican Maze (New York City: 
Inter-American Publishing Syndicate, 1928); and Francis McCullagh, Red Mexico: A Reign of Terror in 
America (New York: L.Carrier & Co., 1928).   
 
54 See Douglas J. Slawson, "The National Catholic Welfare Conference and the Church-State Conflict in 
Mexico, 1925 - 1929," Americas 47 (July 1990): 55 - 93; L. Ethan Ellis, "Dwight Morrow and the Church-
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Leopoldo Ruiz y Flóres as Apostolic Delegate to Mexico, to regulate future relations between the 
two states, and announced that, "a continuation of the mutual good will and cooperation which 
have effected the settlement will mean an era of peace and prosperity for the Mexican nation."55  
But the 1929 Vatican-Mexican settlement soon proved evanescent. In 1930, the truce 
between the Mexican government and the Cristeros was suspended, as local Mexican officials 
rounded up, tortured and murdered many Catholic peasants who had participated in the civil 
war. In response, remaining Cristeros rearmed in the countryside, giving the central 
government a new justification to curtail Catholic activities now deemed "anti-national." In 
1931, Mexico's new Secretary of Public Education passed an education reform, which banned 
religious teachings in school and removed crucifixes from the classroom. In 1932, the Mexican 
central government officially repealed the 1929 modus vivendi with the Vatican. In its place, 
local officials passed new laws limiting the number of priests that could be active within any 
given territory and calling for the closure of large numbers of churches. 56 
 Both Edmund Walsh and the Vatican Apostolic Delegate in Mexico City promptly began 
informing Pacelli that the latest measures were due to growing Soviet influence in the country. 
Ignoring the important fact that Mexico had broken off diplomatic relations with the Soviet 
Union in 1930, the two men argued that the failure of the modus vivendi was due to covert 
Russian influence in Mexican affairs.57 The Vatican's Apostolic Delegate for instance informed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
State Controversy in Mexico," Hispanic American Historical Review 38 (November 1958): 482 - 505; and 
M. Elizabeth Ann Rice, O.P., The Diplomatic Relations Between the United States and Mexico, As 
Affected by the Struggle for Religious Liberty in Mexico, 1925 - 1929 (Washington, D.C.: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1959). 
 
55 Statement of Cardinal Pietro Fumasoni-Biondi, June 1929, as reprinted in Edward J. Hanna Papers, 
Archives of the Archdiocese of Santa Fe. Cited in Richard Gribble, The Archbishop for the People: The Life 
of Edward J. Hanna (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2006), 245. 
 
56 See John W. Sherman, The Mexican Right: The End of Revolutionary Reform, 1929-1940 (Westport, 
Conn: Praeger, 1997), 34-7; and Adrian A. Bantjes, “Idolatry and Iconoclasm in Revolutionary Mexico: 
The De-Christianization Campaigns, 1929-1940,” Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos 13, 1 (Winter 
1997): 87-120. 
 
57 Daniela Spenser, The Impossible Triangle: Mexico, Soviet Russia and the United States in the 1920s 
(Durham: Duke University Press 1999), 165ff.  
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Pacelli that the Mexican Interior Ministry was still "sending many youth to Russia to study 
Bolshevism," and that a pending education reform was a plan to "implement communist 
education in [Mexican] schools." Because the "government exercises an absolute monopoly" 
over education, Ruiz y Flóres noted, it might well be able to "imbue the hearts of young people 
with Bolshevik principles and doctrines." The Mexican Archbishop and Vatican employee 
further asserted that since the mid 1920s, "there [had been] many Russians and foreigners in 
government ministries, charged with shaping employees in the principles of Bolshevism."58  
 Drawing on his personal experience, Walsh demonstrated through pamphlets and 
speeches directed at Vatican officials and at American citizens that Mexico's policies were 
planned by the Soviet Union. He founded a broad-based Catholic lobby effort to block the 
United States' diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union. Though the lobby failed to achieve its 
main goal, Roosevelt did force the Soviet Union to protect the religious rights of Americans in 
the Soviet Union -- something that Walsh and the Pope hailed as a major victory for Catholics 
everywhere, and the result of direct American Catholic pressure.59  
 Amidst the fever-pitched anticommunism that had taken the United States by storm 
since 1919, Walsh's message had a growing audience.60 Following the failure of the modus 
vivendi with Mexico, Walsh received over thirty invitations to speak about Soviet influence in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
58 "Il Governatore di Veracruz, Adalberto Tejeda, Ministro del Interno al tempo delle leggi di Calles contro 
la Chiesa [...] invió [sic] parecchi giovani in Russia per studiare il Bolscevismo ed implantó [sic] nelle 
scuole l’educazione comunista [...] Senza dubbio il maggior danno del comunismo nel Messico si trova 
nelle scuole, sulle quali il Governo esercita un monopolio assoluto, e dove può informare i cuori dei 
fanciulli nei principi e dottrini comuniste [...] Nei dicasteri del Governo si trovano molti russi e stranieri 
incaricati di formare gli impiegati nei principi del Bolscevismo." Letter from Leopoldo Ruiz y Flóres, 
Archbishop of Morelia, Apostolic Delegate of Mexico, to Pacelli, San Antonio, Texas, 23 April 1936, ASV, 
AES Stati Ecclesiastici (quarto periodo), pos.474 P.O., fasc.482, ff.12-5. 
 
59 On Walsh's activities to block the U.S.' recognition of the Soviet Union, see McNamara, op.cit., 74-84. 
 
60 On the rise of anti-communism in the United States, see M.J. Heale, McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare 
Politics in State and Nation, 1935-1965 (Basinstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998); Richard Gid Powers, Not 
Without Honor: A History of American Anti-Communism (New York: Free Press, 1995); Ceplair, 
Anticommunism in Twentieth-Century America, 19-53; Cyndy Herdershot, Anticommunism and Popular 
Culture in Mid-Century America (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2003); Melvyn Leffler, The Specter of 





Mexico.61 In December of 1931, Walsh delivered the keynote lecture at the American Historical 
Association, in which he lashed out against "Lenin's dream of universal empire," which 
supposedly remained the linchpin of the Soviet Union, despite Stalin's proclamations to the 
contrary. "The objectives of the Communist State are not confined to domestic prosperity and 
security, nor limited by national frontiers," Walsh asserted. "Their militant political philosophy 
leaps these traditional limits of sovereignty, since their claim is to rule mankind in the mass." 
For the Bolshevik, Walsh argued, "there is but one categorical imperative: Thou shalt 
communize the world, or else destroy it." Thus, it was not only Mexico that was in danger; it 
was the world at large. Walsh concluded by informing secular and non-secular historians at the 
meeting that only one force would be capable of fending off the Soviet Union: the Vatican. 
"Before the Soviet government's [...] conspiracy to attack the entire world," he affirmed, "the 
Catholic Church will not recoil, nor retreat, nor compromise." 62  
 Walsh was not operating on the margins of American society: he was a prominent 
diplomat with close ties to the U.S. government and the American intelligentsia, whose views 
helped foment Catholic anticommunism on many levels in the United States. In fact, the U.S. 
State Department had recently institutionalized anticommunism when it appointed the Irish 
Catholic Robert F. Kelley as the head of Eastern European Affairs, and backed Kelley's notion 
that the Bolsheviks had a hand in Mexican affairs and elsewhere. And this charismatic Catholic 
diplomat -- who likely was directly familiar with Walsh -- would leave a lasting impact on 
Washington's foreign policy establishment. He did so by helping convince young foreign service 
agents who would play a crucial role in the Cold War (e.g., George Kennan and Charles Bohlen) 
of the Soviet Union's expansionistic plans.63 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Laura Pettinaroli, "La politique russe du Saint-Siège (1905-1939)," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Lyon, 2008), 945. 
 
62 Edmund Walsh, SJ, "The Catholic Church in Present-Day Russia," speech delivered at the AHA annual 
meeting, Minneapolis, 29 December 1931. Stored in ARSI, Library, Comunismo Varia (I), ff.1-38. 
 
63 Leffler, op.cit.,18ff. 
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 By the end of 1931, the mistaken notion that Mexico and Spain were ripe for a Soviet 
take-over had found its way into the Vatican's foreign policy bulletins, Catholic Action journals, 
Pacelli's write-ups for the Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs, and the 
pronouncements of Pope Pius XI. In a landmark speech of December 24, 1931, Pius XI for 
instance noted in his annual Christmas sermon that a "terrible triangle of suffering" united the 
Soviet Union, Mexico and Spain. In all three countries, the Pope suggested, a clever minority of 
Bolshevik agents was attempting to spread communist revolution, over and against the wishes of 
the non-communist masses. 64   
 From this point on the idea that Soviet agents were busily at work in Mexico, Spain, and 
further afield, became an insistent part of the Pope's official pronouncements. An encyclical 
published shortly after Quadragesimo Anno (written with Pacelli's substantial input) focused on 
the supposed Soviet attempt to spread “communistic propaganda” through the Mexican school 
system and among Mexico's lower classes.65 The text highlighted how “the grievous condition of 
the Church in Mexico […] differs but little” from “the one raging within the unhappy borders of 
Russia.” Indeed, these disturbing similarities should awaken Catholics everywhere to the gravity 
of the Soviet danger. “May [we], from this iniquitous similarity of purpose, conceive fresh ardor 
to stem the torrent which is subverting all social order.”66 In a second encyclical, Pius XI echoed 
and expanded Quadragesimo Anno's claim that the Soviet Union was taking advantage of the 
Great Depression to expand its global reach. Bolsheviks were “unfurling their impious and 
hateful flags,” in the attempt to “unite the war against God with the war for daily bread, and 
employing any means possible to reach their diabolical aim.” Under the guise of ameliorating !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 L’Osservatore romano (25 December 1931). 
 
65 Pius XI, Acerba Animi (29 September 1932), §9. All citations are drawn from the official English-
language translation of the encyclical, available online at Encyclicals -- Pius XI -- The Holy See -- The 
Holy Father. < http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xi_enc_29091932_acerba-animi_en.html>. Last accessed 3 August 2012. For the drafting of the 
Encyclical (and evidence of Pacelli’s involvement), see ASV Messico, Pos.558 P.O., fasc.319, ff.3-90. 
 




society, these “demons” were in effect endangering “religion and social peace.” It was time, the 
1932 encyclical concluded, for “all nations to abandon their base self-interests, and unite in a 
single front against these evil phalanges, which are enemies of God and of humankind.” 67  
 The trouble was, however, that the Vatican's secret campaign to prevent the Soviet Union 
from joining the League of Nations did not seem to be succeeding, nor did the American 
Catholic lobby (spearheaded by Walsh) appear capable of blocking the United States' diplomatic 
recognition of the Soviet Union. Given this, how, practically speaking, could the Vatican respond 
to the Soviet Union and place itself at the head of the "single front" of anti-Soviet states, as 
recommended by the 1932 encyclical? 
 
4. Launching the Anticommunist Campaign: Pacelli's 1932 Circular 
 
In April of 1932, Eugenio Pacelli provided his answer to the question. The Vatican, he 
recommended, must abandon its secret and disunited efforts to mobilize against the Soviet 
Union. Instead, the time had come for a large-scale campaign, which would present the Soviet 
Union as the leading threat to the European continent and the world at large. The campaign 
would pressure the Vatican's partner states to take vigorous action against the Soviet Union, and 
it would encourage non-partner states to do the same. It would also turn Catholic Action into a 
loudspeaker for the Vatican's new anticommunist political ideology, which would take the form 
of a sustained attack on communist ideas, and the provision of an alternative vision: a world of 
corporatist, peaceful, Church-state duopolies.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 “I partiti sovversivi profittando dell’universale disagio, spiegano sempre più impudentemente le loro 
bandiere di empietà e di odio contro ogni religione, e tentando, non senza effetto, di congiungere la guerra 
contro Dio con la lotta per il pane quotidiano, lavorano con tutti i mezzi, per raggiungere il loro diabolico 
intento [...] Il Santo Padre quindi scongiura tutte le nazioni, a deporre ogni basso egoismo, e a volere 
unire tutte le forze in un unico fronte contro le malvage falangi, nemiche di Dio non meno che del genere 
umano.” Pius XI, Caritate Christi (3 May 1932). This summary of the Encyclical can be found in “La 
nuova Enciclica del S. Padre Pio XI sulle presenti angustie del genere umano.” Rome, 3 May 1932. ASV, 




 Pacelli articulated his motivations and visions for the shift via a circular letter, which was 
distributed to Vatican officials in over forty-three countries. 68 The long letter began by making 
the Catholic hierarchy aware of the supposed threat posed by the Soviet Union to the Vatican. 
"Communist propaganda today represents a grave danger for the social order in general, and for 
the Catholic religion in particular," the letter began. Citing the Soviet Union’s anti-religious 
legislation, Pacelli explained how communism was in its essence anti-Catholic. Indeed, the 
Soviet Union had supposedly targeted two “most Catholic nations,” Mexico and Spain, in a bid 
to quickly destroy the Catholic Church and the Catholic faith. To date, the Soviets had been able 
to expand communism so successfully because they cleverly targeted individuals that drifted 
across national boundaries -- for instance, sailors, merchants, university students, soldiers, 
postal system workers, telegraph employees, train conductors and pilots. Further, Pacelli noted, 
Moscow had figured out how to pitch its message in a language that was appealing to groups of 
all social classes and nationalities. It did so not only through traditional press organs but also 
through a covert film and radio industry that spread communism through entertainment. Soviet 
agents had also proved masterful in setting up organizations that directly competed with 
Catholic Action. In this way, Pacelli noted, communism had become popular not only 
throughout Western, Central and Eastern Europe, but had also won followers as far afield as 
North and South America, Australia, China and India.  
 What could the Vatican do to respond to this threat? The first-order necessity, Pacelli 
explained, was to gather more information on the precise nature of communist tactics, and rank 
countries according to the degree to which they had already been penetrated by Soviet forces. To 
facilitate this, Pacelli included an extensive questionnaire he asked all readers to fill out and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 The countries to which the circular was sent included Austria, Argentina, Albania, Australia, the Belgian 
Congo, Belgium, Brazil, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China Colombia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Haiti, Hungary, Indochina, Iraq, Iran, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Libya, the Netherlands, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Venezuela and 
Yugoslavia. The highways and byways of Vatican information dissemination are outlined in Cardinal 
Pacelli's note accompanying the 14 April 1932 Circular letter. ASV, AES Stati Ecclesiastici (quarto 




send back as quickly as possible.69 The second step was for the Vatican to turn communist 
tactics on their head by launching its own substantive anticommunist crusade. This crusade, 
Pacelli suggested, must operate on multiple fronts. Certainly, it must make use of traditional 
means used by the Church for centuries in its campaigns against its various enemies: "acts of 
reparation, pilgrimages, expiatory communions, prayers for the persecuted of Russia, Mexico 
and Spain, etc."70 Additionally, the Vatican's new anticommunist campaign must also include a 
stronger Vatican presence in mass media, so as to provide a Catholic response to the Soviet 
presence in radio and film. Further, the Vatican anticommunist campaign must lean extensively 
on Catholic Action, which would be encouraged to militate actively against overt and covert 
communist groups. Finally and most urgently, the Vatican needed to use its newfound 
diplomatic prowess to influence partner and non-partner states to turn against the Soviet Union. 
Luckily, Pacelli noted, concordat partners like Italy and Germany seemed willing to heed the 
Vatican's advice. Perhaps due to his close ties to Edmund A. Walsh and members of the 
American hierarchy, the Vatican Secretary of State showered praised on the work of the United 
States' Fish Commission, which between 1930 and 1931 had accused several American citizens 
of harboring communist tendencies, highlighting in particular the purported link between 
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69 To paraphrase Pacelli’s questions: 1. What are the political manifestations of the communist party in 
your country? Do communist parties seem to be plotting to take power through the ballots or by force? 2. 
Are there signs of secret communist activity, particularly in schools and ports? 3. What kinds of Soviet 
films, newspapers, flyers, and journals are distributed in your country? (Here, Pacelli noted that even 
films with apparently anodyne titles could be fronts for communist propaganda -- hence it was necessary 
to report all Russian production agencies whose films were being distributed); 4. What is the attitude of 
public opinion and the press towards communism? Are they sympathetic and curious, indifferent or 
critical?; 5. What is the attitude of the ruling government towards the communist party? Does the 
government conduct counter-propaganda against communism? Does this counter-propaganda highlight 
the need to protect religion and religious orders?; and finally, 6. Are Catholics in your country mobilized 
against communism? Is Catholic Action well-established in your country, for both youth and adults? Do 
these organizations understand that their task is to mobilize around issues of pressing social concern? 
Ibid. 
 
70 "...funzioni di riparazione, pellegrinaggi, comunioni espiatrici, preghiere per i perseguitati della Russia, 




communism and anti-Catholicism.71 Pacelli suggested that this was simply the beginning of a 
wide effort to convince both state leaders and Catholic individuals that the Soviet Union 
represented the world's leading threat , and that it must be isolated and disempowered.   
 In this way, Pacelli’s 1932 circular provided a new, authoritative interpretive framework 
for the Catholic world, according to which all present-day instances of instability and anti-
clericalism could be traced to the Soviet Union. Second, the circular encouraged Vatican officials 
far and wide to help launch an anticommunist campaign that would seek to isolate the Soviet 
Union and curb the spread of communism. In the process, the circular announced a large-scale 
information-gathering mission, which sought to get a sense of the extent of communist 
penetration and glean which communist tactics appeared particularly effective.  
The 1932 circular thus inaugurated a new moment in Vatican history. Alongside a diplomacy 
focused on the preservation of concordat gains, the Vatican would now also focus its diplomacy 
on naming, shaming, and weakening the Soviet Union on the international stage. As a priest 
who would emerge centrally in the Vatican anticommunist effort, Father Joseph Henri Ledit, 
would later comment, the 1932 call to unite against the Soviet Union represented a turning point 
in Vatican history. By drawing “a vivid picture of Godlessness throughout the world,” the 





71 The fervently anticommunist American politician, Hamilton Fish, put the committee together. The 
committee met from June of 1930 through January of 1931, and targeted in particular the ACLU and the 
communist presidential candidate William Z. Foster. For more on the commission and the man behind it, 
see Anthony Troncone, "Hamilton Fish Sr. and the Politics of American Nationalism, 1912-1945" (Ph.D. 
diss., Department of History, Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, 1993). 
 
72 Father Ledit’s memories of Ledóchowski. Undated manuscript, most likely written soon after 






It took approximately a year and a half for the Vatican to translate its diplomatic program into 
practice. During this arc of time, Pacelli and his associates in the Secretariat of State compiled 
the responses to the 1932 circular regarding communist tactics and centers of activity, and 
replaced the chief proponent of the previous, conciliatory, attitude towards the former Russian 
Empire.73 They also sought to convince politicians and members of the Catholic hierarchy and 
laity to come onboard with the new campaign.  
 One key platform for explaining the Vatican's new diplomatic turn against the Soviet 
Union was the exceptional  Holy Year, inaugurated in April of 1933. Officially Holy Years were 
supposed to coincide with Jubilees, and since the last Holy Year had been held in 1925, the next 
one should have taken place in 1950. However, the Pope decided to anticipate the event by 
seventeen years for political reasons and because of the drop in contributions from the faithful. 
It was decided that hosting a massive pilgrimage event in Rome might not only help repair some 
of the losses, but also provide an opportunity to inform the faithful about the Vatican's new 
decision to turn forcefully against the Soviet Union.74 In his official sermons and speeches 
delivered over the course of the Holy Year, Pacelli made the Soviet persecution of Catholic 
priests and congregations his main focus, while Pius XI highlighted how Mexico and Spain were 
infected by the Soviet contagion.75 The Pope explained that the Jubilee had been exceptionally 
extended so as to bring about "the reparation of the whole Catholic world,” which was under 
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73 Archival evidence indicates that the leading clerics responsible for D’Herbigny’s downfall were Eugenio 
Pacelli, Donato Sbaretti, Nicola Canali and Lorenzo Lauri. For strong complaints about D’Herbigny issued 
by these clerics, see, inter alia, ASV, AES (quarto periodo) PCPR, pos.1, fasc.1, ff.30-35; ACS, MI, DGPS, 
DPP, fascicoli personali, b.386, fasc. D’Arbigny (sic) [D’Herbigny]; and Fiduciario #571 [Italo Tavolato], 
12 May 1934. Ibid.  
 
74 Pollard, Money and the Rise of the Modern Papacy, passim. 
 
75 The speeches are reprinted in Il Messaggero, 7 and 15 April 1933. As cited in R.J.B. Bosworth, "L'Anno 




threat because "the destructive efforts of Militant Atheists are on the rise." "These depraved 
men," the Pope warned pilgrims to Rome, "are endeavoring to destroy not only all religion but 
every vestige of civic culture and true refinement."76  
 The 1933 Holy Year was not only directed at the Catholic hierarchy and laity; it also 
sought to encourage European politicians to join the Vatican in its new turn against the Soviet 
Union. The necessity of a joint Italian-Vatican front against the forces of disorder was made 
quite explicit, as the Holy Year was made to coincide with the Exhibition of the Fascist 
Revolution, and as numerous Fascist and Vatican commentators celebrated in speeches and 
articles the coming together of these two powers against a single enemy.77 The Holy Year may 
also have facilitated the Vatican's union with two strongly anticommunist politicians, as the 
institution concluded the last wave of concordat diplomacy. 
  The concordats with Austria and Germany were signed in June and July of 1933, 
respectively. Both were concluded with newly appointed authoritarian leaders, whose 
anticommunism was attractive to the Vatican. Austria's staunchly Catholic leader, Engelbert 
Dollfuss (1892-1934) had come to power in May of 1932, and had moved quickly to replace 
parliamentary government (which he considered susceptible to Marxist revolution) with an 
authoritarian system. Similarly, Germany's newly appointed Chancellor Adolf Hitler (1889-
1945) claimed that the February 1933 Reichstag fire was evidence that communists were plotting 
revolution, and accordingly seized emergency measures to institute a dictatorship, harshly 
suppress the left, and suspend the right to assembly, freedom of speech, and freedom of the 
press. The Führer immediately recognized the importance of allying with the Vatican, and began 
pursuing concordat negotiations. In March, he promised that he would honor the Holy See’s 
concordats with individual German states, maintain government support of Catholic schools, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 AAS, 26:139 (1934). As cited by Ledóchowski, “On the need of vigorously opposing modern atheism: a 
letter addressed to the whole society,” Rome, 27 April 1934. In Selected writings of Father Ledóchowski 
(Chicago: American Assistancy of the Society of Jesus, 1945), 601-6. 
 




and uphold religious education in public schools.78 In an April 1933 meeting with top-ranking 
German Catholic clergy, he proclaimed, “I will protect the rights and freedom of the church and 
will not permit them to be touched. You need have no apprehensions concerning the freedom of 
the church.”79 Soon, Pius XI was confiding to ambassadors his respect for Hitler's willingness to 
join forces with the Catholic Church in the fight against Bolshevism. 80 For that matter, Pius XI 
was not alone: the notion that Hitler could stem the Soviet tide (and that there was such a 
revolutionary tide to stem) was shared by numerous European leaders of the time.81  
 The swiftly concluded Austrian and German concordats, negotiated by Eugenio Pacelli, 
closely resembled in both form and content the concordats the Vatican had concluded in the 
preceding decade. Like the Italian concordat, the Austrian agreement for instance proclaimed 
the Roman Catholic Church as the favored religion of the state. It imposed strict penalties 
against all attacks on religion and the church, recognized the civil validity of religious marriages, 
and gave Roman Catholic clergy free access to public institutions, including orphanages, 
hospitals, prisons and other state institutions. Finally, the agreement increased the amount of 
religious instruction offered in public schools and promised state funds to confessional schools. 
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78 Reichstag speech, 23 March 1933. Dokumente der deutschen Politik und Geschichte von 1848 bis zur 
Gegenwart, vol. 4, ed. Johannes Hohfeld (Berlin: Herbert Wendler & Co, 1954), 30. As cited in Joseph A. 
Biesinger, “The Reich Concordat of 1933,” Controversial Concordats: The Vatican's Relations with 
Napoleon, Mussolini and Hitler, ed. Frank Coppa (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 
1999), 126. 
 
79 Meeting of 26 April 1933. As cited in Ernst C. Helmreich, The German Churches under Hitler (Detroit: 
Wayne State University Press, 1979), 241.  
 
80 Charles-Roux to Bonnet, 7 March 1933. As cited in Chenaux, Pie XII, 185. 
 
81 For instance, Lord Halifax congratulated Hitler for “preventing the entry of communism into his own 
country,” and “bar[ring] its passage further West.” Record of a conversation between Lord Halifax and 
Hitler, 19 November 1937. Akten zur deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945, Serie D (1937-1941), vols 
I-XIII, eds. J.S. Beddie et al. (Baden-Baden: Impr. Nationale, 1950-1970), I, no.31. As cited in Lorna 
Waddington, Hitler’s Crusade: Bolshevism and the Myth of the International Jewish Conspiracy 




82 Within one year of its conclusion, Dollfuss proclaimed Austria a Catholic, corporatist, nation, 
inspired in both economic and political matters by the teachings of Pius XI. 
 The concordat with the German Reich was agreed upon after only four sessions – a speed 
unprecedented in Vatican history.83 Though Pius XI grumbled that the matter had been a bit too 
quick, he posed no substantive resistance to Pacelli’s tour-de-force.84 Like others before it, this 
concordat guaranteed the right of the Church to teach and publicly defend Catholic principles. It 
authorized religious instruction in public schools and state support for Catholic schools, whose 
personnel would be chosen by the Church. Catholic parents were endowed with the right to 
demand the creation of confessional schools. Vatican organizations were endowed with freedom 
of action, on the condition that they remain “apolitical” -- that is, that they halt their support for 
the German Center Party.85 In exchange for the rights granted by the state, the Vatican promised 
to have its bishops take an oath of loyalty to the Reich government. The Vatican further 
promised that religious instruction would encourage patriotism and loyalty to the state.86 If 
Hitler celebrated the conclusion of the concordat for the prestige it gave the Nazi party, Pacelli, 
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82 The text of the Austrian concordat is reprinted in Paul Parsy, Les Concordats récents (1914-1935) 
(Paris: Imprimerie Georges Subervie, 1936). 
 
83 Biesinger, “The Reich Concordat of 1933,” 131. 
 
84 Emma Fattorini, Hubert Wolf, Frank Coppa, and others have arguably made a bit too much of Pius XI’s 
supposed “resistance” to the concordat. Needless to say, if his resistance had been substantive, the treaty 
would have never been signed. 
 
85 Crucially, the concordat failed to outline which particular Catholic organizations would be protected, 
opening the way for the persecutions of Catholic Action that would soon follow.  
 
86 For more information on the concordat, see Konrad Repgen, “Hitlers Machtergreifung und der 
deutsche Katholizismus,” in Katholische Kirche im Dritten Reich, ed. Dieter Albrecht (Mainz: Matthias 
Grünewald, 1976), 1-34; Ludwig Volk, S.J., Das Reichskonkordat vom 20. Juli 1933; von den Ansätzen in 
der Weimarer Republik bis zur Ratifizierung am 10. September 1933 (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-
Verlag, 1972); idem, “Zur Kundgebung des deutschen Episkopats vom 28. März 1933,” Stimmen der Zeit 
173 (1963-4): 431-56; Victor Conzemius, “German Catholics and the Nazi Regime in 1933,” Irish 




on his part, highlighted how the 1933 concordat with the German Reich enshrined canon law 
and expanded the Vatican's power in German society. 87 
 There was nothing inherently surprising about the Vatican's pursuit of concordat 
diplomacy with Germany and Austria, which were, after all, key European countries with which 
the Vatican had sought an alliance for decades. However, the speedy conclusion of the June-July 
concordats may also have demonstrated that the Vatican's anticommunist credentials made it 
more attractive to European states. Furthermore, it showed that anticommunism had become a 
contributing factor in shaping the Vatican's decision-making process regarding the selection of 
friends and foes. It would remain a central factor well into the 1950s, in large part due to the 
Vatican's decision to institutionalize anticommunism from the mid 1930s. How the Vatican did 
so -- and how its decision to do so fit within its continued attempt to expand its influence in 
Europe and beyond -- is analyzed in the following chapter. 
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87 See Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church and Hitler’s Wars (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 86, and 










 [They] today determine the lives of all individuals born into their mechanism [...]  
Fate decreed that the cloak should become an iron cage. 
-- Max Weber, 19051 
 
 
Institutions [are] the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. 





In 1934, the Vatican launched an ambitious campaign against the Soviet Union, which became 
the new focus of the Vatican's diplomatic apparatus. Following the circulation of Pacelli's 
circular in 1932, a series of key figures within the Vatican began to discuss how to implement the 
campaign. They agreed that the first priority was to found an institution expressly dedicated to 
battling communism.3 This institution would be officially administered by members of the 
Jesuit order, maintain constant communication with the Vatican Secretary of State, and have 
Vatican City as its base of operations. It would engage in the double project of disseminating the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Having argued that "die Strukturen des Kapitalismus und der Bürokratie" trace their partial origins to 
religious asceticism, Weber notes: "Denn indem die Askese aus den Mönchszellen heraus in das 
Berufsleben übertragen wurde [...] half sie [...] jenen mächtigen Kosmos der modernen, [...] 
Wirtschaftsordnung erbauen, der heute den Lebensstil aller einzelnen, die in dies Triebwerk 
hineingeboren werden [...] bestimmt und vielleicht bestimmen wird [...] Aber aus dem Mantel liess das 
Verhängnis ein stahlhartes Gehäuse werden." Max Weber, Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des 
Kapitalismus (1905; Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck, 2004), 44; 204. Talcott Parson's influential translation of 
Max Weber first used the phrase "iron cage," which later translators have disputed, preferring to render 
"stahlhartes Gehäuse" as "shell as hard as steel." See, e.g., Peter Baehr, "The 'Iron Cage' and the "Shell as 
Hard as Steel': Parsons, Weber and the Stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in the Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism," History and Theory 40, 2 (May 2001): 153-169. I have nonetheless decided to 
preserve the term "iron cage" in the title of this chapter because I think it more succinctly communicates 
the core insight that institutions structure (and severely limit) agency. 
 
2 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge, 
1990), 3.  
 
3 The earliest planning document located is the letter of Joseph-Henri Ledit to Wladimir Ledóchowski, 
Rome (Pont. In. Orientalium Studiorum), 8 January 1933. Archivium Romanum Societatis Iesu, Rome 




Vatican's anticommunist ideology (through Catholic Action, mass media, exhibitions, and 
courses of study), and of pressuring concordat and non-concordat state partners to band 
together, in a bid to marginalize the Soviet Union from the international state system.  
 By no means a foregone conclusion, the Vatican's crusade against the Soviet Union was a 
heavily contingent development. As argued in the previous chapter, as a result of the Great 
Depression and the interpretation (and misinterpretation) of events in the Soviet Union, Spain, 
and Mexico, the Vatican began to feel that its newfound influence in European society was being 
challenged. Increasingly, the leading threat to the Vatican's prominence was deemed that state 
which in certain respects was similar to the Vatican, in that it was characterized by a strong 
ideological program and sought transnational influence through civil society and diplomacy. 
Events in 1933-4 would further convince many Vatican officials that it was both advantageous 
and necessary to take action and invest considerable funds and resources in the campaign by 
expanding its institutional apparatus. 
 To date, no scholars have analyzed in detail the nature of the Vatican's interwar crusade 
against the Soviet Union. To be sure, many scholars of the interwar papacy have included a 
cursory discussion of official encyclicals that sought to delegitimize communism on theological 
and theoretical grounds.4 A handful of scholars interested in Catholic civil society between the 
wars have also spoken about Catholic Action's anticommunist campaigns.5 However, even 
historians interested in interwar Vatican-Soviet relations have failed to discuss in great detail 
the activities the Vatican undertook against the Soviet Union in the 1930s.6 By and large, 
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4 Thus for instance all recent works on the interwar Vatican contain a discussion of Divini Redemptoris, 
Pius XI's 1937 encyclical against communism, which will be discussed in the following chapter. See the 
cited works by Hubert Wolf, Emma Fattorini, and Fabrice Bouthillon. 
 
5 See, e.g., Susan B. Whitney, Mobilizing Youth: Communists and Catholics in Interwar France (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2009); Renato Moro, La formazione della classe dirigente cattolica, 1929-1937 
(Bologna: Il mulino, 1979). 
 
6 See, e.g., Hansjakob Stehle, Eastern Politics of the Vatican, 1917-1979, trans. Sandra Smith (Athens, 
Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1981); Philippe Chenaux, L'Église catholique et le communisme en Europe 
(1917-1989) (Paris: Cerf, 2009). 
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scholars have taken Vatican anticommunism as a given and failed to analyze it as something that 
needed to be built, both from the ground up and from the top down. They have told a largely 
teleological story that highlights the "inevitability" of the epochal struggle between opposing 
worldviews, focusing primarily on the years after the Second World War.7 In the process, they 
have exaggerated the correlation between a presumed growth in Soviet activity and the rise of 
Vatican anticommunism. In fact, the Soviet threat was invariably magnified, as we will see, by 
the Vatican's new anticommunist institutions, which tended to see Soviet influence everywhere -
- a compliment Stalin couldn't resist but taking.8 
 
1. The Communist International vs. the Catholic International 
 
If developments in the Soviet Union, Mexico and Spain between 1930 and 1932 had greatly 
worried the Vatican, its fears were exacerbated in 1933-4, as the United States and the League of 
Nations extended diplomatic recognition to the Soviet Union, despite the Catholic hierarchy's 
substantial lobbying of American, German and Italian politicians.9 The Vatican's conviction that 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 See, e.g., Peter C. Kent, The Lonely Cold War of Pope Pius XII: The Roman Catholic Church and the 
Division of Europe, 1943-1950 (Montréal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002); Michael Phayer, Pius 
XII, The Holocaust and the Cold War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); Anthony Rhodes, 
The Vatican in the Age of the Cold War, 1945-1980 (Norwich: Michael Russell, 1992); Paul Philip 
Mariani, Church Militant: Bishop Kung and Catholic Resistance in Communist Shanghai (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011); David Kertzer, Comrades and Christians: Religion and Political 
Struggle in Communist Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); and Jonathan Luxmoore, 
The Vatican and the Red Flag: The Struggle for the Soul of Eastern Europe (London: G. Chapman, 
1999). 
 
8 How fear, misinformation and manipulation can transform what are in reality complex and disparate 
threats into the perception of a single all-powerful enemy has been discussed by various scholars in 
reference to the rise of the Red Scare in the United States, and the war on a supposedly univocal "Al-
Qaeda." See M.J. Heale, McCarthy's Americans: Red Scare Politics in State and Nation, 1935-1965 
(Basinstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998), xivff; Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2004); and Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold 
War and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon, 2004). 
 




it must respond robustly to the Soviet Union was also exacerbated by the decision of the 
Communist International, or Comintern, to adopt the bold new Popular Front strategy.   
 Though the establishment of the Comintern 1919 had originally been due to a rift with 
socialist parties (the majority of which favored either intervention in World War I or world 
peace), from early 1934, socialist and communist groups increasingly began joining forces, 
particularly in Western European countries (like France and Spain) characterized by the rise of 
radical, revolutionary, rightwing movements. It may well have been these on-the-ground 
collaborations that paved the way for an official change in policy in Moscow.10 In May of 1934, 
the General Secretary of the Comintern announced that henceforth, "The wall between 
Communist workers and Social Democrats should be destroyed." 11 The shift was immediately 
echoed in an article in the Russian communist party newspaper Pravda, which explained that 
the Comintern would now encourage communist and socialist parties to join together in a 
shared struggle against fascism, and form a Popular or United Front.  Western European 
socialist and communist parties thus began to conclude pacts of united action, and, with Russian 
assistance, hold events protesting fascism, broadly conceived. Popular Fronts mobilized quickly 
in light of elections slated to be held in late 1934 in both Spain and France. Many observers -- 
including key Vatican officials -- watched the developments with dismay, and concluded that the 
Comintern sought to bring about the Sovietization of the European continent. 12  
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10 Some for instance argue that it was the union of communist and socialist workers in France in the 
aftermath of the attempted right-wing coup of February of 1934 (known as the Stavinsky affair) that 
changed the Comintern's policy. See Matthew Woley, “Courting Disaster? The Communist International 
in the Third Period,” in In Search of Revolution: International Communist Parties in the Third Period, 
ed. Matthew Worley (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 14. 
 
11 Tsentralnyi partinii arkhiv (Sofia), f. 146, op.2, a.c. 317, 1.II. As cited in William J. Chase, Enemies 
within the Gates? The Comintern and the Stalinist Repression, 1934-1939 (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2001), 15. 
 
12 The official change in Comintern policy was enshrined at the Seventh Comintern Congress, held 
between July and August of 1935. On the Comintern’s shift from the Third Period to the Popular Front 
strategy, see Chase, op.cit., 14ff; “Comintern,” in A Dictionary of 20th-Century Communism, eds. Silvio 
Pons and Robert Service (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); and Peter Huber, “The Central 
Bodies of the Comintern: Stalinization and Changing Social Composition,” in Bolshevism, Stalinism and 
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 The Vatican decided the time had come to step up its own commitment, articulated from 
1932, to form an international Catholic front against the Soviet Union. No longer was it 
sufficient for the Pope and his Secretary of State to make strong rhetorical attacks on the Soviet 
Union and covertly support a scattered group of organizations countering Soviet influence in 
civil society and in government in Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, 
Spain, Yugoslavia and the United States.13 Rather, the time had come to make the Vatican itself a 
center of action, and take control of international anticommunism -- in much the same way that 
the Soviet Union, it was thought, had taken control of international communism. From early 
1934, plans to found a Vatican institution expressly dedicated to battling the Soviet Union 
picked up speed. Through a series of letters, both the Vatican Secretary of State and the 
Secretary General of the Jesuit order sketched out the contours of the Vatican's new diplomatic 
program, and provided a quick illustration of the tasks with which the Vatican's new 
anticommunist center would be charged. Wladimir Ledóchowski, whom Pacelli had befriended 
during his time in Germany, was brought into the project thanks to the many good services he 
had performed over the previous decade, like translating papal encyclicals, raising considerable 
funds for the reconstruction of Vatican City and placing Jesuits with diplomatic competence at 
the Pope's service. Furthermore, Ledóchowski had some important personal characteristics he 
shared with new functionaries like Pacelli: loyalty, obedience, efficiency, meticulousness, 
industry, and a keen interest in contemporary politics.14 
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the Comintern: Perspectives on Stalinization, 1917-1953, eds. Norman LaPorte, Kevin Morgan and 
Matthew Worley (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 66-89. 
 
13 These organizations included the Centre International de Lutte Active Contre le Communisme / Geloof 
en Vrijheid (based in the Netherlands), Acciò Anticomunista (Spain), Antikomintern (Germany), Unitas 
(France), the International Center of Active Struggle Against Communism (Belgium) and three Swiss 
organizations -- the Bureau des Travailleurs Chrétiens Russes (active also in France and Yugoslavia), the 
Pro Deo organization, and the Entente Against the Third International. See Chapter Four.  
 
14 On the many services performed by Ledóchowski for the Pope, see Ingoni, op.cit.,108- 23; and Giorgio 
Petracchi, “I gesuiti e il comunismo tra le due guerre,” in La Chiesa cattolica e il totalitarismo, ed. 
Vincenzo Ferrone (Florence: L.S. Olschki, 2004), 123-4. On Ledóchowski's personality, see the 
contemporary reports of men who knew him well, including Ingoni, op.cit., 129-30; Friedrich 
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 In 1934, Lédochowski informed all members of the Jesuit order of the imminent creation 
of the anticommunist institution. Following the style of Pacelli's 1932 circular (discussed in the 
previous chapter), Ledóchowski began his missive to the Jesuit order by highlighting the great 
threat posed by the Soviet Union. "Cleverly trained in Moscow," he noted, the Soviet Union's 
"depraved emissaries," were "powerfully organized," and "actively at work in various countries." 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union's men and women were having an impact not only where they 
were most visible, "in Europe and America, in India and in China." Indeed, Soviet propagandists 
were perverting minds even farther afield -- "in Japan and other very remote parts of Asia, in 
Egypt and the more populated seaboards of Africa." Echoing fears privately articulated by the 
Pope regarding the influence of communism among downtrodden African-Americans and 
imperial subjects, Ledóchowski argued that the Soviet Union was winning converts "even in the 
far removed and almost unknown Negro districts." In short, the Soviet model -- thanks to the 
hard and clever work of Soviet propagandists -- was wielding "mighty appeal to millions of 
human beings in all parts of the world."15 
The Soviet Union's growing global presence was worrisome indeed, Ledóchowski noted, 
insofar as its leading aim was to destroy religion in general, and the Catholic Church in 
particular. Communism, he argued, "has declared open war against God Himself, Whom it 
considers as its personal enemy." Indeed, in its essence, "communism demands the abolition of 
all religious creeds and practices, and the institution of absolute atheism and unbelief." For this 
reason, it was easy for the Secretary General of the Jesuit order to conclude that because "the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Muckermann, Im Kampf zwischen zwei Epochen: Lebenserinnerungen (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald, 
1973), 635-6; ARSI, Ledóchowsky 1025-15, fasc. “Testimonianze dagli Stati Uniti,” sf.335, Lord, Daniel, 
S.J. St Louis, 29 September 1943; and ARSI, Ledochowsky, 1025/8, fasc.321. Letter of Father Paul de 
Chastoney, SJ, Sondico, 14 Feb 1943.  
 
15 Ledóchowski to “The Provincials of the American Assistancy and Canada,” Rome, 17 April 1934. Stored 
in ARSI, JESCOM 1038 (De comm. Atheo, 1933-1943), fasc. “Defensio contra Comm.” The original letter 
is in English. On the Pope's fears regarding Soviet influence among African-Americans and imperial 
subjects, see Depeche 356 de Fontenay, Rome, 8 Dec 1930, MFAE, vol.32, tome II. As cited in Bouthillon, 




Great and growing evil of our time is none other than Communism," it was necessary for the 
Vatican to mobilize against it. “Does it not look as if the present emergency entail[s] a fresh call 
to our zeal and generosity as soldiers of Christ and of His Church?” Indeed, did not communism 
represent “a call to take up arms against the great heresy of our time, more dangerous perhaps 
than any heresy of the past?”  
In reply to this rhetorical question, Ledóchowski thus explained that the Jesuit order, 
with the assistance of the Secretary of State, would soon found a Secretariat on Atheism. The 
Secretariat on Atheism would constitute the first response (or "plan of concerted action") in the 
"momentous struggle" between the two great transnational forces of the twentieth century, 
Catholicism and communism, as embodied and defended by the Vatican and the Soviet Union.16 
The Secretariat, Ledóchowski further explained, would battle Soviet influence in the workplace, 
in the home and in government. It would do so by collecting information on the global 
expansion of the Soviet Union and by disseminating counter-propaganda to individuals of all 
ages and social classes. The use of the term "Secretariat," though not explained, was certainly 
not accidental. At a minimum, it was meant to signal the importance of this new anti-Soviet 
institution, which was now (rhetorically at least) on par with institutions like the Secretariats of 
War and State of secular governments, the Secretariat of the League of Nations, and, of course, 
the Soviet Union's Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. 
Though the announced Secretariat on Atheism won the approval of most members of the 
Vatican and the Jesuit order, certain individuals voiced their disapproval. For instance, the 
German Jesuit Gustav Gundlach, to whom Ledóchowski initially offered the leadership of the 
Secretariat, worried that launching a Vatican campaign against the Soviet Union might be 
interpreted as further proof of a Vatican alliance with the Nazi party. Hitler and the Nazis, he 
noted, might gain "moral sustenance" from "an undertaking of this sort, thus confusing 
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Catholics in Germany and elsewhere weakening the moral influence of the Church.”17 Other 
German Jesuits and Vatican officials voiced similar concerns. 18 As will be discussed in the 
following chapter, some of these figures would gradually be brought onboard with the Vatican’s 
new diplomatic program. Most would be ignored and intentionally circumvented.  
 
2. The Secretariat in Action 
 
In spring of 1935, the Secretariat on Atheism entered into operation. Based within the limits of 
Vatican City, funded by the Vatican Secretariat if State, and headed by Joseph Henri Ledit, an 
enterprising young Jesuit who had traveled to the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, the 
institution soon became a branch of the Vatican's foreign policy apparatus. Its creation enabled 
the Vatican to expand its surveillance of global communist forces and improve its response to 
the communist penetration of civil society and government structures. It raised the Vatican's 
profile, transforming the Vatican into the leader of the battle against the Soviet Union. The 
Secretariat increasingly helped disseminate a Manichean political ideology, according to which 
Catholics and communists were archenemies and thus bound to a struggle to the death for 
survival. This dualistic of notion of international politics would be employed to great effect 
during the Spanish Civil War, and it would soon be mobilized again during the Axis invasion of 
the USSR, and, in varying forms, throughout the Cold War years.  
 During its four years in existence, the Secretariat on Atheism would stand at the helm of 
numerous anti-Soviet undertakings, many of which were conceived directly in response to 
Comintern activities. Targeting Catholics, the public at large, and European and American 
politicians, the Secretariat on Atheism would raise awareness of the extent of the Soviet threat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Johannes Schwarte, Gustav Gundlach, SJ (1892-1963): massgeblicher Repräsentant der katholischen 
Soziallehre während der Pontifikate Pius' XI und Pius' XII (Munich: F. Schöningh, 1975), 29-32.  
 
18 Letter of Cardinal Faulhaber to Torregrossa, Munich, 5 March 1933. Archivio della Congregazione per la 
Dottrina della Fede, Rome (henceforth ACDF), R.V.1933, n.15, ff.41-2. 
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through a pioneering monthly journal translated into multiple languages. It would create and 
support anticommunist radio and film propaganda, and put together a series of traveling 
anticommunist exhibitions. It would organize conferences, seminars, and regular courses of 
study detailing the Vatican's theoretical and practical response to the Soviet Union and training 
priests to use the pulpit as a loudspeaker to denounce "the spread of atheism under 
communistic auspices." Additionally, it would encourage youth to shun communist teachings, 
using concordat victories to spread its particular brand of anticommunism to schools, colleges 
and universities. In doing so, it would also work in concert with Catholic Action organizations in 
Italy and elsewhere to make Vatican anticommunism a centerpiece of the education of Catholic 
youth in parishes, houses of retreat, and Catholic Action summer camps. Finally, the Secretariat 
would encourage Vatican officials and Catholic Action lobbies to exert direct pressure on 
government figures to take a stand against the Soviet Union. 19  
 The Secretariat on Atheism's many activities consolidated the emergence of the Vatican 
as a new kind of transnational actor in the 1930s by actively working to present the Vatican as 
an institution capable of responding to the Soviet challenge.20 As the programmatic first article 
of the Secretariat's journal, Lettres de Rome, announced, If "Moscow's Comintern is at the head 
of the Communist International," then "Rome is the center of the Catholic International!"21 
"Thus," Ledóchowski clarified, "shall center be opposed to center – the Roman to the 
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19 Ledóchowski to “The provincials of the American Assistancy and Canada: Directions to accompany 
letter on communism,” Rome, 17 April 1934. ARSI, JESCOM 1038 (De comm. Atheo, 1933-1943), fasc. 
“Defensio contra Comm.” 
 
20 On how internationalism and nationalism thrived on one another in this period, see, e.g., Mauricio 
Tenorio-Trillo, Mexico and the World's Fairs: Crafting a Modern Nation (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996); and Martin H. Geyer and Johannes Paulmann, "Introduction: The Mechanics of 
Internationalism," in The Mechanics of Internationalism: Culture, Society and Politics, eds. Geyer and 
Paulmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 7ff.  
 
21 “Il n’est pas difficile, à Rome, d’entrer en rapports avec tout l’univers. Le Komintern de Moscou est à la 
tête de l’Internationale Communiste; ceux qui s’occupent de politique ou d’economie internationales se 
réunissent à Genève. Rome est le centre de l’Internationale catholique!” Lettres de Rome, vol.1, n.1 (May 




Moscovite.”22 As another article in the Secretariat's journal argued, the Secretariat on Atheism 
was a perfect match for the Comintern, in that it was dedicated to “fight[ing] against 
communism with the same efficacy that communism fights against Christian civilization.”23 To 
be sure, this was because the Vatican was the only "dynamic and truly global organization," 
endowed with both actions and ideas, which could compete with the Communist International.24 
 The posturing of Catholic unity against a supposedly unified communist enemy bolstered 
the illusion of two, strong, well-organized, forces -- in place of that messier reality of weak and 
fractured networks of shifting elements, many of which did not even recognize Moscow or Rome 
as their command post. Thus, the fiction of a single, unified, leftist movement, which took its 
cues from Stalin, helped feed the illusion of a single "Catholic International" led by the Pope and 
held together by the Secretariat on Atheism. 
In fact, the message that the Vatican stood at the head of the "Catholic International" helped 
remind allies seeking to roll back concordat gains (such as Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) of 
the crucial role played by the religious institution in keeping revolutionary forces at bay.  
 The centrality of maintaining concordat alliances was drive home by first issue of the 
Secretariat's journal. “We all know,” an anonymous writer for Lettres de Rome noted, “that in 
the mouth of a communist, the word Fascist refers to all governments that are not led by the 
Third International.”25 Warning its readers from falling into the Comintern’s "Popular Front !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Ledóchowski, “A Letter to the Fathers Who, in Their Respective Provinces, Direct and Promote the 
Fight against Atheism,” Rome, 28 October 1934. As translated and reprinted in Selected Writings of 
Father Ledóchowski (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1945), 606-8. 
 
23  “Mais si l’on veut lutter vraiment contre le communisme avec la même efficacité que le communisme 
lutte contre la civilisation chrétienne, il est indispensable de la faire avec la même cohésion, la même 
discipline universelle.” “Unité révolutionnaire et unité chrétienne,” Lettres de Rome (July 1936): 139-142. 
Stored in JESCOM, the Private Library of Father Ledóchowski, Lettres de Rome. 
 
24 “En dehors de l’Eglise catholique, qui est au dessus de toutes les nations et de toutes les nationalités, 
l’Internationale Communiste semble être la seule organisation dynamique qui soit vraiment mondiale.” 
Lettres de Rome, vol.1, n.6 (October 1935): 4. Ibid. 
 
25 “On sait que dans la bouche d’un communiste, le mot de fasciste désigne tout gouvernment qui n’est pas 
dirigé par la III Internationale.” Lettres de Rome, vol.1, n.5 (September 1935): 1. This definition is 
repeatedly recalled: see for instance the October 1935 issue of Lettres de Rome, which affirms that “...pour 
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trap," the journalist concluded that to call oneself anti-Fascist was analogous to declaring 
oneself a communist. 26 The inverse, the journal implied, might also hold true: a Fascist was an 
anticommunist, and thus allied with the Vatican in the struggle against the Soviet Union.  
 Given the existence of paeans of this sort, it was unsurprising that both the Fascist 
regime in Italy and the Nazi regime in Germany immediately welcomed the Secretariat and 
encouraged the publication of its journal. The Fascist secret police provided the Secretariat's 
leader, Joseph Henri Ledit, with special permission to import over fifty banned publications so 
as to provide the most up-to-date coverage on communism's expansion. 27 In its first year of 
publication, the Secretariat's journal also appeased those who worried that the Vatican stood 
against the Nazi party, by clarifying that the journal’s concern would exclusively be communism 
– other non-communist movements that perhaps sought to challenge Catholicism would be “left 
aside.” 28 Tellingly, this clarification was issued just a few weeks after the Secretariat began 
issuing its journal in a German-language edition -- and after Hitler justified the passage of the 
Nuremberg Laws as a means of safeguarding Germans against the pernicious influence of a 
subversive “Judeo-Bolshevism” [Judäo-Bolschewismus].29 The Secretariat on Atheism would 
also give advice to the Fascist, Nazi, and Eastern European regimes regarding the organization 
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un communiste, est ‘fasciste’ quiconque oppose le mouvement communiste. Et l’on est ‘fasciste’ dans la 
mesure où l’on oppose le communisme.” Lettres de Rome, vol.1, n.6 (October 1935): 1. Ibid. 
 
26 Lettres de Rome, vol.1, n.1 (May 1935): 14-5. Ibid. 
 
27 Letter of Tacchi Venturi to Arturo Bocchini, dir. of Italy's national and secret police force, Rome, 10 
December 1934. Archivio Centrale di Stato, Rome (henceforth ACS), Polizia di stato (henceforth PS), A1, 
1937, b.37, fasc. “Ledit." 
 
28 “Nos Lettres se spécialisent de plus en plus dans l’étude du communisme, laissant de côté les athées 
d’autres tendances.” In “Pour la paix, ou pour la...‘lutte finale’?” Lettres de Rome, vol.1, n.7 (Nov 1935), 
p.1. Stored in JESCOM, the Private Library of Father Ledóchowski, Lettres de Rome. 
 
29 Hitler also referenced the Comintern congress of July-August 1935 as justification for the Nuremberg 
laws. See Lorna Waddington, Hitler’s Crusade: Bolshevism and the Myth of the International Jewish 




of anticommunist exhibitions, and help mediate a three-way agreement between Italy, Germany 
and the Vatican, regarding the joint surveillance and jamming of signals of Radio Moscow.30 
The Secretariat on Atheism not only strengthened concordat alliances with the Vatican's 
leading European partners; it also advertised the Vatican's anticommunist credentials to non-
allied states, justifying the expansion of Vatican influence even further afield. It supported in 
various ways Eugenio Pacelli's unprecedented lobbying trips to Argentina (1934), France (1935) 
and the United States (1936), where the Vatican Secretary of State spoke out against the Soviet 
Union and sought to present the Vatican as the leading global force against it. For instance, the 
Secretariat helped Pacelli's speeches abroad be promptly broadcast over Vatican Radio, where 
they reached Catholic radio listeners around the world.31  Accordingly, Pacelli's well-publicized 
attempts to sell Vatican anticommunism not only had an effect on local politicians, as noted by 
participants on the ground.32 Even Hitler complained that Pacelli was attempting to deprive 
"National Socialism of the historic credit of having started the anti-Bolshevik campaign."33  
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30 On collaboration regarding blocking Soviet radio stations, see Letter of Cesare Orsenigo, Nunzio 
Apostolico of Berlin, to Eugenio Pacelli, Berlin, 29 January 1933. AES Stati Ecclesiastici (quarto periodo), 
1932-1942, pos.474 P.O., fasc.477, ff3f-5v; Pacelli to Father Filippo Soccorsi, SJ, Vatican, 24 April 1936. 
ASV, AES Stati Ecclesiastici, 1936-8, pos.533 P.O., fasc.556, ff.5; Circular 1478/36, from Pacelli, Vatican, 
30 April 1936. Ibid., ff.29-30; and ACS, MI DGPS, DPP, b.44, fasc.C11/48 Germania Polizia. See below for 
collaboration regarding anticommunist exhibitions. 
 
31 John Pollard, “Radio, cinema and television, from Pius XI to John XXIII,” The Papacy since 1500: 
From Italian Prince to Universal Pastor, eds. James Corkery and Thomas Worcester (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 185; Marilyn J. Matelski, Vatican Radio: Propaganda by the 
Airwaves (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), xviii; Fernando Bea, 'Qui, Radio Vaticana'. Mezzo secolo dela 
radio del papa (Vatican City: Edizioni Radio Vaticana, 1981), 96-7. 
 
32 See Cordell Hull to Myron Taylor, Roosevelt’s personal representative to the pope, Washington, 22 May 
1940. Taylor Papers, box 10, FDR Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York (henceforth FDRL); and 
Arnoldo Cortesi, “Pacelli Reported Seeking Aid of U.S. in Anti-Red Drive,” New York Times (2 October 
1936): 1. 
 
33 See a poorly referenced 1936 clipping from the Nazi newspaper Angriff, in Powers, Not Without Honor, 
450, fn.30. For an early articulation of the ambitions of the Nazi media empire, see Joseph Goebbels' two 
speeches on the tasks of the Reich Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda (March 15 and 
March 25, 1933), as reprinted in Goebbels-Reden, ed. Helmut Heiber (Düsseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1971), 
90-107. For a broad discussion, see David Welch, The Third Reich: Politics and Propaganda, 2nd ed. 




The Secretariat on Atheism showed particular interest in cultivating North and South 
American audiences -- most likely due to the considerable income these regions generated for 
the Vatican, and because anticommunist movements in these regions were already active. The 
Secretariat encouraged local clergy in North and South America to start anticommunist radio 
broadcasts of their own, following the lead of Berlin bishops who had used radio “in the battle 
against Bolshevism” from circa 1931, and of Fathers Charles Coughlin and Edmund Walsh, who 
throughout the early 1930s hosted “radio broadcast conferences on Bolshevism” in the United 
States, which comfortably reached over ten million listeners.34 The Secretariat also encouraged 
local Catholic organizations in the United States (including the United States' Catholic War 
Veterans, Father Pro Clubs, and Pro Deo organizations) to unite their disparate efforts and 
create single-topic campaigns maligning the Soviet Union.35 Though Fascist officials were happy 
about the spread of anticommunism, they also worried about the budding relationship between 
the Vatican and the United States. "Yesterday an American car manufacturer gave the Pope a 
magnificent motor vehicle," a paranoid Fascist secret police officer noted, adding that clearly a 
highly suspect Vatican-U.S. alliance was in the making, as even the sisters of a prominent 
prelate had begun, "parading around in a luxurious Cadillacu [sic], which is also an American 
gift."36  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 On Monsignor Schreiber’s radio broadcasts against communism, see D’Herbigny, preparatory notes, 
and “Ex audientia Ssmi” notes, 8 May 1931. ASV, AES Pro Russia (quarto periodo), 1924-1935, pos. 
Scatola 4, fasc.27, ff.28. Also see Laura Pettinaroli, "La politique russe du Saint-Siège (1905-1939)," 
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Lyon, 2008), 936. On Father Walsh, see Draft of Letter from D’Herbigny 
to Goyau, eventually sent on 26 August 1932. ASV, AES Pro Russia (quarto periodo), 1921-1944, pos. 
Scatola 37, fasc.215, ff.79-82. On Coughlin, see Alan Brinkley, Voices of Protest: Huey Long, Father 
Coughlin and the Great Depression (New York: Vintage, 1983) and Charles Gallagher, SJ, Vatican Secret 
Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurley and Pope Pius XII (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 49-71. 
 
35 Powers, Not Without Honor, 133-4. On November 23, 1927, the Jesuit Father Michele Agostino Pro had 
been killed in Mexico; his final words, according to the Jesuit papers that spread his legend, were "Viva 
Cristo Rey!" Father Ledóchowski had quickly ordered Jesuits to honor "this glorious death." Ingoni, 221. 
 
36 "Ieri una Casa di Automobili americana ha fatto dono al Papa di una magnifica vettura, che Pio XI si è 
affrettato ad accettare, ricambiando la cortesia con...L'Apostolica Benedizione! [...] Intanto le sorelle di 
Mons Pizzardo marciano in una lussuosa auto Cadillacu [sic] (pure americana) regalata al prelato." 
Fascist secret police report on Pizzardo, Rome, 14 November 1929. ACS, MI, DGPS, DPP, Fascicoli 
personali, Serie B, b.19, fasc. "Pizzardo monsignore," f.139. 
 !
164 
In 1937, the Secretariat on Atheism began publishing its leading journal not only in 
French and German, but also in English and Spanish.37 To ensure that the new policy actually 
lead to an increase in readership, Pacelli promptly mandated that the journal be required 
reading for all Vatican personnel, and that it be made available in all Catholic Action centers.38 
He personally urged that clergy in the Americas actively expand Catholic Action as an 
anticommunist measure, noting for instance to Mexican clergy that, "Catholic Action is not a 
pious confraternity that recites a few prayers; it is a project of consciousness-formation 
[concerning] the entirety of human being!" As such, Catholic Action would be able to train a 
generation of anticommunists, and thus was of vital importance.39 As further proof of its 
commitment to the Americas, the Secretariat also expanded the journal's news coverage 
considerably, including extensive analyses charting the purported growth of Soviet-led 
communist movements in countries like Cuba, Mexico, El Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
and of course Canada and the United States.40  
By 1936, according to a Jesuit who may well also have had careerist reasons to inflate the 
good news, the Secretariat's work in the Western hemisphere "had already penetrated in the 
highest governmental spheres," where it "exercised an extraordinary influence."41 The same 
point was made by the Jesuit's Secretary General, who in an internal letter claimed that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 ARSI, JESCOM 1038 (De comm. Atheo, 1933-1943), fasc. “Defensio contra Comm.” 
 
38 Fernando Cento, Nunzio in Venezuela, to Pacelli, 30 June 1936. Letter of ASV, AES Stati Ecclesiastici, 
1936-8, pos.533 P.O., fasc.556, ff.92. 
 
39  "L’Azione Cattolica [...] non è una pia confraternita per recitare qualche preghiera, ma è formazione di 
coscienze perché tutto l’uomo e tuta la vita si ispirino ai dettami del Vangelo." Pacelli, “Messico: 
Commissione Messicana diretta dal Vescovo di Chiapas,” 14 December 1936, ASV, AES Messico (4° 
periodo), 1936, pos.590, fasc.388, ff.13-16. 
 
40 See, e.g., “Le plus grand péril,” Lettres de Rome (July 1936): 129; and "Pourquoi les catholiques 
rejettent le bolchevisme,” Lettres de Rome (June 1936): 1. 
 
41 “Lettres de Rome qui n’ont qu’un an d’existence ont pénétré déjà dans les plus hautes sphères des 
Gouvernements et de l’Eglise et y exercent une influence extraordinaire.” Letter of P. Lambert, Provincial 
of Paris, to four unspecified Jesuit Provincials, Rome, 9 February 1936. ARSI, JESCOM 1038 (De comm. 




globe's “leaders and rulers” were growing increasingly convinced that communism posed a 
threat and that they must unite with the Vatican “to ward off this calamity.”42 But even as the 
Vatican continued to claim leadership of a global anticommunist campaign, its anticommunist 
practices became increasingly imbricated in political movements which either overtly 
sympathized with Nazi-Fascist parties, or agreed that Germany and Italy posed a much less 
worrisome threat to the Church's survival than did the Soviet Union.  
 
3. An Imbricated Anticommunism 
 
The birth of an imbricated anticommunism took place in the radicalized political climate of the 
Popular Front years, as personnel in the Secretariat on Atheism began to more actively reflect on 
the art of propaganda -- that is, how they might reach the minds of the masses through the use 
of traditional and non-traditional media. In particular, the Secretariat's officials became 
interested in how entertainment media (rather than news media) could mold minds, in much 
the same way that Cinecittà or the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda, for instance, seemed capable of 
packaging precise political messages within pleasing envelopes. The Secretariat translated this 
awareness into practice as it launched an ambitious anticommunist book prize and hosted the 
first of three high-profile anticommunist exhibitions.  
To be sure, the papacy had long been interested in propaganda -- indeed, the word itself 
had been coined during the reign of Pope Gregory XV, who in 1622 had established the Sacred 
Congregation of the Propaganda of the Faith, to spread Catholicism to the non-Catholic world. 
With the rise of industrialization and literacy rates, propaganda had taken on a new meaning for 
states eager to communicate their views to citizens -- something the Vatican understood well, as 
in 1861, it chose to found its own newspaper (L'Osservatore romano) and grow a distinct 
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42 Ledóchowski, “On furthering the fight against atheism: a letter addressed to the whole society,” 19 June 
1936. In Selected writings of Father Ledochowski, 608-14. 
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Catholic journalism, starting from the late nineteenth century. The Great War marked a second 
important shift, as governments professionalized and institutionalized propaganda bodies. 
President Wilson's Committee on Public Information, for instance, famously aimed to use the 
latest developments in the science of public opinion (as well as extensive news management and 
censorship) to sway Americans in favor of U.S. intervention in the war, and to disseminate a 
carefully crafted image of the United States abroad.43 Lenin promptly followed suit, launching 
an extensive propaganda campaign both at home and in the wider world.44 So too Mussolini and 
Hitler constructed media empires capable of disseminating their political ideologies far and 
wide.45 For the first time, new entertainment media -- like film -- were being marshaled in 
support of official government positions. Though it took the Vatican a bit of time to catch up, not 
least because of its long-standing suspicions regarding the supposed corrupting influence of film 
and other media, Pius XI helped pioneer the Vatican's embrace of new media as vital 
instruments in the propaganda war against the Soviet Union. 
In the same years that he rolled back the Vatican's prohibition on film and encouraged 
the founding of Catholic film and censorship companies, the Pope also turned his attention to 
literature.46  In the early 1930s, the former librarian -- whose love of classic novels like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 For an introduction, see Susan A. Brewer, "Crusade for Democracy: Over There in the Great War," in 
Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 46-87. 
 
44 For an overview, see Philip Taylor, "The Bolshevik Revolution and the War of Ideologies (1917-1939)," 
in Readings in Propaganda and Persuasion: New and Classic Essays, eds. Garth S. Jowett and Victoria 
O'Donnell (London: Sage Publications, 2006); and Alexander Guchkov, "The Third International and 
Colonial Propaganda," The Slavonic and East European Review 10, 30 (April 1932): 509-24.  
 
45 For a comparative look at the Nazi and Fascist media empire, see Clemens Zimmermann, Medien im 
Nationalsozialismus: Deutschland 1933-1945, Italien 1922-1943, Spanien 1936-1951 (Wien: Böhlau, 
2007); Benjamin Martin, A New Order for European Culture: The German-Italian Axis and the 
Reordering of International Cultural Exchange, 1936-1943 (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 
2006); and Aristotle Kallis, Fascist Ideology: Territory and Expansionism in Italy and Germany, 1922-
1945 (London: Routledge, 2000). 
 
46 Pius XI's landmark text on cinema, which was greatly influenced by the work of enterprising American 
Catholics, is Vigilanti Cura (29 June 1936), in which the Pope declared: "The motion picture should not 
be simply a means of diversion, a light relaxation to occupy an idle hour. With its magnificent power, it 
can and must be a bearer of light and a positive guide to what is good." On Pius XI's embrace of cinema, 
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Alessandro Manzoni's I promessi sposi was well known -- proposed that the Secretariat back a 
worldwide competition for the best religiously themed anticommunist novel.47 The competition 
would encourage writers from all over to the world to produce Catholic anticommunist literature 
and thus (it was hoped) help create a new literary genre: the Catholic anticommunist novel. As 
one of the competition proponents affirmed, “An international competition on this theme would 
surely result in a flowering of compositions, which -- even if they are not all given a prize -- 
would appear in nearly all countries.” Accordingly, novels submitted "in any language" would be 
encouraged. Even though the Vatican already knew that it would be unable to find prize 
administrators competent in every language, it was nonetheless decided that the priority was to 
increase the production of Catholic anticommunist literature -- whether or not there would be 
personnel capable of reading it.48  
The anticommunist novel prize proposed by the Pope sought to convince the educated 
classes of the wisdom of Catholic anticommunism through non-traditional means. As Vatican 
bureaucrats reasoned, literature was uniquely able to communicate moral lessons because it 
appealed “to both reason and emotion.” “A novel -- well-connected to reality -- seems a useful 
way, to better instruct the public at large and public opinion on the errors and horrors of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
and on its effect on the wider Catholic world, see Gaye Ortiz, "The Catholic Church and its Attitude to Film 
as an Arbiter of Cultural Meaning," in Mediating Religion: Studies in Media, Religion and Culture, ed. 
Sophia Marriage (London: Continuum Books, 2003), 179-200; Harvey O'Brien, "Church and State and 
Film," in The Real Ireland: The Evolution of Ireland in Documentary Film (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2004), 61-3; Daniela Gennari, Postwar Italian Cinema: American Intervention, 
Vatican Interests (New York: Routledge, 2009), 22ff; Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 301; and 
Gregory D. Black, The Catholic Crusade against the Movies, 1940-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). 
 
47 For Domenico Tardini's reports of Ratti's love of the great Milanese novelist Alessandro Manzoni (and 
the Milanese poet Carlo Porta), see Domenico Tardini, 1888-1961: l’azione della Santa Sede nella crisi fra 
le due guerre, ed. Carlo Felice Casula (Rome: Edizioni Studium, 1988), 89. 
 
48 "Un concours – internationale – sur ce theme provoquerait sans doute une floraison de compositions 
qui, même non primées, paraitraient un peu en tout pays." Letter from D’Herbigny to Monsieur Georges 





Bolshevism,” they noted.49 Of course, the idea of using emotions to impart lasting lessons was 
perfectly in line with the Vatican's new mass mobilization strategy, as explicitly theorized in 
Quas Primas and by the new science of public opinion management.50 The notion was echoed by 
one of the future prize coordinators, who noted that the idea of using literature "as a weapon in 
the fight against Bolshevism” was both "quite new" and "charming." "It denotes a 
comprehension, which delights me, of the role that literature and novels play in contemporary 
life," and particularly "of the profound influence novels can have on ideas and mores."51  
 So as to confer legitimacy on the project, it was decided that the prize should be openly 
administered by respected members of Paris' Académie française. The Vatican proposed to 
provide covert funding and contribute the entirety of the prize money. It also promised to 
provide the funds and personnel needed to print, distribute, and where necessary translate the 
winning novels. In exchange, Vatican officials would withhold veto powers, in case any of the 
Académie's proposed winning novels ran counter to the theory and practice of Vatican 
anticommunism.  
 Creating a Catholic anticommunist literary culture out of thin air was no easy feat, even 
in an age of emergent "authoritarian fictions," to use Susan Suleiman's term.52 A close glance at 
the political leanings of those who administered the Pope's anticommunist prize and those 
awarded prizes demonstrates the extent to which the Vatican was willing to lean on extreme 
right-wing groups in order to advance its own, increasingly imbricated, anticommunist !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 "Il semble utile, pour instruire mieux le grand public et l’opinion générale, que, sous forme de roman – 
mais bien appuyé sur la réalité – les erreurs et les horreurs du Bolchévisme soient mises en lumiére." Ibid. 
50 On Quas Primas, see chapter three. The most influential 1920s studies on the art of propaganda include 
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Brace and Co., 1922) and Edward L. Bernays, Propaganda 
(New York: Horace Liveright, 1928).  
 
51 “L’idée elle-même me séduit. Je la trouve tout-à-fait moderne. Elle dénote une compréhension, qui 
m’enchante, du rôle que la littérature, que le roman joue dans la vie contemporaine, de l’action profonde 
qu’il peut exercer sur les idées et les moeurs. C’est une arme dont on n’a pas encore fait usage dans la lutte 
contre le bolchevisme." Letter from Reynold de Cressier to Bordeaux, Fribourg (Switzerland), 19 January 
1933. ASV, AES Pro Russia 1921-1944 (4° periodo), pos. Scatola 37, fasc.216, ff.50-1. 
 
52 Susan Rubin Suleiman, Authoritarian Fictions: The Ideological Novel as a Literary Genre (Princeton: 




campaign. For instance, the two main administrators of the prize on the French side were 
Georges Goyau, a publicist known for his sympathies with the radical right-wing anti-Semitic 
and monarchist movement, Action Française, 53  and Henry Bordeaux, a prolific novelist 
outspoken in his support for Mussolini and his aversion to parliamentary democracy.54 Of the 
over five hundred manuscripts submitted, those that received positive evaluations from the jury 
members (who shared Goyau and Bordeaux's politics) were by and large written by Russian 
exiles who resided in Germany, Austria, France and Switzerland, and voiced sympathies with 
extreme right-wing movements. 
 The first-place novel was awarded in late 1935 and read in full by the Pope. He deemed it 
"a persuasive and impressive [...] collection of snapshots of a fierce tragedy."55  
The novel represented the second major work by Alja Rachmanova (1898-1991), a Russian exile 
living in Vienna who had struggled as a small shop owner before turning to writing.56 Her first 
significant piece of writing published in Western Europe was a memoir of her experiences as a 
student in Russia during the revolution; her second, the novel submitted for the Vatican !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Goyau's many works include L’Église libre dans l’Europe libre (Paris: Perrin, 1920), La pensée 
religieuse de Joseph de Maistre (Paris: Perrin, 1921), Orientations catholiques (Paris: Perrin et Cie, 1925), 
and Dieu chez les Soviets (Paris: Flammarion, 1929). He was a close friend of Cardinal Baudrillart and in 
regular correspondence with both Charles Maurras and General Castelnau. See Letter from Castelnau to 
Goyau, Paris 19 July 1921. Archives de l'Académie française (henceforth AAF), Fonds Goyau, 7 AP 5, 
correspondance Gen. Castelnau; "Vous êtes la gloire des catholiques français et vous l'êtes avec une belle 
modestie!" Undated business card-letter from Baudrillart to Goyau. Ibid., 7 AP 1, correspondance Mgr 
Baudrillart; and Letter from Castelnau to Goyau, Paris 19 July 1921. Ibid., 7 AP 5, correspondance Gen. 
Castelnau. Despite the Vatican's 1926 reprimand of Action Française (which it was feared would lessen 
allegiance to the Pope and interfere with the Vatican's conclusion of an agreement with Republican 
France), members of the organization continued to enjoy special status throughout the interwar years. 
 
54 Letter of Henri Bordeaux to Goyau, Paris, 17 September 1932. ASV, AES Pro Russia 1921-1944 (4° 
periodo), pos. Scatola 37, fasc.216, ff.18. On Bordeaux’s respect for Mussolini (whom he had personally 
met), see AAF, Registre des procès-verbaux, 27 December 1934.  
 
55 “Sa Sainteté a reçu un exemplaire du livre dont Votre Eminence Révme s’est occupée. Le Saint Père l’a 
lu entièrement; il l’a jugé persuasif et impressionnant; les scènes qui s’y trouvent rapportées sont, en effet, 
des scènes vecues, et tout l’ouvrage est un recueil d’instantanées d’une féroce tragédie.” Letter from 
d’Herbigny to Baudrillart, Rome, 14 Feb 1936. ASV, AES Pro Russia 1921-1944 (4° periodo), pos. Scatola 
37, fasc.217, ff.6 
 
56 See Alja Rachmanova, "My Milkshop in Vienna," in The Sea-Raiders, ed. Edward Keble Chatterton,  




competition, which was issued by a Berlin-based publishing house known for showcasing pro-
Nazi work.57 Entitled The Factory of New Men, Rachmanova's novel presents the Soviet Union 
as a land where women have lost their dignity, children their families, and individuals their 
rights. It profiles two heroic women in their attempts to preserve their Christian purity. 
Repeatedly, the duo is forced to confront cruel party apparatchik attempting to force young girls 
into prostitution. "I am suffocating in this atmosphere," one of the two women cries. 
Denouncing Soviet attitudes towards religion and female probity, she notes, "I want to keep my 
soul and body pure, especially because they ridicule these things; I want some religion, 
especially because they reject all religions." Highlighting the notion of communism as 
hyperbolic collectivism, she further laments, "Everything aims at extinguishing my individuality 
[but] I want to be myself, not a part of the mass, not a brick that is supposed to be part of the 
foundation of some future paradise."58 Though the Soviet Union imagines itself a "factory of new 
men," Rachmanova's characters explain, it is in fact creating a cookie-cutter nightmare for all. 
But above the violence and moral destitution of the Soviet Union, religion triumphs; thus, in the 
words of one of the prize administrators, the novel "maintains the hope of redemption for the 
Russian people alive."59 
 With its lachrymose protagonists, heavy-handed moralizing, and starkly Manichean 
depiction of life in the Soviet Union as the struggle between good (Christianity) and evil !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Idem, Aube de vie, aube de mort. Journal d'une étudiante russe pendant la Révolution (Paris: Plon, 
1935); Die Fabrik der Neuen Menchen (Berlin: Deutsche Buchgemeinschaft, 1937). Rachmanova's 
memoirs were also published in German, under the title Tragödie einer Liebe (Salzburg: O. Müller, 1937). 
The Pope received Rachmanova's memoirs as a gift in 1937. ASV, Segr di Stato, 1937, Pubblic.922. 
 
58 “Ich ersticke in dieser Atmosphäre [...] in der alles darauf ausgeht, alles Persönliche zu vernichten. Ich 
will nicht rauchen, weil alle rauchen, ich will meine Seele und meinen Körper rein erhalten, schon darum, 
weil alle diese Dinge verlachen; ich will irgendeine Religion haben, schon deshalb, weil alle sie 
verleugnen. Ich will ich sein, und kein Massenmensch, kein Ziegelstein, der das Fundament für das 
zukünftige Paradies bilden soll.” The angelic Tamara, in Die Fabrik, 62.  
 
59 "Son roman n’est pas un roman de haine contre le bolchévisme. Il garde, il maintient l’espoir de la 
rédemption du peuple russe. Il y voudrait contribuer." Bordeaux, “Rapport du concours de romans sur le 
bolchévisme organisé par l’Académie d’Education et d’Entr’aide sociales,” Paris, 28 November 1935. ASV, 




(communism), Rachmanova's novel hoped to impart a strong lesson to its readers -- and one 
with which the Vatican was fully onboard. So did the novel awarded second prize in the 
competition, which was penned by the well-known anti-liberal theorist Erik Maria Ritter von 
Kühnelt-Leddihn (1909-1999). The Austrian writer used his novel to celebrate the emergent 
alliance between Germany and Italy against the Soviet Union. Combining the adventure novel, 
the political tract and the religious apologia, Kühnelk-Leddhin's Jesuiten, Spiesser und 
Bolschewicken follows a German-Italian, lay-clerical, trio of muscular, handsome and clever 
men on their rambling adventures to show up (and in many cases, beat up) communists across 
Europe and North Africa.60  The men hope to demonstrate that there is only one viable 
alternative to communism: a Catholic, anti-liberal, and authoritarian political system, which 
creates unity, without flattening out social distinctions. The use of violence is absolutely an 
acceptable means of spreading the message. The novel's hero, a German Catholic journalist, 
seizes opportune moments to show off his Jiu-Jitsu skills, while his Jesuit partner "packs a 
terribly strong punch," as all too many communist upstarts discover.61 Written in 1933, this 
novel's celebration of violence, and of an Italian-German-Vatican alliance against communism, 
bore a clear message.  
 Kühnelk-Leddhin's message regarding the tactics needed to battle the Soviet Union was 
repeated in various forms by other prize-winning novels. For instance, Pierre de Croidys' novel, 
L'Empire des Sans-Dieu, which won fourth place in the competition, similarly made clear its 
preferences for religious, proto-fascist, and anti-parliamentary, solutions to the communist 
problem. Though Académie française judges deeemed its "literary value mediocre," they noted 
that the text's message was sound, and further that it "would make an excellent film."62 By !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Erik von Kühnelk-Leddhin, Jesuiten, Spiesser, Bolschewicken (Salzburg: Salzburg Pustet, 1933). 
 
61 As Düring notes to his fiancée, “Ich kann Jiu-Jitsu und Pater Redel hat einen furchtbar schweren 
Schlag.” Kühnelk-Leddhin, Jesuiten, Spiesser, Bolschewicken, 81. 
 
62 "La valeur littéraire est médiocre, [mais] L'Empire des sans-Dieu de M. Pierre de Croidys ferait un film 
excellent." Bordeaux,  “Rapport du concours de romans sur le bolchévisme organisé par l’Académie 
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interspersing tragic scenes of Bolshevik theft and contempt for basic morality with abundant 
theoretical debates between the novel's pro-communist and anticommunist protagonists (a 
schoolteacher and his wife and friends), De Croidys communicated the novel's central thesis 
loud and clear. Like von Kühnelt-Leddihn, he wore his political allegiances on his sleeve. As 
prize administrators doubtless knew, the Frenchman had participated actively in the rise of 
right-wing movements in alliance with fascist groups, like the Ligues des Patriotes, and was in 
close correspondance with one of the movement's leaders, the French General Edouard de 
Castelnau.63 
 Thus, the Vatican's book prize not only showcased a new, aggressive, propaganda 
strategy, which used entertainment to sway people's emotions. It also awarded the translation in 
literary terms of Vatican anticommunism -- an anticommunism which in practice appeared 
increasingly imbricated with existing extreme right-wing political movements. That the 
Vatican's anticommunist book prize did so cannot simply be chalked up to circumstance or 
chance.  
 In private conversations, the Pope indeed did not hide his preferences for authoritarian, 
religiously imbued governments, which he deemed far superior to democracies. "I have stopped 
believing in democracy and in the effectiveness of democratic governments," book prize 
administrator Henri Bordeaux informed the Pope in 1932, in a private letter explaining how his 
personal biases would shape his literary judgments in the Vatican competition. Democracy and 
democratic governments, he noted, "both lead people slowly but surely to socialism and 
communism, in their search for equality!" In place of liberal democracy, what was needed was a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
d’Education et d’Entr’aide sociales,” Paris, 28 November 1935. ASV, AES Pro Russia 1921-1944 (4° 
periodo), pos. Scatola 37, fasc.217, ff.9-17. The novel was subsequently published as follows: Pierre de 
Croidys, L'Empire des sans-Dieu: roman de moeurs soviétiques (Paris: Maison de la Bonne Press, 1936). 
 
63 On the Ligue des Patriotes and the Federation Nationale Catholique, see Véronique Auzépy-Chavagnac, 
Jean de Fabrèges et la jeune droite catholique: aux sources de la révolution nationale (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires du Septentrion, 2002), 64ff; Eugen Weber, Action Française: Royalism and Reaction in 
Twentieth Century France (Stanford: Staford University Press, 1962), 155ff, 244ff; Zeev Sterhell, Neither 




strong, nationalistic, government interested first and foremost in protecting "order and religious 
authority." Speaking directly to Pius XI's recommendations in Quadragesimo Anno, Bordeaux 
noted that authoritarian regimes should wield a strong hand, but not hold absolute powers; 
rather their powers should be "limited by corporations." Perhaps -- Bordeaux noted in closing -- 
some of these viewpoints could be encouraged by the competition announcement and play a 
mandated role in the selection process. 64  
 In his note of response to the French writer and Fascist sympathizer, Pius XI expressed 
his "immense pleasure" with Bordeaux's recommendations, and agreed that what was needed 
was the restoration of "authority, order, and hierarchy," as based "on the principles of the 
Catholic Church." Lamentably, the liberal "individualists," partisans of democracy, still did not 
understand this. To be sure, Pius XI suggested, winning novels should showcase an ideology 
celebrating authority and the protection of religion. Differing from Bordeaux on only one small 
point, the Pope noted that it would be best for prize administrators not to explicitly encourage 
the production of works with strongly nationalistic motifs. The overarching reason for the Pope's 
veto was theoretical: "The idea of nationalism," he explained, "is opposed to the supra-
nationalism of the Church." But the ban on hyper-nationalistic motifs was also due to recent 
political developments. Of late, the Pope noted, certain “Hitlerians" had failed to take sufficient 
notice of the anti-religious nature of hyper-nationalism, as had communists intent on fomenting 
nationalistic revolts, particularly among oppressed imperial subjects.65  In short, the Pope 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 “J’ai cessé de croire à la Démocratie et à l’efficacité des gouvernements démocratiques. L’une et les 
autres conduisent lentement les peuples au socialisme et au communisme par la recherche de l’égalité! 
[...] Le mal n’est pas seulement en Russie où il est réalisé, il est partout menaçant aujourd’hui où l’on sape 
l’autorité qui, seule, apporte l’ordre, autorité religieuse, familiale et nationale. Autorité d’allure non 
absolue mais contrôlée et spécialement par les compétences et les corporations.” Letter of Henri Bordeaux 
to Georges Goyau (to be communicated to the Pope), Paris, 17 Sept 1932. ASV, AES Pro Russia 1921-1944 
(4° periodo), pos. Scatola 37, fasc.216, ff.18. 
 
65 “Votre franc exposé Lui a beaucoup plu [...] l'Eglise est, moins encore que vous, portée à glorifier ou 
admettre une égalité qui détruirait ou saperait les hiérarchies, les mérites et l'autorité.  Cela dit pour 
rassurer votre scrupule sur ce point, cher Monsieur. Autorité, ordre, hiérarchie – mais dans le devoir de 
conscience – n’auront jamais de base plus forte – parce que seule vraie – que dans les principes de l’Eglise 
Catholique et les applications qu’elle en fait, aujourd’hui comme toujours. Destructeurs, au contraire, des 
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suggested that it would be best for the book prize to reward anti-democratic, authoritarian, and 
religious political thinking, but be wary of lending support to extreme forms of nationalism that 
might be damaging to the Church. 
 The Pope's recommendations dated to 1932, but by the time the Vatican's anticommunist 
book prize was awarded in 1935, it had become increasingly difficult to keep Catholic 
anticommunism separate from the anticommunism of "Hitlerians" and Fascists. As Spain's 
rightwing forces prepared to declare war on the Republic and Mussolini and Hitler began to 
implement their expansionistic foreign policies, the Vatican's anticommunist crusade struggled 
to maintain its independence. Before early 1936, Mussolini and Hitler had turned their 
anticommunism on and off at will, depending on the political and economic expediencies of the 
moment.66 But as Franco prepared his troops for a coup d'état, both leaders decided to launch 
an international anticommunist crusade, transforming a long-standing concern with rooting out 
the enemy within into a far-reaching campaign against Soviet influence across Europe and the 
Americas.67 Standing against communism and with Franco, the leaders reasoned, would win 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
fondements mêmes de toute autorité, ces individualistes qui, en répétant sans cesse le nom, la 
villipendent en pratique pour leurs petits intérêts personnels en inventant de jour en jour des calomnies 
toujours plus sottes, plus odieuses, plus contraires à la vérité, à l’évidence, au bon sense. [...] Peut-être 
êtes-vous, d'âme et de coeur, porté vers les conceptions monarchiques. Aucun obstacle n'en résulte aux 
yeux du Saint Père. Il croit, au contraire, que si la cause monarchique doit de fait disparaître 
définitivement en France, ce serait par l'action et la faute des mauvais serviteurs qui, en l'identifiant à 
leurs mesquineries personnelles, l'auraient rendue odieuse [...] Le communisme, en plusieurs pays [...] 
exploite les tendances de nationalisme forcené contre les 'Empires coloniaux'; ailleurs, par example chez 
les hitlériens et autres, l'idée de nation et de nationalisme est opposée au supra nationalisme de l'Eglise." 
Letter of d’Herbigny to Bordeaux (with copy to Goyau), Vatican, 29 Sept 1932. Ibid., ff.24-28. 
 
66 This argument is made, among others, by R.J.B. Bosworth, Mussolini (London: Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 13ff, MacGregor Knox, Common Destiny, 55, 144; Alan Cassels, “Was There a Fascism 
Foreign Policy? Tradition and Novelty,” International History Review 2 (1983): 255-68, here, 257; Philip 
V. Cannistraro and Edward D. Wynot, Jr., “On the Dynamics of Anti-Communism as a Function of Fascist 
Foreign Policy, 1933-1945,” Il Politico 38 (1973); Giorgio Petracchi, La Russia rivoluzionaria nella 
politica italiana. Le relazioni italo-sovietiche, 1917-25 (Rome: Laterza, 1982); Angelo D'Orsi, La 
rivoluzione antibolscevica. Fascismo, classi, ideologie, 1917-22 (Milan: F. Angeli, 1985); and Pier Luigi 
Bassignana, Fascisti nel paese dei Soviet (Turin: Bollati Boringhieri, 2000). 
 
67 Waddington, Hitler’s Crusade, 7, 29 and passim; Kurt Pätzold, "Antikommunismus und 
Antibolschewismus als Instrumente der Kriegsvorbereitung und Kriegspolitik," in Der 
nationalsozialistische Krieg, eds. Norbert Frei and Hermann Kling (Frankfurt: Campus, 1990), 122-45; 
Marla Stone, "The Changing Face of the Enemy in Fascist Italy," Constellations 15.3 (2008): 332-50, and 
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them a stronghold in the Mediterranean, and hence (it was hoped) mastery over the European 
continent.68  
 As Nazi and Fascist groups stepped up their own anticommunist campaigns from 1936, 
the Vatican tried in various ways to maintain its relevance. After all, if the Vatican lost its 
prominent role as leader of the global anticommunist campaign, its claims to international 
influence might also diminish, and its concordat diplomacy might accordingly be threatened. 
Thus, in May of 1936 -- on the eve of Franco's coup -- the Secretariat on Atheism decided to 
organize a large-scale anticommunist exhibition with the double aim of educating the masses 
about the Soviet threat and of showing Nazi and Fascist movements the distinctive (albeit, 
mutually compatible and thus useful) nature of Vatican anticommunism. In this way, the 
Secretariat's activities increasingly embodied Pius XI's early motto towards Fascist movements: 
cooperazione, ma non confusione -- cooperation yes, but "confusion" and loss of a distinctly 
Catholic identity, no. 
 As Father Ledóchowski announced in a circular letter to fellow Jesuits, the Secretariat's 
first mass exhibition should embody the latest propaganda strategies and convince viewers that 
Bolsheviks professing, “the twofold monstrosity of atheism and absolute communism,” were 
“daily making new conquests throughout the world.” The exhibition should also highlight how 
the Vatican stood at the head of a campaign to fend off the Soviet danger. “At the present time," 
the Superior-General of the Jesuits noted, "nothing is more to the point, nothing is more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
forthcoming work on Fascist anticommunism; Dietrich Orlow, "Fascism, The Only Bulwark Against The 
Advance of Bolshevism, May 1936-March 1938," in The Lure of Fascism in Western Europe: German 
Nazis, Dutch and French Fascists, 1933-1939 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 77, 89-121; Nir 
Arielli, Fascist Policies and the Middle East, 1933-40 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Marco 
Mugnaini, L'America Latina e Mussolini: Brasile e Argentina nella politica dell'Italia, 1919-1943 (Milan: 
FrancoAngeli, 2008); and Francesca Cavarocchi, Avanguardie dello spirito: il fascismo e la propaganda 
culturale all'estero (Rome: Carocci, 2010). 
 
68 So argue, for instance, Knox, Common Destiny, and Mark Mazower, Hitler's Empire: How the Nazis 
Ruled Europe (New York: Penguin Press, 2008). Authors like D'Orsi and Waddington instead claim that 
Fascist and Nazi anticommunism was ontological, rather than instrumental. See Angelo D'Orsi, 
"Antibolscevismo," Dizionario del fascismo (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), eds. Victoria De Grazia and Sergio 




necessary, than our war against atheistic communism.”69 Foreshadowing the actual armed 
confrontation between anticommunist and Republican forces in Spain, the Vatican’s early 1936 
exhibition complemented the Fascist Regime’s 1932-4 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution, 
which in at least three of its twenty-three rooms had shown that how Fascism had destroyed the 
Bolshevik menace at home.70 Global communism, the Vatican exhibition claimed, had only been 
destroyed in limited national settings, like Italy. Elsewhere, it represented an enormous threat, 
and only by partnering with the Vatican in a global "war" (metaphorical or real), could civil 
governments destroy the Soviet Union's tentacles entirely. 
 The core message of the Vatican's anticommunist exhibition was carried by a single 
image, which was present in nearly all of the exhibition rooms and reprinted on the back of the 
visitor booklet (Figure 1). The simple image depicted three things: to the left, a towering white 
crucifix, to the right, a black hammer and sickle dripping with blood, and in the central, lower, 
part of the canvas, a cross-hatched planet earth. Even without text, the message of the image 
came across clearly: two powers were vying for world dominance, Christians and communists. 
Communism was an evil faith -- black as the color of the hammer and sickle, and bloody, as 
evidenced by the bright red blood dripping from the signature communist symbol. Christianity, 
on the other hand, was a faith of light and life, as symbolized by the bright white of the cross, 
which cast its comforting shadow over planet earth.  
 As the text illustrating the image further clarified, civil governments would be able to 
defeat the dark and evil communist faith only by partnering with the Vatican. "Which Sign Will 
Win?" asked the caption below the image, with the word "win" written in white, to reference the 
bright crucifix to which viewer's eyes were then drawn. On the crucifix was scrawled a phrase 
which answered the question. In hoc signo vinces: "In this sign, you will win." Good old !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Ledóchowski, “On Furthering the Fight Against Atheism: A Letter Addressed to the Whole Society,” 19 
June 1936. In Selected Writings of Father Ledóchowski, 608-14. 
 
70 Marla Stone, “Staging Fascism: The Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution,” Journal of Contemporary 
History 28 (1993): 215-43, here 221 and 231-2. 
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Constantine: the famous sentence referenced the story of Constantine marching toward the 
battle that would give him control of the Roman Empire. As myth would have it, during the 
march Constantine had seen the sentence in hoc signo vinces scrawled in the sky, after which 
point he would convert to the Christian faith and transform the Roman Empire into a powerful 
tool for Christianity's expansion. Through this sparse image, the Secretariat on Atheism was 
thus communicating the message that the Soviet Union could only be defeated through the 
collaboration of state powers with the Vatican. With the sign of the crucifix, state powers would 
win the battle (in hoc signo vinces); without it, their empires would be doomed.       
  
 In more or less subtle ways, the entirety of the Secretariat's anti-Soviet exhibition drove 
home the same message. Very much in the spirit of the exhibitions of the day (from the World 
Fair, most recently held in Chicago in 1933, to the 1932-4 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution), 
this exhibition made use of elaborate staging techniques to communicate its heavy-handed 
thesis. 71 Its rooms were not organized chronologically (as was the case with the Exhibition of the 
Fascist Revolution, for instance), but the long entryway staircase contained an important 
chronological summary of the progress of Bolshevism from its earliest days through the mid 
1930s. Each step on the staircase corresponded to a year and event, which demonstrated that 
the Soviet nemesis was none other than the Vatican. For instance, 1923 was highlighted as the 
year of the "sacking of the Churches"; something which literally paved the way and prepared the 
viewer/stair-climber for the 1926 step, the "mass arrests of the Catholic clergy" (Figure 2). The 
illustrated staircase steps thus showed that the Soviets were literally escalating their tactics so as 
to completely destroy the Vatican's global power.  
The Soviet Union's nefarious progress was also highlighted spatially, as each exhibition 
room corresponded to a different part of the world. Some rooms tracked communist progress !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Though the Vatican was not formally represented at the World’s Fair, various Catholic lay organizations 
– such as the Catholic Women’s League – played a role in the activities, and were likely inspired by them. 
See Cheryl R. Ganz, The 1933 Chicago World’s Fair: A Century of Progress (Urbana: University of Illinois 
Press, 2008), 106-7. On the Fascist exhibition, see Stone, “Staging Fascism." 
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within a single country (e.g., “France”), while others documented an entire continent (e.g., “the 
Americas”). Rather than celebrating in World-Fair spirit the technological and cultural 
innovations of these geographic regions, the spatial trope presented a world carved up between 
the Soviet Union and the Vatican. Troublingly, even countries and regions traditionally 
associated with Catholicism were shown to be literally overrun by communist propaganda, 
which lined the walls and ceilings in an oppressive montage. The thousands of colorful posters 
and pamphlets – doubtless chosen for their lewd, disturbing and violent imagery – literally 
impinged on Vatican strongholds in Western Europe and Latin America (Figure 3). Prolific 
maps present in each room and hallway helped underscore that all of the propaganda on display 
originated from Moscow, and that Vatican City was capable of facing off with it (Figure 4). The 
final exhibition room put on jolly display the Vatican's prolific anticommunist literary 
production, and prominently featured the umpteenth copy of the iconic in hoc signo vinces 
poster. The final room thus showed that there was light at the end of the tunnel: the Vatican was 
capable of countering a world under threat, provided that it be given freedom to do so and that it 
work in tandem with allied anticommunist states (Figure 5). 
The message was not simply rhetorical. Indeed, prior to hosting the exhibition, Father 
Ledóchowski had run its contents by the Fascist censors, who assured him that "everything was 
correct, according to civil authorities." It was not least thanks to the collaborative attitude of the 
Fascist regime, Ledóchowski noted, that "the Exhibition was a great success." In addition to the 
numerous high-profile Fascist officials who enjoyed the Vatican's propagandistic installation, 
the exhibition was also visited by Catholic journalists from around the world and by at least 
three members of the Gestapo. The Vatican was promptly encouraged to not limit its exhibition 
to Rome, but rather pack it up and bring it to the major European capitals, which indeed it 
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would. The success of the May 1936 exhibition would also motivate the Secretariat to host two 
additional such exhibitions -- one in 1938 and another in 1939.72 
From the mid 1930s, the Vatican and Nazi-Fascist groups began to actively feed off of 
one another's anticommunist propaganda. Shortly after the conclusion of the 1936 exhibition in 
Rome, Ledóchowski asked the head of the Secretariat on Atheism, Father Joseph Ledit, to travel 
to Munich. The purpose of Ledit's trip was to take part as a guest of honor in the opening 
ceremonies of the first anticommunist exhibition of the Nazi party. The exhibition had been 
organized in collaboration with the Fascist government and most likely with input from Ledit 
himself. The Nazi exhibition -- as had been the Vatican's -- was a great success. As a reporter for 
the Fascist newspaper Avvenire d’Italia noted, “though much more cumbersome,” the Munich 
exhibition had been influenced by the Vatican’s “scholarly and universal touch.” As Ledit later 
recalled, Father Ledóchowski “did not hide his satisfaction” following Ledit's trip, which 
consolidated the Vatican-Nazi-Fascist bond against the Soviet Union. His joy, Ledit later 
explained, was understandable: “This was 1936," he wrote in a 1942 obituary for the recently 





But despite Joseph Ledit's excusatory tone, in 1936, there was in point of fact no consensus 
within the Vatican or in the Catholic world at large regarding the relative threat posed by Nazi, 
Fascist, and communist movements. Indeed, there were several Catholics convinced that 
Nazism and Fascism posed greater threats -- both due to their hyper-nationalistic and so-called !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
72 Father Ledit’s memories of Ledóchowski, written in English. Undated manuscript, most likely written 






neo-pagan tendencies, and due to a spate of increasingly violent and paranoid attacks on 
Catholic Action and Catholic institutions, which took place in Italy in 1930-1, and in Germany in 
1933-4. Fears had further mounted regarding the Nazis' willingness to stamp on Vatican 
prerogatives when on July 24, 1934, a group of Austrian Nazis assassinated the Catholic 
corporatist Chancellor of Austria, Engelbert Dollfuss. Suddenly, one of the chief symbols of how 
Vatican political and economic precepts could be translated into state practice was dead. 
Perhaps, some murmured, the Vatican's newfound prominence in international affairs might 
similarly die a premature death.  
 In the same years that Eugenio Pacelli and Wladimir Ledóchowski busily mobilized 
against the Soviet Union, and sought to institutionalize Vatican anticommunism through the 
Secretariat on Atheism, other officials sought to direct Vatican foreign policy in a different 
direction. The battle between these two factions stretched from fall of 1934 through spring of 
1937, and pitted those who considered the Soviet Union the leading enemy against those 
convinced that Nazism (and, for some, Fascism), was more dangerous. As will be investigated in 
the following chapter, though this second group would initially gain followers it would 
ultimately lose ground -- not least due to the institutionalization of the Vatican anticommunist 
campaign, which increasingly became an "iron cage," structuring Vatican diplomacy. Despite its 
failure to enshrine Nazism and Fascism as threats to the Catholic Church, this anti-Nazi and 
anti-Fascist group would leave an important legacy. Paradoxically, it initially stood to benefit the 
anticommunist campaign, but after 1945, it would help the Vatican whitewash its record of 
alliance with Germany and Italy. The legacy amounted to a sophisticated philosophical and 
theological case against "totalitarianism" -- a word originally used by Catholic theorists to 
condemn the Nazi and Fascist deification of the state. Only from circa 1937 would the word, per 
the Pope's express suggestion, be applied to communism as well, by which point the battle to 
issue a stirring theological condemnation of Nazi-Fascism was all but lost. The contrast between 
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these two factions, and the strange and counter-intuitive emergence of a theoretical grounding 


















Fig.1: The poster bears the caption: "Which Sign Will Win?" The crucifix answers: In Hoc Signo 
Vinces. 





Fig.2: The central stairway of the 1938 exhibition, as that of the 1936 exhibition, dramatically 







Fig. 3: Soviet posters depicting guns and violence dominated the exhibition. The handwritten 
caption reads, "Our army is the army of the world revolution -- Stalin." 
Source: Ibid. 
 
Fig. 4: The 1936 exhibition room dedicated to communist propaganda in France. French 
Communist posters and newspapers line the walls. The room is dominated by a statue of the 
Virgin Mary to the right (representing the Vatican) and by a map of the world (upper left), which 
bears the caption: "La pieuvre communiste étend ses tentacules" (The communist octopus 




























Fig.5: The final exhibition room sold copies of Lettres de Rome and other Vatican 
anticommunist literature to visitors. The kiosk is framed by the statement, "Per Vincere, Bisogna 
Lottare" (In order to win, you need to fight). The classic "Which Sign Will Win?" poster can also 










Language does not simply reflect the processes of society and history. On the contrary, [...] 
important social and historical processes occur within language. 
-- Raymond Williams, 19831 
 
 
Every historical event begins with a struggle centered on naming. 





As the previous chapter investigated, by 1936 the Secretariat on Atheism had institutionalized 
Vatican anticommunism. But the project of mobilizing all members of the Catholic hierarchy 
and laity to support and internalize the Vatican's new campaign was no simple matter. Despite 
the centralization of power in the person of the Pope and the expansion of Catholic Action 
worldwide, the Vatican remained a messy, antiquated, institution, replete with operational 
redundancies and vying centers of power, many of which had a direct stake in controlling the 
Vatican's diplomatic priorities. Similarly, the Catholic world at large -- composed as it was of 
millions of individuals from many different countries -- was by no means uniform. Consider the 
fact that different members of the Catholic world often produced wildly divergent interpretation 
of the Pope's dense, oddly worded, and potentially polysemic, messages, all the while convinced 
that their interpretation was the correct one. This was for instance the case with Quadragesimo 
Anno, which some saw as a strong endorsement of Italian-style corporatism, and others 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983), 15-6; 22. 
 
2 Milan Kundera, as cited in Alain Finkielkraut, "Milan Kundera Interview," Cross Currents: A Yearbook 




interpreted as a criticism of the emergence of an all-controlling Fascist state.3 Even within the 
bounds of the anticommunist campaign there was room for confusion, as commentators 
wondered whether Pius XI's criticisms of "atheistic communism" were coded quips targeting the 
antireligious tendencies manifest in Nazi Germany, or even Fascist Italy. In a sense, Pius XI's 
expansion of Catholic Action had further increased the potential for divergence, despite all its 
centralizing tendencies. Catholic Action empowered clerics and laypeople (workers and 
intellectuals, men and women) to become citizen journalists and on-the-ground implementers 
of the Pope's vision. Either out of caution (so as to not offend ruling authorities), out of 
ideological conviction, or out of confusion (given the under-determined nature of the Pope's 
recommendations), Catholic Action in different countries did very different kinds of things  -- 
despite the fact that all branches were dependent on Vatican oversight, and claimed, in some 
way, to be furthering the kingdom of Christ on earth.4 
 Because of this high degree of heterogeneity, the path towards a unified Catholic vision 
of foreign affairs involved not only creating relevant institutions capable of implementing the 
new turn (such as the Secretariat on Atheism); it also involved constructing a theoretical 
apparatus capable of justifying the Vatican's campaign against the Soviet Union, and convincing 
the varied personnel in the Vatican and in the wider Catholic world, of the necessity and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 See the exchange of notes between Italy's Catholic Action members, led by Ludovico Montini and Igino 
Righetti, and French Jesuit leaders of Action populaire, regarding a planned 1935 Social Week on the 
topic of corporatism and the "crisis of capitalism." To belie the fanfare of a joint Vatican-Fascist 
corporatist vision, Father Gustave Desbuquois for instance noted that Quadragesimo Anno articulates an 
anti-statist position. He did, however, add that the corporatist vogue owes much to papal teachings. 
Fascist authorities, worried about the presence of anti-Fascist interpretations of the encyclical in the 
Catholic world, banned the Social Week. See the letter of Father Desbuquois to Ledóchowski, Vanves, 5 
April 1935. ARSI, Ledóchowsky 1016, fasc.5, d.554; addendum to the letter of Igino Righetti to 
Lédóchowski, Rome, 15 March 1935. Ibid, fasc. “Settimana sociale italiana 1935,” ff.553.  
 
4 For a discussion of the debate around anti-communism and the variance of political views within 
different branches of Catholic Action, see Renato Moro, La formazione della classe dirigente cattolica 
(1929-1937) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979), 441-85; Paolo Ranfagni, I clerico-fascisti: Le riviste 
dell’Università Cattolica negli anni del regime (Florence: Cooperativa Editrice Universitaria, 1975), 190-
3; Gerd-Rainer Horn, "Part I: Catholic Action: A Twentieth-Century Social Movement (1920s-1930s)," in 
Western European Liberation Theology: The First Wave (1924-1959) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008), 1-54; and Paul Droulers, Politique sociale et christianisme: Le Pere Desbuquois et l'Action 
populaire (Paris: Les editions ouvriers, 1969). 
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legitimacy of mobilizing against it. Inevitably, there would be individuals who remained 
unconvinced that the Pope, his Secretary of State and the Secretariat on Atheism had made the 
right decision to make the Soviet Union the Vatican's leading enemy; accordingly, the process of 
implementing this unified Vatican diplomacy also involved new finding ways to censor (and in 
some cases, silence) internal dissenting voices. 
 As discussed in the previous chapter, the year between 1933 and 1934 was not only 
characterized by the reorientation of Vatican diplomacy against the Soviet Union. During this 
same arc of time, the Vatican struggled to respond to the troubling behavior of Nazi Germany, 
which soon after concluding the 1933 concordat had begun persecuting Catholic Action, 
pursuing eugenics and forced sterilization, and endorsing a political theology that deified the 
state and contradicted Catholic precepts. With the Nazi murder of the Vatican-backed Austrian 
Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss and Hitler's cultivation of an alliance with Mussolini, worries 
mounted. Perhaps the time had come for the Vatican to publicly protest Germany's actions, 
many clerics wondered. But how could it do so? And would it even be possible to plausibly 
criticize Nazi Germany, or were critics like the aforementioned Gustav Gundlach right in noting 
that the anti-Soviet turn had strengthened the Nazi-Fascist cause, and thus the Vatican's 
allegiance to Nazi-Fascist powers? 
 Initially, the Pope allowed a series of eager clerics within the Sacred Congregation of the 
Holy Office (the branch of the Vatican dedicated to enforcing questions of doctrine), to tackle 
the matter, and come up with their own response to Nazi and Fascist theories and practices. In 
1936, shortly before the Holy Office was slated to issue its condemnation of Nazi-Fascism in the 
form of an updated Syllabus of Errors, the Vatican Secretariat of State attempted to 
simultaneously stall and transform the project. By this point, anticommunism had been 
institutionalized in the Secretariat on Atheism, and several key members within the Vatican 
(including the Pope himself) had grown convinced that the Soviet Union represented the 
greatest threat to the Vatican's survival. They argued that given its transnational influence, the 
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Vatican was best positioned to lead the "Catholic International," that would face off the 
"Communist International" in a global war of words and worldviews.  
 In an attempt to impose this conviction on all Vatican officials and the Catholic world at 
large, Pius XI and Eugenio Pacelli effectively killed the Holy Office project, despite the 
considerable investment of time and personnel taken to complete it. In place of the Syllabus of 
Errors condemning Nazism and Fascism, Pius XI issued three encyclicals in 1937, all within 
weeks of one another. Two denounced Soviet actions writ large, while the third more softly 
chided Nazi Germany, by encouraging the capricious state to return to the terms of the 
concordat. Curiously, the Holy Office discussion of how Nazi-Fascism ran counter to theories of 
the ideal Catholic state was incorporated not in the encyclical on Germany, but rather in the 
anti-Soviet texts. Thus some of the core theoretical commitments of the Holy Office project 
survived, though they were redeployed to criticize communism, rather than Nazi-Fascism. 
  Though many scholars have analyzed Pius XI's three 1937 encyclicals, they have done so 
primarily to bandy anti-Nazism against anti-communism as a weapon in the Pius wars. Few 
have situated these texts within their proper context, and none have argued that the triple 
encyclical emerged from the shadow of the failed Holy Office project, and registered how these 
texts together marked a bold new step for Vatican diplomacy.5 As will be argued in this chapter, 
the encyclicals of 1937 carried three important messages. First, they argued that only the Pope 
and the Secretariat of State were in a position to make decisions about the aims of Vatican 
diplomacy -- not other Vatican officials or bodies. Further, they imposed loyalty to concordat 
allies (like Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy) and to the Vatican's anti-Soviet campaign, by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 The only scholars to discuss the Holy Office project in any detail are Hubert Wolf, Thomas 
Brechenmacher and Peter Godman, all of whom focus on how the project exemplifies Catholic anti-
Nazism, but fail to tease out the relation between this project and the triple encyclicals. See Wolf, "Contro 
razzismo e antisemitismo? La Santa Sede e l'ideologia nazionalsocialista alla luce delle fonti vaticane ora 
accessibili," in Die Herausforderung der Diktaturen Katholizismus in Deutschland und Italien, 1918-
1943/5 (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2008), 249-71; Idem, Pope and Devil; Thomas Brechenmacher, 
Der Vatikan und die Juden: Geschichte einer unheiligen Beziehung (Munich: Beck, 2005), 180ff; Peter 
Godman, Hitler and Vatican: Inside the Secret Archives that Reveal the New Story of the Nazis and the 
Church (New York: Free Press, 2004), 21-82. 
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providing a far-reaching theoretical apparatus to justify it. Finally, the triple encyclicals upped 
the ante of the Vatican's anti-Soviet campaign, by proposing that even the use of violence was 
warranted in the war against the Soviet Union. Oddly, this bold sanction of armed revolt against 
communist movements -- issued precisely during the years of the Spanish Civil War and 
renewed violence in Mexico -- has received almost no attention in the scholarship. And yet it 
was arguably precisely this sanction, and the theoretical apparatus that undergirded it, that 
allowed the Vatican to maintain and expand its reach during the interwar and postwar years. 
 
 
1. The Syllabus of Errors against Nazi-Fascism 
 
The Holy Office project began to take shape a few months after the assassination of the Austrian 
Chancellor Dollfuss in July of 1934. In a sense, the Vatican had been prepared for the event; well 
aware of Hitler's ambitions regarding Austria, Pius XI had repeatedly urged Mussolini to help 
keep Hitler at bay throughout the spring of 1934.6 Nonetheless, the murder in cold blood of no 
less than the Chancellor of "Catholic Austria" shocked many, including a rather enigmatic 
Austrian Bishop, Alois Hudal (1885-1963). As Rector of the German Pontifical Institute Santa 
Maria dell’Anima and former go-between with the Weimar Republic, Hudal was a respected 
diplomat and cleric within the Vatican. Shortly following the assassination, Hudal traveled to 
Germany and Austria to check on the status of concordat gains in these countries and to make 
sense of political developments.  
 Upon his return to Rome in October of 1934, Hudal retracted his earlier conviction 
regarding the possible union between Nationalism Socialism and Catholic theology. 7 Instead,  he !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 See, e.g., Pacelli’s Udienze notes, 23 May 1934. ASV, AES Stati Ecclesiastici (quarto periodo), 1933-1940, 
pos.430b P.O., fasc.361, ff.14. 
 
7 Hudal's change of heart would not be his last – within the span of two years, he would once against 
present the Catholic cause as reconcilable with Nazism. On this perplexing figure, see Philippe Chenaux, 
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informed the Pope that matters were much worse than he had feared. "It is false," he noted, "to 
affirm that National Socialism is merely a political party that is founded on a positive form of 
Christianity and has protected religion in Germany against the dangers of Bolshevism."8 Rather, 
Hudal affirmed, Nazism was best understood as a heretical and terribly dangerous worldview. It 
was a form a “radical nationalism,” which erected the nation-state over and above all else, 
including God. Nazism embraced a "totalitarian concept of the state," Hudal claimed, borrowing 
a term that had recently entered into regular use. The Nazi "totalitarian concept," Hudal 
remarked, not only suppressed the personal worth of the individual; it also denied that Christ 
and his intermediary on earth, the Pope, could play any significant role in social and political 
life. Finally, Nazism espoused a "radical conception of race," according to which all human 
beings were in no sense equal before the eyes of God. More worrisome still was that Nazism's 
brazenly sacrilegious theoretical committments were winning large numbers of followers among 
German and Austrian youth.9 In several cities, Hudal noted, Nazi youth organizations were 
directly competing with their Catholic Action equivalents, and seeking to render the latter 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
“Pacelli, Hudal et la question du nazisme, 1933-8,” Rivista di storia della Chiesa in Italia 57 (2003): 133-
54; Dominik Burkard, “Alois Hudal – ein Anti-Pacelli? Zur Diskussion um die Haltung des Vatikans 
gegenüber dem Nationalsozialismus,” Zeitscrhift für Religions und Gestesgeschichte 59.1 (2007): 61-89; 
and Matteo Sanfilippo, “Los papeles de Hudal como fuente para la historia de la migración de Alemanes y 
Nazis despues de la segunda guerra mundial,” Estudios Migratorios Latinoamericanos 43 (1999): 185-
209. 
 
8 "Così è dunque un'affermazione finta di pretendere che il Nazionalsocialismo sia solamente un partito 
politco, [...] o più che sia fondato su un Cristianesimo positivo e che abbia protetto la religione in 
Germania contro i pericoli del Bolscevismo." Letter of Alois Hudal to Domenico Sbarretti, 7 October 1934. 
In “Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario: Relazione, Voto ed Elenco,” July 1935, 1-15. Archivio della 
Congregazione per la Dottrina della Fede (henceforth ACDF), S.O., Rerum Variarum 1934, n.29, f.3. 
 
9 In 1937, Alois Hudal would pen a text denouncing Nazi racism, which went through five printings in 
Austria, and found quite an audience there. See Alois Hudal, Grundlagen des Nationalsozialismus: Eine 
ideengeschichtliche Untersuchung von katholischer Warte (Leipzig and Vienna: Johannes Günther 
Verlag, 1937); and John Connelly, From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching on the 




irrelevant. Furthermore, Nazism's able use of print and radio propaganda, Hudal argued, risked 
crowding out Catholic media.10  
 In short, Nazism was militating against the core precepts Pius XI defended: the right of 
the Vatican to integrate civil society through Catholic Action, and its duty to partner with states 
and involve itself in social-political affairs. By elevating nationalism hued with racism over and 
above Vatican supra-nationalism and by demanding the total allegiance of its citizens (rather 
than the partial allegiance, as enshrined by the 1933 concordat), Nazi Germany was posing an 
evident danger to the Vatican. Accordingly, Hudal advised that the Pope send Hitler a sharp 
reproof by issuing a theological condemnation of all those aspects of Nazism deemed 
sacrilegious. The Pope could do this, Hudal recommended, in various ways: by issuing an 
Encyclical, by alerting Catholic Action to "begin a uniform battle against the spread of these 
currents of thought," and by encouraging the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office to 
condemn Nazi teachings via an updated "modern Syllabus [of Errors], modeled on that of Pope 
Pius IX."11  Archival evidence and Hudal's later written testimonies suggest that Pius XI 
immediately took one of these three suggestions quite seriously, by recommending that the Holy 
Office put together a draft Syllabus of Errors on Nazism.12  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 "[Il nazismo] è una teoria che rovescia i fondamenti della religione cristiana e tanto più pericolosa 
perché diviene predicata in una epoca di estremo Nazionalismo, che già da solo rappresenta una eresia; 
inoltre nei tempi dello Stato Totalitario, che come una seconda grande eresia di questi tempi contraddice 
al pensiero cristiano sullo Stato. Così si uniscono nel popolo germanico tre grandi eresie, che per la 
religione cristiana e più per la cattolica nel corso dei prossimi anni formeranno un gravissimo pericolo." 
Letter of Alois Hudal to Domenico Sbarretti, 7 October 1934.  
 
11 "A sgravio della mia conscienza dopo queste esperienze mi sia permesso di proporre che dopo un esame 
di una persona competente queste tre eresie moderne [...] siano condannate dalla Santa Sede in forma 
solenne sia con una Enciclica, sia con un Sillabo moderno nella forma di quello del Papa Pio IX. Nei paesi 
specialmente minacciati da queste eresie si dovrebbe anche incaricare gli Eccmi Vescovi che l'Azione 
cattolica delle relative diocesi cominciasse una lotta uniforme contro queste correnti [...] con tutti i mezzi 
adatti e possibili e appena la Santa Sede ha dato la sua censura." Ibid. 
 
12 See Alois Hudal, Römische Tagebücher: Lebensberichte eines alten Bischofs (Graz: Leopold Stocker 
Verlag, 1976), 120ff; and mention that Pius XI passed along the project on 25 October 1934, in 
“Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario: Relazione, Voto ed Elenco,” Suprema Sacra Congregazione del 
S. Offizio, July 1935, p.5. ACDF, S.O., Rerum Variarum 1934, n.29, f.3. 
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 This Vatican institution had been a central component of the counter-reformation; until 
1908, it had been known under the more descriptive title of the Congregation of the Holy Roman 
and Universal Inquisition. Since the time of its founding, the Congregation's tasks had remained 
largely unaltered and included the identification of heretical systems of belief and the 
condemnation of their transnational vehicles of dissemination, the book and the newspaper. To 
enforce its purported monopoly on truth, the Congregation issued the Syllabus of Errors, which 
catalogued erroneous systems of belief, and the Index of Forbidden Books. Until the eighteenth 
century, the extirpation of opposing viewpoints was carried out through a real-life pyre of 
banned books, as indicated by a striking gravure on the title page of the yearly Index, depicting 
books burning under the approving surveillance of the Holy Spirit and Saints Peter and Paul 
(Figure 1). 
 Because the Congregation had been crucial to identifying Catholicism's leading enemies 
for centuries, Pius XI's decision to charge the Holy Office with putting together a new Syllabus of 
Errors directed against Nazism was no small matter. After all, since 1864 no Pope had updated 
Pius IX's sweeping Syllabus of Errors. To get the new and ambitious project underway, the Pope 
turned to his trusted executor, Wladimir Ledóchowski, whom he asked to put together a 
commission of experts capable of drafting the document. In place of a large and well-known 
group of specialists, Ledóchowski appointed one, relatively unknown, man: the German-born 
Father Franz Xavier Hürth (1880-1963). A professor of moral theology, Hürth since 1918 had 
taught at a Jesuit house of studies in the Netherlands. He had worked for the Holy Office once 
already by helping draft a 1928 condemnation of a German book advocating the forced 
sterilization for the mentally ill, which laid the groundwork for the Pope's limited condemnation 
of eugenics in the 1930 encyclical, Casti Connubii.13 Likely overwhelmed by the prospect of 
drafting a Syllabus of Errors by himself, Hürth asked Ledóchowski if he could appoint a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 The book was Joseph Mayer, Gesetzliche Unfruchtbarmachung Geisteskranker (Freiburg im Briesgau: 
Herder, 1927). For the Holy Office condemnation of the text, see ACDF, S.O. 1797/1928 and 1885/1930. 




colleague in moral theology as his assistant: Johannes Baptista Rabeneck (1874-1960). 
Rabeneck, about whom the sources tell us very little, was being summoned to work for the 
prestigious Vatican office for the first time.14  
 As Hürth and Rabeneck began their research, they drew widely from papal teachings and 
from the writings of Dutch, German, Italian, Austrian and French Catholic theorists, to help 
draft a unified interpretation and condemnation of Nazi texts. In 1935, the body of anti-Nazi lay 
Catholic theorists was small but growing, as was the number of German Catholic clerics 
attempting to resist Hitler in various ways. 15  The polyglot Jesuit scholars, who attracted 
promising students like Karl Rahner, kept abreast of these developments -- something that 
would shape the substance of their text.16 In place of investigating the writings of Nazi theorists 
already on the Vatican's radar (such as Alfred Rosenberg, Ernst Bergman, Hans F.K. Guenther, 
and Lothar Gottlieb Tirala), Hürth and Rabeneck boldly headed straight to the top, and 
immersed themselves in the writings of the German Chacellor, Adolf Hitler.17  
 Perhaps convinced that indicting the Chancellor of the Third Reich was not sufficient -- 
and disturbed by Mussolini's plans for the unilateral invasion of Ethiopia (though not by the 
opening up of this territory to Vatican-directed Catholic missionaries) -- the two men also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Hürth's request for assistance can be found in “Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario: Relazione, 
Voto ed Elenco,” Suprema Sacra Congregazione del S. Offizio, July 1935, p.5. ACDF, S.O., Rerum 
Variarum 1934, n.29, f.3. 
 
15 The most comprehensive recent summary of pan-European Catholic anti-Nazism is provided by 
Connelly, From Enemy to Brother. For an account of anti-Nazism amongst German clergy, see Kevin 
Spicer, Resisting the Third Reich: The Catholic Clergy in Hitler's Berlin (DeKalb, Ill: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2004). For a discussion of Catholic anti-Nazism in the Netherlands, where Hürth and 
Rabeneck were based, see Joop Wekking, Untersuchungen zur Rezeption der nationalsozialistischen 
Weltanschauung in den konfessionellen Periodika der Niederlande, 1933-1940 (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
1990). 
 
16 For Rahner's recollections of Hürth, see Karl Rahner, Sehnsucht nach dem Geheimnisvollen Gott: 
Profil, Bilder, Texte, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1990), 118. As cited in 
Brendan J. Cahill, The Renewal of Revelation Theology (1960-2): The Development and Responses to the 
Fourth Chapter of the Preparatory Schema De deposito fidei (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, 
1999), 137, fn.83. 
 
17 In January-February of 1934, the Holy Office had indeed placed two works by these men on the Index of 
Forbidden Books: Alfred Rosenberg, Der Mythus des 20 jahrhunderts (München: Hoheneichen, 1930) 
and Ernst Bergmann, Die deutsche Nationalkirche (Breslau: F. Hirt, 1933). 
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turned their attention to Italy's Duce.18 The Jesuit scholars analyzed at length the speeches and 
writings of Benito Mussolini, incorporating the reflections of Mariano Cordovani, a prominent 
Roman theologian who had recently published a book condemning Fascism's authoritarian and 
"statolatrous" tendencies as anti-Catholic. Cordovani had also helped place the magnum opus of 
Fascist theorist Giovanni Gentile on the Index, and organized a conference in Rome, which 
called for the rebirth of Thomism over and against Fascist philosophies venerating the nation-
state.19 
 By early 1935, the draft Syllabus of Errors was complete. In place of a simple discussion 
of Nazism, Hürth and Rabeneck chose to outline a sweeping condemnation of a modern 
worldview, which they claimed was espoused by both Hitler and Mussolini, from whom they 
quoted at length. In line with Hudal's initial wording, they called this worldview 
"totalitarianism," and outlined its elevation of the state above individual rights, above the 
Catholic Church, and above God. In so-called "total states," the text explained, "nothing is 
completely exempt from the state's oversight." "Proclaiming the principle of the 'totalitarian 
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18 The Pope spoke out against the invasion only on one occasion, and Eugenio Pacelli and Domenico 
Tardini immediately censored his speech for the press. For an extensive recent analysis of the Vatican 
reaction to the Ethiopian war, which perhaps overmephasizes Pius XI's dissidence, see Lucia Ceci, Il papa 
non deve parlare: Chiesa, fascismo e guerra d'Etiopia (Rome: Laterza, 2010); for an account showing 
instead how the Vatican prepared the ground for Italian and French expansion in the territories and 
happily grew its missionary base there, see Annie Lacroix-Riz, "Le rôle du Vatican dans la colonisation de 
l'Afrique (1920-1938): de la romanisation des missions à la conquête de l'Éthiopie," Revue d'histoire 
moderne et contemporaine 41, 1 (January-March 1994): 29-81; and Elizabeth Foster, Faith in Empire: 
Religion, Politics and Colonial Rule in French Senegal, 1880-1940 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2013).  
 
19 Cordovani, to whom we shall return, had already made quite a name for himself as a coordinator of 
Catholic Action's youth branch, as a professor of theology at the Catholic University of Milan, and as a 
consultor and professor in Rome, at the Angelicum, the Dominican Order's House of Studies. In 1924, he 
published his first reflection on Fascist statolatry, in “L’autorità sociale nella dottrina cattolica,” Atti della 
XI sessione delle ‘Settimane sociali d’Italia’ (Turin: Settimane sociali d'Italia, 1924), 53-70. In 1928, he 
issued his indictment of Giovanni Gentile and the "idealist" strand of Fascist thought; Idem, 
Cattolicesimo ed Idealismo (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1928). In 1934, he was central in the condemnation of 
Gentile's work by the Holy Office and in the organization of the "Primo Convegno Antidealista," as 
outlined in “Bibliografia Domenicana,” Memorie Domenicane: Rivista di Religione, Storia, Arte (May-




state'," Nazi and Fascist movements sought to justify the state's "total dominion" over all, 
allowing "public powers the inherent right to control all things." 20 
 "All theories which teach the 'total' state are full of error," the text announced. 
"According to those Christian principles which the Church has always taught, and which Popes 
have recently repeatedly noted, the state has a different origin, and a different purpose." In line 
with Aquinas' recently revived teachings, Hürth and Rabeneck noted that, "the supreme 
authority of the state is natural law, and therefore in the last analysis derives from God." 
Further, as Popes like Leo XIII and Pius XI had explained, the God-given purpose of the state 
was to allow citizens to pursue the "common good" -- a term Aquinas had famously borrowed 
from Aristotle.21 Thus, "citizens do not have the state as their end; rather, it is the state that is 
made for citizens" so that they may achieve their true end. Though according to natural law, the 
state in some circumstances can "restrain individual rights in the name of the common good, it 
can never completely remove individual rights, insofar as it is not the source of those rights." 
Rather, the true source of these individual rights was God. Nazi and Fascist totalitarianism, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 " Potestati civitatis nihil omnino subtrahitur, habet dominatum totalem; unde proclamant ‘rem 
publicam totalem’ (‘totale Staat’). Quod ita interpretantur. Potestas publica in omnes res proprio suo iure 
se ingerere potest [...] Quanta autem sit oppositio inter asserta theoriae expositae et veritates religionis 
christianae neminem effugere potest [...] Tandem erroribus sunt plena quae de republica docent, de eius 
origine, fine, regimine, imprimis quae docent de republica ‘totali’. Secundum principia christiana quae 
Ecclesia numquam non professa est et quae Summi Pontifices his ultimis temporibus iterum iterumque 
inculcarunt alia est origo civitatis et alius eius finis quam quae ab asseclis theoriae expositae statuuntur. 
[...] Auctoritas suprema in civitate est etiam iuis naturalis et sic ultimatim a Deo [...] Omnino autem 
reicienda sunt ea quae de republica ut ‘totali’ seu de ‘principio totalitatis’ docent, secundum quod 
respublica proprio suo iure se in omnes res civium ingerere potest et cives Duci supremo illimitatam 
oboedientiam debent [...] Etsi cives auctoritati etiam politicae sint subiecti, et hoc ex voluntate Dei et 
propter Deum, et licet pro viribus suis ad bonum commune conferre debeant: tamen cives non sunt 
propter civitatem, sed civitas est potius propter cives, ut communi activitate omnium, quae ab auctoritate 
suprema est dirigenda, id obtineatur quod singuli pro se solis obtinere non possunt. Inde utique sequitur, 
ut etiam singuli in usu iurium suorum non possint esse plane independentes et pati debeant, ut iura sua 
hinc inde a civitate propter bonum commune magis determinentur vel etiam restringantur: sed civitas 
sicut haec iura non dedit, sic etiam ea plane auferre non potest." “Voto” of 17 March 1935. “Nazionalismo, 
razzismo, stato totalitario: Relazione, Voto ed Elenco,” Suprema Sacra Congregazione del S. Offizio, July 
1935, pp.6-16. ACDF, S.O., Rerum Variarum 1934, n.29, f.3. 
 
21 For an introduction, see Thomas W. Smith, "Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits of the Common 
Good," The American Political Science Review 93, 3 (September 1999): 625-636; and Mary M. Keys, 





therefore, stood ranged against the corpus of Catholic teachings, and was juxtaposed to an ideal 
Catholic state, which guaranteed individual rights and the pursuit of the common good. 
 That "individual rights" and "totalitarianism" should emerge as central to the Holy Office 
condemnation of Nazi-Fascism showed that the two clerics were up-to-date with an emergent 
language of Catholic politics. Historically, the two keywords had been strongly associated with 
the defense of liberalism: "rights" had this connotation since being enshrined in the Vatican-
condemned French Declaration of the Rights of Man (1789), while "totalitarianism" was 
associated with liberalism since its recent coinage by liberal democrats in Italy protesting Fascist 
policies.22 
 To be sure, certain Catholic theorists had begun to refer to rights from the late 
nineteenth century, but until the Holy Office document, the usage of the term had remained 
limited and undertheorized. In 1891, Leo XIII for instance argued that according to Thomas 
Aquinas, individuals were endowed with "rights and duties" by virtue of natural law -- and that 
these "rights and duties" were "quite independent of the State," and prior to it.23 Picking up on 
these ideas, many American Catholics eager to bring an end to their isolation from American 
culture defended a Thomistic notion of rights, and argued that the U.S. Bill of Rights had been 
inspired by Catholic teachings.24 Soon after World War I, the fusion of a Thomistic rights talk 
with liberal-democratic claims began appearing in the new constitutions of Eastern European 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 For the papal condemnation of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, see Pius VI, Quod 
Aliquantam (10 March 1791). 
 
23 Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum (15 May 1891), §12. 
 
24 The fusion of neo-Thomism and Anglo-Saxon rights talk is discussed in William M. Halsey, The 
Survival of American Innocence: Catholicism in an Era of Disillusionment, 1920-1940 (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1980), esp. chapter 8 and 9; R. Bruce Douglas and David Hollenbach, 
eds., Catholicism and Liberalism: Contributions to American Public Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994); and David Hollenbach, Claims in Conflict: Retrieving and Renewing the Catholic 




states, for reasons that scholars have only begun to analyze.25 Perhaps inspired by his Eastern 
European concordat partners, starting from the 1920s Pope Pius XI himself had begun 
mentioning certain religious rights in his speeches, such as the "right to education," by which he 
meant the right to a Catholic education.26 It may well be the case that the Catholic turn towards 
rights reflected an increased interest in preserving a Catholic uniqueness, all the while 
cultivating a hybrid legal/rhetorical space which shared much of its language with that occupied 
by civil governments. Regardless, Hürth and Rabeneck were central to giving Catholic rights talk 
a much more precise shape, as they yoked an emergent defense of individual rights to a new 
theory of state totalitarianism.  
 Partisans of liberal democracy in Italy had first coined the term “totalitarianism” soon 
after Mussolini's rise to power. For the Italian liberal Giovanni Amendola, the neologism had 
been a convenient way to trace the characteristics of a system that he saw as opposed, in all 
things, to liberal democracy.27 Picking up on Amendola's term, in 1924 Luigi Sturzo, the founder 
of the Italian Popular Party, noted in a liberal-democratic journal that Mussolini's 
"totalitarianism" sought "to subsume everything moral, cultural, political and religious [into] the 
Fascist [state]." To restore Italy to the right path, it was, "imperative to renounce the totalitarian 
spirit, and recognize the necessity of political parties [and] the popular will, as expressed in 
political elections."28 For both Amendola and Sturzo, all-controlling state power stood at the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 See Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Les constitutions de l'Europe nouvelle, 10th ed. (Paris: Delagrave, 
1938); and Idem, Droit constitutionnel international (Paris: Recueil Sirey, 1933), chap.6, section 2. For a 
more recent analysis, see Case, Between States. 
 
26 Pius XI, Rappresentanti in terra (31 December 1929). The Pope mentioned rights on 25 occasions in 
this encyclical. To prove that education was not exclusively in the hands of the state, the Pope cited 
Aquinas, the newly written Code of Canon Law, and a 1925 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
27 Giovanni Amendola, “Maggioranza e minoranza,” Il Mondo, 12 May and 28 June 1923. On Amendola’s 
use of the term, see Bruno Bongiovanni, “Il Totalitarismo: La Parola e la Cosa,” in La Chiesa Cattolica e il 
totalitarismo, 45ff. 
 
28 “Alcuno osserva che per una concezione esagerata della realtà fascista, la tendenza prevalente è quella 
della trasformazione totalitaria di ogni e qualsiasi forza morale, culturale, politica, religiosa in questa 
nuova concezione: "la fascista" [...] Occorre rinunciare allo spirito totalitario e riconoscere la necessità e 
le funzioni dei partiti [...] rimettere nella sua realtà libera e non alterata, la volontà popolare espressa nelle 
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opposite end of the spectrum from liberal, parliamentary, democracy (and from hybrid Church-
state models that accepted the fusion with the state). 
 Just as "individual rights" had gradually made its unlikely way into Catholic discourse in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the same fate was reserved for the term 
"totalitarianism." By the late 1920s, many continental Catholics -- perhaps thanks to Luigi 
Sturzo's early usage of the term -- had picked up the word for their own uses. They argued that 
only a re-energized Catholicism could curb the "totalitarian," hypertrophied, tendencies of many 
modern states keen on limiting Church influence.29 Turning the term's original usage on its 
head, some Catholics, like the aforementioned Vatican theologian Mariano Cordovani, argued 
that Fascist totalitarianism was in fact a modern variant of liberal democracy, claiming as it did 
that "nothing stands above the State," not even God or the Catholic Church.30 In line with these 
developments, in 1930 Pope Pius XI used the word "totalitarianism" for the first time in a papal 
document, in a widely publicized letter to the Italian Cardinal Schuster. The Pope asserted that a 
state which demands the allegiance of the "entirety of the citizen body," and presumes to control 
all "private domestic, spiritual and supernatural matters," is "totalitarian [and] a manifest 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
elezioni politiche.” Luigi Sturzo, “Spirito e Realtà,” La rivoluzione liberale, 22 January 1924. The article, 
which appeared in Piero Gobetti's liberal-democratic mouthpiece, aptly named La rivoluzione liberale, 
was extracted from Luigi Sturzo, Popolarismo e Fascismo (Turin: P. Gobetti, 1924), which was also 
published by Gobetti. 
 
29 The rise of anti-totalitarianism in European Catholic circles is discussed in James Chappel, "Slaying the 
Leviathan: Catholicism and the Rebirth of European Conservatism" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 
2012); Healan Gaston, "The Genesis of America’s Judeo-Christian Moment: Secularism, Totalitarianism 
and the Redefinition of Democracy" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 2008), chapter 2. 
 
30 "Si ammette generalmente che nulla è al di sopra dello Stato, nessuna limitazione può riconoscersi alla 
sua attività [...] Il liberalismo di ieri credette di non poter governare senza uno spunto di ostilità alla 
Chiesa; l'assolutismo di oggi, più intelligente, senza mutare profondamente le cose [...] misconosce la 
natura della Chiesa." Mariano Cordovani, “L’autorità sociale nella dottrina cattolica,” Atti della XI 
sessione delle ‘Settimane sociali d’Italia’ (Turin: Settimane sociali d'Italia, 1924), 53-70. Again, in 1928, 
Cordovani noted how Fascist "absolutism" drew its heritage from liberalism: “La storia viene ad 
insegnarci che la questione dei rapporti fra autorità e libertà non è nuova, e che se il liberalismo ha nel suo 
passivo molti peccati da espiare, l’assolutismo di tutti i tempi non si è dimostrato meno disastroso. La 
filosofia insegna che non si arriva alla verità ed alla giustizia passando da un eccesso all’altro: si può 
morire assiderati, come anche ustionati.” Idem, Cattolicesimo ed Idealismo (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 




monstrosity." "Fascism declares itself to be Catholic," Pius XI affirmed. "Well there is one way 
and one way only to do that: obey the Church and its head." 31  Referencing an earlier 
pronouncement, Pius XI noted that the totalitarian "conception of the state is not the same as 
the Catholic conception." Indeed, the totalitarian conception "turns the state into an end, and 
makes the citizen a means, monopolizing and absorbing him in the process."32 
 Angered by Mussolini's renewed attempts to limit the scope of Catholic Action, Pius XI 
again used the new language of anti-totalitarianism in a 1931 audience with French Catholic 
leaders. Fascism's self-proclaimed totalitarianism was sacrilegious, for "If there is a regime that 
is totalitarian, totalitarian in reality and according to the law, that is the regime of the Church." 
The reason for this was simple: "Man belongs wholly to the Church, and must belong wholly to 
it, insofar as he is a creature of God."  Thus, the Pope concluded, "the Church really has the right 
and duty to claim the totality of its power over individuals: every man in his entirety belongs to 
the Church, because in his entirety he belongs to God."33 In keeping with the central ideas of Ubi 
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31 "Per non parlare se non di quello che presentemente ci occupa, è troppo evidente che una totalitarietà di 
Regime e di Stato che voglia comprendere anche la vita soprannaturale, è una manifesta assurdità 
nell’ordine delle idee e sarebbe una vera mostruosità quando volesse portarsi nell’ordine pratico […] Il 
fascismo si dice e vuol essere cattolico: orbene per essere cattolici non di solo nome ma di fatto, per essere 
cattolici veri e buoni, e non cattolici di falso nome, e non di quelli che nella grande famiglia che è la Chiesa 
col loro modo di parlare e di agire affliggono il cuore della Madre e del Padre, contristano i fratelli e li 
fuorviano coi loro mali esempi, per tutto questo non c’è che un mezzo, uno solo, ma indispensabile e 
insurrogabile: ubbidire alla Chiesa ed al Suo Capo e sentire con la Chiesa e col Suo Capo.” Letter of Pius 
XI to Cardinal Schuster, Osservatore Romano, 26 April 1931. 
 
32 "Sembra che un'altra volta si riveli e si pronunci una concezione dello Stato che non può essere la 
concezione cattolica, mentre fa dello Stato il fine, e del cittadino, dell'uomo un mezzo, tutto in quello 
monopolizzando ed assorbendo." Pius XI, Allocution to the Secret Consistory regarding Catholic Action, 
Vatican City, December 20, 1926. As reprinted in Pio XI e l'Azione Cattolica, ed. A.M. Cavagna (Rome: 
Ferrari, 1928), 61-3. 
 
33 “La Chiesa propugna giusti rapporti tra [la] colletività [e] l’individuo…ci sono delle intenzioni occulte 
più gravi; e quelli che dicono: tutto alla collettività, dicono anche che la collettività è qualcosa di divino, e 
allora ecco l’individuo divinizzato…una specie di panteismo divinizzato…E in questo caso ci sarebbe una 
grande usurpazione, perché se c’è un regime totalitario – totalitario di fatto e di diritto – è il regime della 
Chiesa, perché l’uomo appartiene totalmente alla Chiesa, deve appartenerle, dato che l’uomo è la creatura 
del buon Dio…Allora la Chiesa ha veramente il diritto e il dovere di reclamare la totalità del suo potere 
sugli individui: ogni uomo tutto intero appartiene alla Chiesa, perché tutto intero appartiene a Dio.” Pius 
XI, “Alla Federazione francese dei sindacati cristiani,” 1931, Discorsi di Pio XI, ed. Domenico Bertetto 




arcano Dei and Quas primas, Pius XI asserted that the Vatican could claim dominion over 
Catholics far and wide -- something no other state had the right to limit or prohibit.  
 Hürth and Rabeneck fleshed out the connection between Catholic anti-totalitarianism 
and Catholic rights talk, in a second draft of the Syllabus of Errors text. This May 1935 draft 
defined in detail the meaning of "totalitarianism" (referred to interchangeably as "the total 
state" and "totalism"), by exploring what totalitarianism meant in theory and in practice. The 
text included analysis of "The Church and the Total State," "The Economic Order and the 
Totalitarian State,"  "Education of Youth," and "Political Life and the Totalitarian State." The 
same overarching definition of totalitarianism provided in March was repeated: "According to 
the totalitarian principle," the draft Syllabus noted, "the state has the total right and total 
powers [...] to control all things that in any way concern the life of men in society." 34 
 Under the subheading "The Individual and the Total State," totalitarianism's violation of 
individual rights was laid out in detail. In totalitarian regimes, the draft noted, "individual 
human beings and private associations of men are not thought to possess any rights prior to 
those granted to them by the state, either in virtue of divine law, or in virtue of natural law." 
Indeed, totalitarian regimes consider "the Supreme Pontiffs in error when they claim that 
human beings have rights that do not derive from the state, but rather from divine law and 
natural law."35  Wielding justifications such as these, totalitarian regimes violated individual !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 "DE TOTALISMO: Essentia Totalitatis. Statui ex principio totalitatis competit totale ius et totalis 
potestas, idest: ius extensione et comprehensione illimitatum et absolutum, quo omnia, quae quocumque 
modo hominum in societate civili consortium tangunt, tota et totaliter sibi subiecta habet." Section 
subheadings included "Ecclesia et Status Totalis"; "Ordo oeconomicus et Totalitas Status"; "Educatio 
iuventutis"; and "Vita politica et Totalitas Status." 1 May 1935 draft, as stored in “Elenchus Propositionum 
de Nationalismo, Stirpis cultu, Totalismo,” in “Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario: Relazione, Voto 
ed Elenco,” Suprema Sacra Congregazione del S. Offizio, July 1935, pp.16-27. ACDF, S.O., Rerum 
Variarum 1934, n.29, f.3. 
 
35 The section was entitled "Individuum et Totalitas Status." It noted: "Singulis hominibus hominumque 
societatibus privatis neque ex divina neque ex naturae iure ulla sunt iura quae habeant antecedenter ad 
Statum vel independenter ab eo, et quidem non solum, is ad iurium exercitium attenditur, sed etiam quod 
ad eorum originem et nudam existentiam attinet. Errarunt Summi Pontifices vindicando hominibus iura 
quae eis quoad eorum originem et substantiam non primo competant ex concessione Status, sed 




rights continuously. The draft thus went on to provide a long laundry list of the rights 
totalitarian regimes supposedly desecrated. To name a few: the text noted that totalitarian states 
stamp out the individual "right to life and the integrity of the body," by encouraging practices 
like eugenics. They violate "the right to procreate," via population control and forced 
sterilization measures, as well as "the right to educate children" in the Catholic faith, by limiting 
Catholic education in schools. They disturb "the right to association" -- that is, the right of the 
Catholic Church to "exercise full independence in civil society," through its work with Catholic 
Action. Finally, they desecrate "the right to true religion and to attain a supra-natural end," by 
hindering the Church in its mission to save souls and profess God's word.36 To be sure, the list 
was a bit of a hodgepodge, uniting the rights defended by the Vatican in concordats with liberal-
democratic rights laid out in foundational eighteenth-century French and American texts. But it 
nonetheless pointed to a larger development: the use of individual rights as the antithesis of 
totalitarianism, in the Vatican struggle against regimes deemed capable of diminishing its 
powers. 
 In May of 1935, precisely as the Secretariat on Atheism entered into operation and began 
publishing is journal, the Holy Office was nearing completion of the sweeping Syllabus of Errors. 
The Syllabus spent not a word on communism, focusing instead on how Fascism and Nazism 
espoused "totalitarian" worldviews that ran counter to Church teachings. In place of respecting 
the rule of the Vatican in civil society and in political matters, Fascism and Nazism sought 
"total" control over society. And in place of recognizing that individual rights derived from God, 
Fascism and Nazism claimed that these rights were invented by the state, and therefore that the 
state could arbitrarily take them away. The message regarding the pre-eminence of the Vatican !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 The laundry list of rights which totalitarian regimes violate reads as follows: "... inter alia: ius vitae et 
integritatis membrorum, ius verae religionis et finis supernaturalis; ius mediorum quae ad vitam sive 
naturalem sive supernaturalem necessaria sunt; praeterea, suppositis supponendis: ius connubii fertilis in 
eoque ius procreandae et educandae prolis, ius vitae coelibis, ius famae, ius proprietatis privatae, ius 





and its right to occupy public and private life was by now a staple of Vatican discourse, but the 
words that were being used to defend this claim, as well as the choice to target Nazism and 
Fascism, was new indeed. 
 
2. One Enemy Replaces Another: How Communism Became Totalitarian 
 
Though the draft Syllabus of Errors was ready to be published, work on it was stalled for over 
one year, at which point it was redeployed to condemn communism rather than Fascism and 
Nazism. The purpose of the action was twofold: first, to provide a theoretical underpinning for 
the Vatican's new campaign against the Soviet Union, and second, to clean up house, and make 
clear to clerics within the Vatican that the Soviet Union -- not Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy -- 
represented the greatest threat to the Vatican's survival. 
 The evidence suggests the Eugenio Pacelli and the Superior General of the Jesuits, 
Wladimir Ledóchowski, were primarily responsible for this outcome. Ledóchowski had received 
the final draft of the Holy Office Syllabus of Errors from Hürth and Rabeneck in July of 1935. He 
proceeded to sit on the project for a whole year, busying himself instead with getting the 
Secretariat on Atheism off to a good start. In April of 1936, three months before Franco's coup, 
and just as the elderly Pius XI fell ill, Ledóchowski and Pacelli resumed the stalled conversation 
on the Syllabus of Errors project. They urged two in-house experts they themselves appointed to 
comment on the draft. Both men promptly recommended that communism be added to the list 
of "totalitarian" heresies catalogued by the Holy Office's Syllabus of Errors. At the precisely the 
same time, Ledóchowski suggested to the Pope that it was urgent to draft an encyclical 
condemning "atheistic communism," given the Soviet Union's "ever-more intense propaganda," 
and the need for "Catholics and others to unite in a more energetic and better-organized 
resistance." "Your Holiness will pardon my boldness," Ledóchowski noted, adding that the 
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Jesuit order would happily contribute to the text's drafting.37 Pius XI agreed that drafting such 
an encyclical would be a good idea. Thus, Ledóchowski asked Joseph Ledit, the head of the 
Secretariat on Atheism, to draft an addendum to the Syllabus of Errors dedicated to the 
Bolshevik menace. Perhaps from the get-go, Ledóchowski hoped that this addendum would 
serve as the basis for an encyclical against communism. 38 
 Ledit's addendum to the Syllabus of Errors amounted to a cut and paste operation rather 
than to the construction of a new theoretical apparatus. In his first draft of the text, Ledit noted 
that communism, like Nazism and Fascism, was "totalitarian." It too deprived the Church of its 
rightful place in human society, and it too sought to control all aspects of human life. Most 
importantly, it too violated rights -- indeed, the very same rights which the Syllabus had accused 
Nazi-Fascism of violating. Communism trampled on the right to education, Ledit claimed, as 
well as the right to a religious marriage, the right to the priesthood, and the right to worship the 
Catholic religion.39 A junior cleric overwhelmed by the major responsibility of leading the 
Secretariat, Ledit most likely copied the work of Hürth and Rabeneck in the interest of time, 
rather than out of some more nefarious motive. Indeed, as the Vatican's anti-Soviet campaign 
picked up speed, with the victory of the Popular Front in France (in May), the start of the 
Spanish Civil War and of Nazi-Fascist arms shipments to Franco's troops (in July), Ledit -- who 
was no theologian -- had little time or interest in delving into theoretical reflections about the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 “La propaganda ateistica di Mosca diviene sempre più intensa [...] e sempre più abile e perfida, [e] molti 
si lasciano ingannare, i quali non cadrebbero nell’errore se sapessero tutta la verità. Una enciclica su 
questo argomento [...] inviterebbe non soltanto i cattolici ma anche altri a una più energica e meglio 
organizzata resistenza. Vostra Santità perdonerà il mio ardire e se credesse opportuno di scrivere una tale 
Enciclica credo che potremmo anche noi contribuire.” Next to this letter, Tardini wrote by hand “prima 
idea per l’enciclica del comunismo.” Ledóchowski to Pius XI, 1 April 1936. ASV, AES, Stati Ecclesiastici, 
pos.548, f.577, Enciclica Divini Redemptoris. 
 
38 See "Voto del P. Gillet, Consultore," in "Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario," April 1936, pp.1-3. 
ACDF, S.O., Rerum Variarum 1934, n.29, f.4; and “Voto del Mons. Tardini, Consultore,” in 
“Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario,” 20 April 1936, pp.6-11. ACDF, S.O., Rerum Variarum 1934, 
n.29, f.4. 
 
39 Joseph Ledit, “Nota d’Ufficio,” in “Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario,” Suprema Sacra 




communist menace: more pressing tasks were upon him. Indeed, per Ledóchowski's request, 
Ledit was using his connection to the Holy Office to help the Vatican step up its activities against 
the Soviet Union.40 Perhaps it was his advice that encouraged Holy Office clerics to place several 
Catholic journals with presumed communist sympathies on the Index of Forbidden Books, and 
force other left-leaning Catholic publications to cease operation -- something that also much 
delighted the Fascist secret police.41 Certainly, Ledit and Ledóchowski were not unhappy with 
the fact that by the fall of 1936, the Holy Office had thus begun morphing into an internal anti-
communist surveillance mechanism.  
 By fall of 1936, the Holy Office had also completed its new Syllabus of Errors, which was 
characterized by a thorough theological exposition of the underlying similarities between Nazi, 
Fascist and communist worldviews, all of which were branded totalitarian violators of individual 
rights. Complete with corrected footnotes and citation pages, the project seemed complete. All 
told, it had mobilized over a dozen theologians, and taken four years of hard work. Hürth and 
Rabeneck, we can surmise, must have been pleased with the final product. 
 But despite its impressive and coherent content, the Syllabus of Errors never saw the 
light of day -- at least in the form in which it was originally intended. In late 1936, Pius XI fell ill 
once again, this time more seriously. Until his death, the Pope would be forced to carry on his 
leadership duties from his bedside -- something which in practice meant that he delegated more !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 The Soviets began sending aid and organizing military brigades in mid-September, 1936. 
 
41 In June of 1936, the French journal Terre nouvelle was placed in the Index of Forbidden Books, and a 
decree was appended warning Catholics against communists and fellow travelers (cum comunismi 
asseclis). The Holy Office also forced Sept to close its doors in August of 1937, and issued a stern warning 
to L’Aube. For the Holy Office proceedings, see ACDF, R.V. 1938, n.1, 187/1937, doc.n.8, 10 May 1937. For 
the response of the Fascist secret police, see Anonymous secret police note, Rome, 25 Nov 1936. ACS, MI, 
DGPS, DPP, fascicoli per materia, b.146, fasc. “Comunismo e Chiesa Cattolica, 1936-8.”  
On the Holy Office injunctions against left-wing Catholic journalism from July of 1936, see Françoise 
Mayeur, L’Aube: étude d’un journal d’opinion (1932-1940) (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966); Agnès Rochefort-
Turquin, Terre nouvelle: organe des chrétiens révolutionnaires pendant le Front populaire, 1935-1939 
(Paris: Éd. De l’EHESS, 1983); Aline Coutrot, Un courant de pensée catholique: L’hebdomadaire Sept 
(mars 1934-août 1936) (Paris: Cerf, 1960); Magali Della Sudda, “La suppression de l’hebdomadaire 





and more power to his trusted Secretary of State, Eugenio Pacelli, and to the Superior General of 
the Jesuits, Wladimir Ledóchowski. Most likely due to the influence of these two men, the Holy 
Office project once again gathered dust, as it had between July of 1935 and April of 1936, and its 
transfer to the printing press was stalled for over a year. At last, in November of 1936, the 
Cardinal Assessor of the Holy Office received the cryptic news that the Pope was going to "do 
something" about the draft Syllabus, independent from the Holy Office.42 In March of 1937, the 
Pope informed the Holy Office that the publication of the draft Syllabus of Errors should be 
postponed until after the publication of an encyclical "in preparation."43 By mid March, the 
contents of the project were revealed. 
 In place of the ambitious Syllabus of Errors, Pius XI issued three encyclicals for global 
consumption, in March of 1937: one on Nazi Germany (March 14), a second on the Soviet Union 
(March 19), and a third on Mexico (March 28). Though bits and pieces of the Syllabus of Errors 
made it into the encyclicals and into a 1938 set of instructions the Pope quietly sent to the 
rectors of Catholic universities and seminars, the original structure of the text was lost -- 
something Holy Office employees themselves noted with displeasure.44 In 1940, the entire draft 
of the Holy Office draft Syllabus of Errors was shipped from Vatican City to the United States, 
perhaps in an attempt to conceal that such a daring project had ever been undertaken in the first 
place.45 
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42  “Sua Santità ha dichiarato che da parte sua farà qualche cosa; intanto il S.Offizio prepari il suo Atto in 
forma di Istruzione o Decreto e condanne.” Ottaviani’s notes from his 19 November 1936 Audience with 
the Pope. ACDF, ACTA C.G. 1936. 
 
43 “Dilata post publicationem Enciclicae quae est in praeparatione,” 17 March 1937. ACDF ACTA C.G. 
1937. 
 
44  “De Communismo,” in “Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario,” Suprema Sacra Congregazione del S. 
Offizio, March 1937, pp.13-22. ACDF, S.O., Rerum Variarum 1934, n.29, f.16. 
 
45 The final meeting of the Holy Office Cardinals dedicated to the draft Syllabus of Errors would take place 
on 2 June 1937. The fact that the report was “Mandato in America nel 1940” is written on the cover sheet 




 In the main, scholars have both neglected to connect the triple encyclical to the failed 
Holy Office project, and to see the three texts as intimately interlinked. Instead, they have 
devoted the lion's share of attention to Pius XI's encyclical on Germany, in the attempt to argue 
that the Pope was pro-Nazi or anti-Nazi. However, according to a contemporary observer of the 
Pope (the French Cardinal Alfred Baudrillart), even “in the moment of his worse sufferings,” 
when "he could not sleep, the bed-ridden Pope "would think of the three encyclicals that he 
wanted to write." First, Baudrillart noted in a diary entry in 1937, Pius XI "planned them 
mentally." "Then he had others read to him and deliver news; sometimes, he would dictate his 
thoughts on them aloud. And this is how the oeuvre was prepared." 46 To be sure, Baudrillart 
exaggerated the extent to which Pius XI directly controlled the encyclicals, which the archives 
clearly demonstrate were written which the substantial assistance of clerics such as Joseph Ledit 
(the head of the Secretariat on Atheism), Friedrich Muckermann (an influential German Jesuit 
also employed by the Secretariat), the Austrian Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, and, of course, 
Eugenio Pacelli himself. But what he did not misrepresent was the extent to which the three 
encyclicals were part of a single Vatican diplomatic platform, and one that the Pope had 
endorsed. The platform asserted that concordat partners must be retained as allies, while the 
Soviet Union must be condemned, both due to its heretical theories and to its violent practices, 
which must be brought to an end, if necessary, through war. 
 This platform was also commented upon by the editor-in-chief of the semi-official organ 
of the Vatican, Civiltà Cattolica, in an article personally approved by Eugenio Pacelli. In May of 
1937, the Enrico De Rosa wrote that the three encyclicals were part of “a whole positive and 
practical ‘program’ of Christian social restoration.” This “program,” the Jesuit editor-in-chief 
explained, “essentially and by definition touches on the religious and supernatural order,” as !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 “Anche nel momento delle sue peggiori sofferenze, quando si placavano, se non poteva dormire, si 
sentiva in riposo con il cervello attivo. Allora pensava alle tre encicliche che voleva scrivere. Le elaborava 
mentalmente, poi si faceva leggere e s’informava; a volte dettava. E così si preparava l’opera.” 
 Les Carnets du cardinal Alfred Baudrillart, vol.1:  20 novembre 1935-11 avril 1939, ed. Paul Christophe 




well as on “domestic and civil society.” It seeks to “promote, reinvigorate and perfect” 
civilization as a whole, by making that civilization more Christian. Accordingly, the Pope's 
encyclicals emphasized that Godless Bolsheviks were "those ‘enemies of God and Jesus Christ’ 
deplored by the Pope.” “Able to pull together a large number of fearful men in their ranks,” 
Bolsheviks had tricked them into participating “in the de-Christianization of peoples.” This was 
true not only in the Soviet Union, but also in Mexico and Spain – countries, that is, “which owe 
to the Catholic religion their greatest glories.” Indeed, the Soviet Union waged its battle against 
the Vatican precisely in Catholic strongholds – a fact used to underline both the existential 
nature of the communist-Catholic conflict and the degree of danger posed. Nazi Germany, by 
way of comparison, posed a much less extreme problem. 47 
 
3. Declaring War on Foes and Mending Matters with Friends 
 
Though forging a reply to Nazi Germany had been the genesis of the Holy Office project, the 
encyclical on Germany was put together last (starting from January of 1937), while the texts on 
the Soviet Union and on communist presence in Mexico were in the making since April and 
December of 1936. While Eugenio Pacelli was the key figure responsible for putting together the 
encyclicals on Germany and the Mexico, the central person who helped draft the encyclical on 
the Soviet Union was Joseph Ledit, the head of the Jesuit Secretariat on Atheism. Small wonder 
that the core theoretical precepts put forward in the encyclical resonated with the anti-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 “[Le encicliche rappresentano]…tutto un ‘programma’ positivo e pratico di cristiana restaurazione 
sociale. Questo programma, senza dubbio, riguarda essenzialmente e per principio l’ordine religioso e 
soprannaturale [...] ed anche la società domestica e civile […] Si estende altresì all’ordine materiale, alla 
prosperità stessa terrena, ossia a quella civiltà naturale ed umana, che dalla civiltà cristiana non è 
soppressa o attenuata, è anzi promossa, rinvigorita e perfezionata. Il che per l’appunto è disconosciuto da 
quei ‘nemici di Dio e di Gesù Cristo’ che il Papa deplora [...] che sono riusciti a tirare gran numero di 
tiepidi e paurosi nelle loro file, inducendoli a cooperare […] allo scristianeggiamento di un popolo che 
deve alla religione cattolica le sue glorie più belle.”  Enrico De Rosa, “l’Enciclica sul Messico e l’opera della 
ristaurazione sociale,” Civiltà cattolica (mid May 1937). Stored with hand-written corrections (with a 
stamp from the Segreteria di Stato – Rapporti con gli stati) in ASV, AES Messico (4° periodo), 1937-1939, 




totalitarian, rights-based, attacks, which Hürth and Rabeneck had originally used to condemn 
Nazism and Fascism, and which Ledit had by and large recapitulated in his addendum on 
communism for the Holy Office. 
 When the encyclical on the Soviet Union was issued in mid March of 1937 under the title 
Divini Redemptoris, it bore so many similarities to the draft Syllabus of Errors that Holy Office 
members painstakingly took note of them, via a line-by-line comparison.48 Like the draft 
Syllabus of Errors, Divini Redemptoris depended on the rhetorical juxtaposition of individual 
rights (mentioned on no fewer than twelve occasions) and totalitarianism, which violated these 
rights at whim. The encyclical highlighted that it was wrong for the Soviet Union “to defraud 
man of his God-granted rights,” and “systematically void these rights by making their use 
impossible.” Like the draft Syllabus of Errors, it provided a laundry list of the rights the Soviet 
Union violated, which included the right to private property, the right to marriage and the right 
to education. Referencing the notion of a totalitarian state that sacrifices the individual to attain 
its own ends, the text noted that in the Soviet Union, “there is no recognition of any right of the 
individual in his relations to the collectivity." Indeed, “no natural right is accorded to human 
personality, which is a mere cog-wheel in the Communist system.49 
 The encyclical further emphasized that the Vatican was capable of countering the 
"collectivistic terrorism" embodied by the Soviet Union. This was because the Vatican possessed 
a strong ideology, which provided a positive, Catholic, alternative to the "most atrocious 
barbarity" of communism. It cared deeply about justice and the common good, and was a voice 
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48 In late March of 1937, the Holy Office compiled an elaborate document which demonstrated the line-
by-line overlap of the Holy Office document and Divini Redemptoris. “De Communismo,” in 
“Nazionalismo, razzismo, stato totalitario,” Suprema Sacra Congregazione del S. Offizio, March 1937, 
pp.13-22. ACDF, S.O., Rerum Variarum 1934, n.29, f.16. 
 
49 Pius XI, Divini Redemptoris (19 March 1937), §10; §11; §28; §30; §50. All citations are drawn from the 
official English-language translation of the encyclical, available on the Holy See website, Encyclicals -- 
Pius XI -- The Holy See -- The Holy Father, 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19031937_divini-




for individual rights. Indeed, the “divine and human rights” violated by the Soviet Union, the 
text noted, were precisely those “on which Sacred Scriptures and the Fathers of the Church 
insist so often.” In conclusion, the text noted, it was "with good reason [that] outstanding 
statesmen have asserted that, after a study of various social systems, they have found nothing 
sounder than the principles expounded in the encyclicals." In short, there was nothing better to 
lead "Catholic and non-Christian countries" than "the social doctrine of the Church."50  
 In addition to having ideas capable of winning over the masses, the encyclical noted, the 
Vatican was capable of countering the Soviet Union because it had the practical capacity to do 
so. True, the Soviet Union was actively attempting to expand its influence far and wide, 
"directing the struggle against Christian civilization" not only "in Mexico and now and Spain," 
but even farther afield. Presenting the Vatican's misinterpretation of current events as a self-
evident fact, the encyclical affirmed that Soviet-led revolution "has actually broken out or 
threatens everywhere, and exceeds in amplitude and violence anything yet experienced." But 
despite these grave geopolitical threats, the encyclical noted, the Vatican was up to the 
challenge. After all, it too was endowed with transnational influence. Via the Secretariat on 
Atheism, the Vatican could respond to the Soviets' "truly diabolical" propaganda, which was 
"directed from one common center," and "shrewdly adapted to the varying conditions of diverse 
peoples." Indeed, the Vatican wielded influence in the press, motion pictures, radio programs, 
schools and universities. Furthermore, the Vatican had a network of tightly allied partner states. 
Thus, the Vatican's Catholic International could counter the Communist International and rival 
the Soviet Union's "great financial resources, gigantic organizations, and international 
congresses."51 
 Divini Redemptoris thus constituted a very important component of the manufacture of 
consent to the Vatican anti-Soviet campaign. The encyclical explained, celebrated and tacitly !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Ibid., §17; §20; §22; §33; §35-6; §46. 
 
51 Ibid., §2; §15; §17; §19; §22; §57. 
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imposed the Vatican's turn against the Soviet Union on the Catholic and non-Catholic world. 
Using very strong language, it claimed that Moscow stood at the head of a global war against 
"civilization," that sought to advance a dangerous, sacrilegious, political ideology. The Soviet 
Union, it asserted, posed a great threat to world peace. To the communist declaration of war on 
"all that is called God," it stood to reason that only Christ's vicar on earth, the Pope, had a lasting 
reply. Indeed, the Vatican was capable of rivaling the Soviet Union's wealth, strength, and 
theoretical sophistication, countering communism's "false principles" in a theoretical sense, and 
stemming the spread of communism through the practical actions of its anti-Soviet campaign.52  
 By asserting with no hesitation that the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to world 
peace, Divini Redemptoris implicitly prepared the Catholic world for Firmissimam 
Constantiam, the encyclical sanctioning a violent response to communist penetration in Mexico. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Eugenio Pacelli had defended the notion that Soviets were 
plotting a communist revolution in Mexico from c.1932. As the 1930s wore on, this conviction 
grew stronger, under the influence of local clerics, Vatican officials, and American Jesuits. By 
1935-6, increasing numbers of reports that reached the Vatican Secretary of State claimed that 
many "authentic Russians" were taking over Mexican government offices. "There [is] absolutely 
no doubt," a correspondent informed Pacelli, "that the ultimate aim of the [Mexican] 
government is to create a new communist generation."53  Similarly, pamphlets written by 
American Jesuits "greatly contributed to enlightening public opinion on the danger of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Ibid., §2; §7; §22. 
 
53 “Je puis affirmer avec certitude que les principaux membres qui composent le ministère de l’Instruction 
publique sont des Russes authentiques venus de Russie, et qui ne se cachent pas pour dire que 
l’expérience qu’ils sont en train de tenter à Mexico réussira mieux encore qu’en Russie [...] Il n’y a aucun 
doute que le but absolu du gouvernement, c’est de former une génération communiste.” Father Alba, “Pro 
Memoria,” March 1936. Underlining in the original. ARSI, Registro-Allegata, Epistolae ad Romanam 




communist penetration in Mexico," as the Jesuit Secretariat on Atheism put it. 54  (These 
pamphlets were, per the Pope's direct request, promptly translated and distributed in extracted 
form to European newspapers.55)  
 Given these mounting pressures, Pacelli decided to undertake a trip in the fall of 1936 to 
the United States, to cultivate a burgeoning friendship with the U.S. government and convince it 
of the Soviet enemy at the gates, as well as to meet with several high-ranking members of the 
Mexican hierarchy. These clerics, much to Pacelli's initial surprise, sought papal support for the 
use of violence to fend off the supposedly imminent Soviet take-over. In place of Catholic Action, 
they affirmed, what was needed was "Civic Action," defined as the same "liberty of action against 
communism" accorded "to Spanish Catholics": that is, "armed defense."56 In the words of a 
Mexican Bishop: "Faced with the danger of communism and the fear that its deeds succeed, 
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54 "[Ils] ont beaucoup contribué à éclairer l'opinion publique américaine sur le danger que la pénétration 
communiste au Mexique constituait pour la tranquillité des Etats-Unis." Summary of Jesuit pamphlets on 
Mexico, in Lettres de Rome 4 (March 1936): 63-4.  
 
55 For instance, with regard to one of these pamphlets -- Michael Kenny, No God Next Door: Red Rule in 
Mexico and Our Responsibility (New York: William J. Hirten Co., 1935) -- the Pope noted: "[Il Santo 
Padre] si è assai compiaciuto del lavoro del P. Kenny SJ e pensa che si potrebbe fare qualche recensione 
od estratto per i giornali europei." Letter of Pizzardo to Ledóchowski, Vatican City, 20 November 1935. 
ARSI, Documenta, 1020: Congregat. Romanae, 1935-6, fasc.XIII, Secr. Status Privata; for Ledóchowski 
prompt response, promising action in this sense, see Letter of Ledóchowsky to Pizzardo, 28 Nov 1935. 
ARSI, Registro – Epistolae, Apud Curiae Romanae, 1935-7, ff.159. 
 
56 From Pacelli's summary of the meeting for the Pope: "La Comissione Messicana [ritiene] che l’Azione 
Cattolica sia un mezzo insufficiente per il bene della religione oppressa e che perciò deve essere integrata 
dall’Azione civica, per la quale richiedono benedizioni dalla Santa Sede etc. [...] Se s'intende l'Azione civica 
desiderata dai detti messicani allora si sdrucciola nella Difesa Armata." Pacelli, “Messico: Comissione 
Messicana diretta dal Vescovo di Chiapas,” 14 Dec 1936, ASV, AES Messico (quarto periodo), 1936, 
pos.590, fasc.388, ff.13-16.  From a memorandum for Pacelli from Mexican clergy: “Que las autoridades 
eclesiasticas dejen a los laicos en plena libertad de acción en nuestra lucha contra el comunismo para 
salvar nuestra sociedad, para defender nuestros hijos, nuestras familias, nuestros derechos naturales 
primarios, la civilización misma[...] En una palabra, que se nos deje en la misma libertad que los católicos 
españoles.” Next to this, Pacelli writes, “Difesa armata!” Underlining in the original. “Cuestion Civica” 





everyone understands that it is necessary to be ready to defeat force with force, and that this 
defense is legitimate."57  
 Pacelli rushed the message back to Rome, and by December of 1936, the Vatican 
Secretariat of State, in collaboration with Mexican clerics and Father Wladimir Ledóchowski, 
had begun the project of writing an encyclical on Mexico, to respond to the Mexican request. 
Picking up where Divini Redemptoris left off, the draft encyclical on Mexico noted that armed 
revolt against atheistic communism was legitimate when "individual rights" were being violated.  
 The hardline endorsement of armed revolt was facilitated by Pacelli and Ledóchowski's 
ability to triumph over the Pope's more nuanced position. In early March of 1937, Pius XI had 
added a passage to the encyclical encouraging Mexican Catholics to avoid "certain abuses of 
Armed Defense," which had taken place during the Cristero wars. These included the Cristeros' 
renown willingness to "kill and mutilate teachers, chop off ears, rape [women] and pillage, all 
the while crying out: 'Long Live Christ the King!'" In his notes on Pius XI's additions, 
Ledóchowski decided that the Pope's recommendations needed "to be mitigated." Thus, the 
Secretary General of the Jesuits proposed that in place of this list of atrocities, which cast doubt 
on the wisdom of armed revolt and the probity of the Cristeros, the encyclical should simply 
"keep to more general language."58 It was Ledóchowski's recommendations that would be 
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57 “Los hechos desarollados en España y las horibles matanzas de Sacerdotes, Religiosos y Religiosas, 
hombres, mujeres y niños, han despertado el deseo de hacer algo parecido en México y se cree que esto no 
ha de tardar mucho tiempo. Es cuestión de meses unicamente. En este estado de cosas, los católicos 
mexicanos y la gente de orden desean estar prevenidos para evitar una hecatombe: esperan [...] poder 
organizar una defensa armada, no católica sino derechista [...] Ante el peligro del comunismo y el temor 
que se desarrollen en México sucesos como los de España, todos comprenden que es necessario 
prepararse para rechazar la fuerza con la fuerza y que esta defensa es legítima.” Letter to Pacelli from 
Gerardo, Bishop of Chiapas, New York, 8 November 1936. Underlining, most likely by Pacelli, in the 
original. Ibid., ff.17-20.  
 
58 Instead of stating, as the Pope suggested, “I principii qui ricordati hanno lo scopo di impedire alcuni 
abusi della Difesa Armata, come quelli di uccidere o mutilare i maestri, mozzando loro le orecchi, violeare 
le maestre, darsi al saccheggio unendo al grido W Cristo Re, quello di M. Calles, ecc,” Ledochowski 
suggests: “forse [...] si potrebbe un po’ mitigare omettendo [gli] 'atti di crudeltà' e tenendosi più 'al 
generale.'" Letter from Ledochowski to Pizzardo, Rome, 9 March 1937. ASV, AES Messico (4° periodo), 




incorporated in the encyclical's final version, which considerably downplayed the potential 
excesses of armed revolt, and avoided any list of atrocities, like that supplied by the Pope.59 
 When Firmissimam Constantiam was published in March of 1937 as part of the 
Vatican's new diplomatic turn against the Soviet Union, the encyclical justified recourse to 
armed resistance noting that, “it is quite natural that when the most elementary religious and 
civil liberties are attacked, Catholic citizens do not resign themselves passively to renouncing 
these liberties.” Referencing Catholic just war theories, the text affirmed that the armed revolt of 
Catholics must be “licit” and waged through acts that were “not intrinsically evil.” Furthermore, 
these acts should have “reason [ratio] of means,” be “proportionate to the end” they sought to 
achieve, and “not cause the community greater damages than those they seek to repair.”60 These 
were, in sum, the conditions of just war. Leaning heavily on negative and passive constructions, 
the text indeed asserted that, 
It is not to be seen how citizens are to be condemned who unite to defend themselves and 
the nation, by licit and appropriate means, against those who make use of public power to 
bring it to ruin.61  
 
Despite the text's perhaps intentionally evasive language, the endorsement of violence was clear. 
Furthermore, as was the case with Divini Redemptoris, the Mexican encyclical effectively 
silenced dissident voices within the Vatican. This time, the voices worried that a justification of 
armed revolt was a renunciation of the Church’s tradition of pacifism, and might be interpreted 
as an “exhortation to revolt.”62 The decision for when and how to publish Firmissimam 
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59 See the new version, integrating Ledóchowski’s edits, in ASV, AES Messico (4° periodo), 1937, pos.591 
P.O., fasc.388, ff.55. 
 
60  Pius XI, Firmissimam Constantiam (28 March 1937), §26-7. The official English-language translation 
can be consulted online, at <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xi_enc_19370328_firmissimam-constantiam_en.html>. Last accessed on March 24, 2012.  
 
61 Ibid., §28. 
 
62 For instance, the minutante of the Secretariat of State, Mons. Antonio Colonna, noted diplomatically, 
“Circa la difesa armata della quale il Santo Padre vuole che si parli [...] Mi pare che sarebbe meglio far 
innanzitutto rilevare che se si seguissero i dettami della Chiesa insegnati per mezzo dell’Azione Cattolica, i 
cattolici sarebbero educati alla resistenza passiva, dinanzi alla quale qualunque tiranno deve cedere senza 
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Constantiam exacerbated some of these worries. Indeed, the text was released on Easter day of 
1937 (March 28th), thus making the papal recommendation of just war coincide with the most 
important festival of the liturgical year. In the United States, clerics already mobilized around 
the Mexican issue exulted. The mainstream non-Catholic American press, on the other hand, 
simply asserted that the encyclical “lamented the spread of atheism and communism." 
According to the Vatican nuncio in Washington, DC, American journalists had quite possibly 
failed to grasp the import of the encyclical’s core message, insofar as their articles “made no 
particular reference to the extremely delicate point, that of armed resistance.” 63  
 When Firmissimam Constantiam was published in Mexico, it was paired in a two-cent 
pamphlet with Divini Redemptoris. The cheap package made clear that the theoretical and 
geopolitical condemnation of communism undergirded the Vatican's recommendation to resist 
"Soviet" emissaries with force in Mexico.64 The third text issued in March of 1937 -- on Nazi 
Germany -- was not included in the pamphlet, must likely because this text was more narrowly 
directed at a German audience, and did not seek to mobilized a global Catholic citizenry against 
Nazism. Instead, Mit Brennender Sorge sought to remind German officials of the importance of 
keeping to the terms of the concordat they had signed with Vatican diplomats in 1933.  
 Eugenio Pacelli and Cardinal Michael von Faulhaber, an Austrian cleric whom Pacelli 
had befriended during his time in Bavaria, drafted the encyclical on Germany. Like Pacelli, 
Faulhaber was convinced that communism, not Nazism, represented the greatest threat to the 
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difese armate, che è difficile che non eccedano […] Se non si espongono questi concetti la lettera pontificia 
verrà interpretata (sia pure a torto) come un eccitamento alla ribellione. Bisogna tener a mente che si 
parla a teste calde!”  ASV, AES Messico (quarto periodo), 1937, pos.591 P.O., fasc.388, ff.58. 
 
63 “Si capisce che il Papa vuole lamentare la diffusione dell’ateismo e del comunismo e denunciare il 
pericolo che tali dottrine si diffondano in altre nazioni dell’America Latina […] Non ho trovato alcun 
accenno particolare ad un punto assai delicato, quello della difesa armata.” “Per notizia: la stampa nord 
Americana non cattolica e l’enciclica Firmissimam. Letter of Amleto Cicognani, U.S. Nunzio, to Pizzardo, 
29-30 March 1937. Ibid., ff.89-90. 
 




survival of Christian civilization.65 Pacelli tightly controlled the process of putting together the 
encyclical, despite the fact that the push for issuing the text came from within the German 
hierarchy and perhaps from the Pope himself. In stark contrast to the spirit of both the other 
1937 encyclicals and the draft Syllabus of Errors, Pacelli informed Faulhaber that the encyclical 
on Nazi Germany should “avoid polemic.” Furthermore, unlike the Holy Office project, the 
encyclical should steer clear of any mention of Nazism or specific Nazi texts, and avoid branding 
Nazism as heretical. Rather, Mit Brennender Sorge should try to restore cordial relations with 
the German state and guarantee the protection of the concordat.66 
 Faulhaber closely followed Pacelli's recommendations, and when Mit Brennender Sorge 
was issued in mid March of 1937, the text presented itself as an attempt to restore an agreement 
that united two now-bickering friends. Though rights were discussed, primary emphasis was 
placed on “rights guaranteed by a treaty,” namely, the concordat.67 Unlike Divini Redemptoris, 
which argued that communism was inherently a rights-violating ideology, Mit Brennender 
Sorge limited itself to a protest of "violations of the treaty." 68  And unlike Firmissimam 
Constantiam and Divini Redemptoris, which were translated into many languages and received 
a wide audience, the consumption of the German-language Mit Brennender Sorge was largely 
limited to a single nation-state. For Reinhold Niebuhr, the triple encyclical was proof positive of 
a dangerous new turn for the papacy, whose actions in the preceding decade he had endorsed. 
"It is becoming daily more apparent," he wrote, "that the Catholic Church has cast its lot with !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 ASV, AES Germania, quarto period, pos.719, fasc.314, ff.5-6. Wolf, Pope and Devil, 265-6; Chenaux, Pie 
XII, 196. 
 
66 Akten Kardinal Michael von Faulhabers 1917-1952, ed. Ludwig Volk  (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-
Verlag, 1975-2002), II: 28. As cited in Godman, Hitler and the Vatican, 142-3. Also see Angelo Martini, “Il 
cardinale Faulhaber e l’enciclica Mit brennender Sorge,” Archivum Historiae Pontificiae vol. II (1964): 
303-320. 
 
67 Mit Brennender Sorge (14 March 1937), §5.  Official English-language translation, available online at: 
<http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_14031937_mit-
brennender-sorge_en.html>. Last accessed 3 August 2012. 
 
68 The Encyclical only mentioned the fact that “Catholics have a right to their children’s Catholic 




Fascist politics."69 As a dismayed British Catholic publicist noted, accidentally referencing the 
keyword of the failed Holy Office project, 
With considerable skill, the extravagances of German Nazi doctrine are picked out for 
condemnation in a way that would not involve the condemnation of political and social 
Totalitarianism.70  
 
The fact that Mit Brennender Sorge skirted strong theological claims was something Pacelli 
himself openly admitted in an article authored for the Osservatore Romano soon after the 
publication of the triple encyclical. The three encyclicals -- he stated -- together taught that 
communism was irreconcilable with Christianity, and that communism was unquestionably 
worse that Nazism, which could still “save itself” by returning to Jesus Christ.71 Immediately 
following the publication of Mit Brennender Sorge, Pacelli also dashed off a conciliatory note to 
the German Ambassador to the Vatican, Diego von Bergen, assuring that friendly relations could 
doubtless be restored. Going directly against the strong criticism of Nazism foregrounded by the 
draft Syllabus of Errors, Pacelli noted that the Vatican would never dare "interfere in the 
question of what concrete form of government a certain people chooses," nor in what political 
ideology governments professed.72 In other words, brandishing Catholic anti-totalitarianism 
against Nazi Germany was a move Pacelli could not endorse. 
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69 Reinhold Niebuhr, “The Catholic Heresy,” Christian Century 54 (8 December 1937): 1524. As reprinted 
in D.B. Robertson, ed., Essays in Applied Christianity (New York: Living Age, 1959), 207. On Niebuhr’s 
earlier sympathies with the Catholic Church (and his celebration of medieval Catholicism “as a communal 
and authoritarian foil to the individualistic and libertarian tendies of American Protestant thought”), and 
his later differentiated reaction to the institutional Church (which he now considered pro-Fascist) and 
liberal Catholicism (espoused by figures such as Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson), see Richard 
Wightman Fox, Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985), 148ff. 
 
70 Michael de la Bedoyère, Christian Crisis (London: The Catholic Book Club, 1940), 100. Bedoyère edited 
London's Catholic Herald from 1934 to 1962. 
 
71 "Dopo il Congresso di Norimberga," Osservatore Romano (15 September 1937). 
 
72 Pacelli to Bergen, 30 April 1937. Documents on German Foreign Policy: 1918-1945, Series D, Volume I 
(Washington: Department of State, 1953), doc.649, 964-5. As cited in Guenter Lewy, The Catholic Church 






By the latter half of the 1930s, the Vatican's concordat diplomacy, integration of civil society, 
and strong anti-Soviet campaign had won it recognition as an important actor on the 
international stage. Thanks to the strenuous efforts of the Vatican Secretariat of State and the 
Jesuit order, Vatican anticommunism had successfully trumped other possible diplomatic 
undertakings and other theologically warranted ways of legitimizing these undertakings. 
Institutionalized by the Secretariat on Atheism and provided with a justificatory framework by 
the 1937 triple encyclical, the Vatican anticommunist campaign had successfully shifted 
attention away from other enemies, all the while turning Catholic anti-totalitarian criticism of 
these movements to new ends. 
 As the Vatican oriented itself completely against the Soviet Union, it brought much of the 
Catholic world along with it. Following the March 1937 triple encyclical, American and 
European Catholic publications underwent a visible shift, concerning themselves more with 
daily geopolitical affairs, and siding decidedly with Franco's troops in the ensuing Spanish Civil 
War. The call to take up arms against communists was echoed in the British Catholic press,73 in 
a “Cathechism on Atheistic Communism” jointly drafted by Italian Catholic Action and the 
Jesuit Civiltà Cattolica,74 and during the First International Congress of Christ the King, held in 
Poland in the June of 1937.75 In Spain, for evident reasons, the tie with the Vatican was notably 
strengthened, and many of Franco's supporters increasingly agreed with the Pope that the battle 
of the moment was one between Catholicism and communism. Franco's Nacionales claimed !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 See, e.g., Douglas Jerrold’s coverage of the Spanish Civil War in The Nineteenth Century, in early April 
of 1937. As cited in Herbert Rudledge Southworth, Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War: The 
Brainwashing of Francisco Franco (London: Routledge, 2002), 5; 10-16. 
 
74 The catechism was published under the title Tenebre di errore e luce di verità: contro il comunismo, 
and was issued by the editor-in-chief of Civiltà Cattolica, Father Enrico Rosa. The booklet – which sold at 
0,50 lire a copy – was extensively advertised in the 1938 issues of the Bollettino Ufficiale dell’Azione 
Cattolica. 
 
75 Father Muckermann, “Le Congres de Poznan,” Lettres de Rome (15 June 1937): 184-6. 
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Catholicism rather than fascism as their leading cause, Catholicism as their chief source of 
emotional and ideological sustenance, and Catholicism vs. communism as Spain's ultimate 
choice. No matter that communists were by no means dominant in the anti-Franco struggle, 
insofar as they were far outnumbered by anarcho-syndicalist and socialist groups. The Vatican's 
anticommunist campaign, and the need to quickly name enemies and construct wartime 
propaganda, increasingly encouraged the Nacionales to point the finger directly at Moscow, and 
its "Communist International," which they juxtaposed with the "Catholic International," based 
in Vatican City.76 Indeed, Franco's men saw clearly that Vatican support was crucial to the 
efforts, as evidenced by their repeated attempts to petition to the Pope via various channels to 
provide forceful and frequent endorsements of their cause.77 
 Given this context, most onlookers found it unsurprising that the Vatican moved quickly 
to send a papal representative to the Burgos government, and became the first among the major 
powers not militarily allied with Franco to grant the post-coup Spain official diplomatic 
recognition (in May of 1938). Negotiations between the Vatican and Spain promptly got 
underway, in a bid to bring concordat diplomacy to this European outpost as well.78 In the 
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76 For an introduction to how Catholicism mobilized Franco's supporters, see Stanley G. Payne, Franco 
and Hitler: Spain, Germany and World War II (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 5-13, and 
passim; Mary Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic: Religion and Politics in Salamanca, 
1930-1936 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); José M. Sánchez, The Spanish Civil War as a 
Religious Tragedy (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987); Sid Lowe, Catholicism, 
War and the Foundation of Francoism: The Juventud de Acción Popular in Spain, 1931-1939 (Brighton: 
Sussex Academic Press, 2010); Hilario M. Raguer Suñer, Gunpowder and Incense: The Catholic Church 
and the Spanish Civil War (New York: Routledge, 2007). 
For an introduction to the international nature of the Spanish Civil War, and the role of "internationalist" 
discourses therein, see Michael Alpert, A New International History of the Spanish Civil War (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Christian Leitz and David J. Dunthorn, eds., Spanish in an International 
Context, 1936-1959 (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999); and Martin Baumeister and Stefanie Schüler-
Springorum, eds., 'If You Tolerate This--': The Spanish Civil War in the Age of Total War (Frankfurt: 
Campus Verlag, 2008).  
 
77 The Vatican archives are replete with evidence of this pressure, mediated by French and Spanish clerics, 
and by Vatican officials such as Eugenio Pacelli himself. See, e.g., letter from Valeri to Maglione, 11 June 
1939. ASV, Arch. Nunz. Parigi, b.609, fasc. 853, ff.17; and Pacelli's Udienze notes, 18 January 1937 and 13 
February 1937, ASV, AES Stati Ecclesiastici, pos. 430a, f.354, ff.13f and 24f. 
 
78 For a discussion of these events, see Antonio Marquina Barria, La diplomacia Vaticana y la España de 
Franco (1936-1945) (Madrid: CSIC, 1983), 92ff. 
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meanwhile, outlying lay Catholic attempts to maintain a neutral stance in the conflict and 
denounce atrocities committed by Franco's troops were increasingly met with clerical ridicule 
and suspicion of "Bolshevik complicity." Consider, for instance, the fate of an organization 
tightly surveilled by Vatican officials: the French Comité français pour la paix civile et 
religieuse en Espagne. Despite the fact that one of the leaders of the Comité, Jacques Maritain, 
had a personal relationship with the Pope and had provided invaluable assistance in the Pope's 
rapprochement with the French government in the 1920s, his articulate petitions to the Vatican 
regarding mass atrocities committed by both sides in Spain fell on deaf ears.79 
 With the 1937 triple encyclical, it was hard not to concur with Reinhold Neihbuhr's 
assessment that the Vatican had cast its lot with Nazi-Fascist states against the Soviet Union, 
and endorsed violence against left-wing (and typically non-communist) forces in Mexico and 
Spain. However, the fact that the Vatican sided with Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the 
Nationalistas in Spain did not mean that it was turning its back to democratic powers like the 
United States. Paradoxically, the Vatican's anticommunist campaign in fact helped lay the 
foundations for an emergent diplomatic relationship with the United States. How it did so is the 






79 See, e.g., Comité français pour la paix civile et religieuse en Espagne to Pius XI, Paris, 16 June 1937. 
ASV, AES Spagna (quarto periodo) 1936-1939, pos.896 PO, fasc.296, ff.15r. The Comité members 
included illustrious French Catholics like Jacques Maritain, Georges Duhamel, Louis Le Fur, Gabriel 
Marcel and François Mauriac. For the strong clerical reactions against the Comité in Spain, France, Italy 





Fig.1: The 1711 cover of the Index of Forbidden Books. 
Source: Index librorum prohibitorum usque ad annum MDCCXI regnante 





80 As reproduced in Hubert Wolf, ed., Römische Inquisition und Indexkongregation. 

























































The Pursuit of Old Diplomacy and New Allies: 




The defense of religion, of democracy and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To 
save one we must now make up our minds to save them all. 
-- Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 19391 
 
 
Where the rights of God are ignored, how do you expect the rights of man to be respected? 





The Vatican's anticommunist campaign and its perceived role in internationalizing the Spanish 
Civil War would increase the Vatican's influence in the United States, and lay the foundations 
for a rapprochement between the two powers during the Second World War. Realpolitik 
considerations that brought the two powers together and led them to forge what from late 1942 
can be called an alliance.  
 Through attention to both deeds and words, this chapter will follow three key episodes 
enabling the emergence of the Vatican-U.S. alliance: the growth of Vatican influence in the 
United States as a result of the Spanish Civil War (1938-9); the joint U.S.-Vatican pursuit of a 
strategy of appeasement in Europe, well beyond Munich (February-June of 1940); and the 
Vatican decision to secretly help the United States prepare to wage war against the Axis (from 
September of 1941). It will be emphasized that on the U.S. side, cultivating ties with the Vatican 
was part of a broader project to obtain the American Catholic vote in national elections, mobilize 
Catholics at home and abroad against the Axis, and gain crucial knowledge about, and influence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “Annual Message to Congress,” 4 January 1939. As reprinted in The Public 
Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (henceforth PPAFDR) (New York: Random House, 1939), 
2. 
 
2 Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., "The Challenge to Religion in a Changing World," Annals of the American 




in, European affairs. For the Vatican, the rapprochement was deemed advisable because of the 
United States' great economic prowess and because the United States seemed willing to protect 
the Vatican's interwar gains in Europe and keep sustained pressure on the Soviet Union. The 
Vatican's cautious turn to the U.S. was also caused by the fear that interwar partners were in the 
process of considerably rolling back concordat commitments and limiting the Vatican's presence 
in civil society. 
 The standard literature on the Second World War has not duly emphasized the 
emergence of the Vatican-United States partnership, due to difficulty in obtaining relevant 
sources and the prevalence of certain historiographical trends. Scholars consulting the Secret 
Vatican Archives in Vatican City are not allowed to view documents written after January-
February of 1939, and the papers of the leading American diplomat in residence at Vatican City 
during the war are unhelpfully scattered between four different U.S. archives.3 These papers 
nonetheless contain a wealth of material and have been, to date, been quite underused, even by 
those enterprising scholars who took the trouble to publish and translate archival selections.4 
Lack of access to the Secret Vatican Archives for the wartime years has been partially remedied 
by the publication of an eleven-volume work, which contains a selection from these archives 
from the years between 1939 and 1945. 5 Using these materials, alongside evidence from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 The FDR Presidential Library in Hyde Park, New York; the National Archives in College Park, Maryland; 
the Cornell University Rare Books and Manuscripts Archive in Ithaca, New York; and the Harry Truman 
Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri. 
 
4 See Myron C. Taylor, Vaticano e Stati Uniti, 1939-1952: Dalle carte di Myron C. Taylor, ed. Ennio Di 
Nolfo (Milan: F. Angeli, 1978).  I am profoundly grateful to Ennio Di Nolfo, who has provided me with 
orientation to these archives, three of which I have personally visited. 
 
5 The multi-volume work contains selections from the Secret Vatican Archives covering the arc of time 
between 1939 and 1945. It was published per Pope Paul VI's request between 1965 and 1981, in response 
to the rise in Holocaust consciousness and the Pius wars, which accused Pius XII of having ignored the 
plight of Jews during the conflict. The selection of documents was curated by four Jesuit historians 
tellingly from France, Italy, Germany and the United States, and issued by a prominent Vatican 
publishing house. Given the context in which it was put together, there are reasons to question the choices 
of sources made by the four scholars, though not -- I believe -- the content or existence of those sources. 
Thus, the eleven-volume work represents a valuable research tool for scholars of the Vatican and of the 
Second World War. See Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la Seconde Guerre Mondiale 
(henceforth ADSS), eds. Pierre Belt, Angelo Martini, Burkhart Schneider and Robert A. Graham, 11 
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published newspaper reports, and French, Italian, British and American foreign ministry 
papers, I have here tried to sketch a picture of Vatican-U.S. relations in the war years. 6 
 In addition to source difficulties, scarce attention to the forging of the Vatican-U.S. 
alliance during the Second World War has most likely been due to the existence of two 
historiographical trends, one within U.S. diplomatic history and the other concerning the 
history of the Vatican during World War II. Until quite recently, diplomatic histories of the 
United States' role in the war have tended to downplay the role of religion. Though much work 
still remains to be done, happily the tide has been turning, as more attention is being paid to 
how religious groups and rhetoric shaped American diplomacy and the electorate at large.7 On 
the Vatican side, the primary reason that the history of relations with the U.S. has been 
understudied is because of scholarly preoccupation with the role the Vatican played in the 
Holocaust.8  Though it certainly matters whether Pius XII was a tacit accomplice of the 
Holocaust or a strong opponent to it, over-emphasis on this particular question has occluded 
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volumes (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1965-1981). Scholars (including this one) may have to 
nuance or modify their arguments regarding the Vatican between 1939 and 1958 when Pope Pius XII's 
papers at the Secret Vatican Archives are opened to the public. 
 
6 In addition to the well-known published foreign policy papers available, new sources have been recently 
scanned and made available to scholars. See, e.g., U.S. Relations with the Vatican and the Holocaust, 
1940-1950 (Farmington Hills, Mich.: Gale, 2010), which provides a selection of documents from the 
National Archives in Washington, DC. 
 
7 Recent works that explore the connection between religious groups and the U.S. entry into World War II 
include Andrew Preston, Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy 
(New York: Knopf, 2012); Charles Gallagher, S.J., Vatican Secret Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurley and Pope 
Pius XII (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); David Zietsma, “‘Sin Has No History’: Religion, 
National Identity and U.S. Intervention, 1937-1941,” Diplomatic History 31 (June 2007): 531-565; Mark 
A. Noll and Luke E. Harlow, eds., Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period to the 
Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and David B. Woolner and Richard G. Kurial, eds., FDR, 
the Vatican and the Roman Catholic Church in America, 1933-1945 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003). For a general reflection on the importance of this "religious turn," see Andrew Preston, "Bridging 
the Gap between Church and State in the History of American Foreign Relations," Diplomatic History 30 
(November 2006): 783-812. 
 
8 The famous spark was the following play: Rolf Hochhuth, Der Stellvertreter: ein christliches Trauerspiel 




many other important historical developments, such as the ones under analysis in this chapter.9 
At the same time, as will be suggested, a better understanding of Vatican diplomatic priorities 




1. The Spanish Civil War and Vatican Influence in the United States 
 
The triple encyclical of March of 1937 showed the world that the Vatican had launched an 
uncompromising battle against the Soviet Union -- a battle which depended as much on the 
mobilization of a certain political ideology as it did on the participation of Catholic civil society. 
From spring of 1937, it became clear that the majority of American Catholics had heeded the 
Pope's calls. The American hierarchy quickly united behind the Vatican, by condemning the 
Soviet Union's violation of "the fundamental rights of God" and disseminating a July 1937 letter 
penned by the Spanish episcopacy justifying armed revolt.10 In late November of 1937, American 
bishops expressed their sympathy and admiration for General Franco and his fight against 
communism through a collective letter.  Additionally, the vast majority of American Catholic 
publications -- despite their traditional isolationalist stance -- came out solidly in favor of 
Franco,\ and the use of violence "against communism" in Mexico and Spain. Strongly influenced 
by the triple encyclical and convinced that Soviet agents were indeed responsible for unrest in 
these two Catholic countries, American Catholic periodicals increasingly presented the choice as 
one "for God or against God."11 
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9 See William Patch, "The Catholic Church, the Third Reich, and the Origins of the Cold War: On the 
Utility and Limitations of Historical Evidence," Journal of Modern History 82 (June 2010): 396-433, and 
Mark Ruff, The Battle for the Catholic Past in Germany, 1945-1975 (forthcoming). 
 
10 Collective Letter of the Spanish Episcopate, drafted by Cardinal Gomá, 1 July 1937. As reprinted in 
Gabriele Ranzato, L'eclissi della democrazia: la guerra civile spagnola e le sue origini, 1931-9 (Turin: 
Bollati Boringhieri, 2004), 153-7. 
 
11 NCWC News Service (March 19, 1937). Many high-ranking American Catholics (most vocal among 
whom being Archbishop McNicholas, Bishop John F. Noll, Monsignor Ready and Father Edward L. 
Curran) were convinced that the Spanish Civil War was brought about by Soviets advancing world 
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 Taking the Vatican's anti-Soviet crusade to a new level, Catholics in the United States 
also formed powerful lobbies that sought to sway congressional opinion on Spain and influence 
political asylum policies regarding Spanish refugees.12 Particularly when compared to the much 
more radical exponents of religious revivalism, who similarly sought to shape domestic and 
foreign policy, Catholics were taken seriously, in that they were perceived as well-organized, 
disciplined, and willing to play by the books.13   
 Due to transformations in both domestic affairs and in the United States' perceived role 
abroad, by 1938 American politicians began to listen to Catholic demands. In this year, 
President Roosevelt noted that Catholic activism around the Spanish Civil War had taught him 
that, "in his whole policy, domestic and foreign, it was necessary to carry along the Catholic 
Church." Indeed, Roosevelt reckoned, if he failed to do so, his party would risk "losing every 
Catholic vote" in the 1938 midterm elections.14  
Accordingly, Roosevelt and American congressmen began to respond to Catholic pressure. 
Congress agreed not to send American arms, men or funds to defend Republican Spain -- a 
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revolution. From mid March of 1937, the same view was espoused by nearly all of the United States' 
Catholic journals, including the National Catholic Welfare Conference News Service, America, Catholic 
Action, Catholic Mind, Catholic Digest, Catholic World, Columbia, Commonweal and Sign.  
 
On the Catholic mobilization in favor of Franco following the publication of Divini Redemptoris in the 
United States, see Michael E. Chapman, Arguing Americanism: Franco Lobbyists, Roosevelt's Foreign 
Policy and the Spanish Civil War (Kent, Ohio: Kente State University Press, 2011), 1-35; 156-84; David J. 
Valaik, “American Catholic Dissenters and the Spanish Civil War,” Catholic Historical Review 53 
(January 1968): 553ff; Roger Van Allen, ‘The Commonweal’ and American Catholicism: The Magazine, 
The Movement, The Meaning (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 61-66, 70-3; Allen Guttmann, The 
Wound in the Heart: America and the Spanish Civil War (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), 202ff; 
Donald F. Crosby, “Boston’s Catholics and the Spanish Civil War, 1936-1939,” New England Quarterly 44 
(March 1971):100ff; and George Q. Flynn, Roosevelt and Romanism: Catholics and American 
Diplomacy, 1937-45 (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1976), 34-7. 
  
12 Flynn, Roosevelt and Romanism, 33; 39-40; 48-52. 
 
13 For a recent reflection on the reactionary impulse of U.S. religious revivalism in the 1930s, see Matthew 
Pehl, "'Apostles of Fascism,' 'Communist Clergy' and the UAW: Political Ideology and Working Class 
Religion in Detroit, 1919-1945," The Journal of American History 99, 2 (2012): 440-65. 
 
14 Norman Thomas, “Interview,” 14 May 1938. Columbia University Oral History Project. As cited in 




policy which, according to many contemporary reports (including the diary entries of 
Roosevelt's Interior Minister, Harold L. Ickes), was drafted in part in response to Catholic 
pressures, and maintained in place despite FDR's subsequent change of heart, due to powerful 
Catholic interests.15 The policy was all the more surprising given the fact that not just Catholics 
had mobilized around the Spanish Civil War: as one historian has noted, for American citizens 
in the 1930s, none "of the major international crises of the 1930s -- Manchuria, Ethiopia, the 
Rhineland, the Anschluss, the Sudetenland -- aroused half the passion of the Spanish Civil 
War."16 Of course, it was not simply Franco who "aroused passions": so too did the Loyalists, 
who throughout the war obtained the support of American citizens in various ways.17  
 In addition to being motivated by local factors (i.e., the perceived importance of the 
Catholic vote in the 1938 midterm elections), the decision to heed Catholics during the Spanish 
Civil War was also due to a shifting perception of the United States' relations with the European 
continent. If in 1936, members of the Roosevelt administration viewed the Spanish Civil War as 
a distant conflict of little relevance to the United States, starting from 1937, and even more so, in 
1938, officials increasingly saw developments in Spain as intimately connected to U.S. national 
interests. Specifically, they began to see the war as part of a wider bid for Nazi-Fascist 
dominance, which might undermine U.S. interests in places like Latin America. There was no 
question in fact that the Spanish Civil War had brought Germany and Italy closer together, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 See Harold L. Ickes, entry of May 12, 1938. The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes: vol. 2, The Inside 
Struggle, 1936–1939 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 389–90; Leo V. Kanawada, Jr., Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s Diplomacy and American Catholics, Italians, and Jews (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 
1982), chap. 3; and Dominic Tierney, FDR and the Spanish Civil War: Neutrality and Commitment in the 
Struggle that Divided America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), who shows that as late as 
December 1938, FDR was unable to ship sorely needed wheat supplies to Loyalist fighters, due to Catholic 
opposition. Though historians continue to debate the extent to which Catholics shaped FDR's neutrality 
policy towards Spain, most agree that Catholic pressure had an effect on the President's diplomacy.  
 
16 Justus D. Doenecke, "Review: No Longer a Sphinx: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Spanish Civil War," 
Diplomatic History 33, 1 (January 2009): 139-142, here 139. 
 
17 For an overview of the contribution of Americans to the Loyalist cause, see Peter N. Carroll, The 
Odyssey of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade: Americans in the Spanish Civil War (Stanford: Stanford 




further isolated the Soviet Union, as Great Britain, France and the United States, of course, 
which had been unwilling to partner with Bolshevik leaders to save the Spanish Republic.18 
From 1938, the Roosevelt administration thus decided that the time had come to get a better 
handle on developments in Europe, and that one way to do so would be by strengthening ties 
with the Vatican.  
 The Vatican seemed like a useful interlocutor for the United States, since as a result of 
the Spanish Civil War it had gained newfound prominence in the Americas and the wider world. 
New U.S. War Department maps of Western Europe and Latin America clearly marked the 
regions as Catholic, and U.S. diplomats based in Europe adamantly argued that the Vatican 
played a leading role in the political, moral and social life of the continent's citizens.19 To be 
sure, U.S. officials likely overemphasized the Vatican's importance in Europe, due a combination 
of ignorance about the true power centers in Europe ("Who to call if I want to call Europe?"), 
and the old American Protestant prejudice casting all Catholics as slaves of the Pope. 
Nonetheless, the United States' interest in the Vatican was yet more proof that the interwar 
reconfiguration of Church-state relations on the continent had been successful -- or at least, that 
it was widely perceived as such.  
 From 1938, the FDR administration thus began to strengthen its ties with top-ranking 
Vatican clergy, just as the country was tentatively emerging from isolationism, but had yet to 
create a robust, multifaceted, transnational presence of its own.20  In November of 1938, FDR 
made a bold proposal to unite with the Vatican to bring the Spanish Civil War to a halt, and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 See Tierney, op.cit., 25-39; 75-89. 
 
19 See Emmet Kennedy, "Ambassador Carlton J.H. Hayes' Wartime Diplomacy: Making Spain a Haven 
from Hitler," Diplomatic History 36, 2 (April 2012): 237-260; and Hayes' discussion of his own 
Catholicism and his personal affinity with Franco's Spain, in his autobiography, Wartime Mission in 
Spain, 1942-1945 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1945). 
 
20  Though the United States had already created a "market empire" in Europe, it had yet to fully couple its 
commercial predominance with a winning cultural-ideological project. See Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible 
Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of 




simultaneously control European political affairs. The mediation proposal involved no less than 
a joint U.S.-Vatican nomination of a three-man provisional ruling government for Spain. 
Though the plan was never realized (most likely due to feasibility questions), it showed the Pope 
that the United States was serious about assigning him considerable power in European affairs. 
The project also confirmed to U.S. officials that if only they could win over the Vatican, they 
might considerably limit Axis influence in Europe. 21 
 
2. A Joint Vatican-U.S. Appeasement Strategy for Europe 
 
The Roosevelt administration was hopeful about its ability to sway Pope Pius XI to turn against 
the Axis powers. After all, particularly between 1938 and early 1939, this Pope had begun issuing 
several emotional eruptions against Germany's seizure of Czechoslovakia, Italy's "anti-Catholic" 
Race Laws, and Fascist and Nazi attempts to limit an ever-growing Catholic Action movement. 
Indeed, despite his full endorsement of the anticommunist campaign and his passage of the 
triple encyclical (in which Nazi-Fascism was deemed less worrisome than communism), Pius XI 
had grown somewhat impatient with both Hitler and Mussolini, particularly in 1938-9. He 
worried that the movements these leaders had created were overrun by a modern form of 
anticlericalism that bode ill for the survival of the Catholic Church, pointing in particular to the 
ways in which their policies violated the rights of Catholic citizens and the tenets of 
concordats.22 In 1939, Pius XI had even secretly asked a group of clerics to draft a modest anti-
racist encyclical, to protest the Nazi regime's deification of Arianism.23 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 See Tierney, op.cit., 75-135. I only learned of this important episode recently, and would like to do more 
research on it in the future. 
 
22 The historiography has, predictably, spent a great deal of ink analyzing Pius XI's eruptions against 
Hitler and Mussolini. Some, like Emma Fattorini, Hubert Wolf, and Frank J. Coppa, have tended to 
inflate the Pope's opposition to these leaders; others have cast Pius XI's words as insignificant and/or 
overly cautious. This chapter and the subsequent ones will argue that both Pius XI and Pius XII remained 
primarily concerned with protecting Catholics (rather than Jews or certainly Muslims or other religious 
minorities). Further, it will be suggested that actions speak louder than words; at this level, neither Pope 
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 More often than not, Pius XI's Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli had been able to censor 
the Pope's fiery statements, editing or rewriting them substantially before they hit the 
international press or were published on the pages of Vatican newspapers.24  Sometimes, 
however, Pius XI's defiant words had slipped through, making him a hero for a small number of 
Catholics and a considerable bother for large numbers of Fascist and Nazi officials, who were 
eager to see the sickly Pope off to his grave. "One hopes that the present Pontiff is really on his 
last legs," a Fascist spy for instance glibly commented in a confidential note on the eve of Pius 
XI's death.25  
 Figures like these were thus quite relieved when one month after Pius XI's death in 
February of 1939, Eugenio Pacelli was elected Pope, in the swiftest conclave in three hundred 
years. Pacelli received the vote of all the sixty-two Cardinal electors, the overwhelming majority 
of whom were European.26 Of the seven non-European Cardinal electors, six came from the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
dared not intervene in any substantial sense, for instance by repealing the German or Italian concordats, 
or officially breaking diplomatic relations with either of these governments. 
 
23 On the suppression of the so-called "secret encyclical" (which was not however as radical as many 
scholars have claimed), see John Connelly, From Enemy to Brother: The Revolution in Catholic Teaching 
on the Jews, 1933-1965 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); Georges Passelecq and 
Suchecky, The Hidden Encyclical of Pius XI, trans. Steven Rendall (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1997); and 
Emma Fattorini, Hitler, Mussolini and the Vatican: Pope Pius XI and the Speech That Was Never Made, 
trans. Carl Ipsen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011).  
 
24 Ample evidence in the archives exists of these rewritings, of which the Pope often approved. For 
scholarly discussions, see, e.g., Lucia Ceci, Il papa non deve parlare: Chiesa fascismo e guerra d'Etiopia 
(Rome: Laterza, 2010); Carlo Felice Casula, Domenico Tardini, 1888-1961: L'azione della Santa Sede 
nella crisi fra le due guerre (Rome: Studium, 1988).  
 
25 "A buon conto però si spera che l'attuale Pontificato stia proprio...agli sgoccioli; e pare che tra i 
Cardinali si sia formata come una lega di reazione, e che tutti si siano giurati l'un l'altro di riformare tutto 
quanto è stato fatto da Pio XI, giungendo al Papato. I più accanati nell'opposizione [...] agogna[no] il 
papato il modo superlativo." Note on Pius XI stored within a Fascist secret police file on Giuseppe 
Pizzardo, dated Rome, 25 December 1937. ACS, MI, DGPS, DPP, Fascicoli personali, Serie B, b.19, fasc. 
"Pizzardo monsignore," ff.31. 
 
26 The 1939 College of Cardinals contained no Cardinal electors from Africa or Asia, and one lonely 
Cardinal hailing from the Middle East. In keeping with the Vatican's longstanding Eurocentrism, fifty-five 
of the sixty-two Cardinal electors were Europeans, the vast majority of whom hailed from Italy (with 
thirty-five representatives), or from other countries transformed by the interwar conclusion of concordats 
or modus vivendi with the Vatican. Among the European and non-Italian Cardinal electors, there were six 
Frenchmen, three Spaniards, two Germans, two Poles, one Brit, one Irishman, one Portuguese, one 
Belgian, one Hungarian, one Austrian, and one Czech.  
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Americas, with the largest number originating from the United States.27 In terms of the absolute 
number of Cardinal electors present, the United States was tied with Spain, second only to Italy 
and France. The existence of comparatively so many U.S. Cardinal electors reflected the 
Vatican's growing realization that it was important to maintain good relations with the United 
States.  
 Pacelli was widely well liked by virtue of his diplomatic, rather than pastoral, 
contributions to the Church; indeed, he was the only twentieth-century Pope who had never 
occupied a bishoprick, or tended to a flock of his own. The former Secretary of State was known 
for introducing two diplomatic strategies that had much benefitted the Vatican since World War 
I: concordat diplomacy and the anti-Soviet campaign. He was also widely viewed as a 
conciliator. During his first year in power, Pius XII would stay true to his practices as Secretary 
of State: he would continue to strongly back the Vatican's anti-Soviet campaign, voice his 
support for Franco and "Catholic Spain," and do his best to heal the rifts created by his 
predecessor in Vatican relations with Italy and Germany. At the same time, Pacelli would quietly 
accept the offer to increase ties with the United States, in the interests of preserving the peace 
and the Vatican's prominence in European affairs.  
 Between May and August of 1939, Pius XII worked hard to show Italy and Germany that 
he remained loyal to them, and that the Vatican was capable of averting war by encouraging 
other European powers to grant Italy and Germany land and influence.28 Proposing to address 
Italy and Germany's demands in the international arena, Pius XII called for the Vatican to host 
an international conference (effectively, a second Munich), wherein the Five Powers might reach !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
27 Six Cardinals hailed from the Americas: in addition to the three U.S. Cardinals present, there was one 
French Canadian, one Argentine and one Brazilian.  
 
28 German Ambassador to the Holy See, Diego von Bergen, to Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, 
Rome, 13 March 1939. In Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, series D (Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office, 1949-1954), d.475, IV: 601. See, inter alia, Giovanni Miccoli, I dilemmi e i 




a “peaceful solution to questions that divide Germany and Poland, and France and Italy.”29 
Mussolini and the Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, initially applauded the proposal, in 
the hopes that listing Italian and German demands side by side would give Italy a powerful place 
at the bargaining table. However, the initiative ultimately failed to win the support of any of the 
other invited powers. Hitler noted coyly that he "did not see the possibility of war," and that in 
place of a conference, the Vatican should impose "a period of spiritual retreat for all of these 
Heads of State and Government, who appear to be exceptionally overexcited." The skepticism of 
the British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax took a different form: he affirmed that the Vatican 
conference would be useless and add nothing to Munich. Ultimately, even Mussolini eventually 
distanced himself from the Pope's proposal.30 Pius XI responded to his failure by pursuing a 
second but less binding peace strategy. In August of 1939, he circulated a letter to German, 
French, Italian, Polish, Spanish, Belgian, Dutch, Swiss, and British heads of state, which asked 
for a simple show of support for a vaguely worded papal message that called for a solution to the 
present conflict, the preservation of the status quo, and a return to the principles of Christ. 
Though praise was privately showered on the Pope, in public the interested parties jealously 
guarded their silence and refused to endorse the peace message.31 
 In addition to his failure to become a broker of peace, the Pope was increasingly forced 
to realize that Italy and Germany did not appear interested in working with the Vatican. In 
1938-9, Mussolini had begun to persecute Catholic Action, violate Catholic teachings on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29  The official invitation, written by Pius XII and sent out by Cardinal Maglione, the Pope’s Secretary of 
State, read as follows: “Pur evitando di scendere ai particolari Sua Santità proporrebbe come scopo della 
Conferenza di comporre pacificamente le questioni che tengono in disaccordo la Germania e la Polonia, la 
Francia e l’Italia.” Cardinal Maglione to the nuncios of Paris, Berlin and Warsaw, and to the apostolic 
delegate of London, Rome, May 3, 1939. As reprinted in ADSS, I: 120 (doc.19).  
 
30 See Orsenigo to Maglione, reporting on a conversation with Hitler of the same day. Berlin, 6 May 1939. 
ADSS, I: 130 (doc.29); Halifax to Osborne, 5 May 1939, in Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-
1939, series III, eds. E.L Woodward, R. Butler and A. Orde (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 
1949-1961), V: 435ff (doc. 380). For all of the reactions to the Pope’s proposal, see ADSS, I: 123-32, 139, 
141 (docs.22-29, 37, 39). 
 
31 The second appeal was sent in late August of 1939. For letters pertaining to the two appeasement 




conversion and marriage (via the aforementioned Race Laws), and cultivate a pragmatic alliance 
with Muslim groups in Europe and the Middle East, for instance by attempting to build a 
mosque in Rome, over and against Pius XII's robust, and prejudiced, protests.32 Even more 
worrisome was Hitler, who was encouraging the closure of confessional schools, seminaries, and 
religious institutions in Germany, as well as the substitution of teaching of catechism with 
courses on National Socialism. 33  The final blow came on August 23, 1939, when Hitler 
concluded a non-aggression pact with his long-avowed enemy, Stalin. Though Vatican 
newspapers failed to officially condemn the pact robustly (most likely fearing reprisals), in 
private Pius XII and his advisors voiced disgust, and exerted great pressure on Germany to 
repeal the pact. German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop attempted to appease Pius XII, 
affirming that, “National Socialism had prevented the triumph of communism in Germany. In 
the years 1930-1932 […] communism was about to triumph. Hitler beat it.” Had Hitler not risen 
to power to save the country, “in Germany not even one church would have remained standing, 
as happened in Russia.” To this, the Pope brusquely responded that there was no way of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 Mussolini proposed to erect a mosque in Rome just a few days after Italian troops invaded Albania in 
April of 1939, "in view of the fact that six million Italian subjects are now Moslems." In response, Pius XII 
informed Fascist officials that he was "horrified at the idea." Mussolini tried to push through the project 
anyway, but abandoned efforts by spring of 1940, thanks in part to the Pope's mobilization of Italian 
Catholics to protest the construction of a mosque. The Pope's words and Mussolini's logic is reported in 
Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano's diary, in an entry of 11 April 1939. Idem, Diary, 1937-1943, trans. 
Robert L. Miller (New York: Enigma Books, 2002), 217-8, and discussed in Abdul Vahab Bey, "Una 
Moschea a Roma," Politica nuova 9, 6 (March 1940): 185-6. As cited in Nir Arielli, Fascist Italy and the 
Middle East, 1933-1940 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 152. For more on Mussolini's pursuit of 
Muslim support and the Vatican's opposition, see Davide Rodogno, Fascism's European Empire: Italian 
Occupation during the Second World War, trans. Adrian Belton (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006); and John L. Wright, “Mussolini, Libya and the Sword of Islam,” in Italian Colonialism, eds. 
Ruth Ben-Ghiat and Mia Fuller (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 121-31. 
 
33 On the Vatican's growing impatience with Nazi Germany's violation of the concordat, see, e.g., Notes of 
Cardinal Maglione, following his meetings with Joachim von Ribbentrop, Vatican, 11 March 1940. ADSS, 
I: 389 (doc.258). Germany’s increasingly repressive treatment of its Jewish population was not the cause 




knowing that Germany could contain Russia now; and for that matter, what would have 
happened to Germany had Hitler not come to power.34  
 The situation was perplexing indeed. In a conversation with the distraught Spanish 
ambassador to the Holy See, Domenico Tardini noted, 
The Spanish know through painful experience what communism means. They thought 
they had delivered a serious blow to communism, defeating it in Spain. Instead now they 
see [that]…even he who had helped Spain against communism is entering into 
agreements with Stalin.35 
 
Could Nazi Germany really be counted on to carry on a campaign against communism if it was 
willing to sign agreements of this sort with the Soviet Union? 
 Prospects for a Vatican-German rapprochement worsened when on September 1, 1939, 
German and Soviet troops invaded "Catholic Poland," and France and Great Britain declared 
war on Germany. Donning the mantle of neutrality, the Pope hardly commented on the events in 
public, despite repeated urgings to do so.36 Even his much-awaited first encyclical, issued in 
October of 1939, contained such a vague and watered-down call to obeying the "laws of God" 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 ADSS, I: 386 (doc.257). Notes of Monsignor Tardini following Pius XII’s meeting with Ribbentrop, 
Vatican City, 11 March 1940. 
 
35 “Gli Spagnuoli sanno per esperienza dolorosa che significhi il comunismo. Essi credevano di aver 
inferto un grave colpo al comunismo, sconfiggendolo nella Spagna. Invece ora si vedono tutte le Potenze 
come inginocchiate davanti a Stalin e si vede accordarsi con lui proprio chi aveva aiutato la Spagna contro 
il comunismo.” ADSS, I: 249 (doc.131). Notes of Monsignor Tardini, following a meeting with the 
Ambassador of Spain to the Holy See, Vatican City, 26 August 1939. 
 
36 Pius XII declined the many requests made of him to protest the German invasion of Poland, citing 
possible German reprisals. In response to a French request, he for instance noted, “That would be too 
much. We can’t forget that in the Reich there are 40,000,000 Catholics. What would they be exposed to 
after a similar act of the Holy See!” Later, Cardinal Maglione affirmed in response to a similar request: 
“The acts speak for themselves. Let’s let them do that.” Notes of Monsignor Montini and Monsignor 
Tardini, Vatican City, 28 August 1939; Notes of Cardinal Maglione, Vatican City, 1 September 1939. In 
ADSS, I: 257 (doc.144); ibid., I: 277 (doc.171). The same response is recorded in Charles-Roux, Huit ans 
au Vatican, 339. The Vatican’s official and semi-official publications followed the Pope's lead, and 
refrained from discussing the event in any detail. Civiltà Cattolica devoted a scant paragraph to the 
invasion, downplaying the importance of this “armed conflict between Germany and Poland, whose origin 
lies in the Treaty of Versailles.” The Osservatore Romano highlighted the conflict’s formal characteristics, 
parroting the official version of events provided by the Italian Council of Ministers on 1 September 1939. 
See “Cronaca contemporanea,” La Civiltà Cattolica, vol.III (16 September 1939), 568; and Osservatore 




that both the Gestapo and the Western Allies allowed its free distribution.37 Commentators 
wondered which side the Vatican was really on.38  
 As it turned out, Pius XII was answering the question -- but only in private. To his closest 
advisors, he made it known that Germany could no longer be relied upon to stick to the terms of 
concordats and carry out a pro-Catholic and anticommunist foreign and domestic policy. Three 
of the Vatican's allies in East Central Europe had already fallen, and Nazi and Soviet influence 
was on the rise in Hungary and in concordat strongholds in the region, like Latvia and 
Lithuania. At the same time, the Vatican was also losing hope in Italy. For though Fascist 
officials had long boasted of their power to shape German foreign policy, now they at last 
admitted that they had "lost any chance of stopping Hitler," and that a world war "now seemed 
inevitable."39  
 In response to this state of affairs, the Pope and his closest advisors began to slowly and 
tentatively transform the Vatican's alliance structure. In order to maintain concordat diplomacy, 
continue the anticommunist campaign, and preserve a measure of peace on the continent, they 
decided to try to form alliances with powerful non-concordat states with influence in Europe. 
First, Vatican diplomats turned cautiously to Britain, a country with which they had established !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 For the full text of the Encyclical, Summi Pontificatus (20 October 1939), see the official English-
language translation, <http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-
xii_enc_20101939_summi-pontificatus_en.html>. Last accessed on 2 November 2012. 
 
In Germany, the Encyclical was read from the pulpits, after having been approved by the Gestapo; in the 
United States, it was reprinted in full on the government’s Official Bulletin of the Federation – which, as 
Jesuit commentators noted, “amounted to something more than a simple advertisement ploy.” See F. 
Pellegrino, “L’Enciclica Summi Pontificatus e le sue ripercussioni nella stampa mondiale,” La Civiltà 
Cattolica (16 March 1940), 411; and Order of Gestapo Munich, 7 Nov 1939, National Archives in 
Washington, T-175, roll 250, frame 2741860. The Gestapo order is cited in Lewy, The Catholic Church, 
245.  
French and Polish Catholics predictably reacted with anger and a sense of betrayal to Pius XII's first 
encyclical.  
 
38 Pius XII, Christmas Sermon, 25 December 1939. 
 
39 “[La decisione aveva tolto] all’Italia la possibilità di intervenire per frenare Hitler…[e] non vede[va] 
come si po[tesse] evitare la guerra.” Note of Tardini following conversation with Fascist officials, 24 




tepid, tactical, relations after the Great War, largely to expand the Catholic missionary presence 
in British colonies in Africa and Asia.40 The British minister in Vatican City, Sir d'Arcy Osborne, 
who held the Pope in high esteem, helped mediate a risky project to replace Hitler as Chancellor 
of Germany. Though Pius XII briefly served as an intermediary between British officials and 
members of a Catholic anti-Nazi group pioneering the anti-Hitler plot, the secret initiative soon 
floundered. 41 Further, Britain and the Vatican were unable to establish a relationship of trust, 
given the Vatican's discomfort with the Church of England, and the resurgence of long-standing 
British fears regarding an "Italianized" Vatican, whose preferences for Catholic Ireland (and its 
religiously-imbued 1937 constitution) were well known. In some cases Osborne himself 
inadvertently exacerbated these fears, as his dispatches played up the Vatican's pro-Italian 
sentiments, in a bid to get them past Fascist censors.  Though forms of collaboration between 
the two powers continued through 1945 and beyond, a true partnership did not bloom. 42  
 Relations with the United States, on the other hand, seemed more promising. The 
vibrancy and wealth of American Catholic civil society had long impressed Eugenio Pacelli, who !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Following an agreement with London concluded in the summer of 1918, the Vatican gained access to 
many of Britain's Eastern territories, including Egypt and East Africa, and to former German colonies 
(turned into mandate territories of France and Britain), like Togo and Cameroun. See Annie Lacroix-Rix, 
"Le rôle du Vatican dans la colonisation de l'Afrique (1920-1938): de la romanisation des missions à la 
conquête de l'Éthiopie," Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 41, 1 (January-March 1994): 29-81, 
here 30-1. 
 
41 See Public Record Office, National Archives in Kew (henceforth PRO), Records of the Cabinet Office, 
Cabinet Minutes and Papers (henceforth CAB), 65: War Cabinet Minutes, October 30, 1939, CAB 65/2 
/1/13: The Vatican; and ibid.,  November 1, 1939, CAB 65/1/65/8: The Vatican. The leading member of 
the Catholic opposition to Hitler, Josef Müller, proposed to win the support of the British in his bid to 
replace Hitler with a government supported by the German military. On two occasions the Pope had met 
personally with Francis D’Arcy Osborne, British ambassador to the Holy See, to discuss the initiative; 
otherwise, he had acted as an intermediary, enabling news from Müller to be communicated speedily to 
his British interlocutors. The episode is also discussed in Owen Chadwick, Britain and the Vatican during 
the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Peter Ludlow, “Papst Pie XII., 
die britische Regierung und die deutsche Opposition im Winter 1939/40,” in Vierteljahrshefte für 
Zeitgeschichte, 22 (1974): 299-341; Peter Hoffman, "The Question of Western Allied Co-Operation with 
the German Anti-Nazi Conspiracy, 1938-1944," The Historical Journal 34,2 (June 1991): 437-64; and 
Miccoli, op.cit., 25-31.  
 
42 On the Vatican's great influence over Irish politics and constitutional law, see Dermot Keogh, The 
Vatican, the Bishops and Irish Politics, 1919-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and 
Samuel Moyn, "Did the Irish Save Civilization? The Secret History of Constitutional Dignity" 




had worked with wealthy American groups such as the Knights of Columbus to fund Vatican 
City's rebirth as an opulent, independent, state, and who certainly knew well that by the eve of 
World War II, American Catholics had risen to become the largest contributors to the Vatican's 
annual collection of funds from the faithful, known as Peter's Pence. Additionally, as explored in 
Chapter Four, Pacelli also greatly respected the work of American Catholic organizations and a 
sector of the U.S. government against communism. But could the U.S. government, as a whole --
which Pacelli in the 1920s had deemed in the hands of liberalistic and secular Freemasons -- 
really be trusted to act in the Vatican's interests? 
 In the summer of 1939, U.S. diplomats were asking themselves the same question about 
the Vatican, and decided that it was worth the trouble to make an attempt at rapprochement. 
The time, they argued, had come to tighten connections with the Vatican -- connections for 
which the bases had been laid by Pacelli's 1936 trip to Hyde Park and by the 1938 joint 
mediation attempt in Spain. The Pope could help the U.S. avert war in Europe and give the U.S. 
a privileged vantage point on European affairs, all the while increasing the support of Italian, 
Irish and other Catholics at home for American policies abroad. 43 Convinced by the reasoning of 
officials like the Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and the American ambassador to Italy, 
William Phillips, Roosevelt agreed to approach the Pope. Soon after Germany's invasion of 
Poland, Roosevelt thus bypassed Congress and proposed to send a personal diplomatic 
representative to Vatican City, so that the Vatican and the United States could work together on 
a joint platform to appease Europe and keep Italy neutral. As Eleanor Roosevelt later suggested, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles and the American ambassador to Italy, William Phillips, 
adamantly encouraged the U.S. to turn to the Vatican for these reasons. See FRUS, 1939, II: 869-70. On 
how Sumner Welles helped shape U.S. policies and his various attempts to guarantee American 
hegemony, see the first monograph to make extensive use of his private papers: Christopher D. O'Sullivan, 
Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943 (New York: 




the bold move may be considered the United States' first act of war -- even though it was of 
course cast as an act of peace.44  
 The Pope promptly accepted Roosevelt's offer, as he too had a strong interest in 
maintaining Italy's neutrality and averting war. In December of 1939, FDR appointed Myron 
Taylor as his special representative at the Vatican, and in February of 1940, Pius XII welcomed 
Taylor in his first trip to Rome. A businessman with a self-proclaimed passion for "solving the 
problems of modern civilization,"45 Taylor nursed a deep admiration for the leader of the 
Catholic world, despite his Protestant faith.46 Between their first meeting and December of 1945, 
Taylor and the Bishop of Rome would meet privately on twenty-nine different occasions. 
Between February and June of 1940, their central project would be to keep Italy out of the war. 
In doing so, they would work in tandem with Roosevelt's Under-Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles, who arrived in Rome with Taylor in February of 1940, and subsequently toured the 
European continent, to pressure state leaders to choose the path of peace.47 In late April of 1940 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 "In December [of 1939] Franklin appointed Myron Taylor as his special representative at the Vatican. 
The letters between my husband and the Pope seem to indicate that this appointment was one of the wise 
preliminary steps in the preparation for war, although it created a certain amount of difficult among some 
of our Protestant groups." Eleanor Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Eleanor Roosevelt (1961; New York: 
Da Capo Press, 1992), 209-212. This hypothesis is more plausible than that given by certain scholars that 
the American president decided to open diplomatic relations with the Holy See in exclusively in order to 
win the Catholic vote in the November 1940 elections. Of course, as Eleanor herself notes, the gesture also 
alienated some Protestant voters, who were of course in the majority. See Di Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti, 
24. 
 
45 As cited in William Inboden, Religion and American Foreign Policy: The Soul of Containment, 1945-
1960 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 120. 
 
46 It is likely that Roosevelt chose a Protestant for the post to counter a variety of anti-Catholic Protestant 
fundamentalism at home, and show his support for growing Catholic-Protestant collaboration in matters 
of both domestic and foreign policy. On the relation between these two strands of religious politics in the 
United States, see David Mislin, "Preserving the Family, Saving the Nation: Catholic-Protestant 
Ecumenism and the Politics of Divorce in Late Nineteenth-Century America," and Andrew Preston, "Anti-
Ecumenism in Evangelical and Fundamentalist Politics," unpublished papers presented at Religion and 
American Politics, Boston University, March 23, 2012.  
 
47 See Stanley E. Hilton, “The Welles Mission to Europe, February-March 1940: Illusion or Realism?” 
Journal of American History 58, 1 (June 1971): 93-120; and Sidney Pash, "Containment, Rollback and the 
Onset of the Pacific War, 1933-1941," in The United States and the Second World War: New Perspectives 
on Diplomacy, War and the Home Front, eds. G. Kurt Piehler and Sidney Pash (New York: Fordham 




– following Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway -- Pius XII and FDR sent coordinated 
messages to Mussolini to urge him to avoid war. The Pope’s letter praised Mussolini for his 
labors to date to ensure the peace, expressing the wish that these labors continue unabated; 
Roosevelt’s letter, though less effusive, expressed the same sentiments.48  
 Drawing attention to the joint Vatican-U.S. initiative, American newspapers began to 
“frequently highlight the efforts of the Holy Father and the President to keep Italy out of the 
conflict,” according to the upbeat press summary provided by the Vatican nuncio in 
Washington. Deploying an argument that American diplomats and Vatican officials were testing 
on the ground, U.S. newspapers affirmed that Italy should shun war, because it was “contrary to 
the tradition, Latin spirit and religion of the Italian people.”49 The pacification policy was also 
publicized by the Vatican's daily newspaper, the Osservatore Romano, which effused over the 
"almost literal identity of views" between President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, "the leader of 
one of the most powerful and modern nations of the world, and the principles enunciated by the 
supreme religious leader with the highest spiritual authority of the world," namely, the Pope.50  
 However, following Germany's invasion of Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands (on May 10, 1940), American and Vatican efforts to keep Italy out of the war began 
to seem rather vain. Soon after the invasion, Italian-Vatican relations took a dip for the worse, 
as Mussolini editorialized Pius XII's behind-the-scenes diplomacy as follows: “The Church is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 For the Pope's message, see Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (DDI) (Rome: Libreria di stato, 1952-
2007), series IX, vol. IV:157-8 (doc.189); for FDR's message, see ibid., 212-4 (docs.262 and 263). 
 
49 “Stampa spesso richiama sforzi Santo Padre et Presidente Repubblica per mantere Italia fuori del 
conflitto; et pure ammettendo ragionevoli richieste italiane, rileva intervento in favore della Germania 
come contrario tradizione et spirito latino et religione popolo italiano.” Apostolic Delegate in Washington 
Cicognani to Cardinal Maglione, Washington, 4 June 1940. ADSS, I: 483 (doc.340). 
 
50 The text of this Osservatore Romano article was translated and cited in full by Reverend Bernard 
James Sheil, auxiliary bishop of Chicago, in “America’s Catholic Youth and Europe’s War: Radio Address,” 
a speech delivered over the National Broadcasting Company’s Red Network on 2 October 1939. The 
speech was reprinted in full in the Congressional Record of 9 October 1939. We can surmise that FDR 
took the speech seriously, insofar as it was also stored in his personal file: Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York (henceforth FDRL), President’s Personal File (henceforth 




always on the wrong side. With Austria in 1915-18; against Germany today [...] The Church has 
always been, and I mean always, the ruin of Italy.” 51  When Mussolini repeated similar 
sentiments in a private audience with the Pope, Pius XII rebuffed that "in certain circumstances 
the Pope could not be silent." Drawing a distinction between the realpolitik that determined the 
actions of normal states and the religious considerations that supposedly determined the actions 
of the Vatican, Pius XII affirmed that, "while governments put military and political concerns 
first," for the Vatican, "moral and legal considerations come first, and can in no way be 
overlooked."52 
 With Belgium and Holland's surrender to Germany in late May of 1940, Pius XII 
informed Roosevelt that the time had come to abandon all attempts to pacify Italy. 53 
Simultaneously, he strongly suggested that the special relationship that had previously existed 
between the Fascist and Vatican state was coming to an end. From late May of 1940, the Pope 
informed both Taylor and Roosevelt that the Catholic Church was under attack in the Fascist 
media, that Fascist ruffians were beating up Roman Catholic priests, that the distribution of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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law and inexperienced Foreign Affairs Minister. Cf. Galeazzo Ciano, Diario 1937-1943, ed. Renzo De 
Felice (Milan: Bur Biblioteca Univ. Rizzoli, 1994), 429. Mussolini was particularly incensed to learn of a 
private telegraph the Pope had sent to deposed state leaders in May, which lamented Hitler's violation of 
international law, and expressed the hope "for the re-establishment of freedom and independence" in the 
invaded European territories. The Pope’s telegrams of 10 May 1940 are reprinted in full in ADSS, I: 444-5 
(docs.301-3). 
 
52 The words pronounced by the Pope and Mussolini during their meeting were immediately recorded by 
the participating Giovanni Battista Montini, who noted: "Il Santo Padre si è mostrato molto tranquillo e 
sereno, osservando di non avere alcun timore di finire, se sarà il caso, in un campo di concentramento o in 
mani ostili [….] Il Papa [disse che] in certe circostanze non può tacere. I governi mettono in primo luogo 
la considerazione politica e militare, e […] trascurano di proposito la considerazione della morale e del 
diritto; per il Papa questa considerazione è invece la prima, e non può essere da Lui assolutamente 
trascurata.” Notes of Montini following Mussolini’s audience with Pope Pius XII, 13 May 1940, ADSS, I: 
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Vatican print media (including the Osservatore Romano) was gravely hindered, and finally, that 
Fascist hooligans in the street had gotten into the habit of yelling the following chant: "Down 
with the Pope, the French and the English!"54 To protect Vatican funds, and to show the U.S. 
that the Vatican was indeed turning away from Fascist Italy (which had of course been its 
primary funder since 1929), Pius XII arranged to transfer the Vatican's gold reserves to New 
York's Federal Reserve Bank.55 By this point, the United States' status as the new global 
economic hegemon had become crystal clear to the Vatican: in 1940, in fact, American Catholics 
contributed as much to the annual collection of offerings by the faithful, known as Peter's Pence, 
than all other countries combined.56  
 From the spring of 1940, Roosevelt also changed course and began to work to convince 
the Vatican, as well as Catholic and Protestant Americans, to abandon neutrality and support 
U.S. intervention in the European conflict. Roosevelt began by articulating this message in 
speeches, which presented the defense of "Christianity" as the United States' leading diplomatic 
priority. Echoing to a longstanding tradition of civil religiosity, Roosevelt declared that 
"democracy" and "Christianity" were inextricably interlinked. As he informed Congress in 1939, 
"Storms from abroad directly challenge three institutions indispensable to Americans [...] The 
first is religion. It is the source of the other two – democracy and international good faith.”57 
With this message, Roosevelt was affirming that Christianity provided the grounds for American 
democracy. He was also suggesting that because of the co-dependence of religion and 
democracy, and the flagrant disregard of both by Axis powers, the United States could not 
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remain indifferent to the escalating global conflict. “The defense of religion, of democracy and of 
good faith among nations is all the same fight,” the President summarized. “To save one we 
must now make up our minds to save them all.”58  
 As Roosevelt nudged the United States towards war in 1940 and 1941, he continued to 
align himself with the cause of "Christian civilization," stressing that the United States was 
founded "not upon strength nor upon power, but upon the spirit of God."59  In the process, he 
was not simply trying to win over American Christians in general; he was also targeting 
Catholics more narrowly, both at home and abroad. Roosevelt did so for instance by creating an 
annual Day of Prayer to God exactly on the day of a pre-existing Catholic holiday: the Catholic 
Feast of the Nativity of Mary. The president also loudly celebrated the work of Catholic civil 
society organizations in the fight against Nazism and for "the fundamental rights of all."60 
American Catholics promptly responded to the president's special attentions. Archbishop 
Francis Spellman, who has been responsible for bringing FDR and Pacelli together since 1936, 
noted for instance that "Catholics especially welcome" FDR's actions and words, in that they 
"bear public witness to the Christian-mindedness of the American people and their leaders."61   
 
3. The Local Suspension of the Anti-Soviet Campaign 
 
The emergent U.S.-Vatican friendship was put to the test with Operation Barbarossa, when on 
June 22, 1941 Germany invaded the Soviet Union and German and Italian officials began to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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plead with the Vatican to endorse the invasion. Picking up on the language of the Pope's 
anticommunist campaign, they called the invasion a "crusade" against atheism. By way of reply, 
Pius XII's closest advisor, Domenico Tardini, noted that while the Vatican clearly saw the need 
for a crusade against the Soviet Union, "it did not see the crusaders." Because the swastika or 
"uncinate cross" was carrying out a "genuine persecution of Catholics," how was it possible to 
equate it with "that of the crusades"?62  The Pope repeated the same idea to the Italian 
ambassador to the Holy See, affirming: "If one day I speak out against Bolshevism -- something 
I am very ready to do -- how could I be silent about Nazism? [...] If one day I must speak, I will, 
but I will say everything."63 Though local clergy members and Catholic civil society organizations 
were quick to enroll in the Nazi-Fascist crusade against "atheistic Bolshevism," the Pope stayed 
true to his word, and refrained from issuing an official endorsement of the invasion.  In his 
public statements, he remained "neutral"; in private, he and many others expressed the wish 
that the two states would destroy each other. “In the designs of God,” Tardini for instance 
informed the Pope, Operation Barbarossa might inaugurate “the end of communism and 
Nazism alike.”64 The view was popular across the Atlantic as well. 65 
 On the day after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union, President Roosevelt proposed 
to Congress that the United States begin delivering aid to the Soviet Union. American Catholics 
were incensed and noted that the Vatican's 1937 encyclical Divini Redemptoris spoke loud and 
clear. According to its fifty-eighth paragraph, "communism is intrinsically wrong." Indeed, "no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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one who would save Christian civilization may collaborate with it in any undertaking 
whatsoever." Even if that "undertaking" were beating Nazism and that "collaboration" the 
provision of material aid, they must be shunned in the interests of "Christian civilization."66 
Though Roosevelt urged American officials to try to calm the angry public by emphasizing that 
the provision of material aid betrayed no sympathy with communist ideology and its anti-
religious policies, the protests continued.67 Even Sumner Welles' prompt condemnation of both 
communism and Nazism as worldviews opposed to religion had little effect.68 At this point, the 
President decided that he could only get Catholic opinion on his side by convincing the Pope to 
take action through covert or overt channels. Taylor concurred, suggesting that perhaps the 
Pope could convince "some bishop or group of bishops [to] take definite measures to counteract 
[this] movement of opposition to national policy.”69  
 But before the Pope would agree to something like this, Roosevelt correctly calculated, he 
needed to see that the U.S. was truly ready to act in its interests. Accordingly, the American 
President immediately and publicly asked two American ambassadors on mission in Moscow to 
begin pressuring the Soviets to outline a government plan to protect religious freedom. The 
declaration, the president advised, should take the form of "a declaration that could be given to 
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the press."70  What mattered here, Roosevelt calculated, were words, and words that could 
promptly reach the world through a speedily drafted Soviet communiqué. To the astonishment 
of many, Roosevelt’s actions had their intended effect. The American President's statement in 
favor of religious rights was promptly reprinted and endorsed in the leading organ of the 
Russian communist party, Pravda.71 In a dramatic volte-face dictated as much by wartime 
diplomacy as by the desire to keep a still-religious population on board with the war effort, the 
newspaper went further still, and presented the Soviet Union as the protector of religion against 
the “barbarous Fascist hoards, drunk with blood” that “turn into ridicule the religious 
sentiments of women, Catholic and Protestant, devastating churches and violating the sacred 
vessels.” In other words, now the Soviet Union stood with religion against “Godless Germany.”72  
 In case the Pope had missed the news, Roosevelt promptly informed him that the Soviets 
had finally started to recognize religious rights as a result of American pressure. "The churches 
in Russia are open," Roosevelt triumphantly informed Pius XII. "I believe that there is a real 
possibility that Russia may as a result of the present conflict recognize freedom of religion," he 
added.73 But in order to continue to carry out a diplomacy based on "the teachings of the New 
Testament," Roosevelt informed the Pope that he would need his support and "spiritual 
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leadership."74 Following a similar line of argumentation, Taylor noted: "Unless these two 
symbols of civilization at its best operate in harmony, there can no fair or permanent justice in 
the world."75 Furthermore, now that the United States had curbed the Soviet Union's campaign 
against religion, Germany alone represented the greatest threat to "the survival of religion."76 To 
emphasize this, Roosevelt painted a dreadful picture of the world that would result were 
Germany to win the war. Stressing that Germany held Jesus Christ in opprobrium, he noted in a 
well-publicized speech that were Germany to win, “The god of Blood and Iron will take the place 
of the God of Love and Mercy." Further, "In place of the Bible, the words of Mein Kampf will be 
imposed and enforced as Holy Writ." With Hitler in charge and the Nazi New Order in place, 
Christianity as such would come to an end: “In place of the churches of our civilization," 
Roosevelt prophesized, "there is to be set up an International Nazi Church.”77 By emphasizing 
that National Socialism rather than communism was the leading enemy of the Christian 
Churches, Roosevelt followed the American Bishop Joseph P. Hurley, who had long since begun 
to make the same argument -- with Sumner Welles' support, no less.78 
 The Pope's willingness to heed American pressure and locally suspend the anti-Soviet 
campaign was also greatly influenced by a series of reports received from the staunchly 
anticommunist Leopold Braun, one of two Catholic priests still stationed in the Soviet Union. 
Roosevelt's actions, the American priest onsite noted, had had a visible impact on the rhetoric 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 1 Sept 1941 letter of Roosevelt to Taylor. Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell 
University (henceforth RMC), Myron Taylor Papers, n.3308, box 4.  
 
75 Memorandum from Taylor to FDR, Washington, DC, 2 September 1941. Letter of FDR to Pius XII, 3 
September 1941. FDRL, PSF, Box 51, “Diplomatic Correspondence: Vatican: Taylor, Myron C., 1941." 
 
76 Letter of FDR to Pius XII, 3 September 1941. Ibid. 
 
77 Navy and Total Defense Day Address, 27 October 1941. PPAFDR, 1940, 440. As cited in Preston, op.cit. 
 
78 Joseph P. Hurley, speech at National Council of Catholic Women, Florida state convention, April 30, 
1941, Hurley Papers, Archives of the Diocese of St. Augustine, Florida. As cited in Charles Gallagher, S.J., 





and practice of Soviet leaders.79 The time was ripe for the Vatican to suspend its anticommunist 
campaign, Braun recommended, and restart its long-suspended negotiations with the Soviet 
Union for a concordat or modus vivendi. "This is, if ever, the time to act,” Braun wrote. "One 
must “beat the iron while it is hot and soft and obtain from these people what they would be only 
too willing to grant.”80  
 At last, the Pope listened and acted. At the end of September, he agreed to a local 
suspension of the Vatican anti-communist campaign. Pius XII set the process underway by 
asking Domenico Tardini to contact the Apostolic Delegate in Washington, so that he, in turn, 
could enroll the influential Archbishop McNicholas of Cincinnati in the delicate project. 
McNicholas -- despite his well-known sympathies for Franco -- promptly accepted the Pope's 
request. Tardini informed McNicholas that he must help suspend the Vatican's anticommunist 
campaign in the United States by issuing a new interpretation of Divini Redemptoris. 
McNicholas should do so via a pastoral directed at American clergy and the faithful, which 
should make no mention of Pius XII or suggest that the Pope had issued the directive. Drawing 
on a combination of political and theological motifs, the text should argue that Divini 
Redemptoris was, in Tardini's words, "not applicable to the present circumstances." Suggesting 
a potential line of argumentation, Tardini proposed that McNicholas might note that it was a 
"fundamental exegetical norm that each text be accurately examined in its natural context." 
Tardini reminded McNicholas that the "natural context" of Divini Redemptoris had been the 
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rise of Popular Fronts in Spain to France and the fear of a communist take-over in much of 
Western Europe. Never mind that the Pope's encyclical, insofar as it was an official statement of 
doctrine issued ex cathedra, was infallible, according to the Vatican's own rulebook: instead, 
McNicholas could treat the text as a historically bound recommendation, applicable only to the 
moment in which it had originally been uttered.81  
 In early October, Archbishop McNicholas' pastoral suspending the Vatican's 
anticommunist campaign in the United States was released. The text put forward three lines of 
argumentation: Tardini's radical historicism, Roosevelt's claims regarding Nazi Germany as a 
greater threat to Christianity than the Soviet Union, and McNicholas' personal flourish, the 
reinterpretation of the concept of "collaboration." The text began by highlighting the similarities 
between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, as well as the fundamental identity of interests of 
the U.S. and the Vatican in the war. The Vatican and the United States (“our country”), 
McNicholas affirmed, were gravely and “rightly concerned not only about the total war of many 
nations, but also about the total loss of freedom under two systems that seek world dominance – 
Nazism and Sovietism.” However, Nazi Germany, not the Soviet Union, was posing the most 
immediate threat to Christianity's survival. In these exceptional circumstances it was warranted 
for Christian nations to cooperate with communist ones, and thereby engage in a "war of 
defense [...] to save Christian civilization." 82   
 True, the Archbishop conceded, Divini Redemptoris appeared to prohibit collaboration 
between Christians and communists, as many of the president's critics had correctly noted. But 
the critics of the president had misunderstood a crucial point. By "collaboration," McNicholas 
affirmed, the Pope had clearly intended to refer to person-to-person interactions, not state-to-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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state relations. “The great and courageous Pope,” McNicholas explained, was "not laying down a 
course of action governing our country and all other countries regarding every future 
circumstance whatsoever." Indeed, when it was precisely “saving Christian civilization” that was 
at stake, state-to-state collaboration with communist powers was not only warranted, but 
necessary.83   
 Much to Roosevelt's delight, McNicholas' pastoral was broadly effective in reorienting 
the positions of low-ranking American clergy and American Catholics at large. At the end of 
October 1941, the largest Jesuit publication in the United States, America, buttressed its views, 
prophesizing that once Nazism was defeated, communism would fall as well and thus Russia 
would turn into "one of the greatest missionary fields in the world."84 (The resurgence of the 
great conversion narrative in Catholic circles was part and parcel of the resurgence of the 
possibility of concordat diplomacy with the Soviet Union.) By the end of October, the Vatican-
based Jesuit Secretariat on Atheism closed its doors.85 As the Secretariat's leader, Joseph Henri 
Ledit noted, the Secretariat had for years received the bulk of its outside funding from American 
sources; now, in the absence of this funding (given the silencing of the anticommunist campaign 
in the United States), the Secretariat could no longer stay afloat.86  
 Ironically, in the same months that Roosevelt scrambled to obtain guarantees regarding 
"religious rights" from the Soviets -- and at the same time that the Pope was so impressed that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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he bowed to American pressure -- Vichy France was putting in place a series of measures against 
Jews and Nazi Germany had begun to implement the "final solution." In other words, the 
grandstanding about religious rights in the Soviet Union had largely ignored the leading 




By the fall of 1941, President Roosevelt had successfully begun to prod the Pope out of his 
official stance of neutrality, by convincing him to locally suspend the anticommunist campaign. 
Shortly after the United States entered the war in December of 1941, Roosevelt redoubled his 
efforts, particularly once he learned that the Vatican was pursuing diplomatic relations with 
Japan. 87  The American President thus encouraged Taylor and the U.S. intelligence 
establishment to undertake a large-scale effort to convince the Pope and Catholics across Latin 
America and Western Europe to openly side with the Allied powers. The core way in which he 
chose to do so was by continuing to argue that Christianity and democracy were inextricably 
interlinked, and that the Axis powers were bent on destroying them both. 
 In early 1942, Roosevelt asked the U.S. intelligence establishment to assist in the task of 
winning Catholics over to this message, in that “direct pro-Allied propaganda” had thus far 
shown itself to be “not effective in a Catholic milieu.” 88 Soon, influential lay Catholics and 
Vatican officials joined the effort, and helped disseminate the message that because democracies 
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were based in Christian teachings and grounded in respect for the Christian Churches, 
Christians around the world must cast their lot with the Allied powers. For instance, the French 
Catholic Jacques Maritain, who had worked closely with the Vatican in the interwar years prior 
to his migration to the Untied States, readily lent his support. He agreed to have a short tract he 
had recently written, Christianity and Democracy, be dropped from Allied planes over France 
in 1942-3. The pamphlet affirmed that, “democracy is linked to Christianity," insofar as "the 
democratic impulse has arisen in human history as the temporal manifestation of the 
inspiration of the Gospel.”89 Similar ideas were foregrounded in texts penned by leading 
American Catholic clerics with ties to both the Vatican and the FDR administration, such as 
Monsignor John A. Ryan, Monsignor (future Archbishop) Fulton Sheen, and Archbishop 
Francis Spellman. Inadvertently putting Catholic anti-totalitarianism to its original purposes, 
these clerics emphasized that Nazi-Fascist “totalitarianism,” was “anti-Christian,” and 
“destructive of democratic government," and implied that the battle against this form of 
totalitarianism was more pressing than the battle against the Soviet Union. 90   
 In addition to mobilizing individual Catholics, the U.S. intelligence establishment 
encouraged entire news agencies to back its message. For instance, it targeted the Catholic 
Center of Information Pro Deo, founded by the Belgian Dominican Father Morlion, who had 
been rescued by American forces during the German invasion of Belgium. With OSS funding 
and support, Morlion set up satellite Pro Deo agencies throughout Latin America and non-
occupied Europe, which were encouraged to include a series of “special articles answering the 
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precise questions which bother Catholics” about the war. 91  American intelligence experts 
carefully specified that the articles that appeared in Catholic news agency publications should 
address topics such as “The Thomist Doctrine of Democracy as the Most Perfect Form of 
Government,” and “The Christian Foundations of American and English Democracy.”92  
 Though it was certainly exploited to great propagandistic effect, the yoking of 
Christianity and democracy was not a theory invented wholesale in the context of the American 
war effort. Starting from the interwar years, a group of American Catholics -- perhaps inspired 
by their brethren overseas -- had indeed begun to argue that democracy could constitute the 
best form of government, on the condition that it be grounded in neo-Thomist principles rather 
than the French Revolutionary legacy.  The efforts of these American Catholic intellectuals had 
received a powerful boost following a 1938 pastoral letter of the American hierarchy, issued 
without the Pope's consent or subsequent support. 93 The pastoral affirmed the compatibility of 
Catholicism and democracy, and called for a deeper study of how Catholicism had contributed to 
the political ideology of the “Christian democracy” of the United States. Following this pastoral, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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economics," and had made no mention of democracy as a political form. In the attempt to present 
Catholicism and American democracy as compatible and interdependent, the Bishops’ pastoral taken the 
Pope’s recommendation a textually unwarranted step further. The late November 1938 pastoral affirmed 
that the Pope had approved “the American hierarchy’s traditional position of unswerving allegiance to our 
free American institutions. To carry out the injunction of the Holy Father, it is necessary that our people, 
from childhood to mature age, be ever better instructed in the true nature of Christian democracy. A 
precise definition must be given to them both of democracy in the light of Catholic truth and tradition and 
of the rights and duties of citizens in a representative Republic such as our own.” This “precise definition,” 
the pastoral continued, would be enshrined in “a more comprehensive series of graded texts for all 
educational levels.” The New York Times summarized the pastoral as outlining “a plan for the study of 
democracy by Catholic schools,” suggesting that it was Catholics who were accepting a pre-existing 
American model of democracy, rather than seeking to redefine democracy on their own terms. See 
“Pastoral Letter on the Teaching of Democracy,” The New York Times (25 November 1938), 2. I owe this 
reference to Samuel Moyn, “Jacques Maritain: le origini dei diritti umani e il pensiero politico cristiano,” 
in Dialogo interculturale e diritti umani: la Dichiarazione universale dei diritti umani. Genesi, 
evoluzione e problemi odierni (1948-2008), eds. Luigi Bonanate and Roberto Papini (Bologna: Il Mulino, 




a re-energized group of American Catholics sympathetic to democracy developed some of its 
core insights, and in a January 1939 article in the Jesuit journal America, the American Father 
John LaFarge for instance spent a great deal of ink on formalizing the phrase “Christian 
Democracy,” which had been mentioned in passing in the Bishops' pastoral. As Jacques 
Maritain soon noted, American Catholics like LaFarge and the "American episcopacy" had thus 
“officially reintroduced [...] 'Christian Democracy' into the Catholic vocabulary.”94 
 The fact that European and American Catholics had done so was of course contentious. 
Historically, the phrase “Christian Democracy” --- coined in the 1880s and popularized in the 
mid 1890s in European Catholic lay circles – had not sat well with the Bishops of Rome. Initially 
used to reference Catholic non-political aid organizations, by the early twentieth century, 
“Christian Democracy” was used to denote more radical political parties, which called for the 
separation of Church and state and the independence of the Catholic laity from the hierarchy. 
Predictably, these movements had promptly received the explicit and implicit censure of the 
papacy. But as Tardini had noted in his talking points summary to Archbishop McNicholas, in 
the "present conditions of war," certain time-honored precepts perhaps did not apply. In the 
following chapter, I address how the papacy at last turned towards "Christian Democracy," and 
at the same time redefined the phrase, to bring it in line with the Vatican diplomatic priorities of 
the interwar years.   
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94 Jacques Maritain, The Twilight of Civilization (New York: Sheed and War, 1943), 55-6. For more on 





Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose? 




We must lay claim to the word democracy, because it has not yet been seized, and for this 
reason, it expresses an idea in conformity with the Gospels [….] We are taking it before it is 
taken away from us, and we will be able to substantiate it. 
-- Father Joris Helleputte,18911 
 
 
To call Representative Democracy into our debate will appear to some to be calling a Rip van 
Wrinkle of social and political doctrine [...] Representative Democracy is not a philosophy that 
anyone could accept 
nowadays without a radical restatement, which has yet to be provided. 





The striking thing about Vatican diplomacy in the war and postwar years was not how much it 
changed, but how much it stayed the same. Throughout the period under analysis, the Vatican 
continued to pursue the core of its interwar diplomacy: protecting concordats, expanding the 
Vatican's presence in civil society, and convincing partner nations to curb the Soviet Union and 
the spread of communism. However, the historical circumstances in which the Vatican was 
operating were drastically shifting, particularly from the fall of 1942 on. From this date, it 
became clear that the Allies were gaining the upper hand in the war, and that President 
Roosevelt's campaign to convince Catholics to come to the Allied side was winning converts. 
Furthermore, from summer-fall of 1942, Western European writers and intellectuals had begun 
to come together, to found newborn “Christian Democratic” political parties. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Father Joris Helleputte pronounced these words in his capacity as representative of the Belgian 
Democratic League, during a speech at the Congress of Malines (Belgium) in September of 1891. As cited 
in Father Angelo Brucculeri, S.J., “Giuseppe Toniolo, il milite della Democrazia Cristiana,” Vita e Pensiero 
(1929): 35-51. 
 
2 Michael Oakeshott, The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe (Cambridge: 




 This chapter will argue that the Vatican responded to these momentous transformations 
by preserving the core elements of its interwar diplomacy and translating them into a new 
language, which was broadly appealing to the United States and to Europe's emergent Christian 
Democratic parties. Like any language, it did not depend on perfect agreement on meanings; 
rather, it established sufficient grounds for communication by employing a shared set of words, 
which each power productively misinterpreted and redefined in its own way. Developed between 
1942 and 1944, the Vatican's new language sought to show its allegiance to the United States and 
to emergent Christian Democratic parties, all the while defending its prominence and leadership 
position on the European continent. It made use of terms like "rights," and "Christianity," and 
had at its center the redefinition of the word "democracy." Over and against the myth of 1945 as 
a year zero characterized by a great democratic awakening, this chapter argues that Pius XII's 
democracy talk drew heavily from Catholic interwar theorizations of a corporatist, anti-
totalitarian, and anti-liberal, order, and helped foreground a certain model of democracy that 
was highly constrained and deeply suspicious of "the masses." 3 Though it may be correct to 
continue to call Pius XII the Pope who "baptized democracy," this chapter suggests that what 
matters more is what exactly he baptized, and why.4  I argue that the Pope's "turn to democracy" 
emerged as a result of Myron Taylor's second trip to the Pope, in September 1942. From this 
point forward, the United States, Christian Democratic parties and the Vatican began to work 
more closely together, developing what looked from afar like overlapping peace platforms, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Only in the past five to ten years have scholars begun asking the question of how not just democracy writ 
large – but how a particular, highly constrained, conception of democracy – emerged as normative in 
Western Europe in the years following 1945. Key works include Martin Conway, “The Rise and Fall of 
Western Europe’s Democratic Age, 1945-1973,” Contemporary European History, 13, 1 (February 2004): 
67-88; Jan-Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy: Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), esp. chapter four; Phil Nord, France’s New Deal: From the 1930s to 
the Postwar Era (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); and Nicolas Guilhot, The Democracy 
Makers: Human Rights and International Order (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). 
 
4 Jean-Dominique Durand used this phrase to refer to Pius XII’s 1944 message, in his L’Église catholique 
dans la crise de l’Italie (1943-1948) (Rome: École française de Rome, 1991), 407. Many other scholars 




couched in a shared vocabulary. Though this rhetorical overlap the concealed substantial 
differences of opinion that would gradually come to light, in 1944, Pius XII would seek to soften 
these differences by suggesting that the Vatican's vision of postwar Europe was fundamentally 
capable of reconciliation with that of the United States and Christian Democratic parties.  
 
1. The Papal and Allied Peace Platforms of 1942  
 
The deeper the United States became embroiled in the war, the more it needed the Vatican as a 
source of intelligence and legitimacy. In the late summer of 1942 -- boosted by success in the 
Pacific war -- Roosevelt instructed Myron Taylor to meet with Pius XII, win the Pope's support 
for the Allied platform, and begin sketching the outlines of the postwar peace. To guarantee his 
success, Taylor invited a marginalized American bishop who had long advocated American war 
against the Nazis to join him in the effort.5 The bishop and two like-minded American clerics 
proceeded to secretly draft a long document that would be presented as the work of the United 
States government. The text sought to convince the Pope to definitively endorse Allied war aims, 
including the Atlantic Charter and the Manifesto of the United Nations. By late August the draft 
was complete, and in mid September of 1942, Taylor traveled to Rome, with the text in hand. 6  
 The fine piece of black propaganda -- which purported to articulate a United States 
government position but was in fact the work of a small faction in the American Catholic 
hierarchy -- was read aloud by Taylor during his September 19 audience with the Pope.7 Taylor's 
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5 Taylor to Edward Mooney, September 2, 1942, Archives of the Archdiocese of Detroit. As cited in Charles 
Gallagher, S.J., Vatican Secret Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurley and Pope Pius XII (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2008), 136. 
 
6 For a broader discussion of this text, see ibid., 136-9. 
 
7 Compare the letter from Welles to FDR, 4 September 1942, which contains a full draft of the 
communiqué drafted by Archbishop Mooney, Bishop Hurley and Monsignor Ready, to that sent to the 
Pope by Taylor. Franklin Delano Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, New York (henceforth 
FDRL), President's Secretary's File (henceforth PSF), Box 51, “Diplomatic Correspondence: Vatican: 
Taylor, Myron C., 1942." 
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speech sought to cast American war aims in a language that would appeal to the Pope. The letter 
began by asserting that the friendship between the U.S. and the Vatican had been forged in the 
"parallel effort [...] for the preservation of peace" (i.e., the failed attempt to keep Italy out of the 
war). It went on to argue that the American entry into the war was the direct outcome of papal 
teachings. "In the just war which they are now waging," it asserted, "the people of the United 
States derive great spiritual strength and moral encouragement from a review of the utterances 
of His Holiness Pope Pius XII and his venerated Predecessor." Indeed, the Pope's statements 
had been their mark upon all Americans; "Catholic and non-Catholic have been profoundly 
impressed." Further, Taylor declared, the Pope's statements clearly showed that the Vatican and 
the United States were in the same camp. Take Pope Pius XI’s Mit Brennender Sorge, with its 
condemnation of "Nazi religious persecution," or Pius XII’s encyclicals and sermons, which 
outlined "the essential postulates of a just peace." Even the secret telegrams Pius XII had 
circulated following Germany's invasion of the Low countries contained "forthright and heroic 
expressions of indignation." Thus, Taylor boldly concluded, the Vatican and the United States 
had shared enemies: "the enemies of Christian civilization." And they also had a shared cause in 
the war. "Now that we are fighting against the very things which the Popes condemned," Taylor 
affirmed, "our conviction of complete victory is one with our confidence in the unwavering 
tenacity with which the Holy See will continue its magnificent moral leading."8  
 In addition to casting American policies as the actualization of papal pronouncements, 
the text argued that the postwar peace envisioned by the American administration was similar to 
that desired by the Vatican. Echoing FDR's commitment "to establish a new order in the spirit of 
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8 Memorandum of Taylor to Pius XII, Washington, 19 September 1942. Division of Rare and Manuscript 
Collections, Cornell University (henceforth RMC), Myron Taylor Papers, Folder 1, Box 1. The 





Christ,"9 Taylor stressed that the American President and the Pope both sought to “ensure rights 
and liberties to the world.” Indeed, these rights and liberties would be the centerpiece of the 
American peace. "The provisions of the Atlantic Charter and the Manifesto of the United 
Nations," Taylor boldly asserted, "are in substantial agreement with the Holy Father's above-
mentioned postulates for a just and lasting peace."10 
 Though Vatican officials responded positively to Taylor's speech, they asked him to 
return in a week with more details on the precise nature of the postwar order envisioned by the 
United States. "The Vatican would be much more enthusiastic when faced with the prospect of 
an allied victory in Europe if it felt reassured that this would not mean a period of anarchy 
following the victory," the head of the Vatican daily newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano, 
informed Taylor, alerting him to the Vatican's core worries regarding the spread of communism 
and left-wing unrest. "Do the Allies have concrete projects to maintain order after the cessation 
of hostilities?" he asked. "It is possible that the Vatican believes that the Axis, in case of victory, 
would have the means to maintain order, whereas the Allies, on the other hand, would not."11  
On September 25, 1942, Taylor met with Pius XII's Cardinal Secretary of State, 
Maglione, to allay the Vatican's fears by explaining the United States' postwar planning in 
greater detail. Taylor was prepared to do this by virtue of his ongoing work with the 
Subcommittee on Political Problems.12 In the September 25 meeting, Taylor informed Vatican 
intermediaries that the U.S. could guarantee the peace at war’s end, insofar as it was prepared to 
maintain “order in every country,” and set up a “world organization” or “world court,” endowed 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Aloisius Muench, "One World in Charity," (1946), reprinted as Appendix C in Suzanne Brown-Fleming, 
The Holocaust and the Catholic Conscience: Cardinal Aloisius Muench and the Guilt Question in 
Germany (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 154.  
 
10 Memorandum of Taylor to Pius XII, Washington, 19 September 1942. 
11 Memorandum of Conte Della Torre, September 1942. FDRL, Taylor Papers, Box 10. As cited in Ennio Di 
Nolfo, Vaticano e Stati Uniti, 1939-1952: Dalle carte di Myron C. Taylor (Milan: F. Angeli, 1978), 199. 
 
12 FDR gave formal approval to start postwar planning in 1942. See Anna Liza Su, "The Law on Religious 




with “enforcement powers,” and capable of settling “minor disputes between nations.” In 
particular, Taylor suggested that this world organization would help curb the Soviet Union’s 
antireligious forces and limit its expansionistic tendencies.13 He also reminded his interlocutors 
that the Soviet Union had already endorsed the Atlantic Charter, whose "preamble, among other 
things, asserts adherence to the principle of Religious Freedom." This showed that U.S. pressure 
could indeed force Russia to both "cease her ideological propaganda in other countries, and 
make religion really free within her borders."14 The United States was also preparing to provide 
extensive “relief immediately upon the cessation of hostilities,” again to avert the possibility of 
European individuals turning in despair to communism.15  
In closing, Taylor asked Vatican officials to articulate their vision for postwar Europe, 
particularly with regard to the redrawing of the boundaries of Central European states. Vatican 
officials readily concurred that redrawing the boundaries of European states would be an 
important way to protect the continent from the twin menace of Soviet and German 
expansionism. The most important place to redraw boundaries – Taylor and Vatican 
interlocutors agreed -- must be “that part of Europe bound roughly by Germany and Austria on 
the one side and by Russia on the other.” When Taylor suggested that the United States was 
considering recreating “the old Austria, the Empire,” Vatican officials showed themselves quite 
interested in the idea. The new “Austria which was set up by the Versailles treaty was a nation in 
name only,” one Vatican official lamented, resuscitating the old Vatican animus against the 
Versailles settlement. The post-Versailles Austria, “was bound to be a source of trouble because !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Memorandum of Conference between the Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione and Myron Taylor, 
prepared by Myron Taylor, 25 September 1942. FDRL, PSF, box 51, “Diplomatic Correspondence: 
Vatican: Taylor, Myron C., 1942.” 
 
14 Informal memorandum of Myron Taylor for discussion with Pope Pius XII, Maglione, Montini and 
Tardini on the Russian Post-War Position. FDRL, PSF, box 52, “Diplomatic Correspondence: Vatican: 
Taylor, Myron C., Report on [September] 1942 Trip.”  
 
15 Taylor is cited in the testimony of another person present at the meeting between Taylor and Maglione, 
the American priest, Father Walter Carroll. The Carroll memorandum of the meeting between Cardinal 




it was not self-sufficient.” The trouble with restoring the Empire, however, was what to do with 
all of the peoples within it “demanding autonomy and independence.” “If it were possible to 
have these various peoples accept a restoration of the former empire, then it might be possible 
to establish a new Austria,” Vatican officials concluded.16 The question merited further study – 
and were the Holy See to be invited to take part in a postwar peace conference by the United 
States or Great Britain, it would be happy to lend its support and advice. 17  
It is possible that in the course of discussion about European borders, Myron Taylor also 
presented Vatican officials with Sumner Welles' proposal to the Subcommittee on Political 
Problems. Welles' plan, completed in April of 1942, called for the redrawing of European 
boundaries according to religious lines so as to guarantee the peace. A Europe subdivided by 
religious faiths was justified by appeal to State Department maps, which showed that the 
continent was already in effect carved up into Catholic and Protestant blocs (figs. 1 and 2).18  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 Ibid. 
 
17 Memorandum of Conference between the Cardinal Secretary of State Maglione and Myron Taylor, 
prepared by Myron Taylor, 25 September 1942. FDRL, PSF, Box 51, “Diplomatic Correspondence: 
Vatican: Taylor, Myron C., 1942.” In late December of 1943, there is evidence that Pius XII was actively 
trying to push the creation of a larger Austria – to include Budapest as well – so as to isolate the Soviet 
Union. According to a secret report on the Vatican, “Pio XII sogna un’unione delle antiche nazioni 
civilizzate per isolare il bolscevismo a est, come fece Innocenzo XI, che unificò il continente e liberò 
Budapest e Vienna dai musulmani. Il pontefice ha tentato invano di convincere le potenze occidentali su 
questo punto…” “Events in the Vatican,” 13 December 1943. NACP, RG 226, s.210, b.440, f.1. As 
translated and reprinted in Nicola Tranfaglia, Come nasce la repubblica: la mafia, il Vaticano e il 
neofascismo nei documenti americani e italiani, 1943-1947 (Milano: Bompiani, 2004), 218-9. 
 
18 In the case of Germany, for instance, Welles favored a federated republic composed of three quasi-
autonomous states: the first consisting of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and the Rhine-
Ruhr region, including the Saar and Palatinate regions, would be predominantly Roman Catholic; the 
second, a North German confederation made up of Hesse, Thuringia, Westphalia, Oldenburg and the 
Hamburg region, including Schleswig and Holstein, would be largely Protestant; and the third would 
consist of Mecklenburg, Saxony, Silesia and a new Prussia, divested of East Prussia after its incorporation 
into Poland. NACP, Minutes of the Subcommittee on Political Problems, 1942-3 (henceforth P minutes), 
7, April 18, 1942, box 55; Ibid., Supporting documents of the Subcommittee on Political Problems, 1942-3 
(henceforth P documents), 175, "Agenda for Meetings on Germany," January 15, 1943, box 57; P 
document 186, "Memorandum to Welles from Division of Political Studies regarding Germany," January 
22, 1943, box 57; P document 182, "Myron Taylor memorandum on Germany," January 23, 1943, box 57; 
P minutes 5, April 4, 1942, box 55; P minutes 6, April 11, 1942; P document 121-a, "Tentative Views of the 
Subcommittee on International Organization," October 22, 1942, box 56. As cited in Christopher 
O'Sullivan, Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943 (New 




Religious minorities like the tragically shrinking Jewish minority were entirely out of the 
equation, insofar as the Committee deemed them a racial-ethnic category, on par with 
"Germans, Russians, Poles, and so forth." This led to the disturbing conclusion that while there 
could, for instance, be "Catholic Germans," there could not be "Jewish Germans" (fig. 3). 
Further, the plan suggested, making Europe Christian was all the more pressing because it was 
surrounded by an incurring "Moslem world," keen on self-determination (fig. 4).19 If Taylor 
presented this plan to Vatican officials, it is likely that they would have approved it, insofar as 
concordat diplomacy had been part of the Vatican response to minority rights regimes, via the 
construction of greater religious homogeneity under the state. Furthermore, as demonstrated by 
Pacelli's anti-Jewish views in the interwar years, and the pushback against Mussolini's 
entreaties to Muslim communities during World War II, pro-Jewish and pro-Muslim sentiment 
had not exactly been a Vatican forte in the interwar and war years.20 
Overall, Pius XII and his intermediaries showed themselves to be “very pleased” and 
“greatly impressed” by American plans to keep the Soviet Union at bay and keep Europe safe 
through the redrawing of boundaries and the distribution of aid. They noted with pleasure that 
the United States appeared committed to bringing about a postwar order characterized by “the 
preservation of man’s God-given rights,” as well as the “assurance of […] the vital interests of the 
Vatican and of Catholic Church.”21 Further, they agreed that without order and “the absolute 
necessities of life,” a most “fertile ground” would be created “for the seeds of internal strife and 
[communist] revolution.” They also liked the plan of a “world organization” or “world court,” 
and agreed that perhaps such an institution would help limit religious persecution in the Soviet !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 I learned of the Welles plan only recently, and would like to learn more about its details and try to 
ascertain whether Vatican officials were indeed informed of its contents. 
 
20 Of course, it is less clear whether Pius XII would have accepted relinquishing a part of Europe to 
Protestant groups. 
 
21 Carroll memorandum of the meeting between Cardinal Maglione and Taylor, 25 September 1942. 




Union. Finally, Vatican officials were flattered that Taylor had asked them to help reimagine 
Europe's borders and that he took seriously the idea of restoring the old Austrian Empire.22 
In sum, Taylor's meetings of 19 and 25 September had their intended effect, as the Pope 
made clear in his Christmas sermon of December 24, 1942. Resuscitating the language of the 
failed Holy Office project, Pius XII repeatedly defended the protection of "individual rights" and 
of religion, perhaps as a way to connect to the language of the 1942 Declaration of the United 
Nations and the Atlantic Charter. The 1942 Christmas message additionally laid out the 
Vatican's peace platform, emphasizing that "dignity and the rights of the human person" must 
be the foundation for the new social order following the war. Echoing recent conversations with 
Myron Taylor, Pius XII stated that, “the call of the moment is not lamentation but action; not 
lamentation over what has been, but reconstruction of what is to arise and must arise for the 
good society.” Happily, the Pope suggested, certain nations were already putting their energies 
towards planning for "reconstruction." Indeed, these nations were prepared to instantiate a 
“juridical order” founded on belief in God, which would protect the human being’s innate 
“dignity” and “unforgettable rights.” Echoing American condemnations of Nazi Germany and 
repurposing Catholic anti-totalitarianism, the Pope affirmed in closing that recent history had 
showed only too clearly that if the most “fundamental personal rights” were not protected, an 
“excessive herding of men, as if they were a mass without a soul,” would result.23  
Though Pius XII’s peace platform stopped short of a full-scale and explicit endorsement 
of the Atlantic Charter, it was quite well received by the Allied powers. The message was 
translated and reprinted in full on the pages of the New York Times on the same day it was 
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22 Memorandum of Taylor's conversation with Card. Maglione, Vatican City, 25 September 1942. FDRL, 
Taylor Papers, box 10. As cited in Di Nolfo, op.cit., 191. 
 
23 Pius XII, Christmas Address, 1942. As reprinted in The Major Addresses of Pope Pius XII, ed. Vincent 




delivered. 24 It was accompanied by two interpretive articles, which extolled the Pope for 
providing a “verdict in a high court of justice”: namely, that “fundamental personal rights” were 
non-derogable and that they must be protected through legal instruments.  As one American 
journalist stated, underlining the alliance between the United States and the Holy See, “Pope 
Pius expresses as passionately as any leader on our side the war aims of the struggle for 
freedom.”25 Though the journalist had missed Pius XII's attempt to situate Allied war aims 
within a Catholic framework, he or she had hit upon an important wartime development: the 
emergence of a language that was used by divergent forces to rally around a shared cause and 
condemn the Axis powers. By speaking a hybrid language of rights, Pius XII was showing 
himself to be a friend of the United States and suggesting the possibility of a reconciliation of the 
Vatican's "vital interests" with those of the United States. In 1942, only careful observers would 
have noticed that the Pope was making this crucial rhetorical move. Matters would become 
much more explicit in 1944, when the Pope strongly endorsed "democracy," the keyword of U.S. 
interventionist rhetoric. As he did so, the Pope attempted to reframe democracy talk within the 
context of the Vatican's interwar gains, using the term to legitimize a highly constrained and 
anti-secular model of democracy, which had in fact little to do with the kind of democracy 







24 “Text of Pius XII’s Christmas Message Broadcast from Pope to the World,” New York Times (25 
December 1942): 10. 
 
25 “The Pope’s Verdict,” The New York Times (25 December 1942): 16. Emphasis mine. For similar 




2. The Rise of "Christian Democracy"  
 
President Roosevelt had increasingly begun to yoke “democracy” and “Christianity” in his public 
speeches, as he prepared to have the United States join the war. 26 As explored in the previous 
chapter, following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States’ entry into war in December 
of 1941, the calls to save Christianity and democracy had gained strength, particularly following 
the launching of a propaganda effort to win over Catholics to the Allied cause. Furthermore, the 
yoking of “Christianity” and “democracy” was not simply popular in U.S. propaganda efforts; in 
the course of the 1940s, presenting the two terms as co-constitutive became increasingly 
common in the Western European context as well. The contested phrase was dusted off by 
Christian lay groups in 1942-3, as they formed national “Christian Democratic” political parties 
with strong transnational ties.  As compared to their interwar predecessors, these movements 
were more centrist and more closely bound to the Catholic Church. Many of their leaders had 
been trained in Catholic Action, which had shaped their views on concordat diplomacy and 
communism in important ways. 
 In Italy, the rebirth of Christian Democracy began in the summer of 1942, when a small 
group of Catholic laymen with strong connections to the Vatican gathered near Trento to lay the 
foundations for a new political party.27 Their leader, Alcide De Gasperi, had worked as a 
librarian at the Vatican in the interwar years, where he had quietly opposed concordat !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 On this general phenomenon, see David Zietsma, “‘Sin Has No History’: Religion, National Identity and 
U.S. Intervention, 1937-1941,” Diplomatic History 31 (June 2007): 531-565, and Andrew Preston, Sword 
of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 2012), 
Chapter 17.  
 
27 On the close link between many of these figures and Catholic Action, see Renato Moro, La formazione 
della classe dirigente cattolica (1929-1937) (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1979). The group which gathered near 
Trento, in the small city of Borgo Valsugana, was primarily composed of former members of the Italian 
Popular Party and members of the Movimento Guelfo d’Azione, a political party which had maintained a 
clandestine existence in Italy since the 1930s and which espoused close loyalty to the Pope. On this group, 
see Gioacchino Malavasi, L’antifascismo cattolico. Il movimento guelfo d’azione (1928-1948) (Rome: 
Edizioni Lavoro, 1982); and Carlo Brezzi, “Il gruppo guelfo fra gerarchia ecclesiastica e regime fascista,” in 
I cattolici tra fascismo e democrazia, ed. Pietro Scoppola and Francesco Traniello (Bologna: Il Mulino, 




diplomacy, all the while earning his keep by supplementing his librarian income with journalism 
jobs, including a stint at the Vatican's popular illustrated magazine, Illustrazione Vaticana.28 In 
October of 1942, a larger group met in Milan and founded the new political party under the 
contested name “Christian Democracy.” So as to avert potential problems with the Vatican, the 
members of the new party decided that they must take stock of the movement’s past failures. 
Rather than advocate for the separation of Church and State, as Luigi Sturzo had after World 
War I, the new political party vowed to help promote Church interests on the peninsula. 
Further, rather than operate independently from the Vatican hierarchy, the new movement 
decided to bring Vatican personnel onboard with its activities.29 In July of 1943 – just as Allied 
troops were landing in Sicily -- the newly founded party met at a famous monastery in a remote 
town of Camaldoli, near Arezzo, where they drafted their organizing principles. The process was 
overseen by the Bishop of Bergamo and Father Pietro Pavan, a young priest with close ties to 
Pope Pius XII.30  
The resulting Code of Camaldoli outlined the new party’s views on the state, the family, 
education, work, the economic regulation of society and international life. However, it made no 
mention of democracy, nor did it justify democratic forms of rule. Perhaps out of caution, its 
theses stayed close to the views outlined by Pope Pius XII and Pius XI on the importance of 
limiting excessive state power and the need for a corporatist economic order.  The fact that 
democracy was left out of the founding Code was also unsurprising in that key members of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 De Gasperi’s numerous articles for the Illustrazione Vaticana, published under the pseudonym 
“Spectator,” have been collected and reissued in Angelo Paoluzi, ed., De Gasperi e l'Europa degli anni 
Trenta,  (Rome: Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1974).  
 
29 Much works remains to be done on the rise of Christian democratic parties in Europe during the war 
and their relationship with the Vatican. For an introduction, see Jean-Marie Mayeur, Des partis 
catholiques à la Démocratie chrétienne (Paris: A. Colin, 1980); Jean-Dominique Durand, L’Europe de la 
démocratie chrétienne (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1995); Philippe Chenaux, Une europe vaticane? 
(Brussels: Editions Ciaco, 1990); and Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of the 
European Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
 
30 Pietro Pavan was indeed central in disseminating the myth that Pius XII was the Pope of democracy. 




new party with close ties to Vatican officials asserted that they “did not love the name” that De 
Gasperi had chosen for the party, and particularly the second word in that name.31 
The challenge of making a commitment to democracy an integral part of Italian Christian 
Democracy would be taken up by the party’s leader, Alcide De Gasperi, in January of 1944. He 
did so through a short pamphlet entitled La parola ai democratici cristiani, released under the 
telling pseudonym “Demofilo,” or demophile, lover of democracy.32 The pamphlet laid out the 
exact model of democracy that Christian Democrats could, and must, espouse. Speaking directly 
to the corporatist vision endorsed by the Vatican since Quadragesimo Anno, De Gasperi 
proposed to counter the risks of excessive state power represented by so-called “state 
totalitarianism” (il totalitarismo di stato) by empowering Italy’s individual regions with greater 
institutional autonomy. Direct democracy, De Gasperi recommended, must be heavily 
constrained by a multiplicity of local interests. Furthermore, there should only be a limited 
number of political parties allowed to vie for power -- already in Italy there were “fatally too 
numerous” (fatalmente troppi) groups. To curb the proliferation of parties and to instantiate a 
corporatist order, De Gasperi proposed that professional organizations, trade unions 
representing local interests, and regions within the Italian peninsula elect members of the 
Senate -- not the general electorate. Finally, in a sign of the emergent geopolitical balance of 
power, De Gasperi closed with a celebration of the British Commonwealth and the Pan-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 In a letter to don Sturzo, Mario Scelba had explained that the new party was called “Democrazia 
cristiana, col proposito di riunire vecchi e giovani che non conobbero il Ppi o che ne conobbero la storia 
attraverso la polemica fascista. Io non amo il nome perché, non avendo vissuto l’epoca leonina, non ne 
sento il fascino.” Letter from Scelta to Sturzo, 18 August 1944. For reasons unknown, this letter made it 
into the National Archives in College Park, Maryland. NACP, RG 226, s.92, b.531, f.10. As cited in 
Tranfaglia, Come nasce la repubblica, 240-1. 
 
32 “La molteplice esperienza mondiale degli ultimi 150 anni ha portato alla conclusione che il metodo più 
adatto alle presenti condizioni della convivenza umana è il metodo della libertà;…ne è anche risultato che 
il miglior sistema politico ci è dato da una democrazia rappresentativa fondata sull’uguaglianza dei diritti 
e dei doveri…Oltre la netta distinzione dei poteri, lo Stato democratico dovrà rispettare i diritti naturali 
dell’uomo e della famiglia e considerare le autonomie locali, sindacali, culturali ed economiche come lo 
spazio vitale del cittadino.”  Demofilo [Alcide De Gasperi],  “La parola ai democratici cristiani”  (January 
1944). As reprinted in Atti e documenti della D.C., 1943-1967, ed. Mariano Rumor (Rome: Edizione 




American Union, which had been established by the U.S. Secretary of State at the turn of the 
century and was reconstituted in 1948 as the Organization of American States. In an awkward 
attempt to liken transnational Christian Democracy to imperial or quasi-imperial structures, De 
Gasperi asserted that both the British Commonwealth and the Pan-American Union provided 
sources of inspiration for Christian Democracy, insofar as they, too, were committed to the 
principles of liberty and democracy and able to “keep peace within their borders.” As such, they 
represented a source of inspiration for a potential federation of Christian Democratic parties on 
European soil.33  
Soon after De Gasperi issued his pamphlet, leaders of the Christian Democratic party 
began to urge the Pope to speak out in their favor. From circa August of 1944, Pius XII's 
provisional Secretary of State, Giovanni Battista Montini, urged the Pope to back the Christian 
Democrats.34 However, the Pope remained silent. As late as October of 1944, leaders of the 
Christian Democratic party complained that the Pope had not yet clearly voiced his support for 
the party, despite repeated urgings to do so.35 Only in December of 1944 -- when Allied victory in 
Italy was assured, but extensive partisan activity continued in the North -- would Pius XII finally 
give his support to the new movement, and with it, to the Allied powers. Pius XII’s 1944 message 
allowed him to express shared ownership over the concept of “democracy,” and also redefine it 
in a narrow and novel sense. Tellingly, neither De Gasperi nor other leading Christian 
Democrats were involved in drafting the speech, which was the work of two theologians who had 
never explicitly theorized democracy before. The speech they crafted for Pius XII reflected their 
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33 Ibid.  
 
34 “Report of the Vatican on the Catholic-communist movement,” 27 August 1944. National Archives in 
College Park, Maryland (henceforth NACP), RG 226, s.108, b.152, f. jp-1000. As reprinted in Tranfaglia, 
Come nasce la repubblica, 246-7. 
 
35 “Alcuni membri del partito hanno faticato nel tentativo di convincere il papa a pronunciare parole di 
incoraggiamento al partito, parole che non sono mai arrivate.” Letter from Vincent J. Scamporino to the 
Director of the OSS and the Chief of the Italian sector of Si, Earl Brennan, 3 October 1944. NACP, RG 226, 




work on Catholic corporatism as a third-way solution to liberal democracy and Nazi-Fascist 
totalitarianism.  
 
3. New Words, Old Ideas? Pius XII's Redefinition of "Democracy"  
 
Pope Pius XII's speech would be delivered as part of the midnight mass in St. Peter's Cathedral, 
on Sunday, December 24, 1944. By this point, the Pope had become very much a public figure by 
virtue of his 1942 film Pastor Angelicus, frequent radio sermons, and highly choreographed 
appearances in bombarded working-class neighborhoods in Rome.36 As the sky over Rome fell 
dark, hundreds of thousands of Italians and foreigners thus flooded the Basilica and filled the 
surrounding square to capacity to catch a glimpse of the spiritual celebrity and lend an ear to his 
annual assessment of world affairs. Those who could not make it onsite tuned in to Vatican 
Radio, to hear the sermon live over the airwaves (Figs. 6 and 7). 
Pope Pius XII’s 1944 sermon had a simple three-part rhetorical structure: question-
answer-warning. Question: (1) Would it be possible to build a postwar order that could prevent 
the occurrence of future wars? Answer: (2) Yes, through the creation of “true democracy.” 
Warning: (3) “True democracies” must be carefully distinguished from “false democracies,” 
which would lead the world back into war and destruction. 
The Pope set up his question by describing the war in apocalyptic terms. He mourned the 
great suffering of the “dreadful war”: its “sinister darkness,” “mournful groans of sorrow,” 
“heart-rending anguish” and the “blazing heat of a prison-like furnace,” which had been created 
by unprecedented aerial bombardments. However, the Pope noted, the suffering had not been 
for naught. If a “deliberate straying from Christ” had brought about war, the glorious “new era” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 For a comparison of the cult of the Duce to that of Pius XII, as well as an analysis of the content of the 
“cult of Pius XII,” see Oliver Logan, “Pius XII: Romanità, prophesy and charisma,” Modern Italy 3, 2 
(1998): 237-47. Clips of Pius XII’s rehearsals for film and TV appearances are provided in Luigi Bizzarri, 
“Pio XII, Principe di Dio,” screened Rai Tre on 29 December 2006. The segment is available on Youtube, 




which was “dawning” would be one of “far-reaching renovation” in all domains of life. The “total 
reordering of the world,” Pius XII affirmed, would involve the replacement of stale, failed 
models of government with new, more lasting, forms -- forms “more in keeping with the dignity 
and liberty of citizens.”37   
But what exact shape might this new political order take? Faced with the failures of 
authoritarianism, the Pope noted, large numbers of people were now espousing the “democratic 
tendency.”38 In the abstract, this was a move that the Pope could endorse. Citing Pope Leo XIII’s 
famous words, Pius XII asserted that, “Catholic teachings on the origin and use of the authority” 
were the yardsticks by which the Church judged which “of the various forms of government” it 
considered legitimate. If democracies were in keeping with Catholic teachings, then the Church 
would neither “forbid” nor “disapprove” of them.39 As long as it did not contradict papal 
teachings, democracy could be an acceptable political form. However, Leo XIII's 
recommendation still left open the important question of what exactly democracy was. The 
precise meaning of the buzzword, Pius XII affirmed, remained “vague and confused,” and this 
constituted a "problem."40 Thus, the Pope explained that his message would be dedicated to a 
definition and exploration of “the problem of democracy.”41 If “the future is to belong to 
democracy,” the Pope affirmed, then that “democracy” must be defined precisely and made safe !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 Pope Pius XII, “Democracy and a Lasting Peace” (24 December 1944), §6; 9; 11; 12. 
 
38 Ibid., §13. 
 
39 “The Church does not disapprove of any of the various forms of government [….] It is not forbidden to 
prefer temperate, popular forms of government, without prejudice, however, to Catholic teaching on the 
origin and use of authority.” Pope Leo XIII, Libertas (20 June 1888), as cited in Pope Pius XII, 
“Democracy and a Lasting Peace,” §14. Pius XII explained that the Church judged the legitimacy of 
“republics” and “monarchies” by precisely the same logic. He further noted that, “democracy, broadly 
defined, admits of various forms, and can be realized in monarchies as well as in republics.” Ibid., §15-6. 
 
40 Ibid., §12. 
 
41 Section one of the message – entitled “Dawn of Hope” (and composed of paragraphs 1 through 10) – 
was followed by section two entitled, “The Problem of Democracy.” Section two is the overarching title for 
the entire rest of the message (paragraphs 11 through 93) and may accordingly be considered a kind of 
alternate title for the encyclical as a whole. Thus, the core of the Pope’s message was the double assertion 




for the world.42 What shape should a democracy take in order to be in keeping with “Catholic 
teachings,” and not become a "problem"?  That is, what was the model of democracy that the 
Vatican could stand behind? 
Transitioning from part one to part two of the sermon -- that is, from question to answer 
-- Pius XII asserted that the Vatican could only favor “true democracy.” “True democracies,” the 
Pope stated, must recognize the Vatican as their source of legitimacy, and place the Vatican in a 
position to provide state leaders with directives, guidelines, and prescriptions. “Christ and his 
Church” must be recognized as “the ultimate foundation and directing norm of every [true] 
democracy.”43 “Only a clear appreciation of the purposes assigned by God to every human 
society,” the Pope stated, “can put those in power in a position to fulfill their own obligations in 
the legislative, judicial and executive order.”44 Indeed, a “sound democracy” deserving of its 
name could only be one “based on the immutable principles of natural law and revealed truth,” 
insofar as “the authority of God” was the ultimate source of political legitimacy.45 In sum, Pius 
XII's definition of "true" or "sound democracy" implicitly called into question the underlying 
premise of many democratic theories of the day: the idea that legitimacy derives from popular 
sovereignty rather than from God or the Church.46 It also undermined the signal liberal 
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42 How conservative movements discussed the need to make democracy “safe for the world” in the period 
following 1945 is discussed in Charles S. Maier, “Democracy since the French Revolution,” in Democracy: 
The Unfinished Journey, 508 BC to AD 1993, ed. John Dunn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
126.  
 
43 Pius XII, “Democracy and a Lasting Peace” (24 December 1944), §19. Similar ideas were touched upon 
in various of Pius XII’s speeches. See, e.g., his Christmas message of 24 December 1951, §25. 
 
44 Pius XII, “Democracy and a Lasting Peace," §41. 
 
45 Ibid., §44; 39. 
 
46 Similar thoughts were expressed by Pius XII, in his “Speech to the Rota Romana” (2 October 1945): 
“Certamente il medio evo cristiano, particolarmente informato dallo spirito della Chiesa, con la sua 
dovizia di fiorenti comunità democratiche mostrò come la fede cristiana sappia creare una vera e propria 




democratic principle of the separation of Church and state -- a principle against which concordat 
diplomacy had militated so effectively.47  
To justify this somewhat unusual definition of democracy, Pius XII followed the lead of 
American Catholics and the U.S. intelligence campaign by noting that true democratic ideas in 
fact originated in Christian teachings. This was particularly the case with three terms closely 
associated with democratic theory: “liberty,” “equality” and “the people.” Because these were in 
origin Christian concepts, only by recognizing their Christian heritage would democracies 
accomplish their stated aims and function smoothly. “Liberty,” the Pope reminded, was defined 
by Thomas Aquinas and Church fathers as the moral duty of the individual to perfect him or 
herself, thus imitating the perfect Creator to whom he owes his life. It implied the individual’s 
freedom to pursue the “common good” as a supranational and non-earthly aim.48 “Equality” 
referred to the inherent value of human beings as equal in the eyes of God and united in a single 
“family of peoples.”49 However, because God endowed human beings with different qualities, 
“there is an order to be found among men,” and society is necessarily composed of stratifications 
and class distinctions. Attempting to eliminate these class distinctions via a “mechanistic 
flattening, or monochrome uniformity” was a barren strategy that only fools (or communists) 
would pursue.50  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Throughout his pontificate, Pope Pius XII argued for the “intrinsic involvement” of the Vatican with 
political affairs, and hence with the state. By the time of his 1944 message, Pius XII had already made this 
claim on several occasions. See, e.g., his radio message on Pentecost, 1 June 1941. AAS, 33 (1941), 195-
205. He repeated similar ideas in his address of 20 February 1946 to the College of Cardinals, and in his 
radio messages to the German Katholikentage of 4 September 1949 and 17 August 1958. 
 
48 In the same vein, Father Fulton J. Sheen argued that Catholicism was incompatible with liberal 
democracy (which “understands freedom as the right to do whatever you please”), but compatible with a 
model of democracy which recognized “the sacredness of the individual” and the “Christian concept of 
freedom, which is the right to do whatever you ought.” Fulton J. Sheen, Philosophies at War (New York: 
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1943), 23; 175. 
 
49 Ibid., §53. Some analysts have considered this passing statement to be a condemnation of Nazi 
Germany’s anti-Semitic tenets and practices. Though this may be the case, the critique was extraordinarily 
subtle.  
 
50 Pope Pius XII, “Democracy and a Lasting Peace,” §32-3; 35-46; 84. According to Paul E. Sigmund, Pius 
XII's reference point here was Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, 4, 81, and Summa Theologica, 
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Finally, Pius XII emphasized that the concept of “the people” was one to which 
“prominent Christian thinkers from time immemorial” had devoted great attention. “The 
people,” the Pope clarified, were “original subjects endowed with civic rights by God.” They were 
to be scrupulously distinguished from “the masses,” which constituted an "impulsive [and] 
shapeless multitude,” highly susceptible to propaganda and bribery.51 Following a resurgent 
nineteenth-century conception of the lower and worker-class as animalistic, uneducated, and 
unethical,52  Pius XII affirmed, unequivocally: “The masses are the capital enemy of true 
democracy.”53 So as to guarantee that politicians become “representatives of the entire people 
and not the mandatories of the mob,” it was imperative that these leaders be “spiritually 
eminent,” of “solid Christian convictions,” and of superior “intellectual capacity.”54 Thus, though 
Pius XII recognized the principle of equality in a nominal sense, he also espoused a deep 
suspicion of “the masses” and accordingly called for the delegation of authority to society’s most 
Catholic, and most intelligent, individuals, who would become its leaders. In this sense, Pius 
XII’s model of democracy contained elements that made it analogous to a rival form of political 
rule – aristocracy, insofar as it privileged the rule of the enlightened few over the uneducated 
masses.  
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I, q.92, arts.3-4. Id., “The Catholic Tradition and Modern Democracy,” The Review of Politics 49, 4 
(Autumn 1987): 530-48, here 534. Mariano Cordovani also analyzes these passages from Aquinas in his 
Spunti di sociologia (Rome: Belardetti, 1948), 35-42; 76-110. 
 
51 Pius XII made the same point in his “Speech to the Rota Romana” (2 October 1945), when he noted that 
totalitarianism “lascia le decisioni giudiziarie in balìa di un mutevole istinto collettivo.” In AAS, 37 (1945), 
256-62.  
 
52 This antipathy towards the “masses” was discussed at length in a best-selling nonfiction work:  José 
Ortega y Gasset’s La rebelión de las masas. This work -- first published in 1930, and on the best-seller list 
in Europe throughout the 1940s and 1950s -- argued that “the masses” entered politics with the French 
Revolution, and are antithetical to the “noble life” and to individual choice. On the influence of this work 
in postwar Europe, see Müller, op. cit., 126-7.  
 
53 Pope Pius XII, “Democracy and a Lasting Peace,” §21-7. 
 




Having established the true history of true democracy, Pius XII proceeded to close his 
sermon with a warning.  “If the future will belong to democracy,” he noted, “the religion of 
Christ and the Catholic Church must play an essential role in its realization.”55 If this did not 
come to pass, states would once against seize excessive powers. Indeed, without a foundation in 
Christ and the Church, “even democratic regimes, notwithstanding their appearance to the 
contrary,” would devolve into a “pure and simple absolutism," based on the “false principle that 
the authority of the state is unlimited,” and thus entitled to ignore the “absolute order, 
established by God.”56 In sum, even “a democracy could easily change and grow deformed, and 
with the passage of time it is subject to fall into ‘totalitarianism’ or ‘authoritarianism.’”57  
Pius XII’s theory of the ideal (democratic) state, and the threat posed by totalitarianism 
to it, was heavily influenced by the work of the two men who are widely credited with helping 
the Pope write his 1944 speech: the German Jesuit Gustav Gundlach (1892-1963) and the Italian 
Dominican Mariano Cordovani (1883-1950).58 Interestingly, neither figure had ever explicitly 
theorized democracy prior to 1944. 59 Instead, in the interwar years, the two men had spent their 
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55 Ibid., §82. 
 
56 Ibid., §47-9. 
 
57 See ibid., and the 1945 “Speech to the Rota Romana,” 259: “…una democrazia senza [il rispetto dei] 
diritti di Dio e [della] dignità della persona umana…sarebbe difettosa e malferma. Quando dunque il 
popolo si allontana dalla fede cristiana o non la pone risolutamente come principio del vivere civile, allora 
anche la democrazia facilmente si altera e si deforma e col trascorrere del tempo è soggetta a cadere nel 
‘totalitarismo’ o nell’‘autoritarismo’ di un solo partito.” 
 
58 Gundlach is credited with having written the first drafts of all of the most important speeches of the 
Pope on social matters. Cordovani's influence was more mediated, but nonetheless decisive. For the 
influence of Cordovani and Gundlach on Pius XII, see Philippe Chenaux, Pie XII: Diplomate et pasteur 
(Paris: Cerf, 2003), 309; Johannes Schwarte, Gustav Gundlach, S.J. (1892-1963) (München: Paderborn, 
1975), 126-7, 132-5, 590-1; Antonio Acerbi, La Chiesa nel tempo: Sguardi sui progetti di relazioni tra 
Chiesa e società civile negli ultimi cento anni (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1984), 158ff. 
 
59 Nor did they do so afterwards. During his time working with Pius XII's Secretariat of State, Father 
Gundlach would for instance distinguish himself by developing the theories undergirding the Pope's 
attack on communist parties and the worker-priest movement, as well as the notion of nuclear warfare as 
"just war." For the latter, see Gustav Gundlach, "Die Lehre Pius XII vom modernen Krieg," Stimmen der 





energies on developing an alternative ideal Catholic state, which was antithetical in both theory 
and practice to liberal democracies and to totalitarian dictatorships, as really existing in Fascist 
Italy, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Father Gundlach’s initial impetus for the project had 
been his opposition to Nazism’s “hyper-statism” from as early as 1934; Father Cordovani had 
originally taken an interest in the question so as to expose the “statolatrous” tendencies of 
Fascist Italy’s leading philosopher, Giovanni Gentile.60 In the course of the 1930s, the two men 
had independently developed a diagnosis of the ills of extant political models and begun 
outlining their alternative ideal.  
Father Gundlach took as his point of departure the work of his teacher, the German 
Jesuit Heinrich Pesch.61 Gundlach had begun developing a distinctly Catholic sociological 
method with the help of other participants in the German Königswinter Study Circle (discussed 
in Chapter Three), which contributed decisively to Pius XI’s Quadragesimo Anno.62 Forced into 
exile from Germany following Hitler’s seizure of power, Gundlach had left Germany for Rome, 
where he taught at the Gregorian University between 1934 and 1938. It is likely that his !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 See Mariano Cordovani, Cattolicesimo ed Idealismo (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1928). Cordovani is 
discussed at greater length in Chapter Six. 
 
61 Gustav Gundlach’s first substantive research project was entitled, On the Sociology of Catholic Ideas 
and the Jesuit Order, and defended in 1927, under the supervision of Heinrich Pesch, S.J. (who died in 
1926). It was published as Zur soziologie der katholischen ideenwelt und des jesuitenordens (Frieburg im 
Breisgau: Herder, 1927).   
For Gundlach’s articulation of his debt to Pesch, see Gustav Gundlach, “Solidarismus,” in Staatslexikon, 
ed. Hermann Sacher (Freiburg: Herder, 1931), col.1631-1621. As Pesch summarized the theory 
(emphasizing the concept of rights): “Christianity makes no distinctions between races, nations or classes 
with regard to human solidarity. For it, there is no class of pariahs who have no rights…The state is more 
than a mass of individual beings. It is a moral-organic unity, a community of people governed by public 
well-being as its objective. Citizens are morally obligated to assist this objective. They should serve the 
public welfare with their labor, positively by their economic achievements, negatively by respecting the 
rights of others and the public well being in their striving for income.” As cited in Donald J. Dietrich, 
Catholic Citizens in the Third Reich: Psycho-Social Principles and Moral Reasoning (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Books, 1988), 70, fn. 56. 
 
62 Gundlach also issued the authoritative interpretation of Quadragesimo Anno in, Die sozialen 
Rundschreiben Leos XIII und Pius’ XI. Text und deutsche Ubersetzung samt systematischen 
Inhaltsübersichten und einheitlichem Sachregister (Berlin: Paderborn Schöningh, 1931; 1933). This was 
revised and expanded first in Papst Pius XI, zur heutigen Wirstschafts und Gesellshaftsnot: kurze 
Erläuterung des Rundschreibens Quadragesimo Anno (Berlin: Buchverlag Germania, 1932); and again in 
Grundzüge der Gesellshaftslehr (zum Verständnis der Enzyklika Quadragesimo anno) (Valkenburg: 




continued contact with the many members of this Circle who left Germany for the United States, 
where they played a crucial role in institutionalizing Catholic sociology, shaped his views 
throughout the 1930s and beyond.63  
Throughout the interwar years, Gundlach defended the notion that the ideal Catholic 
state must fully reject socialism and communism and heed Catholic principles of social 
solidarity.64 Insofar as human beings have an essentially social character and are situated within 
a hierarchical social order ascending from the person to the family and the state, the state must 
wield limited powers, facilitate the cohesion of local solidaristic networks, and guarantee the 
vocational and spiritual rights of citizens. 65 As Gundlach specified, this ideal Catholic state was 
antithetical to the underlying core commitments of both totalitarian and liberal democratic 
thinking. While totalitarianism privileged communitarianism and the expansion state powers 
over and against individual freedom (thus infringing upon the individual’s right to pursue “the 
common good” and fulfill his Christian duties), liberal democracies privileged freedom from 
rather than freedom to, conceiving of society in contractualist terms, thus breeding selfishness 
and solitude. 66  Though Gundlach asserted that in certain under-specified cases the ideal 
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63 The subject merits further study. Members of the Königswinter Circle who ended up in the U.S. include 
Heinrich Rommen, Götz Briefs, Franz H. Mueller (1900-1994) and his wife, Therese J. Geuer Mueller 
(1905-2002), the latter of whom also played an important role in Quadragesimo Anno.  Some of these 
figures, such as Heinrich Rommen, were able to flee thanks to the assistance of the Episcopal Committee 
for Catholic Refugees. The Muellers moved to St. Paul, Minnesota. Franz Mueller became Professor of 
Economics at the College of St. Thomas (now St. Thomas University) in St. Paul. Götz Briefs taught first at 
the Catholic University of DC, and then became a full professor at Georgetown University. Heinrich 
Rommen taught economics at St. Joseph’s College in Connecticut (1938-1946), and political science at St. 
Thomas College in Minnesota (1946-1953). He was subsequently appointed Distinguished Professor at 
Georgetown University. 
 
64 Several notable texts authored by Gustav Gundlach before 1944 focused on socialism and communism, 
including his Habilitationsschrift, Zum Begriff der Klasse und des Klassenkampfes (Berlin: Phil-Theol. 
Hochschule Sankt Georgen, 1930), and Sozialismus und sozialistische Bewegung (Berlin: Paderborn 
Schöningh, 1931). Gundlach would write extensively on the irreconcilability of Catholicism with both 
socialism and communism in his postwar writings.  
 
65 This summary is provided in Dietrich, Catholic Citizens in the Third Reich, 70.  
 
66 Gundlach referred to this “third way” thinking on numerous occasions. In his memoirs, the Swiss 
Catholic theologian Hans Küng (1928--) recalled studying with Gundlach in the Königswinter circle, and 
then in a “Social Circle” or sociological circle which Gundlach ran in Vatican City. “Gustav Gundlach,” he 
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Catholic state could be compatible with parliamentary democracy, he simultaneously reiterated 
his strong distrust of the hyper-rationalized character of modern democratic states.67  
Mariano Cordovani’s theory of the ideal Catholic state was similarly formulated as an 
alternative “third way” between the reckless all-powerful state of totalitarianism and the un-
rooted, free market-mentality created by liberal individualism. 68  Unlike Gundlach, whose 
contacts with the German laity had been enlivened by his time in Königswinter, Cordovani had 
matured intellectually exclusively within the confines of Roman, clerical, settings. Between 1927 
and 1932, the Dominican priest would serve as regent at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas 
Aquinas, also known as the Angelicum, which Pius XI had indicated as the pre-eminent site for 
the study of St. Thomas Aquinas, and the official “sedes Thomae.” 69  At the Angelicum, 
Cordovani would play an instrumental role in developing interwar Thomism in new directions.70  
In the preface to one of his works, Cordovani explained that he was motivated by the 
great neo-Thomist project, “to marry reason and faith.” He added that he also sought “the 
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wrote, “impresse[d] us with his knowledge, perspicacity, wit and aggressiveness […] He is the one who 
makes me aware for the first time that there is a ‘third way’ between individualism and collectivism, 
capitalism and socialism, which regulates ‘solidarism’ through the principle of personality, solidarity and 
subsidiarity.” Hans Küng, My Struggle for Freedom: A Memoir (Grand Rapids: Saint Paul University, 
2003), 56. 
 
67 Gundlach discussed his views on democracy in general and on the Weimar republic in particular in a 
seminar of the Königswinter circle, on 12-13 May 1932. As referenced in Jürgen Elvert, “A Microcosm of 
Society or the Key to a Majority in the Reichstag? The Centre Party in Germany,” in Political Catholicism 
in Europe, 1918-1945, eds. Wolfram Kaiser and Helmut Wohnout (New York: Routledge, 2004), 38-53, 
here 44, footnote 42; Dietrich, Human Rights and the Catholic Tradition (New Brunswick: Transaction 
Publishers, 2007), 167, fn. 59.  
 
68 “…La storia viene ad insegnarci che la questione dei rapporti fra autorità e libertà non è nuova, e che se 
il liberalismo ha nel suo passivo molti peccati da espiare, l’assolutismo di tutti I tempi non si è dimostrato 
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marriage between the love of the Church and of my country,” namely, Italy.71 Appealing to 
Thomas Aquinas, the Dominican priest explained that the best kind of state was one committed 
to a corporatist order, which protected private property against the excesses of both totalitarians 
and liberals.72 Despite his stated project to reconcile Church teachings with the politics of the 
Italian state, Cordovani did not explicitly affirm whether the ideal corporate state would be 
democratic or committed to some other political form.73  However, Cordovani did emphasize 
that the philosophical system of Aquinas militated against the atheism inherent in the “political 
modernism” of both communism and liberalism. He argued that both systems of thought were 
based on “rationalism and naturalism,” and amounted to “the negation of God and 
Christianity.”74 Accordingly, these systems constituted “a violation of natural human rights,” 
which impinged on the intellectual and spiritual “perfection” of the human person, as discussed 
by Thomas Aquinas and mandated by God.75 Worrying in particular that young Catholics would 
be led astray by these nefarious teachings, Cordovani denounced all those who “renounce 
Catholicism, in the amiable company of Kant and Hegel.” 76  
In sum: Pius XII's 1944 message on democracy emerged from an extensive interwar 
theorization of the ideal Catholic state as the antithesis to Nazi-Fascist totalitarianism, 
communism, and liberal democracy. Unsurprisingly, the 1944 message addressed the risk of 
Nazi-Fascist and communist totalitarianism, highlighting the dangers of excessive state power !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Cordovani, “Gli Universitari Cattolici,” Saggezza e santità: meditazioni filosofiche (Milano: Ancora, 
1931), 234-45. 
 
72 Cordovani, Spunti di sociologia, 284. 
 
73 See Cordovani, Per la dignità della persona umana (Brescia, Morcelliana, 1943) and Tirannia e libertà: 
l’uomo e lo Stato (Roma, Editrice Studium, 1945). 
 
74 Cordovani, “L’insegnamento di Pio XI,” Saggezza, 39-53; and “Il pensiero cristiano nel messaggio di 
Benedetto Croce ai filosofi americani,” Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 19 (1927), 174ff. This was a 
response by Cordovani to an address Croce had delivered in September 1926, at the Sixth International 
Philosophy Congress, held in Cambridge, Massachusetts.  
 
75 Id., “L’insegnamento di Pio XI,” 227. 
 
76 Cordovani, “La Chiesa e la filosofia,” Saggio, 35. 
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and the creation of mass-men. Though for evident reasons liberal democracy was not 
condemned explicitly by the message, some of the positioning against it by Gundlach and 
Cordovani did creep into the text, for instance when the Pope condemned those states which 
considered themselves simply “amorphous agglomeration of individuals” rather than organic 
societies.77 Further, the whole project of the message -- defining a new Vatican-approved model 
of democracy -- was in keeping with interwar debates about a Catholic "third way." As the Jesuit 
journal Civiltà Cattolica defined it, the ideal Catholic polity that Pius XII hoped would emerge 
from the ruins of the war must be, "organized in such a way as to recognize Jesus Christ as its 
supreme King."78 Thus, rather than endorsing any existing political form, Pius XII made clear 
that constructing a religiously imbued "true democracy" was a goal for which all God-loving 
people must strive. Far from accepting a plurality of potential models of democracy, Pius XII’s 
highly constrained model recognized no alternatives and no modifications; anything that did not 
conform to his model in every respect was deemed by definition both anti-democratic and 
illegitimate. As we have seen, his maximalist stance on the foundational and directive power of 
Catholicism and the Vatican was very much in line with a long-standing nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century tradition; now, it was now defended through the redefinition of an 




Largely ignoring the Vatican's attempt to rewrite democratic theory in Catholic terms, the 
American press welcomed the Pope's speech as a “momentous pronouncement” which 
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78 "[Una società cristiana] ordinata a riconoscere Gesú Cristo come il suo Re supremo." Andrea Oddone, 




supposedly proclaimed “democracy as the best form of rule.”79 The sermon was presented as a 
powerful celebration of the political alliance between the Vatican and the American government. 
Journalists latched onto the fact that in his closing lines, Pius XII had praised with 
unprecedented boldness “the United States of America,” highlighting in particular the hard work 
of Myron Taylor, referred to as “His Excellency the personal Representative of the President of 
the Union.”80 Journalists further suggested that American soldiers had “liberated” not only 
Italians, but also the Pope, from his prison within Fascist Italy. As proof, they noted that “many 
Allied military personnel,” had been present at the time of the Pope’s speech in the Basilica of St. 
Peters, where a “throng estimated at 100,000 jammed every available inch […] and overflowed 
into the courtyards on all sides of the huge church.”81 Similar demonstrations of Pope Pius XII’s 
high esteem for the United States were staged for the international press. Countering the image 
of an anti-modern, aloof,  "Vicar of Christ," the Pope was shown with broad smiles and in 
intimate discourse with large groups of American men and women (figs.8-10).  
As I have tried to show in this chapter, Pius XII’s prescriptive 1944 message was directly 
connected to the Vatican's core diplomatic priority: maintaining Vatican influence in Europe, 
and ensuring that groups willing to preserve that influence come to power. If in World War I, 
Pacelli had sided with the war's losers and thundered against democracy as a conspiratorial plot 
to destroy the Vatican and Catholicism as such, during World War II he sided with the victors, 
and sought to "lay claim to democracy," and redefine it in a way that could remind the Pope's 
interlocutors that the Vatican had a vision for Europe that must be respected.82 Both the 
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American government and European Christian Democratic parties had invited the Pope to join 
the conversation about democracy since the early 1940s, as a way to increase their own 
legitimacy and obtain the promise of support. From 1942, the Americans had in fact attempted 
repeatedly asked the Pope to speak in their favor by promising close postwar collaboration. So 
too, by 1942-3, a newborn and significantly tamer Christian Democratic movement had actively 
sought the official approval of the Pope, promising obedience to him if that support was 
forthcoming. As Pius XII’s important 1944 message showed, the Vatican was willing to partner 
with these forces on the condition that it could maintain its interwar prominence on European 
soil. The Vatican's attempt to rebuild postwar Europe in the image of the interwar years was not 
a project circumscribed to the rhetorical realm, as the subsequent chapter will try to show.  












Fig.1: U.S. postwar planning map, showing religion subdividing East-Central Europe.  
 
Source: Subcommittee on Political Problems, April 24, 1942.83 
 
 
Fig. 2: U.S. postwar planning map presenting Germany as a land neatly subdivided between 
"predominantly Protestant" purple areas, and "predominantly Catholic" pink ones. Judaism and 









Fig.3: Ethnic Map of Poland, prepared for use by the Subcommittee on Political Problems, 
1941-3. Note that the paradoxical situation of classifying Jews as an ethnicity leads the map to 





Fig. 4: U.S. postwar planning map presenting Africa, the Middle East and Asia as regions of the 
world so dominated by Islam that it is appropriate to refer to them uniformly as "the Moslem 
world." The entirety of Western and Eastern Europe (including Greece, "purged" of Muslim 
influence by Lausanne) is depicted as Muslim-free. 
 







Fig.5: Crowds thronged St. Peter’s square when Pope Pius XII spoke to the people of Rome the 
day after its liberation by Allied troops. Vatican City, June 5, 1944. 
 












       
Figs.6 and 7: The interior of St. Peter’s on December 24, 1944. In the left-hand photo, men 
stand atop a confessional booth to catch a glimpse of the Pope.  
 
Source: Time Magazine (December 1944). Photos by Margaret Bourke-White. 
 
                            
 
Figs.8-10: Pius XII warmly welcomes Allied personnel (left), Allied journalists (center) and 
American soldiers (right) soon after the liberation of Rome in June of 1944. 
 









St Thomas [Aquinas] made the new by accident, as all he wanted to make was the truth; today, 
on the other hand, we make the new on purpose, and now it’s the truth which will be 
constructed only by accident. 
-- Jacques Maritain, 19301 
 
 
Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself. (I am large, I contain multitudes.) 





To summarize the arc of my argument thus far: after World War I, the Vatican reconfigured 
Church-state relations through concordat diplomacy and by launching a campaign against the 
Soviet Union, in which many of its concordat partners had a direct stake. During the Second 
World War, the Vatican began cultivating a relationship with the United States, which promised 
to remain in Europe after the war and work with the Vatican to rebuild the continent and protect 
it against the Soviet Union. Through his Christmas sermon of 1944, Pius XII definitively 
signaled his willingness to partner with the United States and Christian Democratic parties, on 
the condition that they recognize the Vatican's primacy in European affairs. 
 This chapter shows how in the early postwar years, the Vatican sought to use its interwar 
gains and wartime alliance-building to ensure that European Christian Democratic parties and 
the United States were acting in its best interest. In particular, I focus on how after the Yalta 
Conference, the Vatican re-energized its anticommunist campaign, which it used as a means of 
pressuring the United States -- and to a lesser extent, Christian Democratic parties -- to act in 
conformity with its wishes. Once the United States turned against the Soviet Union, the two !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Jacques Maritain, Le docteur Angelique (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1930), 107-8. 
 




powers worked closely together for a brief, but intense, period. The collaboration was motivated 
by a conviction shared by the Pope, the United States president, and many U.S. officials 
stationed in Germany and Italy, that Christianity in general -- and Catholicism in particular -- 
was a superb weapon in the fight against communism. The chapter highlights in particular two 
sites of collaboration between the Vatican and the United States: their work in U.S.-occupied 
Germany between 1946 and 1949, and their collaboration in Italy, during the national elections 
of 1948. 
 
1. The Resurgence of the Vatican Anticommunist Campaign 
 
Between January and February of 1945, the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the 
Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain met in 
Yalta, to plan the defeat and occupation of Germany and the fate of Eastern Europe. The 
conference confirmed the previously accepted subdivision of Germany into occupation zones 
administered by America, French, British and Soviet forces, and called for free elections in 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.  
 Vatican officials promptly showed their displeasure at being excluded from preliminary 
talks and at the respect accorded Stalin.  “We are struck by the silence of the three great powers 
on Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia,” American Catholic bishops announced, speaking in one voice. 
In addition to failing to so much as mention two of the Vatican's concordat strongholds, the 
agreement -- by parceling up Germany -- ran counter to the principles of "peace loving 
nations."3 The Vatican protested again when in July of 1945, the United States recognized the 
pro-communist government in Poland. Summoning the Catholic associational networks that 
had taken part in the interwar mobilization against the Soviet Union, the American hierarchy !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 New York Times (February 18, 1945): 24. On this episode, also see Robert I. Gannon, The Cardinal 




promptly choreographed mass protests in numerous cities, calling for Soviet withdrawal from 
the country and for free and fair elections.4 Behind the scenes, Vatican officials asked the United 
States to “use financial and economic pressure to force [the] provisional government to grant 
liberties, which have been promised.”5 The Vatican emphasized that in Poland “freedom of 
speech” was being violated by the prohibition of “Polish clergy [to] communicate with the Holy 
See.” More broadly, Vatican officials urged the U.S. to take a stand against Poland’s termination 
of the concordat and its new provisions on civil affairs, which came into effect on January 1, 
1946. Summoning Pius XII’s democracy talk, they argued that the "anti-Catholic legislation," 
i.e., the repeal of the concordat, "in a country which is 95% Catholic is anti-democratic.”6 The 
same message was also transmitted to Washington by Myron Taylor, who had been reappointed 
as personal representative to the President following the coming to power of Harry Truman in 
April of 1945. 7  
 By the time the full Yalta agreement was made public in February of 1946, communist 
governments had been established across Eastern Europe, through elections that were neither 
free nor democratic. The agreement's release caused an uproar particularly in the United States, 
which was blamed with having naïvely trusted Stalin's word. American bishops spoke out again, 
noting with regret that Yalta had given the Soviet Union sanction to “dig deep inroads” in 
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Europe, as it “tirelessly [tried] to grind into dust the blessed freedoms for which our sons have 
fought, sacrificed and died.”8  
In the meanwhile, priests stationed in East-Central Europe informed the Vatican that 
increasingly “widespread persecutions of the Church” were underway not only in Poland, but 
also in Hungary, Romania, the Ukraine, and of course the Soviet Union. As Vatican officials 
informed their American interlocutors, the Soviet Union’s temporary suspension of religious 
persecution during the war increasingly appeared to have been an instrumental farce rather 
than an action motivated by a profound change of heart. To buttress their case, Vatican officials 
prepared detailed English-language reports, which illustrated in lurid detail ongoing religious 
persecution in East-Central Europe. From as early as May of 1946, Vatican officials began to 
suggest that the United States must help guard against the expansion of Soviet influence by 
increasing its presence in Western Europe and perhaps even preparing to go to war against the 
Soviet Union. They noted with satisfaction that an “anti-communist trend” in the United States 
was growing by virtue of Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech in March. Accordingly, they 
expressed the hope that the "anti-communist trend" on the rise in the United States would have 
an impact “in domestic but also in foreign policy.” 9 Curiously, a neo-Fascist group in Italy with 
which the Pope was in regular contact expressed an identical aspiration at precisely the same 
time. In February of 1946, it informed the Pope that to avert the Russian threat, Italy should 
advertise itself as a “Mediterranean base for the United States." "If the United States abandons 
Italy," the neo-Fascists feared, the country might well “fall in the hands of communism, and 
hence become a Soviet Republic in the Mediterranean basin.”10 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 New York Times  (October 7, 1946): 48. As cited in Crosby, op.cit., 14. 
 
9 “Vatican Policy Following the Recent Consistory,” 15 May 1946. NACP, RG 260, Box 203, folder, 
“Religious Affairs – Misc." 
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focolaio di infezione sociale per l’Europa e il mondo. Potrebbe quindi cadere nelle mani del comunismo, 
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As the Vatican anticommunist campaign re-energized, it found its cause célèbre in the 
fall of 1946, with the Archbishop Stepinac of Yugoslavia. Yugoslav authorities had arrested the 
Archbishop in September, and charged him with collaborating with Italy, Germany and the 
Usta!e government during the war, as well as with participating in the forced conversion of 
Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism. After a quick show trial, Stepinac was condemned to sixteen 
years in prison. The Vatican immediately responded to the event by encouraging the Holy Office 
to issue a decree excommunicating all those responsible for the imprisonment and arrest, 
including Prime Minister Tito and the entirety of the Yugoslav government.11 The Vatican also 
organized a worldwide press campaign depicting Stepinac as a martyr and Tito as Stalin's 
bloodthirsty executor. So as to put pressure on the United States to change its policies towards 
the Soviet Union, the campaign suggested that the American partnership with the Soviet Union 
during the war had enabled the postwar disaster. “Since the beginning of our alliance with 
Stalin,” one typical article thundered, "the crimes of Russia are on our soul."12 Additionally, the 
Vatican vaunted its power in civil society by organizing mass rallies, with thousands of Catholics 
thronging the streets in all major American cities.13 In New York, FDR's close ally Cardinal 
Spellman announced a drive to found an “Archbishop Stepinac High School” to honor the 
newest martyr to the Catholic cause. Through galvanizing sermons and fund-raisers, Spellman 
was able to raise $4,000,0000 in less than year – about $2,000,000 more than needed.14  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Under the impetus of the Vatican Secretariat of State, the National Catholic Welfare Conference 
and the American National Council of Catholic Women sent letters to U.S. Secretary of State 
James F. Byrnes, urging him to intercede with the Yugoslav government and save the "saintly 
Stepinac."15 Byrnes was also put under pressure to act by two Democratic Catholic Congressmen, 
John McCormack of Massachusetts and John J. Rooney of New York. Arguing that the United 
States “must be firm” in its dealings “with national governments who would make a plaything of 
religion or a foible of Christianity,” McCormack and Rooney called on Byrnes and the House of 
Representatives to immediately lodge a formal protest with the Yugoslav government.16 The 
indefatigable Myron C. Taylor also made himself an advocate of the Vatican cause.17 
Though the Vatican’s anticommunist campaign was certainly not the primary cause of 
the change in American policy towards the Soviet Union, the U.S. Secretary of State did 
acknowledge its effectiveness. In October of 1946, Byrnes in fact cast aside his initial skepticism 
regarding the gravity of the situation, and informed the secretary of the National Catholic 
Welfare Conference that the “arrest and trial of Archbishop Stepinac” had helped show him 
“that Yugoslavia is being used by the Soviets merely as a testing ground for Soviet policy in 
occupied countries.” He additionally asked the secretary of the national Catholic organization to 
relay to the Pope that the United States government was beginning to heed his long-heralded 
warning about the Soviet Union.18 From the fall of 1946, the United States actively solicited !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Vatican officials to produce reports on the influence of the Soviet Union and its violation of 
religious rights in countries such as Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Yugoslavia, Albania and Argentina.19 In other words, rather than simply being the passive 
recipient of this information, the United States was putting the Vatican in the position of 
supplying what were deemed valuable and reliable reports; after all, as an anonymous U.S. 
official noted, "the Vatican possesses the best spy organization in the world."20  
When in late 1946, the deeply religious successor to President Roosevelt, Harry Truman, 
began to reposition the United States against the Soviet Union, he chose to maintain strong ties 
with the Vatican. Truman's collaboration with the Vatican in occupied Germany and in Italy 
began in the same months that he loudly protested the Soviet Union's delayed withdrawal from 
Iran and agreed to help the British curb the expansion of communist influence in Greece and 
Turkey.21  Vatican-U.S. collaboration in Europe was already well established by March of 1947, 
when Truman famously announced before a joint session of Congress that he would come to the 
assistance of Greece and Turkey and reorient U.S. policy so that it could “block aggressive 
movements that seek to impose totalitarian regimes.” Pointing his finger directly at the Soviet 
Union, he highlighted the “violations of the Yalta agreement in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria,” 
wherein “totalitarian regimes” had been “forced upon [individuals] against their will.” Using a 
language that overlapped substantially with that of Pius XII, Truman affirmed that the world 
was now faced a choice between two rival “ways of life”: totalitarianism and democracy.22 
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By June of 1947, when Truman announced the European Recovery Program or Marshall 
Plan, U.S.-Vatican collaboration was so robust that Pius XII played an important role not only in 
distributing aid, but in claiming to have originated the program itself. 23 Informing Truman that 
the Marshall Plan might indeed help save “what remains of a free world [from] Godless 
totalitarianism,”24 Pius XII emphasized that the assistance would be successful only if paired 
with America’s continued support of Catholicism on the European continent.  "Any program of 
assistance will fail,” the Pope remarked, “unless it takes into account the imperative need for 
men to return to God.”25 Indeed, it was no accident that the provision of aid dovetailed with the 
end of joint Christian Democratic-Communist ruling coalitions in both France and Italy, 
signaling the decision of Christian Democratic parties to fully back what was by this point 
emerging as the U.S.-Vatican anticommunist crusade. Finally, when in July of 1947 the U.S. 
Congress passed the National Security Act, the Vatican's attempt to expand the U.S. presence in 
Europe seemed vindicated. The NSA in fact created a series of robust and semi-permanent 
instruments of war, in case of battle with the Soviet Union. During its unveiling, the American 
President noted that the United States also had at its disposal a “secret weapon” which was even 
more powerful than military might. Religion, Truman affirmed, would be used to consolidate 
the “Western bloc” against the East, and effectively reduce and perhaps eliminate the 
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communist phenomenon altogether. “Religion alone," Truman dramatically announced, "has 
the answer to humanity’s twentieth century cry of despair."26  
As will be explored in what follows, from late 1946 through 1948 the United States and 
the Vatican would thus work closely together to fight communism on European soil. Truman 
believed that the Pope was an essential partner, in that he could help lay “the essential bases of a 
Christian civilization” and re-establish a “moral world order.”27 Echoing the core of the Pope's 
1944 Christmas message, the American President affirmed that, “No peace can be permanent 
which is not based upon Christian principles.” Indeed, it was crucial that (Christian) religious 
rights and freedoms be protected, in order to avert the possibility of anti-Christian governments 
rising to power.28 According to the American President, a “renewal of faith” in war-torn 
territories would prevent the rise of both Nazism and communism, and guarantee that “the 
individual’s sacred rights, inherent in his relationship to God and his fellows, will be respected 
in every land.”29  
Truman’s overtures to the Pope were not merely rhetorical. Indeed, Truman’s direction 
of American policy in Italy, Germany and elsewhere would be shaped by the conviction that 
Christianity in general – and Catholicism in particular – could serve particularly useful to the 
United States in at least two senses. First, the Catholic Church could help the United States in 
organizational terms, through the distribution of food, aid, and propaganda justifying the 
presence of U.S. troops in Europe. Second, the Church could act as a moralizing force capable of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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helping with de-Nazification, and increasingly, anti-communist, activities. Soon, however, the 
United States was pulled into Catholic religiosity much more actively than Truman could have 
predicted. This was brought about in the course of the expansion of Catholic activism in 
occupied Germany and by the collaboration between the U.S. and the Vatican in the Italian 
elections of 1946 and 1948. In the process, the Vatican-U.S. crusade against communism 
accelerated the transformation of the Cold War into a global war, and bound the U.S. more 
tightly to Catholic organs on the ground. 
 
2. Fostering Religion: Vatican-U.S. Policy in Occupied Germany, 1946-8 
 
Of the four occupied sectors of Germany, the United States had control of the largest and most 
Catholic one. If Catholics represented approximately a third of the German population in the 
mid 1940s, in the American zone they were a majority, with 53% of the population in the region 
professing the Catholic faith – a percentage which in Bavaria alone soared to approximately 
70%.30 Between 1944 and 1945, the Vatican worked hard to attain special status in these 
territories by convincing U.S. actors that not only had the Catholic Church strenuously opposed 
Nazism throughout the interwar years; further, it was the only local institution which had 
survived the war with power, wealth and a measure of dignity. U.S. soldiers and diplomats 
onsite internalized the idea of an anti-Nazi Church as the "almost only constituted authority" in 
Germany with surprising speed. They agreed to partner with the Vatican, and extend the 
collaboration of Church and state established by concordat diplomacy in the interwar years. 31 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 “Population of Germany According to Religions,” official statistics for use by the U.S. military, compiled 
by ETOUSA, 24 June 1945. NACP, RG 260: Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, 
World War II, Box 203, folder “Religious Affairs – Misc." 
 
31 Paul W. Freedman, Editorial Unit, Office of Military Government for Germany (henceforth OMGUS), 
“The Catholic Church in Bavaria,” pp.1-28, undated report prepared by OMGUS, presumably August 
1946, in that the report was prepared after approximately “seventeen months of American occupation.” 




Indeed, the Americans played a crucial role in the preservation of this regime of shared power, 
by preserving German concordats and granting Catholic organizations substantial powers in 
both political and social domains.  
At war's end, per Pius XII’s orders, Catholic organizations and high-ranking priests had 
drafted long documents detailing the supposed resistance of German Catholics to Hitler and the 
importance of protecting Catholicism in the postwar years, as a means of averting Nazism’s 
return.32 Leaning on reports such as these, American occupying forces reasoned that Catholics 
were indeed the most reliable group in the American zone: the Catholic Church, they argued in 
reports sent to Washington, had successfully resisted Hitler’s attack and speedily removed those 
“few” priests who had sympathized with National Socialism. 33  Furthermore, the Catholic 
democracy and anti-totalitarianism talk increasingly spoken by high-ranking German clerics 
convinced occupying authorities that the Catholic faith was ideologically better equipped to 
resist Nazism than were the Protestant faiths, thus giving it preferred status in the 
reconstruction project.  A surprisingly isolated group of American observers worried that the 
Catholic Church was itself “totalitarian” and that its natural sympathies in reality lay not with 
American-style democracy, but rather with dictatorship.34 
In the early months of the occupation, Catholics emerged as players with 
disproportionate influence in the American zone. Catholic clerics became preferred interlocutors !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 See, for instance, the series of sermons delivered in 1945 by the American-German priest Aloysius 
Muench, who was a top adviser to the American officials on religious affairs, One World in Charity (S.l.: 
s.n., 1946). Muench, like many of his coreligionists, also made a strong case against the American stance 
of “collective guilt." For more information on the large-scale attempt to cover-up the support of some 
German priests – and many more German Catholics -- for Nazism post-1945, see Kevin Spicer, Hitler’s 
Priests: Catholic Clergy and National Socialism (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008), 
203–20, 228–34.  
 
33 Tellingly, the assessment seemed exclusively based on reports produced by the Catholic Church itself 
rather than from independent investigations. The American occupiers were also aware that had they 
intervened to have Nazi-sympathizing Church officials removed, a conflict may have ensued, in that – as 
Paul W. Freedman reported -- a “a conflict of jurisdiction” between Military Government regulations on 
de-Nazification and “the law of [the] Roman Catholic Church, the Codex Juris Canonici,” would have 
presented itself. Indeed, according to the Codex Juris Canonici, “no secular agency may judge a priest.” 





of OMGUS officials and were entrusted with distributing aid, maintaining order, and helping lay 
the groundwork for a shift from Nazi “totalitarianism” to democracy. The Religious Affairs 
Branch of the American Military Government, founded in 1945, was perhaps the institution 
most responsible for granting Catholics  special status in the reconstruction project. For the first 
three years of its operation, the Religious Affairs Branch -- despite its name -- was given 
extensive powers to determine many aspects of economic, educational and cultural affairs in the 
American zone of Germany.35 The stated aim of the Religious Affairs Branch was to “foster 
freedom of religion and respect for religious institutions”36 -- a goal repeated in the Objectives of 
the American Military Government as follows: “(1) You will, in the U.S. area of occupation, 
continue to assure freedom of religion. You will assure protection of religious activity and 
support these principles in the deliberations of the [Allied] Control Council.”37  The importance 
of protecting “freedom of religion” was also outlined in several other high-profile directives, 
issued by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and by what came to be known as the 
Allied Control Authority.38  
In practice, the Religious Affairs Branch sought to promote "freedom of religion" by 
strengthening Christianity's social and political role in German society. Given recent historical 
events, it may be surprising that a Christian religion received priority over Judaism in the U.S.-
run Religious Affairs Branch, but this until a quite late date was unmistakably the case. As the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 It was only in 1948 that the Religious Affairs branch handed over many of its responsibilities to the 
newly founded Education and Cultural Relations (ECR) Division. See NACP, RG 260, OMGUS General 
Order No.6, 18 February 1948.  
 
36 The aim of “develop[ing] and stimulat[ing] the acceptance of a policy and program of freedom of 
religion,” was repeated throughout the life of the Religious Affairs Branch and represented a shorthand 
way of referring to the support of organized religion. See “Religious Affairs Branch: Summary Report, 
1949,” NACP, RG 260, Box 204, folder, “Summary of the F[iscal] Y[ear] – 1949 Program of the Religious 
Affairs Branch, E+CR Div." 
 
37 The “Objectives of Military Government,” outlined by General Clay on 18 July 1947, are referenced in 
ibid. 
 
38 See the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) report of August 1947 (report # 269/8) and 




head of the Religious Affairs Branch affirmed, Christianity was crucial to setting Germany back 
on its feet. The country would never have put its fate in Hitler’s hands, he argued, “had the 
Christian religion permeated the life of the people and assisted them in developing not only a 
sense of responsibility but also a power to judge evil critically and therefore concertedly to 
oppose it.”39  
To grow Christianity's presence in German society, the Religious Affairs Branch 
encouraged greater interdependence of Church and state. As the head of the Religious Affairs 
Branch candidly explained in a summary prepared for Washington officials, “Some matters 
upheld in principle in America had to be modified in practice in Germany. This was obviously 
true of the religious situation.”40 In particular, it was not advisable to implement “the separation 
of church and state, as observed in America.”41 In one of its first moves, the American Military 
Government thus complied with concerted pressure from Vatican officials and recognized the 
1933 concordat with Germany and the 1924 concordat with Bavaria as legally binding.42 Setting 
aside the fact that concordat diplomacy had militated against religious freedom and minority 
rights, American officials argued that concordats represented “a bulwark for all religion,”43 and 
further that Germany's Catholics would be sorely disappointed if the Americans did not seek to 
repair Nazism’s wrongs by reaffirming their faith in these treaties.44  
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42 Soviet objections that the concordats represented Hitler-era legislation and should accordingly be 
abrogated were summarily silenced. Religious Affairs Section, “Statement of Principle Differences 
Encountered with Soviet Representatives on Official Matters,” 1946. NACP, RG 260, Box 202, folder, 
“Intelligence Reports – Mitropa -- 1946." 
 
43 Letter from Ambassador Robert Murphy to Captain Richey, Berlin, 5 August 1945. NACP, RG 260: 
Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II, Box 203, folder “Religious Affairs – 
Misc." 
 
44 Memorandum of Conversations between John O. Riedl, Father Zeiger, Assistant to Bishop Muench, 
Monsignor Tardini, and Father Leiber, 30 December 1947. NACP, RG 59: General Records of the 
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As OMGUS officials noted, extensive “discriminations in favor of Catholics” increasingly 
became the norm in the America-occupied Germany. Citing restrictions on the rights of 
Catholics to free expression under Nazi rule, the American military government -- spurred on, of 
course, by Catholic journalists and opinion-makers -- helped flood the market with “a 
preponderance of Catholic publications,” which received distribution privileges and free 
supplies of hard-to-find printing paper.45  Additionally, German Church leaders were taken 
under the wing of the Religious Affairs Branch and brought to the United States on short-term, 
all-expenses-paid, study trips, where they learned to improve and revitalize religious journalism, 
focusing on both business methods and the craft of writing.46 
Catholics in Germany also pressured the United States authorities to preserve their gains 
in public and private schools. Appealing to the Pope's resurgent anti-totalitarianism, German 
clerics cast the school reform issue as one pitting excessive state power against individual rights: 
“The state is obliged to protect and support, not to restrict or eliminate the parents in carrying 
out this duty and in the practice of this natural right.”47 Echoing Pius XII's distinction between 
true and false democracies, they affirmed that, “Every disregard of this legal right and every 
exaggeration of the power of the state in this field, even though it is done in the name of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Department of State, Entry 1068: Office of the Personal Representative of the President to Pope Pius XII, 
Box 15, Folder “Memoranda of Conversations.” 
 
45 The State Department had noticed the imbalance and contacted the Military Government for an 
explanation. Letter from Robert A. McClure, Director of Information Control, to Ambassador Murphy, US 
Political Adivsor, 14 November 1946. NACP, RG 260, Box 181, folder, “Muench, Bishop." Emphasis in the 
original. 
 
46 “Religious Affairs Branch: Summary Report, 1949” NACP, RG 260, Box 204, folder, “Summary of the 
FY – 1949 Program of the Religious Affairs Branch, E+CR Div.” The “improvement of journalism in the 
field of religion” project aimed to help daily papers, religious periodicals, parish and diocesan 
publications, and religious news services, “present religion to the people in a more vitalized form.” See 
letter from C. Arild Olsen, Chief of the Religious Affairs Branch of OMGUS, to Jeremiah L. O’Sullivan, 
Head of the Marquette University School of Journalism, 27 December 1948, with associated addenda. 
NACP, RG 260: Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, WWII, OMGUS, Records of the 
Education and Cultural Relations Division, Records of the Religious Affairs Branch, Box 204, folder, 
“American Experts and Prof. (Cath.)” 
 
47 Letter of Cardinal Faulhaber to Bishop Aloysius Muench, Munich, 7 January 1948.  NACP, RG 260, Box 




democracy, leads to the degradation of a new state socialism and collectivism.” Thus, German 
clergy concluded, "Parents have the primary duty and right in the education of youth in its 
entirety.” 48 Indeed, the American Apostolic Delegate Cardinal Aloisius Muench of North Dakota 
added, “attempts to abolish the denominational school” doubtless constituted “the first step to a 
totalitarian state.”49 An influential draft proposal for school reform by Catholic groups in 
Germany was similarly prefaced by the avowal that “the preservation and revival of Christian 
education is the only effective protection for human personality and society against the dangers 
of our century which threaten them, against collectivism and totalitarianism in every form.”50 
Under pressure from both German and American clergy, the American Military 
Government bowed to the Catholic demand for state support for religious instruction and 
confessional schools -- a demand which had been presented as a way to protect "democracy" 
against Nazi and communist "totalitarianism." In Bavaria, for instance, OMGUS “all but 
abolished” the interdenominational public schools, “reinstituting parochial (or confessional) 
schools” with state funding.51 “The system,” the chief of the Religious Affairs section reported to 
his superiors in Washington, “thus differs essentially from the United States, where religious 
schools are private parochial schools in most instances existing without state support.”52 
OMGUS also gave its support to two articles drafted by influential Catholics for the new 
Bavarian constitution of 1946, which sought to enshrine the special status of religion in 
education under the law. “The prominent goals for education are reverence for God, respect for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Ibid. 
 
49 Letter from Ambassador Robert Murphy, US Political Advisor, to Dr. J. W. Taylor, Education Section, 
IA & C Division, OMGUS, 4 November 1946, citing a recent memorandum of Bishop Muench. NACP, RG 
260, Box 181, folder, “Muench, Bishop.”  
 
50 “General Goals and Tasks of Bavarian School Reform,” 1 April 1947. NACP, RG 260, Box 195, folder, 
“School Reform." 
 
51 Freedman, “The Catholic Church in Bavaria.”  
 
52 James M. Eagan, Chief, Religious Affairs Section, OMGB, “Education and Religion in Bavaria,” Memo, 6 




religious convictions and for the dignity of man,” one article announced. The second article 
called for the recognition of the Catholic Church as an “educational institution” on par with state 
institutions.53 
Additionally, the Religious Affairs Branch helped organize and fund the “preparation, 
publication and importation of religious literature and religious education textbooks,” as well as 
the drafting of syllabi for courses in religion.54 It sponsored the travel of Church experts to and 
from Germany, so that they could learn to apply “the most recent psychological and pedagogical 
advances” to the teaching of religion in schools and to help develop religious leadership among 
school-age children.55 In response to objections, OMGUS officials again repeated the reasoning 
of Church officials, arguing that their actions were simply motivated by the desire to “establish 
and maintain the interests and rights of parents and guardians in the field of denominational 
schools and religious instruction in the schools.”56  
OMGUS officials also chose to entrust Catholics in the American zone in Germany with 
important leadership positions. As American occupiers reasoned, it would be foolish not to draw 
upon the “bedrock of Catholicism” to furnish the region with its new generation of anti-
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53 High-ranking members of the Catholic clergy exerted direct pressure on OMGUS officials regarding 
these articles; they emphasized that preliminary drafts showed that “the danger of an entirely socialist 
constitution has been averted,” but nonetheless worried that Church interests were not sufficiently 
protected.  Letter of the Bishop of Mainz to His Excellency, Ambassador Murphy, Control Council, Berlin, 
Mainz, 29 October 1946. NACP, RG 260, Box 195, folder, “000.3 – Religion: Clergymen – Bishop Stohr 
(Bishop of Mainz)."  Also see “General Goals and Tasks of Bavarian School Reform,” 1 April 1947. Ibid., 
folder, “School Reform.” 
 
54 “Functional Program for Religious Affairs, 1 July to 31 December 1947,” NACP, RG 260, Box 202, 
folder, “Functional Program, R A Branch – 1947." 
 
55 On this, see Pastor Gerhard Hildmann, “Report on my visit in the United States of America,” 26 
February – 19 June 1949. NACP, RG 260: Records of the United States Occupation Headquarters, WWII, 
OMGUS, Records of the Education and Cultural Relations Division, Records of the Religious Affairs 
Branch, Box 204, folder, “Project: Development of Popular Pamphlets Bringing Religion to Bear on 
Various Phases and Problems of Daily Living.” 
 
56 “Functional Program for Religious Affairs, 1 July to 31 December 1947,” NACP, RG 260, Box 202, 




totalitarian leaders. 57 American diplomats accordingly asked contacts in Vatican City, as well as 
Church dignitaries in the United States, to draw up lists of “German Catholic leaders” who could 
help draft pro-democracy and anti-totalitarian propaganda and thus “properly indoctrinat[e] 
and equip” future generations.58 An official OMGUS order announced that political leaders need 
not be laypeople, and that “members of the Clergy” could also “participate in politics, assume 
public office and speak from the pulpit on behalf of any particular party, provided such activity 
is not detrimental to Military Government or hostile to any of the Allies.”59 Unsurprisingly, the 
more confessional political parties expanded and drew clerical support, the more high-ranking 
members of the clergy became crucial point-people for OMGUS. As early as 1945, General 
George S. Patton accepted the advice of Cardinal Faulhaber (who had been close friends with 
Pacelli since 1918) and appointed Fritz Schäffer as the first postwar Prime Minister of Bavaria. 
As a member of the Bavarian People's Party and one of the founders of the Christian Social 
Union (CSU), Schäffer “shared the Church point of view of all issues.”60 He also, however, was a 
renowned anti-Semite, who hoped to turn the CSU in a Catholic-majority party, rather than the 
multi-confessional party others hoped it might be. In this particular case, General Dwight 
Eisenhower ultimately decided to intervene to relieve Schäffer of his post, once details of his 
anti-Semitic past came to light. Still, Schäffer was an example of the sort of figure OMGUS and 
the Catholic hierarchy typically came together to support, during their early years of working 
together in Germany. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 “The Catholic Church in Bavaria.” For more evidence of the American occupation authorities privileging 
Catholic politicians, see for instance, report of Major Earl L. Crum, Chief of the Education and Religion 
Branch of G-F Division, USFET, to “Patrick,” 27 July 1945. Ibid., Box 203, folder, “Religious Affairs – 
Misc."; and “Report from Germany,” 20 June 1945, Ibid. 
 
58 The citations are drawn from a top Secret note from Anthony B. Kenkel to Brig. Gen. William J. 
Donovan, received 12 December 1944. NACP, RG 226, Box 328, Folder 13525. Also see undated 
handwritten note, attached to Top Secret note from Anthony B. Kenkel to Brig. Gen. William J. Donovan, 
received 12 December 1944. Ibid. 
 
59 “Party Leaders Not Optimistic Re: Elections,” Unidentified internal OMGUS publication, 28 June 1946. 
NACP, RG 260, Box 15, folder 23A, “Catholic Church.” 
 




To be sure, sometimes the Americans needed to be pressured to comply. Over the 
summer and fall of 1946, high-ranking German clergy supporting the CSU began lamenting that 
this party was not receiving enough support by the American Military Government to properly 
counter the influence of communist forces.61 Well-positioned Catholics also issued veiled threats, 
suggesting that if the American Military Government backed away from supporting the CSU it 
would lose the Vatican's support and thus lose its legitimacy in Germany. As German bishops 
reminded their American protectors – in a successful bid to downsize de-Nazification programs 
-- communism had clearly become “much more dangerous now than Nazism.”62 According to a 
pastoral issued by German bishops, the former allies of the United States, “the Russians, [were] 
murdering and enslaving those under their rule and suppressing the Roman Catholic Church.”63 
A “turn to the left,” Cardinal Faulhaber warned occupation authorities, would mean “the end of 
all of our work.”64 In the United States, the National Catholic Welfare Conference organized a 
fund-raising operation to enable an anticommunist campaign in Germany.65   
 In more ways than one, OMGUS officials thus used their time in Germany to make the 




62 The words are the Bishop of Regensburg’s. As cited in Freedman, “The Catholic Church in Bavaria.”  
Extensive archival evidence testifies to the Church’s opposition to the United States’ de-Nazification 
policies, which were deemed excessively harsh and dictated by incorrect theories of “collective guilt.” By 
1948, the German Church had so successfully opposed de-Nazification that the United States was looking 
for a way to discontinue the program. Frankfort to Foreign Ministry, 12 February 1948, Archivio Storico 
del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE), f.12, Santa Sede 5 – Germania (1949). As cited in Kent, op.cit., 
147. 
 
63 Pastoral Letter, “A World of Love,” cited by the U.S. Civil Censorship Division report of 9 June 1947. 
NACP, RG 260, Box 15, folder 24 (equivalent of—folder is untitled). 
 
64 Cardinal Faulhaber is cited in Freedman, “The Catholic Church in Bavaria.” 
 
65 Foreign Ministry to Washington, 25 February 1947, ASMAE, folder 6, Santa Sede 12 – Germania; 





separation of Church and State.”66 To the contrary, they supported the Vatican-supported 
attempt to blur the line between Church and state in realms like education, economics and 
politics. 67  When called upon to explain these policies, they typically appealed to the 
trustworthiness of Catholic interlocutors and to their personal conviction that Christianity and 
"totalitarianism" (whether in its Nazi or communist form) were antithetical. General opinion 
surveys conducted in the American zone from as early as 1946 also suggested to OMGUS that 
their policies towards Christianity and the Catholic Churches enjoyed popular approval. The 
majority in fact agreed with a question asking whether religion was “basic to reconstruction,” 
and further whether “religion and belief in God organizes life into a meaningful pattern” and 
averts “chaos.” Further, when asked whether the American Military Government’s “support of 
the Church since the beginning of the occupation” was “sufficient and fitting,” the vast majority 
of Germans interviewed in the American zone said "yes," while a few outliers complained that 
they wished the Americans had done more.68  
 
3. Buttressing Christian Democracy: Vatican-U.S. Collaboration in Italy 
 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, from c.1944 Pius XII had given his conditional support 
to Italy's newborn Christian Democratic party. Recognizing that the question of whether Italy 
should remain a monarchy or become a republic was highly contentious, he decided to feign 
neutrality during Italy's 2 June 1946 referendum and urged Christian Democrats to do the same. 
Once the results were released, Pius XII did privately agree with Myron Taylor that it would !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 The American choice to maintain this taxation system clashed starkly with the Soviet calls for 
abolishing it. NACP, Religious Affairs Section, “Statement of Principle Differences Encountered with 
Soviet Representatives on Official Matters.”  
 
67 Ibid.  
 
68 Surveys Branch, ICD, OMGUS “Attitudes Toward Religion and the Church as Political Factors in 
German Life,” 7 June 1946 (interviews conducted in March 1946). NACP, RG 260, Box 15, folder 23, 




have been far preferable for Italy to remain a monarchy, but he also noted that what was done 
was done.69  The Pope thus decided to do all that was in his power to ensure that the 
communists not win the upcoming administrative and general elections, and that the Christian 
Democrats protect the Vatican's interests.  
First, the Pope and his advisors successfully pressured key members of the Christian Democratic 
party to uphold the concordat in Italian constitutional debates, through near-daily meetings and 
debriefings in which arguments and counter-arguments were suggested.70 Then, the Pope began 
to pressure the United States to secretively re-arm Italy and Germany (in case of war with the 
Soviet Union), and to collaborate with the Vatican to mount an unprecedented electoral 
propaganda campaign in 1948. Truman, as it turned out, had plans of his own; while the Vatican 
sought to enmesh the United States even more deeply in European affairs, Truman was trying to 
forge a transnational religious bloc which -- he hoped -- would form a united front against the 
Soviet Union, and aid the United States in its battle against it. As things would turn out, 
Truman's failure would nonetheless pave the way for Pius XII's success. 
Beginning in August of 1947, Truman informed Pius XII of his plan to create a union of 
religious leaders willing to speak out "in one voice" against the Soviet Union.  Simultaneously 
showing his dependence on Catholic anticommunism and his will to turn it to his own ends, 
Truman (perhaps per Myron Taylor's suggestion) entrusted Pope Pius XII with the leadership of 
this campaign. Taylor justified the President's decision as follows: "In a definite sense no single 
voice has at so early a date and with such direct and forceful language and action fought 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 “Relationship between the Vatican and the DC,” 13 February 1946. The note references the 8 January 
1946 meeting between Pius XII and Attilio Piccioni, secretary of the DC. NACP, RG 226, s.108A, b.270, 
f.jzx-7000. As cited in Tranfaglia, op.cit., 342. 
 
70 Giovanni Sale has recently delved into the extent of the pressure exercised by top-ranking Jesuits and 
members of the Vatican Secretariat of State through his analysis of the still-confidential papers of Father 
Martegani at the Civiltà Cattolica archive. The fascinating story of the Vatican contribution to the 
constitutional debates is outlined in Giovanni Sale, De Gasperi, gli USA e il Vaticano all’inizio della 
guerra fredda (Milan: Jaca Book, 2005), 134-141, and passim. 
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communism as a Godless anti-human freedom cult as has His Holiness the Pope."71 Pius XII 
immediately agreed to Truman's request, and informed the American President that he would 
be happy to lend a hand to the battle for “the rights of the human person” and against 
totalitarian “states, [which] to the exclusion of God, make [themselves] the source of the rights 
of the human person.”72 The Pope also announced that he would "most warmly welcome 
collaboration with Protestants in the common fight of religious persons against the communist 
atheist."73 In his letter of response, Truman thanked the Pope for his willingness to take part in 
the initiative, and reiterated his own “profound devotion to the welfare and rights of the 
individual because he is a child of God.” “Every man, woman and child," he noted, "has rights 
upon which the state may not infringe.”74  
The Pope and Myron Taylor thus began working to build a union of religious leaders 
willing to publicly speak out in concert against the communist menace. Though the project was 
phrased in ecumenical terms, the leaders of Christian faiths were more aggressively targeted 
than those of other faiths -- after all, Taylor explained, “in the Atlantic area, Christianity is the 
decisive element.”75 And because Christian churches were more at risk, they were easier to 
mobilize. “Unfortunately in this critical passage of history,” Taylor explained, “Christianity is 
under siege by Marxism.” Accordingly, “the Christian Churches must establish a bond of union 
for the purpose of combatting the 'barbarian at our gates' and, it might be added, already well !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Letter of Taylor to Truman, Paris, 15 July 1949. RMC, Myron Taylor papers, # 3308, Box 3, "Summary 
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72 Letter of Pope Pius XII to Truman, Castel Gandolfo, 26 August 1947. RMC, Myron Taylor Papers 
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Foreign Policy: The Soul of Containment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 143-4.   
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within our gates.” 76  In the end, however, the project was unsuccessful, largely because 
Protestant leaders were not comfortable with allying with the Pope, and strongly disagreed with 
his position (which was swiftly underwritten by American officials) that the Orthodox Church 
was an “arm of the Soviet government.”77 By the late 1940s, Truman was forced to confront the 
failure of his grand initiative. Using the language of religious anti-totalitarianism, he bitterly 
concluded that it was "deplorable that all sorts and conditions of professing Christians," had 
been unable to "unite in common cause against those twin blights -- atheism and 
communism."78  
Though Truman's project had failed, its pursuit gave the Pope further opportunity to 
lobby for some of his own demands. Starting from December of 1947, Pius XII and his advisors 
thus began to inform their American interlocutors that Italy and Germany should be 
immediately re-armed. Both countries, they argued, were aligned with the forces of “Christian 
civilization” and stood resolutely against “totalitarian and tyrannical countries.” Therefore, an 
unnamed Vatican official noted, “It would seem logical to consider rearming Italy now in spite of 
[the] peace Treaty rather than postponing her rearmament until after [the] outbreak of war” 
with the Soviet Union. 79 In the same vein, the Vatican backed the rearmament of Germany and 





77 Taylor was gradually convinced by the Pope that the Orthodox Church should not to be trusted, insofar 
as it is “little more than an arm of the Soviet government.” See Memorandum of a Luncheon Conference, 
Claridges Hotel, London, 30 April 1948. There were present his Grace the Most Reverend the Lord 
Archbishop of Canterbury; Mr. Clement Atlee, PM of the UK; the Ambassador of the US, Mr. Lewis 
Souglas; Ambassador Taylor, and Mr. Pell. RMC, Myron Taylor papers, # 3308, Box 3, "Summary of 
Contacts by Mr. Myron C. Taylor with Leaders in Religion, 1940-1953." For more evidence of the same, 
see Letter of Truman to Taylor, Washington, 12 May 1948. Ibid.  
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communism, “a show of force” was requisite.80 While in public the Vatican called for peace, in 
private it was advocating quite the opposite. 
 In addition to pressuring the United States to re-arm Germany and Italy, Pius XII also 
asked Truman to collaborate with the Vatican to ensure that the Christian Democrats emerge 
victorious in their contest with the Communist Party in Italy's April 1948 elections. The U.S. 
government agreed to help, and in addition to considerable funds for electoral propaganda, it 
spearheaded novel tactics, such as letter-writing campaigns, wherein Italian-Americans begged 
their relatives in the home country to vote against atheism and for the Christian Democrats. The 
Vatican also became quite active.  
 In his typical centralizing spirit, Pius XII had passed his own reform of Catholic Action in 
his first year in power, which eliminated the Central Committee and concentrated 
responsibilities even more heavily in the hands of top-ranking clerics leading the organization.81 
This put him in the position to closely direct Catholic Action, and turn it into a veritable lobby 
for Christian Democracy. While priests preached from the pulpit how the faithful should vote in 
the elections, Catholic Action militants thus went door-to-door to convince friends and 
neighbors that true Catholics could never vote communist.82 
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80 Pius XII’s pressure for German rearmament has yet to be studied in any detail. Pius XII’s words on 
Yugoslavia were referred to Harold Tittmann. Patterson to Tittmann, 12 October 1945, NACP, Taylor 
papers, box 36, Vatican Matters; Telegram from Tittmann, 28 March 1946, NACP, State Department, 
866A.4611/3-2846. As reprinted in Kent, The Lonely Cold War, 161. 
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 Along with older media like magazines and radio, the 1948 campaign also relied on film, 
which was now produced and distributed by Vatican production agencies. In Italy, for instance, 
these films were brought to remote villages by mobile cinema trucks, known as "cinema carts" 
(carri del cinema) (Fig.1). Under the Pope’s encouragement, Catholic Action also formed a 
special subdivision known as the “Civic Committees,” led by Luigi Gedda, the leader of the youth 
male branch of the national organization. The Civic Committees drew from interwar Catholic 
anticommunism and modern-day advertising methods, developing playful and creative ways to 
drive home the message that communism was ruthless, Godless, and unfathomable (Figs. 2, 3 
and 4).  The Civic Committees would remain active after the elections as a lobby pushing the 
Christian Democratic party further to the right, towards the defense of clerical interests both in 
parliament and in international politics. 
 In the early months of 1948, Italy’s Catholic Action ranks swelled, reaching well beyond 
three million as activists partook in a final effort to sway the populace to vote Christian 
Democratic. 83 The dramatic events of early 1948 helped seal the party’s electoral victory on 18 
April 1948, as the Christian Democrats won 48% of the vote, to the 31% gained by the left-wing 
Popular Democratic Front. Unsurprisingly, the party won most impressively in those regions of 
Italy where Catholic Action was strongest.84 
 
4. How the Vatican Came to Accept the Cold War "West" (1948-1949) 
 
For evident reasons, Pope Pius XII and most of his officials loudly protested against Stalin's 
seizure of many of the Vatican's concordat allies in East-Central Europe. However, over the 
course of 1947-8, the Pope came to accept the idea of a world divided into two blocs, which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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corresponded to a new understanding of what was “East” and what was “West.” Unlike in the 
interwar years, when Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Hungary had 
stood with the Vatican, now these territories formed part of the alien “East,” dominated by the 
Soviet Union. The conceptual map of the “West,” was also new, for in the interwar Vatican 
mindset, the “West” had included most of the European continent, with its western border 
delimited by Portugal and Ireland. Now, “the West” stretched to encompass North America and 
parts of Latin America, but its eastern border -- as Winston Churchill famously put it in March 
of 1946 -- was marked by “Stettin in the Baltic and Trieste in the Adriatic.” In sum, if the “West” 
had shifted considerably west, so too had the “East.” 
 Pope Pius XII began to signal his acceptance of a new definition of “the West” from 
March of 1948. In this month, the Pope began to throw his weight behind European integration 
projects. He gave his strong and open endorsement of the project of creating a European 
federation, hailing it as a Christian project necessary to counter the Soviet menace.85 Civiltà 
Cattolica and the Osservatore Romano soon followed suit, as did Catholic Action groups across 
Europe, many of which inaugurated local “European integration” offices which sought to 
popularize the idea of integration as a Catholic idea and a global necessity.86  
The Pope’s role in rhetorically justifying the emergence of the European Economic 
Community and in pressuring Truman to back the project deserves more study than scholars 
have devoted to it thus far.87 In fact, Pius XII also pressured the United States to back European 
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integration, using the new language of “East” versus “West.” The Pope argued that “if the United 
States would project its leadership increasingly into the organization of unity in the West,” this 
would provide “the best warranty of general security -- and peace."88 Ultimately, under pressure 
from various quarters, Truman accepted that European integration was a necessary and a 
natural correlate to the new containment strategy.89  
Pius XII also stood forcefully behind the remilitarization of “the West” as a necessary 
response to the Soviet threat. He informed his American interlocutors that he was quite certain 
that a “war between the East and West blocs” was imminent. The Pope’s advisors specified that, 
“this subject […] can never be discussed in writing being too secret and too delicate.”90 Having 
sworn his American interlocutors to absolute secrecy, the Pope’s closest advisor asserted 
through confidential conversations and telegrams that reliable sources had informed him that 
the Russians were planning to “invade Italy and surround Vatican State,” only to then “remove 
[the] Pope to Russia and hold him as a hostage.” Pius XII had emphasized that “he would not 
(repeat not) abandon Rome” when the Russians invaded, suggesting that only an intervention 
from the United States could save the Vicar of Christ on earth. Furthermore, the “mere 
premature suggestion [the] Pope might leave Italy would have tremendously serious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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repercussions and vastly encourage Communists who would promptly [the] exploit news, 
making vast segments [of] ignorant Italian people conclude [that the] Pope had abandoned 
them.”91 Given the Vatican's fears of a Soviet invasion, it came as no surprise to insiders when 
the Pope immediately gave his support to the newborn Western military alliance, following the 
signature of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949. 
From late 1948/early 1949, Pope Pius XII also showed his support for the new 
geopolitical and conceptual map of the West through his theological defense of the Western bloc 
at the United Nations. Pointing his finger directly at the Soviet Union, the Pope noted that, “the 
Church has rejected the erroneous idea of a sovereignty which is absolutely autonomous and 
without social obligations.” He thus added that he backed the Western bloc at the United 
Nations because,  
The Catholic cooperates wholeheartedly in those generous efforts, which initially may have 
only modest results and encounter fierce opposition, which, however, are designed to draw 
individual states out of their narrow-minded and egocentric mentality.92  
 
In precisely the same months – on the heels of the imprisonment of the Hungarian Cardinal 
Józef Mindszenty – Pius XII successfully pressured the United Nations to address the “religious 
rights violations” ongoing in East-Central Europe.  
Finally, in July of 1949, Pope Pius XII showed in a definitive way that he stood with the 
new West -- and was willing to sacrifice the old West in the process.  In this month, the Holy 
Office issued a decree excommunicating all Catholics who dared “enlist in or show favor to the 
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ideology was “materialistic and anti-Christian.”93 The Holy Office decree thus took a self-
defensive containment strategy to an extreme. In what was widely presented as an effort to wean 
Western Catholics away from communist parties and thus weaken the pull of communist parties 
in democratic regimes, the Vatican had chosen to effectively sacrifice the East. Here, many of the 
over fifty million Catholics living in communist-ruled countries, were being daily forced to read 
Communist newspapers and become members of the Communist party to maintain their 
livelihoods.94 
Unsurprisingly, the Holy Office decree polarized the Catholic and non-Catholic world. 
Some sympathizers with the anticommunist struggle worried that the too-harsh phrasing of the 
document would effectively preclude any possibility of dialogue across the Iron Curtain. Others 
noted that the decree “would have no widespread effect as very few Communist party members 
were Catholic.”95 If communist leaders in Western countries derided the decree, stating that the 
Vatican had more to lose than to gain from the announcement, communist leaders in the East 
did not give the document so much as a passing reference, though they did begin to refer to Pius 
XII as the "Coca-Cola Pope," to indicate his support for the United States and jeer at his 
supposed embrace of consumer culture and capitalism.96  
Members of the U.S. government, on the other hand, articulated a clear defense of the 
decree. Deploying the keywords of “East” and “West,” CIA officials for instance celebrated the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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decree as a "very powerful factor in the East-West struggle." They also unwittingly repeated the 
treasured juxtaposition proposed by Ledóchowski and Lettres de Rome in the interwar years 
pitting the communist against the Catholic international. CIA agents commented that the 1949 
decree excommunicating communists was to be applauded because it “brought into open and 
basic conflict […] the two most powerful organizations for moving men to act on behalf of 




By 1949, the United States government and the Vatican were still mutually dependent, but their 
relationship had changed in important ways. In the war and early postwar years, the U.S. had 
depended on the Vatican as a source of intelligence and help in Europe's moral, material and 
political reconstruction.  But in the late 1940s, the two powers switched roles, as the U.S. had 
acquired greater relative importance in European affairs than the Vatican. The rise of the Cold 
War – both as a practical conflict and as a set of geopolitical metaphors and concepts – 
increasingly depended on the exponential growth of “hot war” capacities and on a permanent 
propaganda campaign waged by the United States. And though the Pope could contribute to the 
battle of ideas, he had “no battalions,” as Stalin had famously noted with derision. Furthermore, 
in his will to align himself with the U.S. government, while simultaneously maintain active 
control of Christian Democracy (particularly on Italian soil), Pope Pius XII ended up losing 
many of his supporters. The distinctive “third way” solution of Quadragesimo Anno – which 
took a strong stance against capitalism – seemed no longer tenable in the new climate of 
concord between the Vatican and the United States. At the same time, Pius XII’s overtures to 
“democracy” and “rights” clashed starkly with his will to closely censure sites of theological and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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political innovation that arose in the Catholic world. In this sense, the anticommunist campaign 
and the internal inconsistencies represented by Pius XII’s accommodation to “Americanism,” 
including his rights and democracy-talk, paved the way for the reinvention of the Vatican once 







Fig.1: A carro del cinema is depicted here in a photograph from a 1948 Catholic Action journal. 
The caption explains that these “photo-cinematographic carriages” are able to “bring the live 
word of Christ and the person of the Pope to [Italy's] poorest and most isolated populations.” 
 





Fig.2: A Comitati Civici poster from the 1948 elections. The caption reads, “…And if mommy 
and daddy don’t go vote, we will pee in our beds!” 
 
Source: Istituto Paolo Sturzo, Manifesti Comitati Civici. 
 
 
                                 
Figs. 3 and 4: The caption for the 1948 Civic Committee poster on the left reads, “Listen to the 
voice of your conscience: In the secluded voting booth, God sees you, Stalin DOESN’T!” The 















It won't take long for the truth of the twentieth century to reveal itself, as the great masses 
reappear from behind the curtain. Let's hope our Church leaders never lose sight of them, for 
they are the reality of today and tomorrow. 
-- Alcide De Gasperi, 19291 
 
 
The masses [are] an easy plaything in the hands of anyone who exploits their instincts and 
impressions; ready to follow, in turn, today this flag, tomorrow another [...] The masses are 
the capital enemy of a true democracy and of its ideals. 




In this dissertation, I have argued that the Vatican emerged as a leading player in European 
affairs in the middle part of the twentieth century through its concordat diplomacy, its 
integration of civil society, and its declaration of war against the Soviet Union. Through 
concordats, the Vatican carved out a legally protected space for itself in European social and 
political affairs; through its activism in civil society, it grew a loyal and mobilized base; and 
through its anticommunist campaign, it promoted a theocentric political ideology and became 
an indispensable ally to partner states, particularly in the context of war against left-wing forces. 
During and after World War II, the Vatican sought to keep its core interwar diplomatic aims 
intact by establishing partnerships with the United States and resurgent Christian Democratic 
parties. The new alliances rested on informal power-sharing agreements, mediated by a pidgin 
language composed of terms like "rights" and "democracy," which the Vatican redefined in the 
attempt to turn its interwar gains into postwar realities. Initially, it seemed as though the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 " Ma la realtà del sec. XX non tarderà a farsi sentire, le grandi masse ricompariranno dietro allo scenario. 
Auguriamoci che gli uomini della Chiesa non le perdano mai di vista, perché esse sono la realtà di oggi e di 
domani." Alcide De Gasperi to S. Weber, Rome, 12 February 1929. The letter is reprinted in Alcide De 
Gasperi, Lettere sul Concordato (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1970), 65-6. 
 





Vatican had won its battle, as American and Christian Democratic groups agreed to help re-
enshrine concordats, protect the Vatican's hallowed place in associational life, and heed the 
Pope's dire warnings regarding the rise of communist parties and Soviet influence. However, 
from c.1949, the Vatican began to encounter considerable difficulties with both the United 
States and its Christian Democratic partners.  
 Troubles with the United States began with a wave of protests against the re-
sacralization of American politics and the visible increase of Catholic influence in national 
affairs,3 and continued as the Vatican reacted with shock when the United States failed to 
respond to its demands in the foreign policy arena, particularly with respect to the founding of 
the state of Israel and the U.S. rapprochement with Yugoslavia.4 Tensions increased as Myron 
Taylor resigned from his post and the Pope condemned the Geneva Accords partitioning 
Vietnam and the U.S. failure to intervene in the 1956 Hungarian uprising, insinuating that the 
United States was more interested in realpolitik and the profit motive than in upholding the 
principles of Christian morality.5 Though the American President Dwight Eisenhower (in power 
since 1953) bowed to Catholic lobbies and sent a personal representative back to Vatican City, 
supported the appointment of a Catholic Prime Minister in South Vietnam (in a country that 
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was 90% Buddhist), and signed a bill to add “under God” to the Pledge of Allegiance, great 
apprehensions remained. 6  
The Pope’s relationship with European Christian Democratic parties also faced new 
difficulties as the Cold War set in. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the left-wing of the 
Christian Democratic movement was progressively alienated from the Vatican by Pius XII’s ban 
on everything from "Catholic Communist" parties to the worker-priest movement and 
innovative theological movements.7 By way of response to his critics, Pius XII suggested that too 
many had strayed from the definition of “democracy" laid out in 1944, in that, “genuine 
democracy can only live and prosper in an atmosphere of respect for God and his 
commandments.” 8  Unfortunately, however, the Pope's credibility as a voice of genuine 
democracy was badly undermined as a result of the so-called Sturzo Operation, a Vatican-
Catholic Action plot to insert neo-Fascists on the ballot in municipal elections in Rome.9 
Further, the Pope's failure to strongly back the left-of-center French Christian Democratic party 
in the 1951 elections, and his equivocal reaction following Konrad Adenauer’s trip to Moscow in 
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1955, projected an image of an institution struggling to define its identity and maintain its power 
and independence in the face of changing circumstances.10 
The troubles were not only due to the Vatican's clumsy attempts to manipulate political 
affairs; they were also connected to a profound anthropological transformation underway. 
Starting from the 1950s, the role of Catholicism in the daily lives of many European citizens was 
unmistakably on the decline. Not only was church attendance falling off; so too, decreasing 
numbers of European men and women were choosing what had once been a highly prestigious 
option: the priesthood or the monastery. 11  As new forms of association and pluralistic 
epistemologies proliferated, it became harder for Catholic Action and the Vatican to remain 
privileged sites for identity-formation and truth-making. Scholars have suggested that the more 
consumer culture, Hollywood, and new life forms became available, the less Western Europeans 
felt the need or desire to align themselves with the institutional Catholicism. 12 
In response to this state of affairs, the Vatican pursued two contradictory strategies. On 
the one hand, Vatican officials edged closer to Spain and Portugal, professing their loyalty to 
these governments and celebrating their identity as “Catholic states,” despite their quite anti-
democratic character. 13 From the 1950s, Pope Pius XII redeployed his predecessor’s politically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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ambiguous Kingdom-of-Christ rhetoric, noting that it was more important for states to commit 
deeply to the Catholic Church than for them to choose democratic forms of rule. 14  He also 
suggested that democratic systems were unreliable and dangerously prone to “protecting the 
sum of individual interests rather than promoting the good of the whole.” Soon, a series of 
Vatican officials began to proclaim in even starker terms that confessional, authoritarian states 
could protect Catholic interests more successfully than democracies. 15  
Alongside the search for new/old models more compatible with Vatican diplomatic 
priorities, the Pope also reacted to his declining influence in Western Europe with despairing 
gestures. According to the old Risorgimento logic of "O Roma, o morte!" (Rome, or death), the 
Pope fought to reclaim Western Europe and the Italian heartland. At times, he did so by 
adopting a hardline approach, for instance by canonizing participants in Pius X's anti-modernist 
crusade as saints. On other occasions, he advertised himself as a moderate by asking the Holy 
Office to issue a decree which under certain conditions permitted Catholic priests to celebrate 
marriages of communists and communist supporters.16 Unwilling to decide whether conciliation 
or confrontation was best, Pius XII stalled whenever it was time to make a new appointment 
within the Vatican, often preferring to leave posts vacant indefinitely.17 Significantly, on the eve !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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of the Pope's death in 1958, there were no fewer than fifteen vacancies in the College of 
Cardinals, in addition to no Secretary of State, no governor for Vatican City, and no 
Camerlengo.18 
Above all, however, Pius XII stubbornly clung to his joint commitment to concordats and 
anticommunism, and retreated into an apocalyptic worldview. He prophesized an imminent 
clash between Catholicism and communism, which -- he noted -- would likely destroy the world. 
19 The view led him to systematically misread the challenges posed to Catholicism in the 1950s 
and pin nearly all that was wrong on the Soviet Union and its anti-Christian teachings. By the 
end of his life, Pope Pius XII had reached the tragic conclusion that the Vatican was bound to 
inevitably decline in power and perhaps even gradually disappear in the not-too-distant future. 
As he lamented in Easter of 1957, in his last year of life, the Church was like a “lost wayfarer,” 
making its way “through the darkness, a darkness almost of death.” Having reflected on whether 
this lost wayfarer could be brought back to the correct path, the Pope bitterly concluded: “It 
seems that every effort is useless […] it’s not possible to find the way, and words get lost as the 
tempest rages.”20   
It was left to Cardinal Pacelli's successors to carry out a change of course, which they 
tellingly did by trying to transform the hallmarks of the Vatican's interwar diplomacy. Pius XII's 
successor, Pope John XXIII, began by changing the Vatican's attitude toward the Soviet Union 
from “anathema to dialogue,” effectively bringing the anticommunist campaign to a halt.21 He 
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inutile…la via non si ritrova, le parole si perdono nell’infuriare della procella.” The Pope’s Easter message 
of 1957 is reprinted in Discorsi, volume XIX, 91-96.  
 
21 The phrase is Philippe Chenaux’s. See L'Église catholique et le communisme en Europe, 1917-1989: de 
Lénine à Jean-Paul II (Paris: Cerf, 2009), 240; and John M. Kramer, "The Vatican's 'Ostpolitik'," The 
Review of Politics 42, 3 (July 1980): 283-308. Despite its move towards dialogue, the Vatican notably 





also called the Second Vatican Council, in the first attempt to reform the Vatican internally since 
1870-1. Under his impetus and that of his successor, Paul VI, the Vatican’s embarrassing record 
during the Second World War was publicly discussed for the first time, as was the notion that 
the Church should perhaps privilege "spiritual ministry" over involvement in political affairs.  
 At the same time, Vatican II did not seek to reverse other aspects of the Vatican's 
interwar diplomacy, which still survive to this day. Partly as a legacy of its interwar enterprise, 
the Vatican for instance continues to enjoy diplomatic relations with a large number of states 
around the world. In Europe, the Vatican maintains active diplomatic relations with Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Serbia, 
Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The Vatican also exchanges ambassadors with 
twelve states in Central and East Asia, including India and China, and has formal diplomatic 
relations with eight countries in the Middle East, including Iran and Israel. Relations are also 
still active with the United States and Canada, as well as with Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela. 
Though considerably tarnished by its association with European colonial powers throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth century, the Vatican also maintains relations with four African states, 
including Rwanda and Sudan.  
 Since 1964, the Vatican has also enjoyed Non-Member State Permanent Observer Status 
at the United Nations. Undeterred by resurgent controversies -- including a recent petition that 
claimed it was unfair to "allow the Holy See, a religious entity, to act on par with states”22 --- 
Vatican officials play an active role in U.N. bodies, and Popes have on multiple occasions 
addressed the General Assembly. 23 Some prominent Catholics have in fact argued that the Pope 
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22 Catholics for a Free Choice and the Center for Reproductive Law & Law, “A Call to the United Nations to 
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1835. 
 
23 See Edward J. Gratsch, The Holy See and the United Nations, 1945-1995 (New York: Vintage Press, 
1997), x. Pope Paul VI (1963-1978) received an official visit from U Thant, the Secretary-General of the 




would do well to transfer his official residence from Rome to New York, thus transforming the 
Bishop of New York -- rather than the Bishop of Rome -- into the visible head of the Catholic 
Church. 24  
 Arguably, the legacy of the twentieth-century "Vatican moment" continues to be felt in 
other ways as well. In Europe, the provisions of concordats remained on the books for decades, 
and the institutional superimposition of Church and state in domains like education and 
healthcare is still a present-day reality.25 As I hope future historians will investigate in greater 
detail, the particular form of democracy that took shape in many Western European countries 
after 1945 also bore striking similarities to the Vatican ideal outlined from the interwar years, in 
that it was characterized by a distrust of both popular and parliamentary sovereignty and by 
neo-corporatist government processes. 26  In Vatican spirit, Western Europe's constrained 
postwar democracies also defended a variety of new localisms, which placed great importance 
on the preservation of traditional Catholic family norms and values as a means of controlling the 
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high conception of that international organism; it considers it to be the fruit of a civilization to which the 
Catholic religion, with its driving center in the Holy See, gave the vital principles.” AAS 55 (1963): 653.  
 
24 Gratsch, 9. 
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Hugh McLeod and Werner Ustorf (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 201-217; Jeffrey Cox, 
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potentially "totalitarian" tendencies of the modern state.27 Even the project of a federalist 
European Union was initially grounded in a religious language which strongly echoed that 
employed by the Vatican, and early 1950s debates around the European Convention on Human 
Rights were dominated by religious actors who used human rights claims to uphold old Vatican 
hobby horses, like the right of Catholic schools to receive state funding.28 Finally, the evidence 
suggests that Vatican officials and Catholic intellectuals contributed in important ways to the 
postwar revival of just war theory, the rehabilitation of natural law, and the rise of the academic 
discipline of international relations -- though the history of how they did so still remains, by and 
large, to be written.29   
 In the midst of calls to enshrine Europe's “Christian roots" within foundational texts and 
the recent troubling rulings of the European Court of Human Rights on questions of religious 
freedom, it seems all the more pressing to shed light on the Vatican's role in postwar European 
politics and society. Indeed, for better or worse, the specter of "Christian Europe" -- to which the 
Vatican sought to give flesh and substance between 1917 and 1958 -- still haunts us today. 
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